JUDGMENT : 1. - There are two appeals arising out of the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment of the defendants from the suit shops and the open land behind the two shops. Appeal No. 476 of 1973 has been filed by the tenant and Appeal No. 7 of 1974 has been filed by the plaintiff landlord. 2. The plaintiff Hardeo Instituted the suit with the allegations that the plaintiff was a co-sharer of the joint Hindu Family Firm Messrs Govindram Pannalal in the year 1953 there was a family arrangement and the suit premises fell to his share. At that time Sardar Attar Singh husband of defendant No. 1 Govinder Kaur, was the tenant in the suit premises and was carrying on business there. The suit premises were originally taken on rent by Deewan ,Singh, father-in-law of defendant No. 1, from the plaintiff's ancestors for business on a monthly rent of Rs. 47/-. The suit premises consists of shop No. 5 and shop No. 6 situated on Station Road in Bohra Building. The description of the suit premises has been stated in pica 2 of the plaint. In pars 3 of the plaint, it was alleged that the plaintiff instituted the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment against Sardar Attar Singh and defendant No. 2 Gurubachan Singh on 11-12-1964, but on account of death of Sardar Attar Singh that suit abated on 3-5-1966. Thereafter the defendant No. 1 as heir continued to carry on business on the suit shops jointly with others and started giving rent to the plaintiff as tenant and for the first time on 3-10-1966 the defendant No. 1 paid rent to the plaintiff as tenant. 3. The plaintiff sought eviction of the defendants on the ground of personal reasonable and bonafide need, sub-letting and material alteration. As regards personal need, it was stated in para 4 (ka) that the plaintiff needs the suit premises for his own use and for the use of his family reasonably and bonafide. Then he specified that out of the two shops and shop is required for opening of the office of his son Gauri Shankar, who is an advocate The plaintiff does not have any proper accommodation for establishing his office. Then he specified that out of the two shops and shop is required for opening of the office of his son Gauri Shankar, who is an advocate The plaintiff does not have any proper accommodation for establishing his office. As regards, the second shop, it was stated by him that the second shop is required for carrying on the business of general merchandise by himself and his son Radha Krishan. It was averred that the plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction earlier and demanded pot session from Govinder Kaur after the death of Attar Singh, but the defendant No. 1 expressed her helplessness on account of the death of her husband and asked the plaintiff to wait for a year. Thereupon the plaintiff considering her circumstances agreed to wan for one year, but after one year when the plaintiff asked her to vacant the suit premises, reluctance was shown by her. It was also stated that the second shop is needed for the business to be carried on by him and his son Radha Krishan and that there is enough shop for the shop of merchandise on the Station Road. 4. As regards the ground of sub-letting it was averred that the defendant No. 2 continued to express that he is an employee of the husband and father-in-law of defendant No. 1 and the husband and father-in-law of defendant No. 1 also continued to express so. The plaintiff came to know some time before filing of the earlier suit that in tact the husband of defendant No. 1 had sub let the shop No. 5 to defendant No. 2, without too plaintiff's consent and defendant No. 2 is not the employee of defendant No. 1. It was also averred that defendant No. 1 has also inducted one Mohendrasingh in her business carried on in shop No. 6 and the open land. 5. With regard to material alteration, it was alleged that the defendant No. 1 constructed a 'Pakka' wall towards west on the open land without the plaintiff's consent and a part of it has been covered by stone slabs and further she has opened a window or an opening 2' X 2' in shop No. 6 in the northern wall of shop No. 6. This window opine in the adjoining shop of Laxminarain Govindram Bohra, which is also on her rent. 6. The defendants submitted their joint written statement. This window opine in the adjoining shop of Laxminarain Govindram Bohra, which is also on her rent. 6. The defendants submitted their joint written statement. It was admitted that the suit premises were part of the building of Messrs. Govindram Paanalal, which fell to the plaintiff's share and the plaintiff realises rent of it. It was denied that the deceased Attarsingh was carrying on business in both the shops in the year 1953 or at any other time. It was alleged that the defendant No. 2 Gurubachansingh has been carrying on his business in shop No. 5 since 1936 and Deewansingh, father-in-law of defendant No. 1, was carrying on his business for the last 35 years in shop No. 6 and the open land behind the two shops. After the Death of Deewansingh his son Attarsingh became the tenant. Attarsingh died in July 1965. After his death his widow, defendant No. 1, and his three sons and one daughter are in possession of the suit premises as tenants. It was further stated that Deewansingh took shop No. 6 on a monthly rent of Rs. 31/2 from Messrs. Govindram Pannalal. In the year 1936 when defendant No. 2 came to take shop No. 5 on rent, then Messrs Govindram Pannalal did not let out that shop to him, as he was a stranger. Thereupon Sardar Deewansingh took shop No. 5 as well on rent in his name and let out that shop to defendant No. 2 with the permission and knowledge of M/S. Govindram Pannalal since 1936 the defendant No. 2 is carrying on his business in shop No. 5 without any objection or protest. It was also stated that from the year 1936 to 1950 sub letting was not prohibited and the tenant could sub let under the law then existed. The plaintiff is estopped to raise any protect against subletting. It was also denied that defendant No. 1, is carrying on business in partnership with Mahendrasingh. Mahendrasingh is a resident of Delhi and being of her husband's friend, whenever he visits Jodhpur, comes to the shop of defendant No. 1. 7. The defendants denied that the suit premises are required by the plaintiff reasonably and bonafide. It was also denied that defendant No. 1, is carrying on business in partnership with Mahendrasingh. Mahendrasingh is a resident of Delhi and being of her husband's friend, whenever he visits Jodhpur, comes to the shop of defendant No. 1. 