Judgment :- 1. Since we are holding in this appeal that the suit ought to have been dismissed by the court below on the plea of limitation raised by the defendant, we are stating only the facts which are necessary to appreciate the above said plea 2. The defendant in the suit, who is the appellant here, entered into a contract with the Kerala State Electricity Board, the plaintiff, for manufacture and delivery at Kuthuparamba of 1,000 R.C.C. Poles 24 ft. long. Later the work relating to 500 more poles of the same specifications was also awarded by the plaintiff under the same terms and conditions and to the earlier agreement of 20th March 1968 a supplemental schedule was signed by the parties on 15th July 1969. The work was completed on 6th March 1970. The plaintiff was to supply to the contractor cement and M. S., rods required for the work and the value of such supply was to be recovered from the contractor's bill. The surplus materials that remained with the defendant after completion of the work was to be returned to the plaintiff at his store and receipts obtained from the Store Keeper. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendant did not return the surplus materials. A registered letter was sent to the defendant by the plaintiff on 14th December 1970 and this was followed by another letter dated 3rd March 1971. To this the defendant replied on 19th March 1971 denying his liability to the claim for return of M. S. rods as demanded in the notice. The plaintiff thereafter sued the defendant for the value of 11426 kgs. of M. S. rods, 259 kgs. of cement and 1541 empty gunny cement bags. Defendant disputed the liability on the plea that there was no excess with him for return, that the plaintiff was at any rate not entitled to calculate fine or storage charges on the value of the materials supplied and further that the suit itself was barred by limitation. The suit was filed on 18th March 1974. The plaintiff had pleaded in the plaint an acknowledgment letter of the defendant dated 19th March 1971 and the suit was within three years of the date of the said letter. 3. The suit was filed on 18th March 1974. The plaintiff had pleaded in the plaint an acknowledgment letter of the defendant dated 19th March 1971 and the suit was within three years of the date of the said letter. 3. The court below found that defendant was liable to return the materials as claimed by the plaintiff, that the amounts claimed as storage charges and the fine were reasonable and that the suit was not barred by limitation. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant addressed us on the question of the propriety of the imposition of fine. According to him it had not been shown that the plaintiff was entitled to any reasonable compensation on account of the default of the defendant. Counsel also contended that Exts. A-6 to A-9 certificates which alone were signed by the defendant would show that there was no excess issued to the defendant. If we find that the suit is barred by limitation it may not be necessary to go into the merits and therefore we will first deal with the question of limitation. 5. The suit is beyond the period of three years from the date when the work under the contract was completed. Defendant has no case that the suit will be within time if Ext. A4 is not shown to operate as an acknowledgment of liability. Therefore we need only consider whether Ext. A4 acknowledges the subsistence of the liability urged by the plaintiff in the suit. 6. It is necessary to refer to the contents of Ext. A4 That was in reply to Ext. A3 notice issued by the Executive Engineer of the plaintiff to the defendant. Ext A3 letter dated 3-3-1971 was itself in continuation of the earlier notice dated 14-12-1970 to which reference has been made therein. In Ext. A3 the Executive Engineer mentioned the quantity of M.S. rods and cement which the defendant was found liable to return and also indicated their value and the fine and storage charges. It is in reply to this that Ext. A4 was sent. The body of Ext. A4 reads thus: 'I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 14th December 1970 and the second letter dated 3rd March 1971. When I received your first letter I was laid up and it is regretted to say I was unable to send you a reply. A4 was sent. The body of Ext. A4 reads thus: 'I acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 14th December 1970 and the second letter dated 3rd March 1971. When I received your first letter I was laid up and it is regretted to say I was unable to send you a reply. I hereby deny the allegations contained in your second letter dated 3rd March 1971 that I have to return large quantities of balance of M. S. rods with me. I have all the accounts in regard to the work of M. S. rods as per the date given to me by the Department. Only on submitting all the date I can impress upon you that I am not liable to return as much quantities as referred to in your letter. As I am not fully recovered from my illness I request you to be kind enough to grant me two weeks time to file all details in regard to the use of M.S. rods supplied to me by the Department." It is evident that the claim for return of large quantities of balance M.S. rods was specifically denied by the defendant. Mention is made that the defendant had accounts in regard to M. S. rods issued to him by the Department. It is also mentioned therein that if all the data is given to him, he could impress upon the Executive Engineer that he was not liable to return as much quantity as is referred to in the plaintiff's letter. The learned Subordinate Judge, who disposed of the suit, was evidently of the view that since the statement in Ext. A-4 could be read to mean that he admits the liability for some quantity of M. S. rods, it would operate as an admission to save limitation. There is no admission in Ext. A-4 concerning liability to return any specific quantity of M. S. rods. Assuming that the statement in Ext. A-4 amounts to an admission that some quantity of M. S. rods was liable to be returned by the defendant to the plaintiff, but the defendant was not liable to return the quantity claimed in the notice for the value of which quantity the suit is filed, could it be said that Ext. A-4 will operate as an acknowledgment in regard to the liability which is the basis of the plaint claim. 