Judgment :- 1. The petitioner filed B.R.C.R.P No. 2 of 1972 before the Rent Control Court, Kottayam, for eviction of the respondents from a building situated within the Kottayam Municipality, which one P T. Antony, the deceased father of respondents 1 to 13 and the husband of the 14th respondent had taken on lease on a rental of Rs. 150/- P. T. Antony died on 14-7-1970. The petition was filed under S.11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, on the ground that the respondents had ceased to occupy the building and also on the ground that the petitioner required the building bona fide for starting a rubber business for his third son, Raju Cherian. The petition proceeded to state that Raju Cherian, then aged 23 years, was without any job and was dependant of the petitioner, and as such, it was necessary to provide him with a job According to the petitioner, the building was rented to the deceased P. T. Antony for the specific purpose of conducing a Wine Store. The licence for the Wine Store expired on the 1st of April, 1970. Though the petitioner wanted the building to be surrendered neither P. T. Antony nor the respondents vacated the building They were keeping the building vacant for about an year. In the first week of April, 1971, without the knowledge of the petitioner the respondents attempted to put up additional structures to start a new business The petitioner, thereupon, filed O.S. No 133 of. 1971, before the Munsiff's Court, Kottayam, for an injunction restraining the respondents from putting up structures. That suit was dismissed with the observation, that, the tenant would not be entitled to claim any value for the improvements and alterations effected in the building. 2. The respondents contested the claim. Respondents 1 and 2, in their counter filed by them, admitted the lease arrangement with P.T. Antony, but contended that there was no specific agreement or understanding, that the building would be used only for the purpose of conducting Wine Store The Wine Store was being conducted in the building till the licence thereof expired in April, 1970. Thereafter, P.T. Antony made arrangements for starting a stationary business. The necessary furniture and other articles required for the business were collected by P.T. Antony for starting the stationary business. Thereafter, P.T. Antony made arrangements for starting a stationary business. The necessary furniture and other articles required for the business were collected by P.T. Antony for starting the stationary business. After his death the stationary business was started in the building by respondents 1 and 2. The rent was being paid by respondents I and 2 for and on behalf of the respondents till March, 1971. It was, thereafter, that O.S. No. 133 of 1971 was filed by the petitioner. After the filing of the suit even though rent was tendered it was not being accepted by the petitioner. The respondents denied that there was any intention on the part of the petitioner to start a business for bis third son. The petitioner's third son was neither trained in rubber business nor has he any aptitude to such business. The building, according to the respondents, was not fit for starting rubber business in as much as it lacks facilities for storing articles and also for loading and unloading them in lorries. The petitioner has other convenient buildings for starting a business for his son. The respondents denied that there was any understanding that the building would be surrendered on their ceasing to conduct the wine store. They also stated that on obtaining licence a wine store was restarted from 1-4-1972. It was not correct that the building was left unoccupied from April. 1970 to March, 1971, and therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to eviction of the respondents either under S.11 (3) or under S.11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 3. The Rent Control Court held that the 'petitioner's case that he required the building bonafide for starting a business for his son was not established. The court also held, that the petitioner had other buildings available for starting a business for his son. The claim for eviction under S.11 (3) was, therefore declined. The court, however, held that since the liquor business was stopped in March, 1970, and was restarted only from April, 1972 and the building was unoccupied from April, 1970 to March, 1971, the petitioner was entitled to an order of eviction under S.11 (4) (v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1965. The court, however, held that since the liquor business was stopped in March, 1970, and was restarted only from April, 1972 and the building was unoccupied from April, 1970 to March, 1971, the petitioner was entitled to an order of eviction under S.11 (4) (v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. 1965. Although a claim for eviction has also been made on the ground of arrears of rent the Rent Control Court disallowed eviction on that ground holding that rent was not in arrears. 4. Against the order of the Rent Control Court, both the petitioner as well as the respondents, filed appeals before the appellate authority. The appellate authority confirmed the order of eviction under S.11 (4) (v) and also held that the petitioner was entitled to get the building vacated on the ground of bona fide requirement. The appeal filed by the petitioner was, therefore, allowed and the appeal filed by the respondents was dismissed. 5. Respondents 1 and 2 preferred revision petitions against the orders of the appellate authority in the two appeals as B R C. R. P. No. 46 of 1976 and B R. C. R. P. No. 47 of 1976. The Additional District Judge, Kottayam, vacated the order of eviction under S. H (4) (v) holding that the building was being occupied by the tenant and that the failure, if any, to use it for a short period was for a reasonable cause viz., the death of the original tenant during the said period and the failure to get liquor licence for the period in question. As regards the claim for eviction on the ground of bona fide need the learned Additional District Judge held that the Appellate Authority had not considered all the relevant factors. The order of eviction under S.11 (3) was set aside and the petition was remanded to the trial court for fresh disposal, if necessary after taking fresh evidence. ft is this order that is challenged in the present revision petition. 6. The two points that arise for consideration are: (1) whether the denial of the claim under S.11 (4) (v) is justified; and, (2) whether the order of remand in respect of the claim for eviction under S.11(3) is sustainable. 7. ft is this order that is challenged in the present revision petition. 6. The two points that arise for consideration are: (1) whether the denial of the claim under S.11 (4) (v) is justified; and, (2) whether the order of remand in respect of the claim for eviction under S.11(3) is sustainable. 7. Under S.11 (4) (v) a landlord is entitled to recover possession of the building if the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause. In the instant case, according to the averments in the petition the tenant was conducting a wine store in the building upto April, 1970. From the first week of April 1971, arrangements began to be made for starting a new business. While so the tenant obtained a fresh licence for conducting wine store and the wine business was restarted from 14 1972 The period when the building was kept vacant, even according to the petition was from April 1970 to March 1971. The petitioner has no doubt a case that the tenant was not entitled to conduct any business other than that of a wine store. But this claim is not admitted. The petitioner has not established that there was any condition in the agreement of tenancy that the building would be used only for the purpose of a wine store. Probably, at the time when the building was let the intention of the tenant was to use it for the purpose of conducting a wine store That does not, however, mean that the tenant was not entitled to conduct any other business in the same building. There is ample material in the case to show that arrangements bad been made for starting a stationary business in the building. That will not entitle the petitioner to get surrender of the building in the absence of a term in the contract of lease that the building would be used only for a wine store. This aspect of the matter does not gain importance because the claim for eviction under S.11(4)(v) is based on the ground that the building was left unoccupied without reasonable cause for the period April 1970 to March 1971 only. There is no case that the building was kept unoccupied thereafter. The petition for eviction in this case was filed on 6-1-1972. There is no case that the building was kept unoccupied thereafter. The petition for eviction in this case was filed on 6-1-1972. According to the petitioner the non-occupation for the above mentioned period gave him a cause of action for eviction under S.11(4)(v) and he is entitled to get a surrender of the building. In other words, the contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that the tenant having kept the building unoccupied for more than six months after 1-4-1970 the landlord became entitled to have the building vacated and the subsequent occupation by the tenant will not take away the right, which accrued to the landlord by virtue of the unoccupation. The tenant, on the other hand, would contend, that under S.11(4) (v) of the Act the landlord has to establish not only that the building was not being occupied continuously for more than six months but also that there was no reasonable cause for such unoccupation and that the building continued to be unoccupied by the tenant on the date when the petition was filed. Therefore, in the instant case, even assuming that the building was being kept vacant for more than six months after 1-4-1970 if it was subsequently occupied by the tenant and such occupation continued on the date of the filing of the petition the landlord will not be entitled to get the building vacated. The point for consideration is whether S.11(4)(v) supports the case put forward by the revision petitioner. S.11(4)(v) states, that the landlord will be entitled to recover possession of the building "if the tenant ceases to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause". The present tense "ceases", according to the tenant, clearly indicates, that the unoccupation should continue on the date of the filing of the petition. 8. There is no doubt that the tense used in a particular provision in a statute has a bearing in interpreting the provision. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, deals with this aspect as follows: "The tense used in a statutory provision may have a decisive effect. A section which empowered a Minister to make a certain order if he was satisfied that a school "is being administered" in contravention of the Act only allows him to consider the present conduct of the school, and not the past conduct, when making the order". (See 12th Edn. page 31). A section which empowered a Minister to make a certain order if he was satisfied that a school "is being administered" in contravention of the Act only allows him to consider the present conduct of the school, and not the past conduct, when making the order". (See 12th Edn. page 31). Reference may also be made in this connection to the decision in Kunjukutty Amma v. Raghava Kurup, 1965 KLT.1013, which dealt with interpretation of S.145 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant portion of the section reads: "Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed...". This Court held, that the expression "has existed" would relate to a point of time anterior to that on which the party seeks to satisfy the Magistrate as to the existence of a dispute, and the word "exists" would relate to the time at which the party seeks to satisfy the Magistrate about the existence of a dispute. If this analogy is to be followed the word "ceases" in S.11 (4) (v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, connotes a point of time when the petition is filed and not to an anterior date. In other words, the landlord, who seeks eviction, should establish not only that the tenant was not in occupation of the building without reasonable cause continuously for six months but also that be was not occupying the building on the date of the petition. If that be so, the petitioner in this case has not established that the tenants were not occupying the building on the date when the petition was filed. 