7. The defendants denied that the suit premises are required by the plaintiff reasonably and bonafide. It was stated that the Plaintiff has got a big house, in which be can raise construction for residence as well as office and shop is not suitable for the office of an Advocate. It was also stated that the plaintiff and his son Radhakishan do not want to carry on any business. The alleged need is only a pretext. the plaintiff in fact intends to effect increase in rent. The defendant denied that after the death of Attar Singh the plaintiff asked her to deliver possession of the suit premises and the defendant No. 1 sought one year's time. 8. The averment regarding material alteration, was also denied. It was stated that in fact Sardar Deewan Singh had closed the open land by raising a wall and putting up stone slabs for carrying on Motor Repair Workshop with the permission of Messr. Govind Ram Panna Lal The defendant No. 1 did not make any alteration thereafter. The alleged wall has been constructed on the Government Nalah and the stone slabs have been put on the land of Naraindarji Momji. No wall has been constructed on the plaintiff's land, nor any stone slats have been put. As regards the opening in the wall in shop No. 6, it was stated that this opening is in existence since the time of taking the shop on rent. The opening is an old one. As objection was taken that as the three sons Richhpal Singh, Jaspal Singh and Hanuwat Singh and daughter Mst. Manjeet Kaur, are the tenants of the suit premises, so they are necessary parties 9. The defendants raised some other pleas, as well, but they are not necessary and material to be referred for the disposal of this appeal. So far as the present appeal is concerned; the material issues, which are in controversy ate as follows: 10. Manjeet Kaur, are the tenants of the suit premises, so they are necessary parties 9. The defendants raised some other pleas, as well, but they are not necessary and material to be referred for the disposal of this appeal. So far as the present appeal is concerned; the material issues, which are in controversy ate as follows: 10. As the trial, in order to substantiate his case, the plaintiff Hardeo examined himself as P.W. 1 and produced his son Radhakishan as P.W. 2, Badri Singh (R.W. 3) and his second son Gaurishankar (P.W. 4), in rebuttal the defendants Govinder Kaur examined herself as D.W. 1 and Gurubachan Singh as D.W. 2 and they produced Gopil (D.W. 3), Baluram (D.W. 4), Devi Lal (D.W. 5), Kesrimal (D.W. 6), Mahendra Singh (P.W. 7), Gurmeet Singh (D.W. 8) and Chhagan Lal (D.W. 9). One Sardar Gyan Singh was examined on commission. 11. After hearing argument, the learned munsif decided issues No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11 in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No. 5 was decided against the plaintiff. In view of the findings on issues in favour of the plaintiff, the learned Munsif decreed the plaintiff's suit for eviction on 29-4.1972 Dis-satisfied with the judgment and decree, both the defendants preferred separate appeals. Appeal No. 118 of 1973 was preferred by Govinder Kaur and appeal No. 5 of 1973 was preferred by Gurubachan Singh, defendant No. 2. The learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Jodhpur, by his judgment dated 28-8-1973 accepted the appeal of Gurubacban Singh and dismissed the plaintiff's suit regarding shop No. 5 and decreed the suit for shop No. 6 and the open land. He further apportioned the rent in respect of shop No. 6 and the open land. It was directed that the plaintiff shall get Rs. 27/- p.m. as damages for use and occupation from 16-2-1968 till the delivery of the vacant possession. This apportionment was made on the basis that defendant No. 2 is said to be paying rent @ Rs. 20/- p.m. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the finding regarding personal necessity for shop No. 6 for opening of the office by Gaurishanker. This apportionment was made on the basis that defendant No. 2 is said to be paying rent @ Rs. 20/- p.m. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the finding regarding personal necessity for shop No. 6 for opening of the office by Gaurishanker. As regards shop No. 5, the finding of the trial court was reversed on the basis that there was no averment in the plaint that the shop is needed by the plaintiff to start business with Radhakishan (P.W. 2) and that notice for termination of the tenancy did not disclose this intention of the plaintiff It was also observed, while arriving at the finding regarding need of shop No. 5 that Radhakishan has no inclination and the experience for general merchandise business and further it has not been stated as to how much capital he poetess as and from where he will invest the capital in business On Issues No. 2, 6, 7 and 8 it was found that there was an implied consent of the plaintiff in sub-letting shop No. 5 to Gurubachan Singh. The findings on issues No 3 and 4 were also reversed. As regards issue No. 5, finding was recorded in favour of the defendants, though it wat wrongly observed as regards issue No. 5 that issue No. 5 has been decided by the Munsif in favour of the plaintiff. As a matter of fact issue No. 5 was decided against the plaintiff by the trial court. As regards issue No. 11, the learned Additional District Judge concurred with the finding of the trial Court. He proceeded to decide issue No. 11 on the basis that the tenancy of Sardar Attarsingh was terminated and thereafter in the earlier suit, his status was that of a statutory tenant and statutory tenancy did not devolve on the heirs of the deceased Attarsingh. It was found that after the death of Attarsingh by agreement Govinder Kaur, defendant No. 1, became the tenant. Aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, the defendant No. 1 Govinder Kaur has preferred Appeal No. 476 of 1973 and the plaintiff Hardeo has preferred Appeal No. 7 of 1974. 12. During the pendency of these appeals, section 11 (2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") has come into force. 12. During the pendency of these appeals, section 11 (2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") has come into force. Thereupon, an additional issue regarding hardship was framed by this Court in both the appeals. In Appeal No. 476 of 1973 the issues was remitted on 29-7-1976 and in appeal No. 7 of 1974 the issue was remitted on 15-3-1977. The learned Additional District Judge No. 1, after the remand of the case in Appeal No. 118 of 1913 by Govinder Kaur, recorded the statements of Gaurishankar and Govinder Kaur. Govinder Kaur also submitted an application that she is prepared to deliver the possession of the open root of the two shops to the plaintiff and she is prepared to construct one room on the roof of the shop, within a period of 21/2 months and will adjust the amount invested, against rent. A negative reply to this offer wad submitted by the plaintiff. The learned Additional District Judge recorded the finding on the additional issue against the plaintiff on 10-12-1976. In Gurubachansingh's appeal No. 5 of 1973, after remand of the case, the Additional District Judge recorded the statement of Hardeo (P.W. 1), Gajanand (P W. 2), Gurubachan Singh (D.W. 1) and Gopal Das (D.W. 2) Satyadev (D.W. 3) and Attarsingh (D.W. 4). After hearing the parties, on 13-9-1977 he recorded the finding on additional issue against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has tilts objections against the findings on the additional issue in both he appeals. 13. I have heard Shri M.C. Bhoot, learned counsel for Smt. Govinder Kaur Shri A.L. Chopra, learned counsel for defendant No. 2 Gurubacbansingh and Shri I.C. Maloo, learned counsel for the plaintiff Hardeo and have perused the record of the case. 14. As some of the questions involved in these two appeals, are common, they will be dealt with simultaneously and questions, which will arise only in individual appeals, will be dealt with separately. 