JUDGMENT K. M. Dayal, J. - The present second appeal has been filed by the defendants in suit No. 587 of 1966. That suit was filed by Smt. Kapuri Devi against the appellants who are carrying on business in the name of Krishna New Hindustan Transport Company and the appellants Nos. 2 to 6 are the partner of the firm. The instant suit was filed by Smt. Kapuri Devi widow of Chandi Prasad impleading the appellants and Banu Mal as defendants. Smt. Kapuri Devi claimed that she was the tenant of the disputed accommodation along with others and Banu Mal was the landlord. Earlier her husband Chandi Prasad was the tenant of the entire accommodation. He had given the disputed room to the appellants for carrying on the business as licensee. According to the plaintiff the licence was revoked by Sri Dhandi Prasad in his lifetime. Subsequently after his death, the license was revoked again but the defendants-appellants did not vacate and on the other hand obtained fictitious tenancy from Banu Mal in respect of the portion in dispute. Consequently the instant, suit was filed for ejectment from the disputed accommodation. 2. Banu Mal in his turn filed suit No. 546 of 1966 for ejectment of Smt. Kapuri Devi and other heirs of Chandi Prasad. The heirs of Chandi Prasad had given a notice to Banu Mal that they had surrendered their right to Smt. Kapuri Devi and she alone was liable for the payment of rent and was the tenant. The minor daughter of Chandi Prasad, however, could not give any such notice. Banu Mal filed the suit alleging that the aforesaid act of the heirs of Chandi Prasad in favour of Smt. Kapuri Devi amounted to sub-letting and, therefore, they were liable to be ejected under Section 3 (1) (c) of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act of 1947. The suit of Banu Mal was dismissed and that judgment became final. No appeal has been filed against the decision of the lower appellate court in the suit of Banu Mal. 3. In the present appeal the appellants learned counsel Sri Jagdish Swaroop argued that on the death of Chandi Prasad the widow alone could not revoke the licence and the licence could be revoked only by the entire body of the heirs of Chandi Prasad. 3. In the present appeal the appellants learned counsel Sri Jagdish Swaroop argued that on the death of Chandi Prasad the widow alone could not revoke the licence and the licence could be revoked only by the entire body of the heirs of Chandi Prasad. The second argument was that on the death of Chandi Prasad, the licence would be deemed to be continued if the heirs of Chandi Prasad recognised the licence. He relied upon Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 53, page 815 Col. I under the heading death which reads as under: "Since a licence is a personal privilege, ordinarily it is terminated by the death of either licenser or the licensee, unless in case of death of the licenser his heirs elect to continue it in force." 4. The lower appellate court discussed the question whether the licence could be revoked by Smt. Kapuri Devi alone or by the entire body of heirs and held that a trespasser could be sued for possession-even by one co-owner. Here the case was not of a trespasser but was one of a licence. Obviously unless the licence was validly revoked, the licensee could not become trespasser. The reasoning's of the court below is, therefore, not correct. 5. There is yet another aspect of the case. On the death of licenser, it is conceded by Sri Jagdish Swaroop that the license comes to an end. But according to him, it continues as soon as the heirs of the licenser recognise the licence. Obviously the recognition of the licence by all the heirs would be in the nature of a joint recognition and even licensers will be joint promisers. They will not be compromisers. In case of an agreement by joint owners or joint tenants, it could be revoked by any one of them or refusal by any one of them under intimation would bind the entire body. 6. In the circumstances, if according to the appellants' own case, his licence was recognised by all the licensers that could be only as joint promisers. On the other hand, under the ordinary law, the license stood terminated on the death of Chandi Prasad. In either case, the suit could be filed or license could be revoked by Smt. Kapuri Devi as she was one of the joint promisers or licensers and her act was binding on all the other licensers. On the other hand, under the ordinary law, the license stood terminated on the death of Chandi Prasad. In either case, the suit could be filed or license could be revoked by Smt. Kapuri Devi as she was one of the joint promisers or licensers and her act was binding on all the other licensers. On the other hand, in case the licence came to an end on the death of Chandi Prasad all the heirs could file suit tor the ejectment of the licensee as the license stood revoked on the death of licensor. In the circumstances, I find that the decree has rightly been passed against the appellant for his ejectment from the disputed accommodation. I, therefore, agree with the ultimate conclusion of the court below though not with the reasons given by it and hold that the licence was validly terminated and the defendant-appellant was liable to be evicted from the disputed accommodation. 7. In the result, the present appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellants are carrying on Transport business in the disputed accommodation and, therefore, if they are immediately turned out their business will be adversely affected. In the circumstances, it is expedient that the appellant be granted six months time to vacate the disputed accommodation. It is, however, made clear that the defendant-appellant is directed to hand over vacant possession of the disputed accommodation peacefully to the appellant within six months period allowed to him.