JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, C.J. - This revision involves interpretation of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the scope, ambit and power of the Court thereunder to summon any person as a witness at any stage of any enquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code. This point arises in the following circumstances. 2. During the night of 26-10-1976 a dacoity was committed in the house of the informant Petitioner in village Ghusuria. The dacoit severely assaulted the Petitioner causing a number of injuries on his person and decamped with cash of Rs. 5,000/- and gold and silver ornaments. On 27.10.1976 at about 7 p.m. the Petitioner lodged a within report with the A.S.I., Rajkanika Out Post on the basis of which a formal F.I.R. was drawn up and investigation was commenced. Ultimately opposite parties 1 to 8 along with one Karnadev Naik and two others, out of whom one is dead, were put on trial for the offence u/s 395, Indian Penal Code in S.T. No. 1/1 of 1979 in the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Kendrapara. As Kamadev Naik and another absconded, the case was split up and the opposite parties 1 to 8 are being tried as aforesaid. During investigation on the application of opposite party No. 1 his confusional statement was recorded on 20-11-1976. 3. About a month or so prior to the date of occurrence, i.e. 26.10.1979, the opposite parties 1, 7 and 8 and others committed dacoity in the district of Dhenkanal which gave rise to Parjang P.S. Case Nos. 27 and 35 of 1976. During the course of investigation of these cases the Circle Inspector of Kamakhyanagar seized a letter written by opposite party No. 1 to opposite party No. 8 on 19-10-1976 in which it is mentioned that preparations were being made for committing dacoity in village Chusuria which in fact took place on 26.10.1976 in the house of the Petitioner. The said letter is in the handwriting of opposite party No. 1. That letter had been filed in S.T. No. 11 of 1978 and proved in the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Dhenkanal which arose out of said Parjang P.S. Case Nos. 27 and 35 of 1976. That Sessions Trial having ended in acquittal, the State has preferred an appeal to the High Court which is pending as Government Appeal No. 6 of 1979. 4. 27 and 35 of 1976. That Sessions Trial having ended in acquittal, the State has preferred an appeal to the High Court which is pending as Government Appeal No. 6 of 1979. 4. In the present sessions trial the Circle Inspector of Kamakhyanagar was examined as P.W. 21 on 10.8.1979 and he deposed that the said letter seized by him had been exhibited in Dhenkanal Sessions Trial No. 11 of 1978 and that Government Appeal No. 6 of 1979 arising therefrom was pending in High Court. On the basis of this evidence the Public Prosecutor filed a petition to call for the said letter from the High Court. This petition was rejected by the Assistant Sessions Judge by his order dated 10.8.1979 on the sole ground that it was filed at the close of the prosecution case. He, thereafter, posted the case to 13.8.1979 for accused statement and after two dates posted to 11-9-1979 for defence. 5. On 11-9-1979 after the defence was declined prosecution filed a certified copy of the said letter with a petition to call for the original from the High Court. This petition was heard on 12.9.1979 after objection had been filed to the same. By order dated 13.9-1979 the Assistant Sessions Judge rejected the petition on the ground of delay as also on the ground that the authorship of the document cannot be established. This order is impugned in this revision. 6. It appears from the impugned order that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge has not properly appreciated the ambit and scope of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure which corresponds to Section 540 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 311 runs as follows: Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act which deals with Judge's power to put questions or order production of documents runs as follows: Judge's power to put questions or order production-The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any tittle, of any witness or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall he entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question: Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved: Provided also that this section shall not authorise any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under Sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the question were asked or the document were caned for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question 'which it would be improper for any other person to ask u/s 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted. 7. Section 540 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, which is equivalent to Section 311 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, and Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act came in for consideration by the Supreme Court in the case of Jamatraj Kewalji Govani Vs. The State of Maharashtra. Their Lordships held that Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure confers wide discretion on the Court to act as the exigencies of justice require. Another aspect of this power and complementary to it is to be found in Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. These two sections between them confer wide jurisdiction and power on the Judge to act in aid of justice. Another aspect of this power and complementary to it is to be found in Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. These two sections between them confer wide jurisdiction and power on the Judge to act in aid of justice. Some cases were cited before the Supreme, Court in support of the view that the prosecution must close its case before the defence begins, but if any matter arises ex improviso, which no human ingenuity can foresee, on the part of the Defendant in a civil suit, or a prisoner to a criminal case, the matter which so arose ex improviso may be answered by contrary evidence on the part of the Crown. In other words, those cases tended to limit the power of the Court u/s 540, Code of Criminal Procedure Referring to the limitations which were sought to be put on the power of the Court u/s 540, Code of Criminal Procedure in those cases, their Lordship of the Supreme Court observed: ...It is difficult to limit the power under our Code to cases which involve something arising ex improviso which no human ingenuity could foresee, in the course of the defence. Our Code does not make this a condition of the exercise of the power and it is not right to embark on judicial legislation. Cases that go that far are of course not quite right. Indeed they could be decided on fact because it can always be seen whether the new matter is strictly necessary for a just decision and not intended to give an unfair advantage to one of the rival sides. Even in England where the rule in Dora Harris case 1927-2 KB 587 obtains, the powers of the Court have not been held to be wrongly exercised, when fresh evidence has been let in for a just decision. In Willian Sullivan (1922) 16 Criminal Appeal Report 112, rebutting evidence was held to be properly called when the accused put forward a suggestion which could not have been foreseen and in John Mckenna (1956) 40 Criminal Appeal Report 65 it was held that a Judge has complete discretion whether a witness should be recalled and that the Court of Criminal Appeal would not interfere unless it was made to appear that injustice had been caused. In that case (like the one here) the defence had dosed the case and the accused had submitted that there was no case to go to the jury. It would appear that in our criminal jurisdiction, statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a witness or Examine one present in Court or to recap a witness already examined, and makes this the duty and obligation of the Court provided the just decision of the case demands it. In other words where the Court exercises the power under the second part the inquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether the Court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case. If the Court has acted without the requirements of a just decision, the action is open to criticism but if the Court's action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision the action cannot be regarded as exceeding the jurisdiction. 8. Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure (equivalent to selection 540 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure) is intended to be wide. The section consists of two parts. The first part confers discretionary power but the latter part is mandatory. Under the first part the Court may act in anyone of the three ways: (a) summon any person as a witness, (b) examine any person present in Court although not summoned, and (c) recall or re-examine a witness already examined. The, second part is obligatory and compels the Court to act in all or the three ways or anyone of them; if the just decision of the case demands it. On a plain reading of the section no limitation on the power of the Court can be read into it arising from the stage to which the trial may have reached and where the power is invoked. If the Court is bona fide of the opinion that for the just decision of the case the power is to be exercised it will do so irrespective of the stage at which the trial has reached, even though the prosecution may have closed its case and even though the defence may have closed its case. If the Court is bona fide of the opinion that for the just decision of the case the power is to be exercised it will do so irrespective of the stage at which the trial has reached, even though the prosecution may have closed its case and even though the defence may have closed its case. According to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, "requirement of just decision of the case does not limit the action to something in the interest of the accused only. The action may equally benefit the prosecution". Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers the Court not only to examine any witness but also to order production of any document. The Court has power, therefore, to allow prosecution to prove a document which is relevant and is necessary for the just decision of the case. 9. It is quite clear to me that the learned Assistant Sessions Judge has not considered the point arising out of the petition of the prosecution to prove an additional document from all the aspects indicated above. Mere delay is no ground for refusing to exercise to vower if it is essential to the just decision of the case that the additional document should be proved and a person is to be examined to prove the document. The trial Court has not given any finding as to whether the document sought to be proved by the prosecution is essential to the just decision of the case. On the contrary he has failed to grasp and appreciate the requirements' of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. He is further in error in thinking that the document is impossible to be proved. If that document could be proved in another sessions case, it could also be proved in this case. That is an unwarranted assumption on his part. Furthermore, he has completely lost sight of Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act. The order of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge under revision is impossible to be sustained and is hereby quashed. 10. I would direct the learned Assistant Sessions Judge to reconsider the petition in true perspectives of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 165 of the Evidence Act as interpreted above and dispose it of in accordance with law. 10. I would direct the learned Assistant Sessions Judge to reconsider the petition in true perspectives of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure read with Section 165 of the Evidence Act as interpreted above and dispose it of in accordance with law. In result the revision is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the trial Court is directed to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations above. Final Result : Allowed