15. Mr. Bhoot, learned counsel for Smt. Govinder Kaur, first contested the finding on issue No. 1 it was urged by him that after the death of Attarsingh, the tenancy devolved on all his heirs, so all the heirs of the deceased-tenant Attarsingh, being tenant in common, are necessary parties in the suit. 15. Mr. Bhoot, learned counsel for Smt. Govinder Kaur, first contested the finding on issue No. 1 it was urged by him that after the death of Attarsingh, the tenancy devolved on all his heirs, so all the heirs of the deceased-tenant Attarsingh, being tenant in common, are necessary parties in the suit. He strenuously urged that the learned Additional District Judge wrongly proceeded on the basis that Attarsingh's tenancy, after determination of his tenancy, became statutory tenancy, so it did not devolve on the heir of the deceased Attarsingh. He submitted that neither such a case was pleaded, nor proved and the learned Additional District judge made out a new case of his own. He also submitted that a case of creation of new or fresh tenancy, has also not been pleaded by the plaintiff, so toe question of fresh tenancy in favour of Smt. Govinder Kaur alone does not arise. Govinder Kaur made payment of rent es heir of her husband and a cheque was delivered by Shri Amritlal Chopra In respect of the rent prior to 1-7-1966 for and on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased Attarsingh, as stated by Gaurishankar P.W. 4. He, referred to section 19 (b) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and cited Vidhyawanti v. Tokan Dais & another, ; Ajit Kumar Roy and ors. v. Satya Bala Dutt and ors., Shrimati Shafiqua and others v. Maqsood Ahmed Khan and others, Konijeti Vankayya and another v. Thammana Pada Venkata Subbarao and another, AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 619) and Damadilal and others v. Parashram and others ( AIR 1976 SC 2229 ) . 16. Shri Maloo, on the other hand, submitted that admittedly the tenancy of Attarsingh was determined and thereafter suit for eviction as instituted against him and during the pendency of the suit Attarsingh died In the state of law then existing, right to continue to remain in possession of the premises, being personal to the deceased-tenant, did not survive to his heirs, as was held in Jagdish Chander Chatterjee & ors. v. Shri Shri Kishan and anr. ( AIR 1972 SC 2526 : 1972 W.L.N. part-I 600) . So after the abatement of that suit Smt. Govinder Kaur alone became the tenant The sons and the daughters of the deceased Attarsingh were all minors and Smt. Govinder Kaur alone was carrying on business of Messrs Attarsingh and sons. v. Shri Shri Kishan and anr. ( AIR 1972 SC 2526 : 1972 W.L.N. part-I 600) . So after the abatement of that suit Smt. Govinder Kaur alone became the tenant The sons and the daughters of the deceased Attarsingh were all minors and Smt. Govinder Kaur alone was carrying on business of Messrs Attarsingh and sons. The trial court has found that an agreement of fresh tenancy came into being with Smt. Govinder Kaur. The Additional District Judge has also found that an oral agreement between the parties with regard to the creation of tenancy with Smt. Govinder Kaur, stands proved from the statements of P.W. 1 and P.W. 4. Thus, both the courts have concurrently found the oral agreement with Smt. Govinder Kaur, creating a tenancy in her favour. The learned Additional District Judge has given an additional ground that there could be no devolution of statutory tenancy after the death of statutory tenant and on that basis Issues No. 11 has been decided against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff. 17. I have carefully considered the rival contentions advanced before me by both the sides. In view of the concurrent findings of both the courts regarding the creation of tenancy by oral agreement on 13.10.1966, The contentions of Mr. Bhoot are not sustainable. It is true that in para 3 of the plaint it has not been specifically pleaded that a fresh tenancy was created by an oral agreement. What has been pleaded in para 3 is that defendant No. 1 continued to carry on business as heir of the deceased along with others, but she started paying rent in her capacity as tenant and in such capacity of a tenant she paid the rent for the first time on 13-10-1966. My attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff to the reply to the notice Ex. 6 dated November 13, 1967 Defendant No. 1 stated in her reply to the notice that in fact the concern run by her, is solely owned by her and there is none, who has joined her in her concern. Apart from this addition of Smt. Govinder Kaur regarding the business being solely run by her, both the courts hate placed reliance on the plaintiff's evidence. Apart from this addition of Smt. Govinder Kaur regarding the business being solely run by her, both the courts hate placed reliance on the plaintiff's evidence. P.W. 1 Hardeo has stated that Smt. Govinder Kaur alone is his tenant and it is she who is paying rent. After the dismissal of the first suit, Govinder Kaur paid rent vide receipt Ex. 1. It was of course admitted by him that on the death of Attar Singh, an application was moved to being the heirs of the deceased tenant on record, who were the widow, three sons and one daughter. An emphasis has been laid on what was stated by him in cross examination. As to why the other heirs did not become tenant, he stated, he say on the basis of the legal advise. Nothing can be turn on the basis of this statement of Hardeo. The legal advice may be that on the death of the statutory tenant the tenancy does not devolve on the heirs of the deceased statutory tenant so the heirs did not become the tenant of the disputed premises and as Smt. Govinder Kaur started paying rent, so tenancy arose in her favour From the statement of Gaurishankar it cannot be taken that something new has been introduced by him in his evidence, which does not find mention in the plaint Gaurishankar has categorically stated that after the abatement of the suit, talk with regard to the tenancy took place with defendant No. 1 and thereafter it was defendant No. 1 who continued to make payment of rent and the defendant No. 1 also stated at the time of the payment of rent that it is she who carried on business and she alone is the owner of the shoe and she also expressed that her children are minor and they have no liability of the shop. The courts below have considered this aspect of the case, as argued before them, that on 13-10-1956 Smt. Govinder Kaur was not present at Jodhpur and the receipt Ex. I was signed by Gurmeet Singh, her brother. The courts below have considered this aspect of the case, as argued before them, that on 13-10-1956 Smt. Govinder Kaur was not present at Jodhpur and the receipt Ex. I was signed by Gurmeet Singh, her brother. The discrepancy in the statement of Smt. Govinder Kaur and Gurmeet Singh, has been considered and this has not been believed, as stated by Smt. Govinder Kaur that she was not at Jodhpur on 13-10-1966 Smt. Govinder Kaur stated that she has left Jodhpur on 12-10-1966 on receipt of trunk-call and her father expired on 16-10-1966 Gurmeet Singh, on the other hand, stated that Smt. Govinder Kaur had gone to Delhi, as her father had expired. From the statement of Gurmeet Singh it appears that Smt. Govinder Kaur went to Delhi after the death of her father. If the father of defendant No. 1 had expired, then Gurmeet Singh too would have left for Delhi and he could not have remained on 13-10-1965 at Jodhpur. Thus, Smt. Govinder Kaur must have been at Jodhpur on 13-10-1966 and it was on her behalf that payment of rent was made by Gurmeet Singh. Although it was not necessary for me to go into the evidence, as there was a concurrent finding of both the courts with regard to oral agreement, but as the evidence was referred to in arguments, so I ventured to consider the evidence and on consideration of the evidence, in my opinion, it is established that new tenancy by oral agreement, had come into being with Smt. Govinder Kaur. Had a new tenancy would not have been created the legal position would have been, what has been contended by Mr. Bhoot. The tenancy would have devolved on all the heirs as tenants in common. I need not examine the contention as to whether all the tenants in common are necessary parties to the suit or not in view of the creation of new tenancy, with Smt. Govinder Kaur, after the death of her husband. 18. Mr. Bhoot next argued that the learned additional District Judge has found that there was an implied consent of the plaintiff in sub-letting shop No. 5 to Gurubachan Singh. 