ORDER A.N. Verma, J. - This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India which is directed against an order passed by the respondents Nos. l and 2 under S. 8 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent Eviction) Act, 1972. 2. Shortly stated the relevant facts are these:- The respondents Nos. 3 and 4 claiming themselves to be the landlords of the accommodation in dispute served a notice on the petitioner, who is admittedly the tenant of the same under S. 5 of the aforesaid Act purporting to enhance the existing rent from Rs. 300/-per annum to Rs. 600/- per annum. The petitioner disputed his liability to pay the enhanced rent. Thereupon, the said respondents moved an application under S. 8 for an order determining the dispute. The petitioner contested that application on a variety of grounds. The District Magistrate by an order dated 9th Dec., 1977, fixed the standard rent at Rs. 450/- per annum instead of Rs. 600/- as claimed by the landlord. Two appeals were preferred from that order one by the landlords and the other by the tenant. Both these appeals have been disposed of by the learned District Judge by his order dated 5th April, 1978. The learned District Judge allowed the appeal of the landlords holding that the standard rent in the case of the petitioner is Rs. 600/- per annum. The appeal filed by the petitioner has, however, been dismissed. 3. It is against the aforesaid orders that the present writ petition is direct- ed. The undisputed facts are that the rent payable for the accommodation in dispute at the commencement of the aforesaid Act was Rs. 300/- per month. The building of which the accommodation in dispute is half portion was assessed by the Municipal Board at Rs. 800/- per annum in the assessment made for the period 1st April, 1973 to 31st March, 1974. The annual reasonable rent for the accommodation in dispute was Rs. 400/- plus 25% thereof according to the definition of the term "reasonable annual rent" as was defined under S. 2 (f) of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 which definition has been adopted for the purposes of determining reasonable annual rent under the present Act namely U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 400/- plus 25% thereof according to the definition of the term "reasonable annual rent" as was defined under S. 2 (f) of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 which definition has been adopted for the purposes of determining reasonable annual rent under the present Act namely U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Applying the provisions of S. 2 (f) of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 therefore, the annual reasonable rent of the accommodation in dispute would be Rs. 500/- per annum. The question, therefore, which arises is as to what is the standard rent of the accommodation in dispute. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner took me through the definition of standard rent as given in S. 3 (k) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and urged that if properly construed cl. (a) of that section clearly indicates that in the case of agreed rent the standard rent would be the agreed rent itself and that it cannot be enhanced under the provisions of the aforesaid Act i.e. Act No. 13 of 1972. In order to appreciate the above argument, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of S. 3 (k) which reads as follows;- "Section 3 (k) "standard rent", subject to the provisions of Sections 6, 8 and 10 means - (i) in the case of a building governed by the old Act and let out at the time of the commencement of this Act - (a) where there is both an agreed rent payable therefor at such commencement as well as a reasonable annual rent (which in this Act has the same meaning as in S. 2 (f) of the old Act, reproduced in the Schedule) the agreed rent, or the reasonable annual rent plus 25% thereon, which- ever is greater: (b) where there is no agreed rent, but there is a reasonable annual rent, the reasonable rent plus 25% thereon; (c) where there is neither agreed rent nor reasonable annual rent, the rent as determined under S. 9; (ii) in any other case, the assessed letting value for the time being in force, and in the absence of assessment, the rent determined under S. 9." 5. Learned counsel contended that this Court should hold that the words "whichever is greater" occurring in cl. (a) are surplusage as otherwise cl. (b) of that section would have no purpose or significance. 6. Learned counsel contended that this Court should hold that the words "whichever is greater" occurring in cl. (a) are surplusage as otherwise cl. (b) of that section would have no purpose or significance. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. I find no substance in this argument. Each one of the clauses of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 (k) deals with a different and distinct situation. Clause (a) deals with the situation where there is both agreed rent payable for the accommodation in dispute as well as the reasonable annual rent. The present case is covered by cl. (a) as there is both agreed rent and reasonable annual rent available. Clause (b) deals with the situation where there is no agreed rent and there is available a reasonable annual rent. Clause (c) deals with the situation where there is neither agreed rent nor annual reasonable rent available. That being so, I find no justification for holding that the words "whichever is greater", are surplus. The language of cl. (a) is clear and explicit. In the present case there being both agreed rent and annual reasonable rent and inasmuch as, annual reasonable rent plus 25% thereof is indisputably greater than the agreed rent, it is the former, that is the annual reasonable rent plus 25% thereof which would be the standard rent. The learned District Judge is, therefore, right in taking the view that the standard rent in the case of the petitioner would be Rs. 625/- being the annual reasonable rent plus 25% thereof but as the landlord himself has claimed only Rs. 600/- the learned District Judge has rightly fixed the standard rent at Rs. 600/-. 7. The next argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the application of the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 under S. 8 was not maintainable, inasmuch as, all the landlords have not joined in making of the application. This argument was raised before the learned District Judge also. The learned District Judge repelled this argument, and in my opinion rightly on the ground that the petitioners own case was that there were no other landlords except Ram Lal Shah. The pleadings of the petitioner were clear and unambiguous on this point. This argument was raised before the learned District Judge also. The learned District Judge repelled this argument, and in my opinion rightly on the ground that the petitioners own case was that there were no other landlords except Ram Lal Shah. The pleadings of the petitioner were clear and unambiguous on this point. It was only in the course of arguments that it was sought to be urged that there were other landlords who have not joined in making the application. The learned District Judge has observed that such a case would be clearly contrary to the pleadings of the petitioner and it ought not to be permitted to be raised in the course oi argument. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the statement made by Kailash Chandra Shah-respondent No. 3 (which is Annexure 4 to the writ petition). In this statement Kailash Chandra Shah has mentioned that his grandfather Prem Lal Shah had constructed the house in dispute. He had two sons namely the father of Kailash Chandra Shah and the latters .uncle. He has further stated that his father died in the year 1948 and Kailash Chandra Shah has two other brothers besides his mother. From this statement, learned counsel wanted this Court to infer that there were other co-landlords. The argument is misconceived. The distinction between co-owners of a property and co-landlords is far too well established to require any elaboration. The statement at best proves only that there may be some other owners besides the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. It does not prove that there are any other landlords. The learned District Judge has therefore rightly disallowed the petitioner from urging this point. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner then placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (in Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 257 of 1977) : (reported in 1979 All LJ 1174). The Full Bench has observed that a point of jurisdiction could be raised at any stage and that consent cannot confer jurisdiction on any Tribunal. This case has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case. There is no question of jurisdiction involved in the present case. The petitioner has merely been held not entitled to urge in arguments that there were other landlords besides the respondent No. 4 not having pleaded the same. This case has absolutely no application to the facts of the present case. There is no question of jurisdiction involved in the present case. The petitioner has merely been held not entitled to urge in arguments that there were other landlords besides the respondent No. 4 not having pleaded the same. The petitioner has, therefore, not been debarred from urging any point of jurisdiction. There is thus no substance in the last point also. 9. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this petition fails and is dismissed. There will be as to costs.