( 1 ) THIS is a petition for revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 7-1-1977 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner as barred by time and also dismissing the application for condonation of delay filed before it under Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). ( 2 ) IT appears that the petitioner had filed a suit for possession and recovery of Rs. 434. 00 as damages at the rate of Rupees 60. 00 p. m. for the period 1-2-1975 to 31-8-1975, and also for recovery of Rupees 14. 00 as water charges for the same period at the rate of Rs. 2. 00 per month against the respondents who are the legal representatives of one Om Prakash Kaura. ( 3 ) THE case of the petitioner in the plaint was that Om Prakash Kaura was his tenant in respect of a room in house No. 16/10181-82, Gurdwara Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The petitioner terminated the tenancy of Om Prakash Kaura by notice dated 1-1-1970 and thereafter Om Prakash became a statutory tenant. Om Prakash died on 16-3-1975 and at the time of his death he was in possession of the said room as statutory tenant and now the legal representatives (respondents) are in illegal occupation of the premises in dispute, ( 4 ) THE respondents contested the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as there exists relationship of landlord rod tenant between the parties and the defendant-respondents had inherited tenancy rights of their father who was a contractual tenant in the suit premises and the tenancy of Om Prakash was never terminated. ( 5 ) FROM the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court had, inter alia framed the following issues: (1) Whether the civil court has got no jurisdiction in the case? (2) Whether the plaintiff legally terminated the tenancy of Om Prakash? If go, its effect? ( 5 ) FROM the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court had, inter alia framed the following issues: (1) Whether the civil court has got no jurisdiction in the case? (2) Whether the plaintiff legally terminated the tenancy of Om Prakash? If go, its effect? ( 6 ) THE issue relating to the question whether the civil Court has got no jurisdiction in the case was treated as a preliminary issue and the learned trial Court by order dated 7-4-1976 took the view that the respondents has inherited the tenancy rights of deceased Om Prakash and, therefore, they are tenants of the plaintiff and thus the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. ( 7 ) AFTER giving the aforesaid finding, the learned trial Court directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff to be filed in the proper Court, ( 8 ) AGAINST the aforesaid order of the learned trial Court, the. petitioner filed a petition for revision in this Court on 3-9-1976 purporting to be under Sec. 115 Civil Procedure Code. ( 9 ) THE dealing assistant in the Registry of this Court took an objection that it should be stated as to how the "c. R. P. " is maintainable against the impugned order whereas remedy of appeal is available under the provisions of O. 43, Rule 1 (a) Civil Procedure Code and stated that it should be correctly specified. This objection was approved by the Deputy Registrar concerned on 7-9-1976 and the petition was directed to be returned to be refiled within a week. The petitioner through his counsel lcv, received back the revision petition from the Registry on 13-10-1976 and instead of replying to the objections raised by the Registry filed an appeal before the Court of the District Judge, Delhi, against the aforesaid order of the learned trial Court dated 7-4-1976. The learned counsel presented the original revision petition itself before the Court of the District Judge and requested that the revision petition be treated as appeal. Along with the appeal, an application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Act read with Section 151 of the Code was filed for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and for treating the revision petition as an appeal and the grounds of revision petition to be treated as grounds of appeal. Along with the appeal, an application under Sections 5 and 14 of the Act read with Section 151 of the Code was filed for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and for treating the revision petition as an appeal and the grounds of revision petition to be treated as grounds of appeal. ( 10 ) THE aforesaid application along with the original revision petition was filed in the Court of the District Judge on 14-10-1976. The application for condonation of delay was supported by an affidavit of the Advocate concerned as well as an affidavit of the petitioner. ( 11 ) IN the application for condonation of delay, it was stated that the petitioner took the certified copy of the impugned order on or about 7-7-1976, and consulted "lcv", Advocate, as to whether an appeal or revision was to be filed against the impugned order. "lcv" advised that the revision petition was to be filed against the impugned order and accordingly the revision petition was filed through Shri "lcv" on 3-9-1976. ( 12 ) IT was then averred in the application that on 13-10-1976 "lcv", Advocate "enquired