18. Mr. Bhoot next argued that the learned additional District Judge has found that there was an implied consent of the plaintiff in sub-letting shop No. 5 to Gurubachan Singh. This finding is based on the appreciation of evidence on record and is not in any way vitiated by any error of law Shri A.L. Chopra, learned counsel for the respondent Gurubachan Singh in appeal No. 7 of 1974, also vehemently urged that it , a finding of fact and is not oven to challenge in the second appeal. Reliance was placed by him on Smt. Krishnawati v. Shri Hani Raj . 19. Shri Maloo, on the other hand, urged that knowledge of subletting cannot be imputed to the plaintiff, as he was told that defendant No. 2 Gurubachan Singh is the servant or employee of the predecessor of defendant No. 1. It is only in 1964, sometime before filing of the suit, the plaintiff came to know that defendant No. 2 is carrying on his own business in shop No. 5 and that shop had been sublet by Attar Singh without the consent of the plaintiff. It was also pointed out that Gurubachan Singh has taken entirely a new stand in his statement that he took shop No. 5 from Messrs Govind Ram Panna Lal on rent on 9.6.1936 and Govind Ram and Pannalal told him that if he wants to take shop No. 5 on rent, then he should bring Deewan Singh and when he went along with Deewan Singh, they told him that they will issue receipt in the name of Deewan Singh and sons. Such a stand was not taken by Gurubachan Singh in his written statement. What was pleaded by him, was that defendant No. 2 has been carrying on business since 1936 with the permission and consent of the landlord Shri Maloo contended that there to variance between the pleading and the statement of Gurubachan Singh (D.W. 2) His pleas with regard to sub-letting should not be believed and further there is no clear proof on record that subletting was within the knowledge of the plaintiff, so the question of tacit or implied consent does not arise. He supported his contention by placing reliance on the decision of Goppulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadeeshji & another (1969 W.L.N. Part-III-17) . 20. He supported his contention by placing reliance on the decision of Goppulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadeeshji & another (1969 W.L.N. Part-III-17) . 20. As regards the pleas of sub-letting, it may be stated that the defendant's case has been consistent that since 1936 he is in occupation of shop No. 5, Admittedly, Gurubachan Singh is carrying on the business of repairing of harmoniums and other musical instruments on this shop. This business of Gurubachan Singh is no way connected with the business of Messrs Attar Singh and Sons. Messrs Attar Singh and sons carries on business of motor parts and runs motor repair workshop. The learned Additional District Judge has referred to the statements of P.W. 1, P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 and has cane to the finding that the defendant No. 2 is in occupation of ship No. 5 since very long time. According to P.W. 1 Hardeo, Gurubachan Singh is known to him for the last 15 years and according to Gaurishankar (P.W. 4) he knows Gurubachan Singh since 1953. According to him, he saw him carrying on business of sate and repairing of harmoniums and used to see him sitting in both the shops No. 5 and 6. He pleaded his ignorance as to whether he was in occupation of shop No. 5 from before 1953. Badri Singh (P.W. 6) has stated that Gurubachan Singh is carrying on his business in shop No. 5 for the last 20 years When Gurubachan Singh is doing business unconnected with the business of defendant No. 1 and her predecessor, it cannot be conceived that the plaintiff had no knowledge of shop No. 5 having been sublet or having parted with possession to defendant No. 2 of shop No. 5. Admittedly, no notice was ever serves on defendant No. 1 prior to the filing of the suit in 1964 Goppulal's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable. In that case there was no pleading nor any issue that the subletting of two shops was made with the permission of the landlord. In that case it was not the case of the defendant at any stage of the trial that he had obtained the permission of the landlord for subletting the two shops. In that case there was no pleading nor any issue that the subletting of two shops was made with the permission of the landlord. In that case it was not the case of the defendant at any stage of the trial that he had obtained the permission of the landlord for subletting the two shops. In the contest of the facts of that case their lordships observed that in the absence of any pleading and any issue on this point, the courts were in error in holding that the two shops were sublet with the permission of the landlord. It was further observe that the permission of the landlord for the subletting is not established from the mere fact that the landlord realised rent after the subletting in the absence of proof that the landlord had then clear knowledge of the sub-lessee in the present case from the long occupation of shop No 5 by defendant No 2, knowledge of the plaintiff and implied consent of sub-letting of the plaintiff, can be inferred, as the same was never objected to. It was an inference of fact from the material on record, so such a finding of fact is not open to challenge in the second appeal. The matter can further be viewed from another angle. When a fresh tenancy had been created in 1966, knowing it very well that Gurubachan Singh is a sub-tenant, then there is implied consent in this sub-tenancy and it is not open to the plaintiff to contend that the tenant had sub-let shop No. 5 without the permission and consent of the landlord. 21. Issue No. 3 has also been found in favour of defendant No. 1, by the learned Addition it District judge This finding is also a finding of fact. It has not been pointed out by Shri Maloo as to how this finding of fact is vitiated. 22. As regards issues No. 4 and 5 suffice it to say that the alleged ground of material alteration is not available to the plaintiff in view of the creation of new tenancy in favour of defendant No. 1. Whatever was done, by the predecessor of defendant No. 1. 22. As regards issues No. 4 and 5 suffice it to say that the alleged ground of material alteration is not available to the plaintiff in view of the creation of new tenancy in favour of defendant No. 1. Whatever was done, by the predecessor of defendant No. 1. So far as the defendant No. 1 is concerned it cannot be said that she made any material alteration in the suit premises and so she has not rendered herself liable to be evicted Thus, this ground of eviction needs no further consideration. Apart from that issue No 5 has been concurrently found by both the courts against the plaintiff and as regards issue No. 4 the first appellate court has found that the alleged construction of all does not materially affect the suit premises. In Ratanlal v. Motilal, this court has held that "material alteration" is a question of fact and not of law and there are no legal principles to be applied for determining whether a particular alteration is material or not. It is to be decided as a question of fact only and then the matter is decided to be made out or not by the evidence. The finding regarding material alteration under issue No. 4, cannot be said to be perverse, so is not liable to be interfered with in the second appeal. 