JUDGMENT - RELE B.J., J. : - These two Revision Applications are disposed of by a common judgment as they arise out of the same facts. The only reason why these two Revision Applications came to be filed is that the cases of the two petitioners were separated by the learned trial Magistrate and hence as a matter of procedure these two Revision Applications have been filed. In substance, the point arising in these two Revision Applications is the same. 2. The Rule raises an important question of law on the interpretation of section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The question is whether, once proceedings are initiated under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by the Magistrate against witnesses appearing in any proceedings before him on the ground that the witnesses had knowingly or wilfully given false evidence or had fabricated false evidence, with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceedings, the Magistrate can, during the course of such proceedings, initiate proceedings under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The facts giving rise to these Revision Applications are that the accused one Babulal Walchand Shah was charged under section 135(ii) read with section 135(a) of the Customs Act, 1962, for owning, possessing or controlling 325 watches and 67 watch-straps of foreign make. The prosecution examined Panch witnesses Kapoorchand Walchand Jain(Petitioner in Criminal Revision Application No. 598 of 1979) and Ambalal Krishna Jain.(Petitioner in Criminal Revision Application No. 601 of 1979) in that case. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay, before whom the trial proceeded against the said accused Babulal Walchand Shah in Customs Case No. 468/CW of 1974 convicted the accused and in the judgment the learned. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate stated :- “Before I close, it may be observed that both the Panch witnesses have purposely given false evidence in order to help the accused who is their neighbour and casteman. Both of them are businessmen and seemed to be intelligent persons. They have signed the panchanama in English and Panch Kapoorchand is definitely well conversant with English as he explained the contents of the panchanama to the other Panch in Hindi. Both of them are businessmen and seemed to be intelligent persons. They have signed the panchanama in English and Panch Kapoorchand is definitely well conversant with English as he explained the contents of the panchanama to the other Panch in Hindi. Both of them admitted to have been present throughout, when the Pancha-nama was written and yet they have knowingly and wilfully given false evidence with respect to the search and the recovery of the contraband and, therefore, I am satisfied that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that they should be tried summarily for giving false evidence. I, therefore, take, cognizance of the offence committed by them as per section 344 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and direct that notices be issued to them to show cause why they should not he punished for commission of the offence of giving false evidence.” Pursuant to the order passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 30-1-1976, notices were served on the same day, i e., on 30-1-1976, being C. C. No. 61 /N of 1976, on both the petitioners herein, viz., Kapoorchand Verimal Jain and Ambalal Krishna Jain, stating that it has been observed by that Court that they have purposely given false evidence in order to help the accused, that they had knowingly and wilfully given false evidence in the said case No. 468/CW of 1974, that the Court being satisfied that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that they should be tried summarily for giving false evidence, that the Court has taken cognizance of the offence committed by them as per section 344 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and that they were required to attend the Court on 28th February 1976 to show cause why they should not be punished for the said offence. 4. It appears that thereafter the notice was kept pending as the appeal preferred by accused Babulal Walchand Shah against his conviction was admitted by this Court. Case No. 61 /N of 1976 was, therefore, stayed in all probability under the provisions of section 344(4) of the said Code and after the appeal was disposed of, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order on 9 12-1976 as follows: “Appeal of the accused is dismissed. The respondents are absent. They have no cause to show. Case No. 61 /N of 1976 was, therefore, stayed in all probability under the provisions of section 344(4) of the said Code and after the appeal was disposed of, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order on 9 12-1976 as follows: “Appeal of the accused is dismissed. The respondents are absent. They have no cause to show. Send the papers to Public Prosecutor for drafting the complaint.” It appears that thereupon the complaint was drawn up by the Additional . Public Prosecutor for Greater Bombay and it was signed by the learned Chief .Metropolitan Magistrate. The said complaint was filed in the Court of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, and it was numbered as Case No. 373/S of 1977. The, complaint was filed on 4th March 1977. It appears that the 38th Court was shifted from Esplanade to Ballard Estate and the case was re-numbered as Case No. 137 /S of 1977. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court, Ballard Estate, Bombay, passed an order on 20-3-1978 directing the trials of each of the accused on the same complaint to be separated and process was issued against the accused. It further appears that the trial before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 38th Court, proceeded under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the prosecution examined witness I. M. Soloman, who was the Inspector of Customs and who had raided the place in question accompanied by two Panchas, viz., the two petitioners herein Kapoorchand V. Jain and Ambalal Krishnaji Jain. Before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate it was inter alia con-tended on behalf of the accused that the prosecution is bad in law on the ground that the complainant was barred from filing the complaint under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure since he had already chosen to proceed under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to try the case summarily for giving false evidence. This contention did not find favour with the learned Magistrate and by order dated 3-9-1979, the learned Magistrate observed that charge will have to be framed against the accused for offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Against the said order dated 3-9-1979, the petitioners have filed their respective Criminal Revision Applications. 5. This contention did not find favour with the learned Magistrate and by order dated 3-9-1979, the learned Magistrate observed that charge will have to be framed against the accused for offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Against the said order dated 3-9-1979, the petitioners have filed their respective Criminal Revision Applications. 5. Shri Kamat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has contended that on a true and proper construction of sub-section(3) of section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure once proceeding are chosen to have been taken by the Magistrate under section 344 of the Code, then, any proceeding under section -340, which may be directed to be taken against the accused by the learned Magistrate, is barred. His contention is that the learned Magistrate before whom witnesses knowingly or wilfully gave false evidence or fabricated false evidence with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceeding had a choice either to proceed under section 344 or to proceed under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and once the Magistrate elected to proceed under either of the two sections, the Magistrate must proceed to bring the trial to its conclusion and not to leave the trial half way and to proceed under another section as has been done in the present case. Shri Karnat has contended that in the prerent case the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has elected to proceed against the petitioners herein under section 344 of the Code and the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate should have brought the trial to its conclusion and not directed the papers to be sent to the learned Public Prosecutor for drafting a complaint for proceeding against the petitioners herein under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is the further contention of Shri Kamat that the said section 344 is a complete Code itself and that being so, it was not open for the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to proceed to file a complaint as provided for in the said section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. Shri Deshmukh, on the other hand,, has contended that neither section 340 nor section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, speaks of any election, as has been contended by Shri Kamat. 6. Shri Deshmukh, on the other hand,, has contended that neither section 340 nor section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, speaks of any election, as has been contended by Shri Kamat. He has contended that sub-section(3) of section 344 cannot be construed to mean that even though proceedings are initiated under section 340, the Magistrate is debarred from proceeding under the said section 340 if the Magistrate feels it just and proper for proceeding under that section. Shri Deshmukh has referred to 5. section 325 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and he has contended that it was always the intention of the Legislature that if the Magistrate felt even after the conclusion of the proceeding that the offender should be more severely punished, section 325 of the Code entitled the Magistrate to refer the matter to the Sessions Court for awarding higher sentence. On the basis of section 325, Shri Deshmukh has contended that it is not open to the petitioners to contend that the penalty provided for under section 344 is only three months, while the penalty provided for an offence under the Indian Penal Code to be tried by the Magistrate as provided for under section 340 read with section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is very much higher and, therefore, the accused would be put to a greater jeopardy than what was intended to be put at the time when the proceedings were initiated against them., Shri Kamat has rejoined and he has referred to the provisions of section 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and he has contend-ed that under that Code Chapter XXXV contains provision for proceedings in case of certain offences affecting the Administration of Justice. They are sections 476 to 479 and he has referred to the provisions of sections 476 to 479 and he has contended that once an action is initiated under section 479A, action under sections 476 to 479 is barred. 