ORDER A.N. Varma, J. -These are two connected writ petitions which are both directed against a common order dated 4-4-1978, passed by the respondent No. 1 allowing two revisions filed by one Rakesh Trading Company, arrayed as respondent No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 6316 of 1978 and R. S. Enterprise, arrayed as respondent No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 6312 of 1978, declaring these persons to be lawful occupants of the shops in dispute entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. These are the relevant facts: By an order dated 21-1-1970, one of the two shops in dispute namely shop No. 7 was allotted to Shanti Swarup, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6312 of 1978, while the other shop No. 8 was allotted by an order dated 26-12-1969. These orders were passed under the provisions of U. P. Temporary (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1947 (U. P. Act No. III of 1947). The landlord challenged the aforesaid orders under the provisions of U. P. Act No. III of 1947 by way of revision and representation to the State Government but without success. Thereafter, the allottee's initiated proceedings under Section 7-A of U. P. Act No. III of 1947, for dispossessing the landlord and some other persons who were alleged to have been inducted by him. The landlord filed objection against these proceedings. The objection was rejected. Thereupon, the landlord filed a revision which was allowed by the Commissioner by an order dated 12-3-1973. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court, being Writ Petition No. 1555 of 1973, which was allowed by an order dated 27-5-1975. The landlord, thereafter filed a special appeal in this court before a Division Bench and obtained an order of stay therein staying the proceedings under Section 7-A which had been launched against the landlord. The special appeal was, however, got dismissed by the landlord on 5-10-1976 as not pressed. 3. While the aforesaid proceedings were going on, U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, I came into force with effect from 15th July, 1972. The special appeal was, however, got dismissed by the landlord on 5-10-1976 as not pressed. 3. While the aforesaid proceedings were going on, U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, I came into force with effect from 15th July, 1972. This Act was amended by U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 which introduced important amendments in S 14, besides other provisions of U. P. Act No, XIII of 1972, In July 1976, both R. S. Enterprise as well as Rakesh Trading Company made application claiming the benefit of Section 14 on the assertion that they had been admitted as tenants by the landlord prior to the coming into force of the U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 and they were in occupation as such and that consequently they could not be dispossessed from the shops in dispute. 4. On 7-8-1976, each of the two petitioners filed applications alleging that the aforesaid two concerns were in collusion with the landlord and their occupation was unauthorised. They were, therefore, liable to be evicted from the shops in dispute. They prayed by means of these applications that orders for eviction of the said concerns be issued under Section 16 (4) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The Rent Control As Eviction Officer before whom the aforesaid applications were filed, allowed the prayer of the allottee's (petitioners) and directed that notices be issued to the said concerns under Rule 19 of the rules framed under U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 asking them to vacate the shops and deliver possession to the allottee's. It may be noted here that though the applications of the allottee's were allowed, the Rent Control & Eviction Officer recorded two findings which are relevant for the decision of these petitions. These were:- 1. The Rakesh Trading Company and R. S. Enterprise were in occupation of the shops in dispute with the consent of the landlord since before the commencement of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976. 2. No suit or proceedings for eviction of the aforesaid persons was pending before any court or authority on the date of the commencement of the aforesaid Act. 2. No suit or proceedings for eviction of the aforesaid persons was pending before any court or authority on the date of the commencement of the aforesaid Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, however, directed the dispossession of the R. S. Enterprise and Rakesh Trading Company on the ground that as nominees of the landlord they could not lawfully resist the claim of the allottee's to take possession under valid orders of allotment. 5. Both R. S. Enterprise and Rakesh Trading Company filed revisions under Section 18 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The learned District Judge hearing the two revisions has endorsed the aforesaid two findings of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and has held that the said concerns were in occupation of the shops in dispute with the consent of the landlord since before the commencement of U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 and that no suit or proceedings for eviction of these persons was pending. The learned District Judge has held that, inasmuch as, both the requisite conditions mentioned in Section 14 were present, the aforesaid two concerns clearly became entitled to the benefit of Section 14 irrespective of the fact that proceedings for eviction were pending against the landlord. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the benefit of Section 14 is not claimable by a tenant even if he was in occupation with the consent of the landlord prior to the coming into force of U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976. if there was a valid order of allotment in favour of a third person. He submitted that the view of the learned District Judge that the mere fact that some proceedings for the eviction of the landlord were pending on 5-7-1976, would make no difference to the applicability of Section 14 is manifestly erroneous in tion. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merits in this petition. 8. Before the amendment of Section 14 by U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976, it read as follows:- "14 Regularisation of occupation of existing tenants. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merits in this petition. 8. Before the amendment of Section 14 by U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976, it read as follows:- "14 Regularisation of occupation of existing tenants. Notwithstanding anything contained in any general order made under subsection (2) of Section 7 of the old Act, any tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of this Act, not being a person against whom proceedings under Section 7-A of the old Act are pending immediately before such commencement, shall be deemed to be in authorised occupation of such building". 9. After its amendment by U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976, Section 14 reads thus: "14. Regularisation of occupation of existing tenants - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, any licensee (within the meaning of Section 2-A) or a tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976, not being a person against whom any suit or proceedings for eviction is pending before I any court or authority on the date of such commencement shall be deemed to be an authorised licensee or tenant of such building." 10. The changes brought about by the amendment of U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 are striking. The unamended section 14 commenced with the words, "notwithstanding any general order mad under sub-sec. (2) of Section 7" of the old Act ........... that is, a special order of allotment which may have been passed) under section 7 in favour of a third part was still enforceable at law notwithstanding the provisions of section 14. The above quoted words are conspicuous by their absence from the amended section 14. The conclusion which logically flows from these legislative changes is that even a special order of allotment has to give way to claim under section 14 as it now stands. 11. The above quoted words are conspicuous by their absence from the amended section 14. The conclusion which logically flows from these legislative changes is that even a special order of allotment has to give way to claim under section 14 as it now stands. 11. After its amendment, Section 14 postulates only two pre-conditions for its application, namely; (1) the claimant should be in occupation of the accommodation in question as a tenant with the consent of the landlord prior to the commencement of the Amending Act, (2 No suit or proceedings for the eviction of that tenant should be pending in any court. The legislative intent in introducing the amendments in Section 14 is clear and explicit. The tenant claiming benefit under Section 14 can be deprived of rights conferred thereunder only if some proceedings for eviction are pending before any court or authority on the date of commencement of the Amending Act against him. A mere existence of an order of allotment would, therefore, not be sufficient to deprive the tenant of the privilege embodied in Section 14. It is only the proceedings commenced in pursuance of a valid order of allotment for the eviction of a person in occupation of a building, which, if pending on the relevant date, could deprive the tenant of the right conferred under Section 14. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this court in Ravindra Kumar v. Ram Chandra Kohili reported in 1973 All WR (HC) 121: (1973 All LJ 162). That decision is on assistance. Firstly, it was construing the legal position as it existed in the year 1973, that is, as Section 14 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, stood prior to its amendment in 1976. Secondly, the Division Bench it- self has observed that if the conditions of Section 14 are satisfied, it would provide a valid defence to the proceedings for dispossession of the existing tenant. This decision therefore far from supporting the petitioner, completely helps the contesting respondents. 13. The next submission was that Section 14 could not be pressed in aid of the respondents, inasmuch as, proceedings for eviction of the tenant were pending on the date of the commencement of U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 and these respondents were his mere representatives. I find no substance in the argument. 13. The next submission was that Section 14 could not be pressed in aid of the respondents, inasmuch as, proceedings for eviction of the tenant were pending on the date of the commencement of U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976 and these respondents were his mere representatives. I find no substance in the argument. The words "not being a person against whom any suit or proceedings" (Emphasis added) occurring in Section 14 are clear and unambiguous. They clearly indicate that the tenant claiming the benefit should not himself be a person against whom proceedings for eviction may be pending on the relevant date. I agree with the learned District Judge that the other interpretation would amount to reading something in Section 14 which is not there. Consequently, it must be held that the aforesaid two concerns, were on the findings of facts recorded by both the courts below, entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Act and the learned District Judge was right in upholding their claim. 14. It may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the petitioner did not challenge the findings recorded by both the courts below that the aforesaid two concerns were tenants in occupation of the shops in dispute with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1976. 15. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that these petitions fail and are dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.