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1980 DIGILAW 143 (BOM)

SHRI DNYANESHWAR MADHURADWAIT SAMPRADAYIK MANDAL, AMRAVATI v. CHARITY COMMISSIONER, Bombay

1980-06-21

M.R.WAIKAR, R.D.TULPULE

body1980
JUDGMENT WAIKAR J.- This first appeal is filed by the unsuccessful applicant against dismissal of his application under section 72 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (called hereinafter the Act) by the Extra Assistant Judge, Amravati. It was prayed that the order passed by the Deputy Charity Commissioner confirming the order passed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Akola be set aside. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that the late Gulabrao Maharaj, who was blind from his birth and possessed certain occult powers, was regarded by Hindu public as a saint who propagated the religious teachings and philosophy of the Vedas. He had established in his life-time a Sampradaya of his own, which was called "Shri Dnyaneshwar Madhuradwait Sampradaya". He executed a will under which he dedicated all his self-acquired property for performing Puja of the foot prints (Padukas) of Shri Dnyaneshwar Maharaj and the image of Shrikrishna, which were the objects of his worship during his life-time and which also became the objects of worship of his followers after his death. The property which he thus dedicated for the religious worship and teachings of his Sampradaya was handed over by him to 9 persons who were the trustees-cum-executors of the said will. In the year 1953, the survivors of the trustees and the executors of the will and other disciples of late Gulabrao Maharaj formed a Society named "Shri Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sampradayik Mandai" as a permanent arrangement for the due administration of the properties of the Sansthan. This Society so formed was registered under the Societies Registration Act on 5th March 1953. The Memorandum of Association of the Mandal and the rules and regulations regarded as "instrument" of the Trust governed the administration of the trust property at the bands of this Mandal. 3. The Assistant Charity Commissioner found that this Society registered under the Societies Registration Act was a public trust within the meaning of section 2 (13) of the Act. He negatived the contention that was put forth by the Mandal that it constituted a private trust established for the benefit of the followers of the Sampradaya, which was a limited and ascertained class and not for the benefit of all Hindu public in general. 4. He negatived the contention that was put forth by the Mandal that it constituted a private trust established for the benefit of the followers of the Sampradaya, which was a limited and ascertained class and not for the benefit of all Hindu public in general. 4. The Deputy charity Commissioner in the appeal under section 70 of the Act, maintained the above finding, dismissing the appeal that was preferred, whereupon an application under section 12 of the Act came to be filed before the Extra Assistant Judge, Amravati, woo also dismissed the same and hence this first appeal. 5. The only point that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the lower Court and the authorities concerned erred in holding that the Mandal was a public trust within the meaning of section 2 (13) of the Act. 6. It is not necessary for us to turn to the terms of the will of late Gulabrao Maharaj. The object and purpose of the Society, as mentioned in clause 2 of the Memorandum of Association alone needs reference for the purpose of the present enquiry. It appears that the object of the Society was to establish, run and subsidise religious and educational institutions with a view to advance the cause of religious, mental and moral education of the equal public in general according to the principles propounded in Sampradaya Surataru and of the followers of late Gulabrao Maharaj in particular. Sub-clause (c) of clause (2) of this Memorandum of Association of the Mandal stated that one of the objects of this Society was to print, edit and publish the various writings of Shri Gulabrao Maharaj and to take steps to propagate his teachings in the public for religious, moral and mental uplift of the people. 7. All these objects of the society clearly point out that this Society was formed primarily for religious teachings and worship, if not also for a charitable purpose. Thus there could be no doubt that this Mandal or Society was formed for religious purpose and was registered under the Societies Registration Act. In fact the said object is writ large in several clauses of the Memorandum of Association and Shri Chandurkar, appearing for the appellant, also did not dispute this position. This finding pronounced by the lower Court and the concerned authorities, therefore, calls for no interference. 8. In fact the said object is writ large in several clauses of the Memorandum of Association and Shri Chandurkar, appearing for the appellant, also did not dispute this position. This finding pronounced by the lower Court and the concerned authorities, therefore, calls for no interference. 8. Section 2 (13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 which defines ·'public trust" is in the following terms: "2 (13) "public trust" means an express or constructive trust for either a public, religious or charitable purpose or both and includes a. temple, a math, a wakf, church synagogue, agiary or other place of public religious worship, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed either for a religious or charitable purpose or for both and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860." 9. The present case falls under the last clause of this definition and satisfies both the conditions, namely, that it is a registered society under the Societies Registration Act and as pointed out above, the society was formed for a religious purpose. 