it" from the Registry of the High Court as to why the revision petition was not listed for hearing and he was told that the revision was lying under objection tor being returned. The revision petition was taken back from the Registry oh the same day i. e. 13-10-1976. "lcv" read the objection and the revision petition, studied the matter and realised that due to bona fide mistake the revision petition had been filed instead of an appeal. The Advocate called the petitioner in Court on 14-10-1976 and told him the above stated facts and was also informed that the revision petition, which was filed in the High Court was being filed as an appeal. It was also stated that the petitioner-appellant had been bona fide prosecuting with due diligence another proceedings against the impugned order and he bona fide believed that the revision petition was to be filed against the impugned order and there is sufficient cause for preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. It was also stated that the petitioner-appellant had been bona fide prosecuting with due diligence another proceedings against the impugned order and he bona fide believed that the revision petition was to be filed against the impugned order and there is sufficient cause for preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. ( 13 ) IN the affidavit filed in support thereof was sworn by "lcv" who stated that the petitioner has contacted him on 7-7-1976 along with the certified copy of the judgment under appeal and had consulted him as to whether appeal or revision was to be filed against the said order. The affidavit further stated: "i honestly believed and was of the opinion that a revision petition was to be filed against the said order and I advised Shri Babu Ram accordingly", ( 14 ) IT was also stated in the affidavit that he accordingly filed the revision petition in the High Court on 3-9- 1976. The said revision petition was to be listed for hearing after about five weeks but the same was not listed. On 13-10-1976 he enquired about it from the Registry of the High Court as to why the petition was not listed for hearing. He was told that the revision petition was lying under objection for being returned. The revision petition was accordingly taken back in the same date and after reading the petition, he realised that due to bona fide mistake the revision petition was advised by him to be filed instead of filing an appeal. It is further stated by the Advocate that he called the petitioner on 14-10-1976 and informed him of the aforesaid facts and thereafter the petitioner-appellant filed the appeal immediately. ( 15 ) THIS application for condonation of delay was opposed on behalf of the re- spondents. The plea taken in the revision was that the application is mala fide, that the revision petition was not filed in good faith and a bare look at the provision ofOrder 43, Rule 1 (a) of the Code would have satisfied any counsel that the matter was appealable and revision could be filed only if no appeal lay as is specially provided in Section 115 of the Code. ( 16 ) THE learned Additional District Judge, as stated earlier, dismissed the application for condonation of delay. ( 16 ) THE learned Additional District Judge, as stated earlier, dismissed the application for condonation of delay. He took the view that the Registry of the High Court had raised an objection that the revision petition was not competent and had directed its return on 4-9-1976, yet the revision petition was taken back from the Registry of the High Court only On 13-10-1976 and filed it as an appeal before the District Judge on 14-10-1976. The delay during the period 4-9-1976 has not been explained. The learned Additional District Judge also took the view that even if it be said that there was error on part of the counsel in giving wrong advice to the appellant, learned counsel for the appellant very well knew on 4-9-1976 that the appeal only was maintainable and revision petition did not lie and despite this knowledge no steps had been taken and filing of appeal after such a long delay cannot be attributed entirely to the advice of the counsel. The learned Additional District Judge also took the view that there is no bona fide mistake in filing the revision petition and thus held that there is no ground for condonation of delay. ( 17 ) MR. The learned Additional District Judge also took the view that there is no bona fide mistake in filing the revision petition and thus held that there is no ground for condonation of delay. ( 17 ) MR. Gopal Narain, learned counsel for the petitioner, has assailed the order of learned Additional District Judge, inter alia, on the ground that the revision peti- tion was filed by the petitioner on the bona fide advice of a counsel of long standing and it was due to his mistaken advice that instead of filing an appeal, a revision petition had been filed in the High Court and as soon as the memorandum of revision petition was returned by the High Court, immediately on the next day the memorandum of the revision was filed in the court of the District Judge with a request to treat the revision petition as an appeal along with an application