7. Section 344 has been inserted for the first time in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,(hereinafter referred to as “the new Code”). Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,(hereinafter referred to as “the Old Code”) contained provisions for proceedings to be taken in cases of certain offences affecting administration of justice. Chapter XXVI of the new Code contains provisions of similar nature. Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,(hereinafter referred to as “the Old Code”) contained provisions for proceedings to be taken in cases of certain offences affecting administration of justice. Chapter XXVI of the new Code contains provisions of similar nature. Section 340(1) and(3) of the new Code corresponds to section 476(1) of the old Code and sub-section(3) of section 340 corresponds to section 476A of the old Code. These sections prescribe the procedure for a complaint to be filed by a Court. The section has been enacted to obviate the difficulty of a Magistrate or a Judge himself appearing before a Magistrate to lodge the complaint as opposed to the procedure that is required to be followed by a common man. 8. In 1955 section 479A was inserted in the old Code by Act 26 of 1955 with a view to eradicate the evils of forgery and false evidence. It contemplates three steps:(1) at the time of delivery of the judgment or final order disposing of the proceeding, to record a finding that the person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding;(2) to give to such person an opportunity of being heard and(3) to make a complaint in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court and to forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction to try the case. Section 479A has been omitted in the new Code and in its place a section 344 has been enacted. Section 479A has been omitted in the new Code and in its place a section 344 has been enacted. Section 479-A states- “Not withstanding anything contained in sections 476 to 479, inclusive, when any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice, it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the Court shall, at the time of the delivery of the judgment or final order disposing of such proceeding, record a finding to that effect stating its reasons therefor and may, if it so thinks fit, after giving the witness an opportunity of being heard, make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court setting forth the evidence which, in the opinion of the Court, is false or fabricated and forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction and may, if the accused is present before the Court, take sufficient security for his appearance before such Magistrate and may bind over any person to appear and give evidence before such Magistrate.” Section 344 of the new Code states- “344.(1) If, at the time of delivery of any judgment or final order disposing of any judicial proceeding, a Court of Session or Magistrate of the first class expresses an opinion to the effect that any witness appearing in such proceeding had knowingly or wilfully given false evidence or had fabricated false evidence with the intention that such evidence should be used in such proceeding, it or he may, if satisfied that the witness should be tried summarily for giving or fabricating, as the case may be, false evidence, take cognizance of the offence and may, after giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be punished for such offence, try such offender summarily and sentence him to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or to fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” The difference between the said section 479A of the old Code and section 344 of the new Code is that section 479A did not give summary power to the Court to punish perjurer. So also if the Court failed to make a complaint as provided under section 479A, the offender would go unpunished. Section 344, on the other hand, empowers the Magistrate to punish the offender summarily in order that flagrant types of perjury should be summarily dealt with. Section 344 does not require any complaint to be filed; but it empowers the Court to consider at the time of passing the final order to punish the offender immediately after the passing of the final order and to initiate action against the offender. Section 344 contemplates three steps, viz., the first step is that the Court of Session or Magistrate of the first class should express an opinion at the time of delivery of the judgment or final order that a witness had intentionally given false evidence or fabricated false evidence;. the second step is that the Court of Session or the Magistrate should be, satisfied that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that the witness should be tried summarily for the offence committed by him; and the third step is that reasonable opportunity has to be given to the offender to, show cause why he should not be punished. The object of section 344 is to obviate delay inherent in the lodging of the prosecution as provided in section 340 of the new Code. It is to arm the Court with a power to deal with more flagrant cases of perjury that summary trial is provided in section 344 of the new Coda. 9. There is no doubt that section 344 is a complete Code in itself. It provides for taking cognizance of the offence. It provides .for a reasonable opportunity to be given to show cause. It further provides far the procedure to be followed, viz., the procedure prescribed for summary trial. It also provides for stay of proceedings and for sentencing the accused to a term of imprisonment. Section 351(1) provides for appeal against conviction and sentence passed under section 344. Thus by section 344 a new offence has. been constituted. 