7. A-4 will operate as an acknowledgment in regard to the liability which is the basis of the plaint claim. 7. If a person claims from another a sum of Rs. 10,000 and the other admits his liability to the extent of Rs. 100 only, would it operate as an acknowledgment for a claim of Rs 10,000. Though learned counsel for the respondent answered this in the affirmative, we don't think we could agree. According to learned counsel, acknowledgment operates on the basis of the admission of jural relationship and when once jural relationship is admitted, irrespective of the quantum of liability admitted, acknowledgment would operate to save the claim of the creditor. It is therefore said that when once in Ext. A-4 defendant impliedly admits his liability to return some quantity of M. S. rods while expressly denying his liability for the quantity mentioned in the notice it must be taken to be an admission of a jural relationship of debtor and creditor between the plaintiff and the defendant and that, according to counsel, would be sufficient to consider Ext. A-4 operating as an acknowledgment. 8. As we have indicated a person may deny the claim of another made against him and he may couple it with an admission of a liability to some extent. It would then be an admission of a jural relationship of creditor and debtor to the extent of the sum admitted. In a case where 'A' claims from 'B' a sum of Rs. 10,000/- 'B' admits the receipt of Rs 10,000/- from 'A' but pleads discharge by payment of Rs. 5,000/- and admits the liability only to the extent of Rs. 5,000/- as outstanding, even though the jural relationship of creditor and debtor at the inception to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- is admitted, the subsistence of a liability of only Rs. 5,000/- is admitted his admission would operate only as an acknowledgment to the extent of Rs. 5,000/-. This would be irrespective of whether he is able to prove his plea of discharge or not. 9. What should happen in a case where an acknowledgment by a defendant is relied on by the plaintiff and the acknowledgment is not of the entire plaint claim but only a part of the plaint claim, the part being not specified? 5,000/-. This would be irrespective of whether he is able to prove his plea of discharge or not. 9. What should happen in a case where an acknowledgment by a defendant is relied on by the plaintiff and the acknowledgment is not of the entire plaint claim but only a part of the plaint claim, the part being not specified? It may happen that a person may dispute a claim against him while at the same time admitting that only a small amount' is due. If he does not specify such small amount, will such admission operate as an acknowledgement in respect of such amount? Evidently since, in such a case, the person who makes the admission does not specify the quantum of liability which subsists, it will not be possible to say that it operates as an acknowledgment in respect of any specific sum. In other words, it may be an acknowledgment of a part of the claim which part is not specified and so long as that is not specified, it cannot operate in respect of any particular sum. In such a case without anything more it would not be available as an acknowledgement to save limitation. 10. In an early case Kali Das v. Danapadi AIR. 1918 Calcutta 294 the High Court of Calcutta had occasion to consider the question of acknowledgment in a case where the defendant had acknowledged his liability to account to the plaintiff for the period upto 1904-05 while the plaintiff's claim was for accounting upto 1910. The case that since the liability to account was admitted such admission should operate as as acknowledgment of the liability to account in respect of the whole plaint claim was discountenanced by the learned Judges, It was found in that case that since there was a specific acknowledgment of a liability to account upto the year 1904-05, to that extent the suit would be saved by acknowledgment but that would not be an acknowledgment in respect of a claim for the subsequent period. That there must be a definite acknowledgment to operate as an acknowledgment under S.19 is evident from the very nature of the rights accruing from the incidence of acknowledgement. The Allahabad High Court, in Meharban Singh v. Panna Lal AIR. That there must be a definite acknowledgment to operate as an acknowledgment under S.19 is evident from the very nature of the rights accruing from the incidence of acknowledgement. The Allahabad High Court, in Meharban Singh v. Panna Lal AIR. 1926 Allahabad 75 considered a case where an endorsement on a money bond stated that accounts made up showed a certain sum and that a usufructuary mortgage was executed for a portion of the sum. It was not clear whether usufructuary mortgage was executed in lieu of the whole amount due to the creditor or whether the debtor still held himself bound to pay the balance of the debt. It was found that since the endorsement was not specific on the question whether there was a balance due to the creditor on the bond, it would not operate as an acknowledgment. 11. We do not think we should exert ourselves further to hold that when a debtor denies the claim made against him by the creditor such denial notwithstanding the implied admission of liability for a lesser unspecified sum, should operate as an acknowledgment of the entire claim to save the suit on the entire claim The debtor in such a case does not evidently intend to keep alive the whole debt and does not indicate intention on his part to acknowledge the subsisting liability for the whole sum Such intention stands negatived by the very denial by the debtor of the claim for the whole sum. If, as we have pointed out, the admission is. not of any specific sum but of some amount, that again cannot operate as acknowledgment, even in respect of a lesser sum, for, no court will be able to grant a decree in regard to 'some amount on the basis of such an acknowledgment In this view, we hold that the suit was barred by limitation and for that reason ought to have been dismissed. We allow the appeal and reverse the judgment and the decree of the court below. In the circumstances of the case, we direct parties to suffer costs in this appeal and in the court below.