10. Shri Chandurkar, the learned counsel for the appellant, referred us to Gurpur Guni Venkataraya v. B. C. Achis1 and The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das2. The first case was under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act and the question was whether the temple in question was a public temple or a temple belonging to Goud Sara swats and the decision mainly turned on the definition of the term 'Temple' as defined in the said Act with reference to the circumstances disclosed in evidence as to whether the Hindu generally used the temple as a place of worship as of right. The second case was under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act and the question involved for consideration was whether the properties in question were properties of public trust within the meaning of the term Religious Trust as defined under that Act. Both these cases, in our opinion, are of little assistance so far as the present matter is concerned. 11. The second case was under the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act and the question involved for consideration was whether the properties in question were properties of public trust within the meaning of the term Religious Trust as defined under that Act. Both these cases, in our opinion, are of little assistance so far as the present matter is concerned. 11. Lastly Shri Chandurkar referred to Administrator of Shringeri Math v. Charity Commissioner, Bombay3 and particularly to the following observations made therein by the Division Bench: "In our view, therefore, the enumeration following the word "includes" in the definition of "public trust" in clause (13) is illustrative and was not intended to extend the definition to private institutions. These are enumerated as answer to a possible argument that they are not express trusts nor constructive trusts. In our view, in order to amount to a "public trust" within the Act the institution must be for the benefit of the public or a section of it." 12. Based on these observations, what is argued by Shri Chandurkar is that the word "public" must be read preceding the expression "Religious or Charitable purpose" in section 2 (13) of the Act, since it is necessary that the society must be formed for public religious or public charitable purpose. This argument in a way postulates that the society in question was to carry on its activities for the benefit of the limited number of its members and not for the benefit of the public at large. In fact the aim of this Mandal or Society is to educate the members of the public and to uplift their standard in general according to the principles propounded by the Sampradaya and as such any member of the public could follow the same and take benefit of the trust. 13. What was observed by the Division Bench in the above ruling of this Court was that the definition of the word 'trust' was not happily worded and it must mean a public temple or a Math. Referring further to the definition of the words "Temple" and "Math", it was observed that these definitions clearly bring out that they must be dedicated for the public use or they must be used by the Hindu community or a section of it as of right. Referring further to the definition of the words "Temple" and "Math", it was observed that these definitions clearly bring out that they must be dedicated for the public use or they must be used by the Hindu community or a section of it as of right. The dispute related to a Math (Shringeri) which is one of the institutions enumerated following the word "includes" in the definition of "public trust" and what was observed was that though the word 'public' did not precede any of these institutions, in order to come within the definition of 'public trust', it must first come under the definition of a Math or a temple which are separately defined in the Act and it must further satisfy the qualification that it is public. The above observations, in our opinion, have no application here because the present case does not fall under the illustrative definition of the term 'public trust'. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act, in our view, intrinsically differs from the institutions mentioned is the earlier part and since the activities of such a registered society would always be considered for the benefit of the public or a section of public, there is no necessity to read the word 'public' before the expression "religious or charitable purpose or for both" appearing in the last part of the definition. In other words, in case of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, the fact that its object is either religious or charitable or both will itself render such a society a 'public trust' within the meaning of the definition. Assuming, however, the last part of the definition should not be read disjunctively, since the words 'public religious or charitable' occur in the earlier part, it was not necessary to duplicate these words again. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the fact that the religious activities of the Mandal were meant not for any limited ascertained section but for the benefit of the public at large is manifest from the Memorandum of Association. 14. In our opinion, therefore, the present case clearly and squarely falls under the last clause of the definition of "public trust", as it satisfies the two requisite conditions, namely, that it is a society formed for a religious purpose and that it is registered under the Societies Registration Act. 14. In our opinion, therefore, the present case clearly and squarely falls under the last clause of the definition of "public trust", as it satisfies the two requisite conditions, namely, that it is a society formed for a religious purpose and that it is registered under the Societies Registration Act. The finding of the concerned authorities and of the lower Court that it is a public trust, therefore, is proper and calls for no interference. 15. In the result, therefore, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.