10. Now section 340 and section 344 are enacted simultaneously. They are to be found in Chapter XXVI of the Code which contains provisions as. to offences affecting the administration of justice. Section 351(1) provides for appeal against conviction and sentence passed under section 344. Thus by section 344 a new offence has. been constituted. 10. Now section 340 and section 344 are enacted simultaneously. They are to be found in Chapter XXVI of the Code which contains provisions as. to offences affecting the administration of justice. Therefore, in order to ascertain the true legislative intent, the words used are not to be taken in an isolated and detached manner dissociated from the context but are to be read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the Chapter itself. It is also a canon of construction that that construction should be adopted which would give effect to all the provisions. In(Cheladina Venkata Rama Rao v. Engu Narayana)I, A.I.R. 1963 A P 168. it has been observed that in interpreting statutory provisions, one essential principle which has always to be borne in mind is that unless the Legislature so enacts, either expressly or by necessary intendment, each provision which provides for a specific situation must be allowed to have its full play and scope without in any way impinging, upon the scope or ambit of the other. Where, however, there is some difficulty, construction should be placed which will harmonise those provisions which may apparently seem contradictory. At any rate, unless forced as a necessary consequence of the spelling out of the intention of the Legislature, one section cannot be used to defeat another section unless it is impossible to effect a reconciliation between them. The sub-section of a section must be read as parts of an integral whole and as interdependent and that construction should be adopted which would reconcile them and avoid repugnancy. 11. The question whether once an action is initiated under section 344, no action could ever be taken under section 340 of the said Code, would depend upon the true construction of sub-section(3) of section 344. 11. The question whether once an action is initiated under section 344, no action could ever be taken under section 340 of the said Code, would depend upon the true construction of sub-section(3) of section 344. Sub- section(3) of section 344 states- “Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the Court to make a complaint under section 340 for the offence, where it does not choose to proceed under this section.” It is on the word “choose” used in the section that great stress has been placed upon by Shri Kamat and he has contended that once the choice has been made, the choice is final and the Magistrate must proceed to conclude the trial chosen to be instituted under section 344. In other words, Shri Kamat has contended, the Magistrate cannot proceed thereafter to file a complaint under the said section 340 of the New Code. The points of distinction between section 340 and section 344 are while section 340 covers all offences mentioned in section 195(1), (b) of the new Code, section 344 deals with only two offences, viz., knowingly or wilfully giving false evidence or intentionally fabricating false evidence. Under section 340 action can be taken by a Court upon an application made to it in that behalf or otherwise, i. e., Court can be moved to take action or Court may take action suo motu, while section 344 does not contemplate any application to be made to it in that behalf. Section 340 covers a very wide field. Under that section any Court, viz., Civil Revenue or Criminal, can file a complaint, while under section 344 only the Court of Session or Magistrate of the first class can initiate action. In regard to the proceedings, section 340 applies to all proceedings provided they are in relation to Court. Section 340 contemplates a preliminary inquiry and recording a finding in regard to the offence committed or in relation to a proceeding, while section 344 requires giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he should not be punished for such offence. Section 340 requires a preliminary inquiry to be held before making a complaint, while section 344 empowers the Court to try the offender summarily by taking cognizance of the offence. Section 340 requires a preliminary inquiry to be held before making a complaint, while section 344 empowers the Court to try the offender summarily by taking cognizance of the offence. Section 344 comes into play only after delivery of judgment or final order disposing of any judicial proceeding, while section 340 may apply at any stage of judicial proceeding provided that the offence is committed in or in relation to a judicial proceeding. 