JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, A.C.J. 1. The first party in a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is the Petitioner before this Court assailing the final order made by the Executive Magistrate at Bargarh against him. 2. The proceeding was initiated by a preliminary order dated 17-5-1972 before the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into force and has therefore, been diposed of on the basis of affidavits and documents as provided under the old Code. The disputed property is 1.92 acres of land pertaining to Hamid Settlement Khunti No. 31 of village Tajutikra. The first party claimed that though originally the property belonged to a family of four brothers namely Jayakrishna, Premasagar, Sriram Padhan and Surajmani the disputed property had come to the hands of Surajmam who on 15.6.1971 had leased out the same in favour of the first party for one year. On 5.1.1972 the lease was extended for a period of five years and on 17.2.1972, Surajmani sold the property to the first party. Even since the lease, the first party maintained that he came to possession. The heirs of Premasagar are the members of the second party. They denied the lease and claimed under a deed of April, 1972 and maintained that they had been in possession of the property ever since. 3. The learned Magistrate has examined the affidavits and the documents at great length with reference to the claim of possession and has found that the members of the second party were in possession of the property. The learned Magistrate has observed: ...From among them (boundary owners) Krushna Kathar has stated that his land is situated at a distance of 200 yards towards the west of the disputed land. He alone has furnished the boundary of the disputed land. According to him the disputed land is bounded by east - Debarchan Padhan, west - Sairam Padhan, north, Bimaleswar Padhan, south - Sudarsan Barap. The names of the boundary tenants in north and south side of the disputed land furnished by the R.I. as well as Krushna Kathar do tally and from among them Bhuban Sarap s/o Sudarsan is a deponent for the 2nd party. Bhuban in his affidavit has stated that tis and his father Sudarsan Sarap's land is situated in the southern side of the disputed land. Bhuban in his affidavit has stated that tis and his father Sudarsan Sarap's land is situated in the southern side of the disputed land. He has specifically mentioned that the 2nd party members have prepared the field for cultivation during 1972 Dalua season and raised Katakichina china variety of paddy. According to him, the 2nd party members were in peaceful possession over the land till the date of attachment. He further denied to have seen the possession of the 1st. party over the disputed land prior to two months of the date of attachment.... The learned Magistrate has also found that the affidavits on the side of the second party are better than the three affidavits given on behalf of the first party. The reasons given for preferring the material on behalf of the second party in support of the claim of possession are cogent and I do not think in revision I should take a different view. 4. Reliance was placed by Mr. Sahoo for the Petitioner on a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Smt. Radha Devi Vs. Mani Prasad Singh and Another, in support of his contention that the proceeding having taken under the old Code by the Sob-Divisional Magistrate (Executive), it could not have been disposed of by the Executive Magistrate set up under the new Code; and it was obligatory for the same Magistrate before whom it was pending when the new Code came in to dispose of the proceeding. It is a fact that the Full Bench observed to that effect by saying: ...The Executive Magistrate (if he was not vested with 1st. class powers) being not a Magistrate empowered by law under the old Code to make an order u/s 145 of the Code, the impugned order is void and has got to be set aside. In view of the clear statutory provision, it is not necessary to notice any decision in support of this proposition and it has to be held that the impugned order of the Executive Magistrate is void and must be set aside. In view of the clear statutory provision, it is not necessary to notice any decision in support of this proposition and it has to be held that the impugned order of the Executive Magistrate is void and must be set aside. No objection was taken about the maintainbility of the proceeding before the Magistrate and there IS no clear and acceptable material that the learned Magistrate who has now dispose of the proceeding had not been vested with the powers of a First Class Magistrate under the old Code and that he was not competent to dispose of the proceeding u/s 145 of that Code. Under these circumstances. I am not prepared to accept Mr. Sdhoo's contention. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed