ORDER Murlidhar, J. - This is a tenants petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings for release of an accommodation under Section 16 (1) of U. P. C. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter called the Act). The disputed premises have been described as a Hathikhana and apparently comprise of a covered hall and an open enclosed yard outside it with a huge main gate. The petitioner has been a tenant of these premises of some 35 years. Respondent No. 3 is the landlady of the premises. The respondent alleged that a deemed vacancy of the premises under Section 12 (1) (a) had occurred and applied for release in her favour on the ground of her bona fide requirement. The delegate District Magistrate recorded the findings that the building was vacant, and the landladys need was bona fide anti ordered release. In a revision under Section 18 before the Additional District Judge, it was contended that no vacancy could be deemed to have occurred as the case was not covered under Section 12 (1) (a). The learned Additional District Judge as revisional authority took the view that the finding of the delegate District Magistrate about there being a deemed vacancy was a finding of fact which could not be interfered with in exercise of the revisional powers under Section 18 of the Act. He also observed that the finding was supported by the Inspectors report, dated 16-3-1974, The Commissioners report, dated 26-3-1974 and the inspection report, dated 18-10-1975 of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Sri Pandey. The revision was dismissed. These are the orders impugned by the present petition. 2. The sole ground pressed is that the established or found facts do not make out a deemed vacancy within the meaning of Section 12 (a) which runs as follows: "12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases:- A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if- (a) he has substantially removed his effects there form, or" (b) ........... 3. The question turns upon the proper interpretation of the words has substantially removed his effects therefrom and determination whether the facts of the present case are covered by the phrase. The facts may be considered first. 3. The question turns upon the proper interpretation of the words has substantially removed his effects therefrom and determination whether the facts of the present case are covered by the phrase. The facts may be considered first. The Inspector's report, dated 16-3-1974 Annexure d to the writ petition was that he saw the Hathikhana in a locked condition when the main gate was locked and was not opened by the petitioner. The petitioner had asserted that he used to tether his cattle in it. The inspector noted that he looked over the enclosure wall and found the premises to be lying vacant. The Commissioner also inspected the premises in the locked condition from outside. He reported that the Kotha was vacant and had no goods therein. That only 3 or 4 beams, some thatch, some broken lans tins and a few hoeblades (Phawaras) were lying there and the courtyard was also quite empty. Also that it seemed that the house had been lying in such disuse for such a long time. The local inspection note dated 18-10-1975 of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was that he found some old door-frames, old beams, old nails and timber and some new iron material in the house which was asserted by the tenant to belong to his wife. The Delegate District Magistrate who decided the case had also made a surprise inspection on 4-10-1977 and has noted in his order that he found some building material and old articles inside the building but the larger space was lying vacant and that he did not find any cart horses or any other cattle in the premises. The case of the petitioner vide his objection Annexure 5 to the petition was that he was using the premises for keeping stock, storing the packaging material and parking bullock-carts, horses and other cattle which brought the goods to his Kachchi Arhat and such user had been going on for a long time. Also that his goods and Bardana were kept in the covered hall and the enclosed sahan was used as parking space and that there had been no change in the manner of user and he had not removed any effects from the premises. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had found some open space in front of the petitioners Kachhi Arhat shop which was used for parking of rickshaw etc. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had found some open space in front of the petitioners Kachhi Arhat shop which was used for parking of rickshaw etc. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that before Section 12 (1) (a) can apply, there must be positive evidence about the goods that were kept in the premises as well as that the same had been removed at any specific time and that such evidence was lacking in the present petition. I am inclined to think that the petitioners own case being that the covered hall was used for storing stock and Bardana and the Sahan for parking carts and cattle etc. the finding that the premises were vacant and in virtual disuse implies the finding that the effects in the premises had been removed by the tenant with the result that the premises ceased to be in use. The present is not a case where the tenancy does not involve keeping of any effects in the tenanted premises. In such a case it may not be possible to say that effects have been removed but where keeping of effects is admitted but the premises are found to be virtually vacant, and not merely temporarily I think it can be properly held that the effects had been removed and subject to the question of re-trospectivity to be presently discussed the case is covered by the language of Section 12 (a) of the Act. It is not necessary for the landlord to lead positive evidence about the actual removal. Therefore, the finding that the petitioner had substantially removed his effects from the premises cannot be questioned. 4. It was, however, urged for S. 12 (a) to apply the removal of effects must be subsequent to the enforcement of Act No. XIII of 1972 i. e. subsequent to 15-7-1972. It is obvious that in the present case there is no material to show when the removal took place. In fact all data points to the fact that the premises have been in the present state of disuse for many years which would be since long prior to the enforcement of the Act XIII of 1972. If, therefore, Section 12 (a) is to cover only cases of prospective removal, the present case would clearly fall outside this provision. This turns on the interpretation to be given to the words has removed his effects. If, therefore, Section 12 (a) is to cover only cases of prospective removal, the present case would clearly fall outside this provision. This turns on the interpretation to be given to the words has removed his effects. Should it cover cases of removal of effects when the removal took place prior to the enforcement of Act No. XIII of 1972 or only removal subsequent to enforcement of Act No. XIII of 1972. Grammatical interpretation would favour the landlord because the present-perfect tense is suggestive of something done in the past but connected with the present like the state of affairs continuing till after the Act. It is, however, now well settled by this Court that the use of present perfect tense is not decisive and the true meaning has to be found from the context and the scheme of the Act. Mangi Lal v. Addl. District Judge (1979 (UP) RCC 672) the recent Five Judges' Full Bench decision of this Court may be referred to in this connection. The question in this case about explanation I to S. 21 was about the interpretation of the words "has built or has otherwise acquired occurring in Explanation I. The Full Bench considered the scheme of the Act and held that in the context the words only covered acquisitions and constructions made subsequent to the enforcement of the Act. Two reasons for holding this pertinent to the present provision given in this judgment are (1) under the former law namely Act No. III of 1947 acquiring a building or property did not entail withdrawal of protection from eviction. Similarly removal of effects did not result in termination of tenancy or occurrence of a vacancy. The tenant had every right to keep the premises in physical disuse as long as the tenancy subsisted and he continued his occupation (2) wherever the legislature intended to cover an Act or activity done before the commencement of the Act it has expressly said so as in Sections 3 (k), 5, 12 (3) proviso, 14, 21 (6), 29A (2 to 6), 29 (3) and various Cls. of 43 (2). 5. There are other reasons which are not relevant to interpretation of S. 12 (a). However, the fact that the proviso to Section 12 (3) uses the words had built, has greater significance for Section 12 (a) than for the Explanation 1 to S. 21. of 43 (2). 5. There are other reasons which are not relevant to interpretation of S. 12 (a). However, the fact that the proviso to Section 12 (3) uses the words had built, has greater significance for Section 12 (a) than for the Explanation 1 to S. 21. It is true that Full Bench has recognised that the words "has sublet in Section 20 may cover past subletting to him but that is on account of legislative history and the position that subletting entailed liability to eviction even under Act No. III of 1947. This feature may have a bearing on the interpretation of the words "has allowed it to be occupied by a non-family member occurring under Section 12 (b) which by virtue of Section 25 amounts to subletting but it does not affect the connotation of the words was removed under S. 12 (a)'. I, therefore, feel bound to hold that Section 12 (a) is prospective and applies only to cases where the removal of effects has taken place after the enforcement of Act No. XIII of 1972. On this legal position no vacancy occurred in the present case and the order of release is unsustainable. This interpretation does narrow the scope of the provision of Section 12 (a) but even in cases of pre-Act removal of effects the landlord is not without remedy. The provisions of Section 21 are always available to him and the circumstance of the tenant not using the premises will be a relevant consideration on the question of comparative hardship. 6. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned orders, dated 28-11-77 and 30-5-1978 of Delegate District Magistrate and the Revisional Authority are quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.