12. Section 344 does not contain any words expressly barring action under section 340. The wording used in sub-section(3) of section 344 merely states that if the Court does not choose to proceed under section 344, then the power of the Court to proceed under section 340 for the offence of perjury is not taken away. It does not proceed further to state that if the Court chooses to proceed under section 344, then it cannot take action under sec-tion 340. It would be doing violence to the language of the said sub-sec-tion(3) of section 344 to say that the said sub-section(3) impliedly bars the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class to proceed under section 340 against a witness who commits perjury during the course of the trial before that Court. Further, the power to proceed under section 344 is given only to the Court of Session or to a Magistrate of the first class. Therefore, if perjury is committed in a Court other than the Court of Session or Magistrate of the first class, that other Court will have the power to proceed against the offender only under section 340 and it will have no power to proceed against the offender under section 344. In such cases the offence is punishable under any of the sections of the Indian Penal Code mentioned in section 195(1), (d) of the new Code. But if the offender commits perjury in the Court of Session or in the Court of a Magistrate of the first class, then he is liable to be sentenced only for three months as provided in section 344 if the Court of Session or the Magistrate chooses to take action under sec-, tion 344. In framing sub-section(3), the Legislature does not seem to have intended that once action is initiated under section 344, then no action under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, could ever be taken. In framing sub-section(3), the Legislature does not seem to have intended that once action is initiated under section 344, then no action under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, could ever be taken. In providing for a summary punishment for flagrant type of perjury, the. Legislature did not intend that the Court of Session or Magistrate of the fir^t class could not proceed under section 340. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the submission that once action is initiated under section 344, then at no point of time action could ever be taken ur.der section 340. 13. In initiating action under section 344 and then dropping it and initiating under section 340, is the accused put in double jeopardy 1 1 think not. The picas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit show that they apply only where there has been a former judicial decision on the same accusation in substance, and where the question in dispute has already been decided. This plea is not available to the petitioner in this case as no decision has been rendered. What is necessary to be considered is, does section 344 contain any words limiting or taking away the power of the Court to initiate action under section 340 once action under section 344 is initiated. There are no such words in section 344 and, therefore, in my opinion, if action is merely initiated, as in the present case under section 344, it would not preclude the Magistrate to file a complaint under section 340 of the said Code. 14. As has been stated above, only an action under section 344 was in contemplation of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and on the day the judgment was delivered, viz., 30-1-1976, notice was served upon the accused to show cause why they should not be punished as provided in section 344. Beyond that no further proceedings have been taken. Section 344(1) contemplates a summary trial. Section 262(1) of the said Code provides that in trials under Chapter XXI, i. e., summary trials, the procedure specified in the Code for summons case shall be followed. Beyond that no further proceedings have been taken. Section 344(1) contemplates a summary trial. Section 262(1) of the said Code provides that in trials under Chapter XXI, i. e., summary trials, the procedure specified in the Code for summons case shall be followed. Section 251 of the Code provides that when in a summons case the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused shall be stated to him, and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make, but it shall not be necessary to frame a formal charge. In the present case, after the notice dated 30-1-1976 was issued to the two petitioners herein, farther proceedings were stayed and after the disposal of the appeal preferred by the accused Babulal Walchand Shah in the High Court, the said order dated 9-12-1976 was passed. After the said appeal by the accused was disposed of, the petitioners did not appear nor were they brought to Court and the particulars of the offence of which they were charged were not stated to them and their plea was not taken. Therefore, merely because a notice of an action contemplated to be taken was given to the accused, it would not, on the facts and circumstances of this case, preclude the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to proceed to take action under section 340 of the Code. It can- not, therefore, be said that the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had no jurisdiction to file a complaint under section 340. It also cannot be said that complaint is not maintainable. 15. In the result, the Criminal Revision Applications fail and are dismissed. Rule discharged. 16. Shri Kamat applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under •Article 134(1), (c) of the Constitution. The questions involved in these Rules are pure questions of law. Leave is, therefore, granted to the petitioners under Article 134(1), (c) to appeal to the Supreme Court and a certificate to be issued that it contains pure questions of law and is a fit case. Stay of •farther proceedings for six weeks in order to enable the petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court and to obtain stay from that Court granted. Rule discharged. Leave under Article 136(I), (c) of the Constitution granted. ------