9. For enabling the landlord to get the tenant evicted under S.11(4)(v) of the Act it is not enough that the tenant did not occupy the building for the period mentioned therein. It should also be established that he did so without reasonable cause. In the instant case the licence issued in favour of the tenant for conducting wine store expired on 1-4-1970. Due to the change in the policy of the Government there was no issue of licence for about two years. It was under such circumstances that the deceased tenant began to take steps for starting a stationary trade in the same building. Due to the change in the policy of the Government there was no issue of licence for about two years. It was under such circumstances that the deceased tenant began to take steps for starting a stationary trade in the same building. But before he could start it he died, and, therefore, it took some more time for the legal representatives to actually start the business. There is evidence to the effect that even after the death of the original tenant his legal representatives were taking steps for furnishing the building and making alterations thereto. In fact, a suit had been filed by the petitioner himself for an injunction restraining the tenant from making improvements in and alterations to the property. Evidently this would indicate that the tenant had no intention of not using the building. If there was any delay in the starting of the business it was only because of supervening circumstances viz, the death of the original tenant and the consequent dislocation in matters affecting his business. Thus, it is not made out that the non-occupation, if any, by the tenant of the building during the interval was not for any reasonable cause. There is, thererfore, no reason for interference with the conclusion of the District judge so far as it relates to the right of the landlord to get the tenant evicted under S.11(4)(v) of the Act. 10. So far as the claim of eviction on the ground that the landlord required the building bona fide for starting of a rubber business for his third son, the learned District Judge felt that there were no sufficient materials in the case to make out that the claim of the landlord was bona fide It has been found by the Rent Control Court that the landlord has other buildings in his possession and that the landlord had no financial capacity to start the business. The petitioner produced in support of his claim for bona fide requirement Ext. Al, a receipt for payment of Rs. 100/- for obtaining a dealer's licence from the Rubber Board. This receipt is dated 19-10-1971. It appears that he put in an application to the Rubber Board for a licence to deal with in rubber on 20-10-1972. Ext. The petitioner produced in support of his claim for bona fide requirement Ext. Al, a receipt for payment of Rs. 100/- for obtaining a dealer's licence from the Rubber Board. This receipt is dated 19-10-1971. It appears that he put in an application to the Rubber Board for a licence to deal with in rubber on 20-10-1972. Ext. A2 is a letter from the Secretary, Rubber Board, calling upon the petitioner to produce solvency certificate preferably obtained from Revenue Authorities to prove his financial suitability to deal in rubber. Ext. A2 is dated 20-1-1973. The petitioner has no case that in pursuance of the above order he produced the solvency certificate. It is argued on behalf of the respondents, that under the Rubber Act and the rules thereunder a dealer's licence is issued only in case the person concerned satisfies the Rubber Board of his financial solvency. There is some weight in the contention Under S.39 of the Rubber Act a person who wants a special licence to deal in rubber should apply for licence in Form B and if the Board is satisfied with regard to the suitability of the applicant a licence will be issued in Form C. One of the columns in Form B referred to above deals with invested capital or the financial standing of the firm. The petitioner would, no doubt, say that he has sufficient funds for investment in rubber business. His case is that he is the owner of a fleet of motor vehicles and as such he will be in a position to divert from the said business the funds required for starting a rubber business in the name of his son. But. there are no, materials available in the case to substantiate the contention. It was under such circumstances that the learned District Judge considered it just and proper to remand the case to enable the petitioner to make out that he has bona fide intention to start a business in rubber in the name of his son. On the face of it the order of remand does not appear to be improper. It was under such circumstances that the learned District Judge considered it just and proper to remand the case to enable the petitioner to make out that he has bona fide intention to start a business in rubber in the name of his son. On the face of it the order of remand does not appear to be improper. It is to be borne in mind in this connection that the scope of revisional powers of this Court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited and this Court is not expected to interfere with the order passed by the District Judge, unless there are proper grounds for such interference. The petitioner has not made out that there are sufficient reasons for interference with the order of the District Judge. The revision petition is, accordingly, without merits and it is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.