23. The most controversial issues between the parties are the additional issues framed by this Court and issue No. 1. In issue No. 1 the first appellate court has concurred with the finding of the trial court regarding the plaintiff's requirement of one shop for the office of Shri Gaurishanker, but has differed with the finding of the trial court regarding the plaintiff's need for the other shop for carrying on business of general merchandise for the plaintiff and his son Radhakrishan. Admittedly Radhakrishan has expired. Now the plaintiff's case is that the plaintiff needs the other shop for the purpose of carrying on business of general merchandise by him and his grandson Gajanand son of Radhakrishan. The findings on the additional issues framed by this Court, are against the plaintiff and the first appellate court has held that defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 will suffer greater hardship in case decree is passed against them, as compared to the hardship of the plaintiff. The findings on the additional issues framed by this Court, are against the plaintiff and the first appellate court has held that defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 will suffer greater hardship in case decree is passed against them, as compared to the hardship of the plaintiff. The findings on personal need as well on comparative hardship, undoubtedly, are findings of facts and such findings can only be set aside if there are grounds on which findings of facts can be vitiated. It has been held by the Full Bench of this Court in Chhatar Lal v. Mahant Ramdas (1979 W.L.N. 37) , that when an issue is remitted under Order 41, Rule 25, C.P.C., is second appeal to the first appellate court, the finding of fact sent back by the first appellate court is not open to attack, except on the grounds stated in section 100, C.P.C. It has been held in Smt. Krishna Devi v. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi that bonafide requirement is a question of fact, which cannot be reopened in second appeal in Indermal v. Ratanlal and in Kantilal v. Dhulji , it has been held by this Court that the questions of comparative hardship and bonafide personal requirements are questions of fact and are not liable to be interfered with in .the second appeal. 24. Shri I.C. Maloo, learned counsel for the plaintiff, however, urged that the whole approach of the first appellate court on the additional issues of comparative hardship, was wrong and the approach of the first appellate court was also wrong, while dealing with the plaintiff's requirement in respect of one shop for starting business of the general merchandise by the plaintiff along with his son Radhakrishan. The first appellate court was mistaken when it observed that it is nowhere stated in the plaint that the plaintiff intends to start business with Radhakrishan and the first appellate court was led away by irrelevant and extraneous considerations while determining the requirement of the plaintiff and his son Radhakrishan of one shop for starting business of general merchandise. The first appellate court was mistaken when it observed that it is nowhere stated in the plaint that the plaintiff intends to start business with Radhakrishan and the first appellate court was led away by irrelevant and extraneous considerations while determining the requirement of the plaintiff and his son Radhakrishan of one shop for starting business of general merchandise. He urged that after the death of Radhakrisban, the plaintiff wants to start business with his grandson Gajanand There was an averment in the plaint that the plaintiff needs the shop for himself and for his family and it was not necessary to seek any amendment in the plaint to introduce the name of Gajanand in place of Radhakishan. The court should have locked into the plaintiff's requirement in the light of subsequent event of death of Radhakishan. As regards shop No. 6. It was urged that the learned first appellate court was essentially led away by the submission that the tenant is prepared to construct a room on the first floor on the roof of shop No. 6 whereby Gaurishsnksr'e requirement for opening the Advocate's office would be fully met. Despite such an offer, if defendant No. 1 is directed to vacate shop No. 6, she will be put to greater hardship. It was urged by Shri Maloo that alternative accommodation should be presently available. Potentiality of accommodation could not have been looked into, which was beyond the scope of section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act",. The court has only to see the existing alternative accommodation and further the question of comparative hardship has not been considered by the first appellate court in its correct prospective. In support of his contention he placed reliance on some case law. 25. Shri Bboot and Shri Chopra, on the other hand, supporting the findings on comparative hardship, urged that the first appellate court had weighed the hardship of both the sides and after weighing the same, has decided the additional issues against the plaintiff. Shri Chopra also supported the finding regarding the plaintiff's requirement for one shop for carrying on business, which matter has been considered by the first appellate court while dealing with the additional issue In the appeal filed against defendant No. 2 Gurubachan Singh by the plaintiff. Shri Chopra also supported the finding regarding the plaintiff's requirement for one shop for carrying on business, which matter has been considered by the first appellate court while dealing with the additional issue In the appeal filed against defendant No. 2 Gurubachan Singh by the plaintiff. Shri Bhoot, on the other hand, challenged the finding of personal necessity on the very ground that the approach of the courts below was wrong in finding that one shop is needed by the plaintiff for opening of the office of Gaurishanker. It was urged by Mr. Bhoot that from the plaintiff's statement it appears that there is no element of need for the shop in connection with the office His statement only shows his desire or wish to open an office for his son Gaurishanker. Some case law has been referred by Shri Bhoot and Shri Chopra. 26. The main question which arises for consideration with regard to the findings on issue No. 1 and the additional issues is an to whether the findings arrived at, are in any way vitiated or can be interfered with on any ground on which a finding of fact can be interfered with in second appeal. If the courts below have adopted a wrong approach, while arriving it a finding of fact, then certainly this court can interfere in such finding of fact in second appeal. 27. I may first consider the plaintiff's requirement in respect of one shop for opening of the office by Gaurishanker. Both the courts have concurrently found that the plaintiff needs one shop for this purpose. The approach to this question cannot be said to be in any way wrong or erroneous. It is wrong to contend on the basis of the statement of plaintiff Hardeo that it is only his wish or a strong desire or there is no element of need for one shop for the establishment of Gaurishanker's office No doubt Hardeo has stated that he needs one shop for the office of Gauriahanker, as there is no suitable accommodation for the office in the house, as people of all castes come over there. If his statement is read as a whole, I cannot be found that his statement does not make out a case of need. He has categorically stated that there is no room on the ground floor. If his statement is read as a whole, I cannot be found that his statement does not make out a case of need. He has categorically stated that there is no room on the ground floor. There is a kitchen, bath room and latrine on the ground floor. I was referred to the statement of Badri Singh (P.W. 3), who has stated in cross-examination that there is one room in the ground floor. It has been clarified by Gaurishanker that this room is only a store. As regards the requirement for the office, the statement of Gaurishanker has gone uncrossed and when the issue was remitted, Gaurishanker in his statement, has elaborately with sufficient details, has stated how and in what manner he is facing difficulties presently in connection with his office. At present he is carrying on his office in a covered 'sal' in the ground floor. The measurement of which is 8' x 8'. The passage to latrine is though this office. There does not remain any space left in the present accommodation after putting in a small table and four chairs. If the statement of Hardeo is read in the light of statement of Gaurishanker, it would be abundantly clear that the present accommodation in the house is not suitable for office. It is to this effect that Hardeo has deposed in his examination-in-chief. Thus, the case of reasonable and bona fide need is and it cannot be said that the approach to the question was in any way wrong. 