for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit of the counsel and thus there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act and also there was good ground for exclusion of time under Section 14 of the-Act as the petitioner was prosecuting the revision petition bona fide in good faith in wrong court and as soon as the mistake was pointed out the revision petition was taken back and filed as an appeal in the court of the District Judge. He thus contended that there was sufficient cause and delay should have been condoned. ( 18 ) IT was also submitted that there was nothing to show that the error of the counsel was tainted by any mala fide motive. ( 19 ) BEFORE I deal with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, a few more dates may also be noticed. ( 20 ) AFTER the impugned order was pronounced by the learned trial court on 7-4-1976, the petitioner applied for certified copy on 8-4-1976 and the copy was ready for delivery on 22-6-1976. It is thus clear that limitation for appeal to the court of the District Judge (which is one month) expired on or about 22-7-1976. ( 21 ) THE revision petition was filed in the High Court on 3-9-1976. As on 3-9-1976 even if the appeal had been filed, it would have been barred by time. It is thus clear that limitation for appeal to the court of the District Judge (which is one month) expired on or about 22-7-1976. ( 21 ) THE revision petition was filed in the High Court on 3-9-1976. As on 3-9-1976 even if the appeal had been filed, it would have been barred by time. ( 22 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, however, relied on the affidavit of lcv to the effect that he "honestly believed and was of the opinion that a revision petition was to be filed against the said order" and "he advised Shri Babu Ram accordingly". The learned counsel submitted that this constitutes sufficient cause as well as good faith of the petitioner in prosecuting the revision petition instead of doing in appeal. ( 23 ) THERE is no universal rule that every mistaken advice given by the counsel constitutes sufficient cause or constitutes "good faith". Every case depends on its own facts. In some cases a bonafide opinion given by a counsel can constitute sufficient cause. It all depends how the opinion is given. If the opinion is given after taking due care and attention then it will amount to "good faith" as well as "sufficient cause". If the Opinion is given off-hand without taking trouble of knowing the law on the point it may not constitute sufficient cause and/or "good faith". Unfortunately, in the present case, the learned counsel who gave the affidavit does not mention how he honestly believed that a revision petition was to be filed. There is no magic in the senior counsel saying that he "honestly gave the opinion. " The senior counsel or for that matter any other counsel ought to further tell the court why he honestly gave that opinion. What was it that led him to give the mistaken advice? Was it something in the impugned judgment which led him to give such an advice or was there something in the law which made him give the mistaken advice. It is not sufficient in such cases to merely state that i am a senior counsel or i am a very experienced counsel and I gave the opinion . Which is of no use. The Court naturally expects that the counsel concerned while choosing to file an affidavit for giving mistaken advice would also state what led him to give such an advice. Which is of no use. The Court naturally expects that the counsel concerned while choosing to file an affidavit for giving mistaken advice would also state what led him to give such an advice. If this much is not expected from a counsel, it may lead to arbitrary decisions by Courts. ( 24 ) SO far as the litigant public is concerned, they have engaged a counsel and every counsel is supposed to have the necessary knowledge of law. Merely because the mistake is committed by a senior counsel does not necessarily mean that the mistaken advice was given bona fide or that it should constitute sufficient cause. Nature of the mistaken advice being bona fide would depend on the facts as to what led the learned counsel to give such an advice. ( 25 ) UNFORTUNATELY, as I have stated earlier, the affidavit-of the learned counsel is completely silent about it. The moment the Registry took the objection immediately on the filing of the revision petition and the moment the learned counsel learnt of the objection, he ought to have replied as to why, in his opinion the revision petition could be filed. In fact, he did not reply at all. Indeed, he had no answer to the objection raised by the Registry. ( 26 ) THE provisions of Rule 1 (a) of Order 43, Civil Procedure Code are very clear. By reading it, one cannot entertain two opinions about it. ( 27 ) IN these circumstances, it cannot, be held as a matter of law the advice! given by the learned Counsel was in good faith as contemplated by Section 14 of the Act and on the same ground it would not constitute "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. ( 28 ) IT has been the consistent practice to construe Section 5 of the Act liberally provided there are no mala fides. ( 29 ) A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of Mata Din v. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 . There, an appeal which ought to have been filed in the High Court on proper calculation of valuation for purposes of jurisdiction, was filed before the Court of the District Judge. ( 29 ) A similar question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of Mata Din v. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 . There, an appeal which ought to have been filed in the High Court on proper calculation of valuation for purposes of jurisdiction, was filed before the Court of the District Judge. The Court of the District Judge returned the appeal for being presented to the proper Court and when it was refiled in the High Court, it was found to be barred by time. The learned counsel not only refiled the appeal in the High Court but separately challenged the order returning the appeal, by way of revision petition, for being filed in the High Court. For his view, why he had filed the appeal in the Court of the District Judge instead of filing in the High Court, the learned counsel gave explanation by way of relying upon a particular rule. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court considered the mistaken advice of the counsel as having been given bona fide and in good faith and thus held that it constituted "sufficient cause" tor condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the proper Court. ( 30 ) BUT, what is the position in our case. Here, the advice is given and on that basis after the limitation for appeal has expired a revision petition is filed. (It may be stated that whereas limitation for appeal before the District Judge was one month limitation for revision or appeal before the High Court is 90 days i. e. three times that of the District Judge ). ( 31 ) THE Registry of this Court immediately points out that only appeal is competent and the revision petition returned. The counsel gives no reply as to why he chooses to file the revision petition and instead accepts the petition and files same by way of an appeal, before the District Judge. This really shows that the opinion given by the learned counsel was not given in good faith and in such a case the mistaken advice of the learned counsel will neither constitute "good faith" under Section 14 of the Act nor "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Act for exclusion of time and/or for condonation of delay. This really shows that the opinion given by the learned counsel was not given in good faith and in such a case the mistaken advice of the learned counsel will neither constitute "good faith" under Section 14 of the Act nor "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Act for exclusion of time and/or for condonation of delay. ( 32 ) THERE is no formula that a person is merely to plead mistaken legal advice, The basis of mistaken legal advice should also be disclosed to enable the court to see whether the advice tendered was bona fide or reckless. Such a basis of explanation was neither given before the Additional District Judge nor before this Court entitling the petitioner for condonation of delay. ( 33 ) THERE is yet another way of looking at the problem. The revision petition was filed on 3-9-1976. For more than five weeks neither the counsel nor the petitioner made any enquiry from the Registry as to what transpired to the revision petition. It is just a matter of chance that the counsel thought of finding out on 13-10-1976 about the date of the revision petition from the Registry. It might as well have been that he would not have gone for a couple of months to enquire about it. It is the practice of the High Court and the learned counsel, who had filed the revision petition, is conversant with the practice of this Court that all petitions which are found defective are notified immediately on the notice board of the Court and the counsel normally go through that list in order to rectify the objections it any. The list containing particulars of the defective petitions continues to be exhibited on the notice board for a considerable time. If a counsel does not choose even to consult the list, sits in his office and goes to check up the matter at his sweet-will it cannot be said that he learnt of the -mistake only on 13-10-1976 when he went to the Registry, as in the present case, ( 34 ) SO far as the registry is concerned, it has immediately pointed out the defect and there is no affidavit of the learned counsel to show that be did not learn of the mistake earlier. There is no explanation whatsoever for this either before the learned Additional District Judge or before this Court detailing the cause of delay right from the date the petition was ordered to be returned i. e. 7-9-1976 till 13-10-1876 when the petition was actually taken back. ( 35 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am satisfied that the learned Additional District Judge was right in dismissing the application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay in entertaining the appeal. ( 36 ) THE result is Hart the revision petition fails and is dismissed. ( 37 ) PARTIES are, how-ever, left to bear their own costs.