JUDGMENT Anil K Sen. J. After lapse of more than ten long years, the petitioners in this Rule have filed an application for restoration of the Rule after vacating an order dated December 16, 1969. By that order a Division Bench of this Court had recorded abatement of the Rule on account of non-sub-situation of the heirs and legal representative of the sole opposite party Parimal Kumar Dutta who died on July 25, 1968. 2. Parimal Kumar Dutta instituted a proceeding under S. 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act against the petitioners claiming their eviction on two-fold grounds of (1) sub-letting and (2) default. In tribunals below it succeeded only on the ground of subletting but the plea of defaults was overruled. Parimal Kumar Dutta moved this court on an application under Article 227 of the Constitution an this Court having found the petitioner to be default remanded the proceeding for assessment of the arrears and affording relief under S.6 of the said Act. After such remand, the Controller assessed the arrears of rent but in doing so excluded the corporation taxes payble by the petitioner on the view that such taxes do not constitute a part of the rent. Parimal Kumar Dutta preferred an appeal and the appellate tribunal; reversed the Controller on the point by the order dated July 28, 1966. The petitioner challenged the said order in an application under Article 227 of the Constitution on which the above Rule was issued. 3. Pending the Rule when the sole opposite party died, on the petitioner' own representation this Court recorded the following order, viz : "It is stated before us by the learned advocate for the petitioners, that on account of non-substitution of the heirs of the deceased opposite party in time, this Rule has abated. Let necessary note of abatement be made accordingly. 4. On February 12, 1980, the petitioners have filed the present application praying for an order vacating the aforesaid order dated December 16, 1969 and restoring the Rule to file. According to them an application under Article 227 of the Constitution does not abale and what the petitioners' advocate represented to this Court to the contrary on December 16, 1969 is erroneous; that led to recorded of an erroneous noted of abatement to the serious prejudice of the petitioner. According to them an application under Article 227 of the Constitution does not abale and what the petitioners' advocate represented to this Court to the contrary on December 16, 1969 is erroneous; that led to recorded of an erroneous noted of abatement to the serious prejudice of the petitioner. Hence in the interest of justice the erroneous note in the order sheet should be vacated. It is further claimed that when the proceeding has yet not finally ended, it would not prejudice the heirs and legal representative of the opposite Party. 5. Relying strongly on the full Bench decisions in cases of Chandra Das v. Sukdeo AIR 1972 Allahbad 504, Babulal v. Mannilal, AIR 1953 Raj 169 & Md. Sadat Ali v. Lahore Corporation, AIR 1949 Lah 186 it has been contended by Mr. Mitter appearing on behalf of the petitioner that when Order 22 rule 4 of the Code does not apply to a revision application like the present one under Article 227 of the Constitution and when there is no limitation prescribed for filing an application for substitution in such a proceeding there could have been no abatement on the death of parimal Kumar Dutta nor could any note of abatement be recorded as done in the present case. 6. Mr. Banerjee who was appearing for parimal Kumar Dutta has opposed this application on three-fold grounds. In the first place it has been contended by him that when on a revision petition the power exercised is really appellate. Order 22 rule 4 would apply when read with order 22 rule 11 in any event it has been contended by him that a least principle recognized by order 22 rule 3 and 4 should be made applicable to such cases because this Court cannot proceed a party who is dead and whose heirs and legal representative have not been brought on record in time Secondly it has been contended by Mr. Banerjee that when the petitioner themselves had such abatement recorded, it is obvious that they never wanted to proceed any further and they cannot now turn around and ask for an order vacating such an earlier order brought about by them. Thirdly Mr. Banerjee has contended that the present application is barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act when it was not filed within at least three years from the date of recording the abatement. 7. Thirdly Mr. Banerjee has contended that the present application is barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act when it was not filed within at least three years from the date of recording the abatement. 7. The main point of controversy before us is as to whether in this case there was any abatement of the Rule issued on the application under Article 227 of the Constitution for non-substituting the heirs and legal representatives of the sole opposite party in time after his death. Rule 3 and 4 of order 22 of the Code on its terms apply to suit and Rule 11 extends their application to appeals as well. If abatement be construed to be the statutory penalty prescribed by those rule for the defaults referred to there in then there can be no abasement beyond the terms of those rules. That was the view expressed by the three Full Bench decision relied on by Mr. Mitter. Considering the question whether there can be abatement of a Rule issued on an application under S.115 of the Code under similar circumstances, this Court in the cases of Yusuf Mondal v. Oman Ali, 1975 (2) CLJ 191 & State Bank of India v. S. Wajir Singh, AIR 1977 Cal 24 differing from the aforesaid Full Bench decision held that there would be abatement. But it was so held because this Court in view of the decision of the Supreme Court was of the view that revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S.115 is nothing but a pert of