28. Here I may also consider the question of comparative hardship. It appears from the finding given by the first appellate court that it was primarily felt persuaded by the fact that in case a room is constructed on the roof of shop No. 6, it will meet the plaintiff's requirement of opening of office. The first appellate court proceeded to consider this aspect in the light of the statement made by Gaurishanker in cross-examination as well as in the light of the application made by Govinder Kaur. The first appellate court considering that the plaintiff's requirement would be met by construction of a room, did not think it proper to look into the difficulties, which are being faced by Gaurishanker. The first appellate court considering that the plaintiff's requirement would be met by construction of a room, did not think it proper to look into the difficulties, which are being faced by Gaurishanker. In his present accommodation where he is having his office and the court also did not consider the question of alternative accommodation to the tenant in view of the fact that the plaintiff's need would not remain, as the need will be met by the construction of new room in the court, of course, considered that Gaurishanker has not been able to paint out that in case one shop will not be vacated then he will suffer such a loss, whereby, his office will be closed. 29. Shri Bhoot vehemently contended that Gaurishanker himself has stated in cross-examination that in case the defendant constructs a room on the first floor on the shop, then he can establish his office there and all his difficulties will be over. In view of this statement, the defendant No. 1 made an application that she will construct a room within 21/2 months and will adjust the investment made by defendant No. 1, against the rent. Having once agreed to the offer made by defendant No. 1, it was not open to the plaintiff to back out from the offer made by defendant No. 1 and it was proper on the part of the first appellate court to examine into the question of comparative hardship in the light of the offer made by defendant No. 1. According to Mr. Bhoot such an offer could be considered under section 14 (2) of the Act and the court below did not go beyond the scope of section 14(2). 30. In the alternative he contended that the plaintiff's requirement for office, was only for one shop, as was the plaintiff's case from the very beginning. His requirement did nut extend to the open land. Under para 2 or subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act, the premises can to splitted. The defendant No. 1 has no place for carrying on her business of workshop. His requirement did nut extend to the open land. Under para 2 or subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act, the premises can to splitted. The defendant No. 1 has no place for carrying on her business of workshop. There is no alternative accommodation available to her for the purpose of workshop, so in case her offer for construction of one room for any reason is not accepted then the premises can be splitted and the premises are capable of being splitted, as there is separate passage on the open land from behind and so far as the shop concerned, It is accessible from the road side, so splitting is possible. The matter has not been examined by the court below from this angle, but the matter can be considered by this court, from this angle. 31. I have considered the submission of Mr. Bhoot. This question assumes a great significance in the present case, as to whether the offer of defendant No. 1, can be taken into consideration for determining the question of comparative hardship in view of the statement of Gaurishanker and reply to the application filed by the plaintiff. If offer can be considered, then it can be said that the approach to the question by the first appellate court, was undoubtedly correct But if such an offer is irrelevant, then in that circumstance the necessary result would be that the matter has not been examined in its correct prospective. It may be pointed out that the tenant cannot dictate the landlord for the purpose of making any new construction, though Gaurishankar in his cross-examination admitted that In case a room is constructed on the roof of one shop, his need would be over. Firstly, there is no such acceptance by the plaintiff. Secondly, the Defendant No. 1's application has been opposed. Such an arrangement can be possible by mutual agreement or compromise. Section 14 (2) of the Act, in my opinion, does not contemplate the availability of accommodation, which for the present does not exist. An alternative accommodation should be available presently. That alone can be taken into consideration. An alternative accommodation, of course, can be made available by mutual agreement and the rights of the parties can be determined on that basis. But when there is no such mutual agreement, the matter has to be adjudicated in accordance with the existing provision of law. An alternative accommodation should be available presently. That alone can be taken into consideration. An alternative accommodation, of course, can be made available by mutual agreement and the rights of the parties can be determined on that basis. But when there is no such mutual agreement, the matter has to be adjudicated in accordance with the existing provision of law. Here I may read section 14 (2) of the Act, which is as under : "Section 14-Restrict on eviction:- (1) x x x x x (2) No decree for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 13 shall be passed if the court is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstance of the case including the question whether ether reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or that tenant, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree then by refusing to pass it. Where the court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree in respect of a part of the premises, the court stall pass the decree in respect of such part only". 32. A reading of sub-section (2) pats one would reveal that the court has to take into consideration the availability of other reasonable accommodation presently. It cannot be said that other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord at present. If such an interpretation as put by Mr. Bhoot is put to sub-section (2) of section 14, then it can be successfully argued that if the plaintiff is in a position to put a new house or construct a now house or the defendant is in a petition to construct a new house for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff's need can be fulfilled and on that basis the plaintiff be non-suited. It cannot be said that such is the Intendment of sub-section (2) of Section 14. The court is only required to look into the question as to whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant and it is In that light, the question of comparative greater hardship has to be adjudged. 