( 1 ) THIS revision petition filed under s. 115 of CPC is by a deserted wife and is directed against the order dated, 3-3-1979 of the III Addl. District Judge, bangalore, on I. A. No. II in M. C. No. 10 of 1978. ( 2 ) ON 25-4-1977 a marriage was solemnized between the petitioner and the respondent under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act of 1954 (Cen. Act No. 43 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to a,s the Act.) For reasons that are not necessary to notice or examine in this case, even before the celebration of the first wedding anniversary, the respondent on 7-4-1978 has presented a petition undar S. 25 (iii) of the Act before the District Judge to grant a decree of mullity of the aforesaid marriage which is being resisted by the petitioner on diverse grounds. ( 3 ) ON 14-11-1978 the petitioner, under Section 36, of the Act filed an application LA. No. II, in the petition filed by the respondent seeking for a direction to him to pay Rs. 5,000/- towards legal erpenses and Rs. 4,000/- per month towards maintenance pending disposal of the main petition, in her affidavit accompanying LA. No. II the petitioner claimed that she was no longer continuing as a cabaret artist, that she had no independent means of income and that her sister who was not well placed was maintaining her. She alleged that the respondent had extensive business income and owned extensive properties. On these and other allegations, the petitioner claimed interim maintenance and litigation expenses. ( 4 ) I. A. No. II was opposed by the respondent. He denied that he had any independent business income or owned properties detailed in the affidavit of the petitioner. He asserted that his father was the owner of the business concerns and the properties and that he was only assisting him for which he pays him ''pocket expenses". He also urged that the alimony and expenses claimed were excessive. ( 5 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the learned District Judge without deciding LA. No. II on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties or further affidavits they propose to file, treated the case as if it was a criminal trial in which the respondent examined himself and closed his case. He also urged that the alimony and expenses claimed were excessive. ( 5 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the learned District Judge without deciding LA. No. II on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties or further affidavits they propose to file, treated the case as if it was a criminal trial in which the respondent examined himself and closed his case. On I. A. No, II, the petitioner while refusing to lead any oral evidence, urged before the District judge for award of alimony and expenses- On 3-3-1979 the learned district Judge taking the view that the petitioner had not proved her case, has rejected LA. No. II. ( 6 ) SMT. S. Pramila, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in rejecting I. A. No. II the learned District Judge has committed an error of jurisdiction, illegality and material irregularity affecting his jurisdiction and that on a consideration of the affidavits filed by the parties he should have awarded reasonable alimony pendente lite. ( 7 ) SRI M. S. Gopal, learned Counsel for the respondent, while supporting the order of the learned District Judge, urged that the order challenged is only appealable and is, therefore, not revisable on which ground this revision petition should be dismissed without examining the merits of the case. As the latter contention urged by Sri gopal goes to the root of the matter, I propose to examine the same first. ( 8 ) SRI Gopal urged that an order made under S. 36 of the Act is in a proceeding under Chapter VI of the Act and the same is a decree and is, therefore, appealable to this Court under S. 39 (1) of the Act. In support of his contention sri Gopal strongly relied on a Division bench ruling of the Allahabad High court in Maharaj Singh v. Smt. Uma Singh, A. I. R. 1969 All. 603. ( 9 ) SMT. Pramila urged that though the order made is in a proceeding under Chapter VI of the Act, the same is not made in a proceeding under the chapter and is, therefore, not a decree which is appealable to this Court. In other words, she maintained that the order is an interlocutory order made under Chapter VII of the Act which is not made appealable and is, therefore, revisable by this Court under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, she maintained that the order is an interlocutory order made under Chapter VII of the Act which is not made appealable and is, therefore, revisable by this Court under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of her contention, she relied on Division bench rulings of this Court in Sudha v. B. Narasimha Pai, ILR 1979 Kar. 382 and Subhasini v. B. R. Umakanth, CRP 2507/78 dt. 27-3-1980. ( 10 ) BEFORE examining the authorities relied on by either side, it is useful to notice that S. 39 of the Act which provided for appeals has been substituted by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) act of 1976 (Cen. Act No. 68 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act) which has come into force on 27th May, 1976. S. 39 of the Act rends thus:"39. (1) All decrees made by the court in any proceeding under chapter V or Chapter VI shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3), be appealable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction and such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. (2) Orders made by the court in any proceeding under this Act, under section 37 or Section 38 shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) be appealable if they are not interim orders, and every such appeal shall lie tc the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court given in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. (3) There shall be no appeal under this section on the subject of costs only. (4) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree or order. "sub-section (1) of S. 39 of the Act declares a final adjudication made by the original Court in a proceeding under Chapter V - Restitution of conjugal rights and judicial separation, - or Chapter VI - Nullity of Marriage and Divorce -' as decrees made by that court and is made appealable as a decree to the court to which an appeal would lie. The term 'decree' is not denned in the Act and, therefore, it would be proper to give the same meaning that is given to that term by sub-section (2) of S. 2 of the Code. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 39 of the Act provides for an appeal against an order made by a Court under S. 37 and 38 in any proceeding under the Act if the order itself is not an interim order. S. 37 provides for permanent alimony and maintenance. S. 38 provides for custody of children in any proceeding under chapter V and VI of the Act. In any application made under Sections 37 and 38, if the order itself is not an interim order, but is an order which so far as that application is concerned finally determines the same is made appealable but not an order made under S. 36 of the Act. Sub-section (3) which prohibits an appeal only against costs and sub-sec. (4) which stipulates the period of limitation for an appeal are not material in deciding the question. When the language of the section, is precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense (vide page 2 Chapter i - preliminary survey - Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes II edn. ). On the, plain language of Sec. 39 of the Act, an order made by a Court under S. 36 of the Act, though it may be in a proceeding under Chapters v and VI of the Act is not made appealable either as a decree or as an order to this Court. When the order made by the District Court, which is a Court subordinate to this Court is not made appealable, then the only remedy available to the aggrieved persons against such an order is to move this court under S. 115 of the Code. ( 11 ) IN Maharaj Singh's (1) case the allahabad High Court was examining the scope and ambit of S. 39 of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by the Amendment Act. The language, scheme and object of S. 39 prior to its amendment and the language, scheme and object of S. 39 as substituted by the Amendment Act are entirely different. In this view the principle in maharaj Singh's (1) case can have no application. The language, scheme and object of S. 39 prior to its amendment and the language, scheme and object of S. 39 as substituted by the Amendment Act are entirely different. In this view the principle in maharaj Singh's (1) case can have no application. ( 12 ) IN Sudha's case (2) a Division bench of this Court had to examine the maintainability of an appeal against an order granting interim maintenance under the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. S. 28 of the said Act which provides for appeals had been amended by the amendment Act and in construing the language, of the same which is somewhat analogous to S. 39 of the Act, this Court held that an order granting interim maintenance was not appealable and was only revisable though it can be executed as if it is a decree. In subhasini's (3) case the Division bench concurred with that view. In any opinion the principles in Sudha's (2) and Subhasini's (3) cases though they deal with construction of S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act are applicable in construing S. 39 of the Act. For all these reasons, I hold that the preliminary objection raised by Sri Gopal has no merits and I reject the same. In this view, I now proceed to examine the merits of the case. ( 13 ) IN his petition, the respondent does not dispute the solemnization of his marriage with the petitioner and its registration under the Act. When once the marriage is admitted, the husband has a moral and legal obligation to maintain his wife. S. 36 of the Act only gives effect to the same. In deciding applications for alimony pendente lite and expenses, Courts normally decide them as a summary proceeding on the basis of affidavits only without recording evidence as is done in a regular proceeding. Without bearing this principle, the learned district Judge has examined the case as if the parties have to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt as is required in a criminal proceeding. In my opinion, the procedure adopted by the learned District Judge in recording the evidence of the respondent and relying on it was wholly irregular and unwarranted. Without bearing this principle, the learned district Judge has examined the case as if the parties have to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt as is required in a criminal proceeding. In my opinion, the procedure adopted by the learned District Judge in recording the evidence of the respondent and relying on it was wholly irregular and unwarranted. Even otherwise, in placing reliance on the interested testimony of the respondent and rejecting the case of the petitioner solely on the ground that she had not entered the witness box was also illegal and irregular. In this view, the evidence placed by the respondent has necessarily to be excluded and the case decided on the basis of affidavits filed by the parties. ( 14 ) IN her affidavit, the petitioner had stated that she had no independent means of income and that she was depending for her livelihood on her sister. She says that on her marriage with the respondent and at his instance she has given up the profession or business of cabaret artist and has, therefore, no independent income. In my view there is nothing unnatural in this assertion of the petitioner and the same, therefore, requires to be accepted. She had also given the extensive business income and the properties owned by the respondent or his father. In his counter affidavit, the respondent does not deny the income from the business and the properties referred to by the petitioner. But, he says that the entire business is carried on by his father and the properties are also owned by him. He admits that he is assisting his father in his business, but very strangely says that his father pays him only 'pocket expenses'. A person like the respondent who assists his father in his business is not normally paid 'pocket expenses'. The theory of 'pocket expenses' which is inconceivable is difficult to accept. From this it follows that the respondent gets an income from the business carried by the family. The petitioner has asserted that the respondent has an income of more than Rs. 35,000/- per month. While the respondent taking refuge under 'pocket expenses' has not furnished particulars of his income. In the absence of particulars, the Court can only make a reasonable guess work and assess the net income of the respondent. The petitioner has asserted that the respondent has an income of more than Rs. 35,000/- per month. While the respondent taking refuge under 'pocket expenses' has not furnished particulars of his income. In the absence of particulars, the Court can only make a reasonable guess work and assess the net income of the respondent. On the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties and the submissions made before me, I am inclined to hold that the respondent is having a net income of about Rs. 2,000 per month. In awarding alimony pendente lite Courts normally grant 1/5th of the net income of the husband. Alimony is granted only to the wife and not to her dependents however near and dear they may be. The claim of the petitioner that she has to maintain her mother and sister cannot be caken into consideration in awarding alimony pendente lite. The claim made by the petitioner that she should be awarded alimony at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per month is, on the face of it, excessive and has no reference to the net income arrived at by me. In my opinion, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be reasonable to award a sum of Rs. 350/- per month as alimony to the petitioner pendente lite from the date the respondent filed his petition in the district Court. ( 15 ) IN her application, the petitioner has claimed Rs. 5,000 towards litigation expenses. On the face of it, the claim made by the petitioner towards expenses of the proceeding is exhorbitant and fanciful. In my opinion, it would be reasonable to grant Rs. 300/- as litigation expenses to be paid by the respondent to the petitioner. ( 16 ) ON the above conclusions, it is necessary to modify the order of the learned District Judge imposing suitable conditions for the fulfilment of the order. In my opinion, it would be reasonable to permit the respondent to pay the arrears of alimony from the date of his petition 1o the end of June, 1980 and the expenses of the proceeding within 45 days from this day and direct him to pay the alimony pendente lite from July, 1980 and onwards on or before 10th of every succeeding 'month. ( 17 ) IN the light of my above discussion, i allow this revision petition, set aside the order dated 3-3-1979 of the learned District Judge on LA. No. II in M. C. No. 10 of 1978 and allow i. A. No. II in part on the following terms and conditions: (a) That the alimony pendente lite payable by the respondent to the petitioner is fixed at Rs. 350 per month, which shall be paid by him from the date of his petition; (b) That the expenses of the proceeding payable by the respondent to the petitioner is fixed at Rs. 300/- (c) That the arrears of alimony from the date of petition filed by the respondent to the end of June, 1980 and the expenses of the proceeding namely Rs. 300/- shall be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within 60 days from this day and the alimony for the month of July 1980 and onwards shall be paid on or before 10th of every succeeding month, both of which shall be a condition precedent for the continuance of the petition filed by the respondent for nullity of marriage. ( 18 ) CIVIL revision petition allowed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/ -. --- *** --- .