the application jurisdiction. This Court however, under Article 227 exercises no appellate jurisdiction ; it is a special jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. Therefore, if abatement be held to be limited to rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 of the Code, there could be no abatement of a Rule issued on an application under Article 227 of the Constitution though it nay be otherwise in case of a Ruled issued on application under S.115 on the Code. 8. But Mr. banerjee has further contended that even if rules 3 and 4 or Order 22 of the Code do not apply on their terms, yet the principles recognized by those rules would be applicable to proceeding not covered by those Rules because such a principle is not limited to those rules but only recognised by them. On this point Mr. banerjee has further contended that even if rules 3 and 4 or Order 22 of the Code do not apply on their terms, yet the principles recognized by those rules would be applicable to proceeding not covered by those Rules because such a principle is not limited to those rules but only recognised by them. On this point Mr. Banerjee is well supported by the weighty observation of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee in the case of Anandamoyee Dassi v. Rudra Mahanti, 18CLJ 141 based on an earlier decision of his own in the case of Deosaran v. Syedunnessa 16 CLJ 571. Though on fact the decision in the case of Anandamoyee Dassi v. Rudra Mahanti (supre) is distinguishable, as distinguished by the Allahabad High Court, the law on the point was, however, expressly enunciated by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee to say they principle recognized by rule 3 and 4 of Order 22 of the Code is applicable to revision cases. The true import of this decision is no doubt a matter of controversy before us but when we are going to dispose of the application on another point referred to hereinafter it is not necessary for us to resolve the controversy finally. 9. So far as the second objection raised by Mr. Banerjee is concerned we find no substance in it. If the representation made by their lawyer is based upon a bona fide mistake or misapprehension that certainly would not preclude them from praying for an order recalling an order passed on such representation. 10. The third objection raised by Mr. Banerjee raises the question whether the residuary provision in Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to an application now under consideration. According to Mr. Banerjee, this application if not made under any other provision of the Code was certainly made under S. 151 thereof and hence it must be governed by the residuary provision as to limitation under Article 137. In our view, however, there can be no limitation for an application of the present nature. A note of abatement has been recorded erroneously by the Court when there was actually no abatement in law. The Court can always strike out such an erroneous note and correct its own mistake acting on its own. The fact that the attention of the Court is drawn to such an error by the application makes no different. A note of abatement has been recorded erroneously by the Court when there was actually no abatement in law. The Court can always strike out such an erroneous note and correct its own mistake acting on its own. The fact that the attention of the Court is drawn to such an error by the application makes no different. Where the power to be exercised is irrespective of any application, to impose limitation on an application invoking such power is really to impose a limitation on the exorcise or that power which the Limitation Act never contemplated or intended By S.151, the Code concerns no powers, it only recognized existence of a power which the Court otherwise possesses and it now well settled that no period of limitation is proscribed for such an application. (See AIR 1962 Calcutta 110 & 46 CWN 326. 11. But though we accept the contention of Mr. Mitter that there is no limitation for an application of the present nature. Yet the Court would not exercise such powers in aid of the petitioners unless the Court is satisfied that there is no unreasonable delay disentitling the petitioners from having such an order from the court. On this point we are not satisfied that any such cases has been made out by the petitioners. Even assuming that there could have boon no abatement on the death of the solo opposite party, yet we are to consider whether in exercise of our discretion we should vacate he order dated December 16, 1969. after long ton years it appears to us that the petitioners not only represented that there has been abatement on account of non-substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased opposite party in time but took no steps to have the abatement set aside. For all practical purposes they failed to prosecute the said Rule for more than ten years. Even if the Court could not have disposed of the proceeding by recording abatement, yet when the necessary were not brought before the Court the Court could certainly have struck off the proceedings. For all practical purposes they failed to prosecute the said Rule for more than ten years. Even if the Court could not have disposed of the proceeding by recording abatement, yet when the necessary were not brought before the Court the Court could certainly have struck off the proceedings. Viewed from that angle, the Order dated December 16, 1969, could only be vacated if there is just cause made out Such cause has not been made out when there is no reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay Accepting the decision of the appellate tribunal al final, the parties have fought out the execution open this Court and it would not be just and proper now for the petitioners to reopen the said decision by reopening the Rule at such a late stage. In that view we dismiss this application. We make no order for costs. B.C. Chakraborti J. I agree. Application dismissed.