33. It cannot be said that such is the Intendment of sub-section (2) of Section 14. The court is only required to look into the question as to whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant and it is In that light, the question of comparative greater hardship has to be adjudged. 33. In the present case, the learned first appellate court, in my opinion, has adopted an approach not warranted by sub-section (2) of section 14 and its wrong approach has resulted into an erroneous finding and in view of the finding arrived at by it, it did not consider the question of bifurcating, splitting or division of tenancy. While determining the question of comparative hardship, the approach of the first appellate court, was wholly wrong that Gaurishanker should have come out with the version that his practice will be fully ruined by closure of his office in the present accommodation. When Gaurishanker is facing difficulties every day in the present accommodation, the question of comparative hardship should have been examined to the light of the difficulties, which are being faced by him presently. As already stated, the first appellate court was almost wholly persuaded by the offer made by the defendant No. 1 for the construction of a new room on the first floor. If that aspect is irrelevant and extraneous, then it can reasonably be found that the plaintiff will suffer greater hardship in case decree for eviction is refused to him. But there arises the question of splitting of tenancy. Under pare 2 of subs-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, the court is required to judge the question of comparative hardship by considering the question of passing of partial decree for eviction. The Rehman Jeo Wangnoo v. Ram Chand and others, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 413 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court remitted the case back to examine the question of partial eviction and it was observed by their Lordships that the court is under an obligation to act in compliance with the mandate of the statute. There was such a provision contained in section 11 (h) of the J. and K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (34 of 1966). 34. There was such a provision contained in section 11 (h) of the J. and K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (34 of 1966). 34. In Bhagwan Vishwanath Phadnis and others v. Bhaskar Digamber Chaudhary (1967 U.J. (SC) 502) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court remitted the case back to determine (1) whether the suit premises can be conveniently split up, and (ii) whether the offer made by the respondent can adequately meet the needs of the second appellant. It was further directed that in case the premises cannot be conveniently split up, no further question will arise and the suit must succeed. In the present case, as contended by Shri Bhoot, Shop No. 6 can conveniently be splitted from the open land behind the two shops and the requirement of Gaurishanker would be satisfied, if the plaintiff would be put into possession of shop No. 6. Gaurishanker has tried to make out the need for the open land, but this appears to be after thought. Such a need for the open land is contrary to what he has stated in cross-examination and is also contrary to the plaintiff's pleading. Thus, the need for the open land cannot at all be taken into consideration. It may also be stated that defendant No. 1 is already running a motor part shop on Chopasani Road. That shop was opened in 1972 under the name Attarsingh and Sons. Chopasani Road is the road where there exist shops of automobile dealers. She has not been able to get any accommodation for her workshop. In the present premises for primary requirement is for running the workshop, which she can run in the upon land behind the two shops. Thus, on weighing the comparative Hardship. I find that defendant No. 1 will not suffer greater hardship, if partial decree for eviction for shop No. 6 is passed and in case such a decree is not passed, it is the plaintiff, who will suffer greater hard-ship. The question of apportionment of rant, will necessarily arise, which I shall consider after determining the question of comparative hardship of Gurubachan singh and the plaintiff in relation to shop No. 5. 35. The question of apportionment of rant, will necessarily arise, which I shall consider after determining the question of comparative hardship of Gurubachan singh and the plaintiff in relation to shop No. 5. 35. With regard to shop No. 5 Shri Maloo strenuously and vehemently contended that the first appellate court, while arriving at the finding of reasonable and bonafide need, seriously erred in misreading the plaint and the finding on that issue is unreasonable and perverse. That finding deserves to be reversed and further the first appellate court mainly proceeded to consider the question of comparative hardship on the basis that after the death of Radhakishan, the plaint was not amended so as to incorporate the need of the plaintiff's grandson Gajanand son of Radhakishan. The first appellate court has declined to consider the plaintiff's evidence regarding Gajanand's need, as the same was beyond the pleadings in the plaint. Further the court ought to have considered the question of comparative hardship in the light that the plaintiff along with his grandson Gajanand, needed shop No. 5 to augment the family income by setting up business in general merchandise. Gajanand's requirement was excluded from consideration as being not pleaded and the plaintiff's requirement alone was not considered simply on the basis that he is an old man doing no business for the last 10-15 years and the requirement is not the requirement of the family. Shri Maloo submitted that the plaintiff wants to set up business in shop No. 5. It was not necessary for him to make search for any alternative accommodation. It was for the defendant No. 2 to make efforts for finding out alternative accommodation, for which no genuine efforts were made by him. Looking to the nature of his business, it cannot be said that the present locality is the only locality where he can carry on the present business. The harmonium repairing shops are situated in different localities of the city of Yodhpur where else. This aspect of the case has not been given due consideration by the first appellate court. Shri Maloo placed reliance on decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others ( AIR 1979 SC 272 ) and on a decision of Madras High Court in P.M. Kuppa Sah v. Rajaram Sah . Shri Maloo placed reliance on decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others ( AIR 1979 SC 272 ) and on a decision of Madras High Court in P.M. Kuppa Sah v. Rajaram Sah . He also placed reliance on Shri Parmeshwari Dass v. Shri G.R. Kohli (deceased) by Smt. Savitri Devi and others) , Sain Dass v. Devi Dass and ors. , Miss Badlani v. A. Hoogewarra (1975 R.L.W. 49) and Ramcharan and another v. Ramavtar and others (AIR 1976 Rajasthan 32) . 36. Shri Chopra, on the other hand, supported the finding on the additional issue and urged that this is a finding of fact and is not liable to be interfered with in the second appeal and cited Manaklal Narandas v. Gajraban, Widow of Chunilal Manaklal (1975 R.C.J. 421) , Narendra Kumar Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (1976 R.C.J 178) , and Bapurao Rajaram Walkar v. Babulal Mulchand Walkar . 37. I have carefully considered the submission of both the learned counsel. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the brat appellate court legally mate a wrong approach to the case. The question of need for shop No. 5 and comparative hardship In relation thereto is required to be examined in the light of the pleadings In the plaint. It is true that in para 4 of the plaint the plaintiff has stated that the plaintiff needs the suit premises for himself and his family, but he has specified the need for his family In the manner that one shop is needed for Gaurishankar and the other shop is needed for starting business by himself along with his son Radhakishan. It is not the plaintiff's case In the plaint that the business is to be started for the family and not only Radhakishan, but other members of the family will also carry on business. After the death of Radhakishan the position is completely changed. It was not the plaintiffs case that he alone will start the business. It is true that subsequent event can be taken notice of without any amendment in the pleadings. After the death of Radhakishan the position is completely changed. It was not the plaintiffs case that he alone will start the business. It is true that subsequent event can be taken notice of without any amendment in the pleadings. The cases, which have been cited by Shri Maloo, are cases of residential accommodation other than the case of Miss Badlani v. A. Hoogawarfe (supra) The plaintiff needed the premises for use and occupation for himself and his family and on that basis even on the death of the landlord, it has been found that the legal representatives of the deceased landlord are entitled to continue ejectment proceedings. In the case of Miss Badlani v. A. Hoogewarfe (supra) the event in the nature that the plaintiff acquired possession of other set of premises subsequently, was taken notice of in the present case whether Gajanand's need can be taken into consideration or not without amendment in the pleading is an important question and in my opinion, the earned first appellate court was right in excluding Gajanand's need on the basis that it is beyond the scope of the pleading. The position Is different for business accommodation from the residential accommodation. In residential accommodation the need is for the whole family, but it may not be so for business premises, for none of the members of the family may be available for carrying on business. Gajanand's need was put into evidence before the first appellate court and this evidence has gone on record subject to the objection by the defendant. If the plaintiff would have made an amendment in the plaint, the position would have been entirely different and the matter could have been lowed in the light of the decision in Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (supra). One can legitimately require the promises for augmenting one's income and one way suffer greater hardship in case one is not allowed to obtain a decree for eviction against a tenant, who may have been in the premises for more than 30 years. In Mst. Bega Begum's case (supra) a wrong approach was adopted and it was taken that where the plaintiff wants the premises to augment his income, it was simply a more desire or wish and not a reasonable requirement. In Mst. Bega Begum's case (supra) a wrong approach was adopted and it was taken that where the plaintiff wants the premises to augment his income, it was simply a more desire or wish and not a reasonable requirement. This approach was considered to be a legally wrong approach and their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the question of relative hardship of the parties and allowed the Landlords' appeal and decreed the suit for ejectment of the defendants from the house in dispute. Their Lordships examined the evidence in detail, which was not taken into consideration by the High Court and on evidence found that the plaintiffs' necessity is imperative and their requirement is undoubtedly reasonable and on careful comparison and assessment of relative advantageous and disadvantageous positions of the Landlord and the tenant their Lordship felt that the scale is tilted in favour of the plaintiff and it was further observed that the inconvenience loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs for outweight the prejudice or inconvenience which will be caused to the defendants. In the present case if the need of the grand-son Gajanand is excluded from consideration, it cannot be said that the view, which has been taken by the first appellate court, is in any way erroneous or that the first appellate court adopted a wrong approach in the case. The plaintiff, undoubtedly has no business of his own, but he alone does not want to get up a business. He wants to set up a business along with some member of the family, so it was necessary far the plaintiff to plead as to who that member is, who will carry on his business along with him. In the absence of such a pleading it cannot be held that the plaintiff requires the premises for himself and for Gajanand and so the question of comparative hardship does not arise for consideration at all. In the absence of such a pleading it cannot be held that the plaintiff requires the premises for himself and for Gajanand and so the question of comparative hardship does not arise for consideration at all. Had it been the case of the plaintiff that any male member of the family will sit on the shop along with the plaintiff and carry on business, the position perhaps would have been different, but the plaintiff came with a specific case that he and his son Radhakishan will start business, so it cannot be said that the plaintiff's pleading was that he needs the shop for the purpose of carrying on business for himself and his family. So far as the plaintiff's own individual need is concerned, the learned first appellate court was right In considering the plaintiff's age as well as the plaintiff's remaining out of business for the east 10-15 years and finding on that basis that the plaintiff will not suffer any hardship as compared to the hardship of defendant No. 2. Rather examining the question of comparative hardship is out of place in the above view. The other cases cited at the bar do not require consideration in the above view of the matter. 38. In the light of the foregoing discussion the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction of defendant No. 1 from shop No. 6. As a result of splitting up, the rent is required to be apportioned. The defendant No. 2 is said to be paying Rs. 20/- p.m. as rent to defendant No. 1 in respect of shop No. 5. Considering the dimensions of the open land, it would be proper that rent may be apportioned between shop No. 6 and the open land to the extent of Rs. 15/- p.m. and Rs. 12/- p.m. respectively, The defendant No. 1, thus, would be liable to pay rent to the tune of Rs. 32/- p.m. in respect of shop No. 5 and the open land. 39. In the result, the appeal No. 476 of 1973 filed by Govinder Kaur, is partly allowed. The plaintiff's decree for eviction regarding shop No. 6 is maintained, whereas the decree in respect of the open land is set aside. The defendant No. 1 shall be liable to pay rent at Rs. 39. In the result, the appeal No. 476 of 1973 filed by Govinder Kaur, is partly allowed. The plaintiff's decree for eviction regarding shop No. 6 is maintained, whereas the decree in respect of the open land is set aside. The defendant No. 1 shall be liable to pay rent at Rs. 32/- per month with effect from the date possession over shop No. 6 is delivered by her to the plaintiff. The decree in respect of shop No. 5 passed by the First Appellate Court, is maintained. Consequently, appeal No. 7 of 1974 is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of both the appeals.Order accordingly. *******