JUDGMENT GINWALA J.-At the relevant time respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) was in the employment of the petitioner as a Clerk. One of his duties was to fill in the necessary forms and give information regarding casual contract business of the petitioner to the running staff to requisition their services at the appropriate time for running the buses engaged on contract basis. On 15th March, 1970 the Volley-ball Association of India had booked a bus of the petitioner as a contract carriage for the Journey from Nagpur to Bhilai at 3.30 p. m. The vehicle was to be made available at the Nagpur Railway Station. According to the petitioner, it was the duty of the respondent to issue instructions to the running staff, i. e. driver and conductor of the bus concerned to take the bus at the appointed time. It is alleged that while issuing instructions to the running staff the respondent mentioned the time as 6 a. m. instead of 3 p. m., with the result that the staff arrived at the Depot at 5 a. m. and it had to be paid the over-time allowance. It was, therefore, 2.lleged that the payment for the over-time duty had to be made to the said staff because of the negligence on the part of the respondent in not writing the correct time in the instructions which he had issued. It appears that on 16-3-1970 the respondent by his letter addressed to the Depot Manager admitted that through oversight he had written the time as 6 a. m. in the book containing information about the contract carriage. On 12-12-1970 the Depot Manager issued a show-cause notice to the respondent calling upon him to explain as to why the amount of Rs. 43.01 p. should not be recovered from him as it had to be paid as over-time allowance to the driver and conductor of the said bus. To this the respondent gave a reply on 15-12-1970 stating that he had not filled in the contract form mentioned in the letter and there was no responsibility on him in this regard. The Depot Manager issued a second notice on 1-1-1971 drawing the attention of the respondent to his letter dated 16-3-1970, wherein he had admitted the mistake on his part. The Depot Manager issued a second notice on 1-1-1971 drawing the attention of the respondent to his letter dated 16-3-1970, wherein he had admitted the mistake on his part. To this the respondent gave a reply on 4-1-1971 and said that he had given his reply on 15-12-1970 to an earlier notice and there was a close connection between that notice and the present notice and that he was not informed about the position of the first notice. He maintained that unless he was informed about the decision taken on the first notice it was not possible for him to give any reply to the second notice. It appears that personal hearing was given to the respondent on the same day and the Depot Manager by his order endorsed on the explanation of the respondent dated 4-1-1971 stated that the respondent was not concerned with any other case and directed an order to be issued. It appears that in pursuance of this direction an order was issued to recover the amount of Rs. 43.01 p. from the salary of the respondent. 2. The respondent moved the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act against the said recovery. In his application made on 29-1-1971 he maintained that the deduction from his salary was in contravention with the specific provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. 1936 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and without complying with the requisite procedure laid down in the Act. Thus, according to the respondent, the said deduction was illegal. In pursuance of the notice issued to the petitioner it appeared before the Authority and submitted its written statement on 17-2-1971. It explained as to how the requisite procedure was followed before ordering deduction and how it was justified. In para 10 of this written statement the petitioner specifically stated that the Competent Authority passed the order dated 16-1-1971 "ordering recovery of Rs. 43.01 p. which was the loss caused by the applicant to the Corporation." It was, therefore, contended by the petitioner that the deduction had been made after following the procedure prescribed by the Act and hence it was legal. 3. The authority under the Payment of Wages Act went into the question of legality and propriety of the said deduction. 43.01 p. which was the loss caused by the applicant to the Corporation." It was, therefore, contended by the petitioner that the deduction had been made after following the procedure prescribed by the Act and hence it was legal. 3. The authority under the Payment of Wages Act went into the question of legality and propriety of the said deduction. It was of the view that the deduction complained of by the respondent was permissible under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 7 of the Act. It observed that such a deduction would be permissible only if the procedure laid down in subsection (1A) of section 10 of the Act is followed. The authority further referring to Clause 5 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure of the petitioner, observed that no employee could be punished for any misconduct without holding any enquiry against him and without giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. In these premises the authority embarked on an enquiry to see whether the petitioner had followed the procedure for inflicting punishment on the respondent by way of deduction of the amount from his salary. As a result of this scrutiny the authority came to the conclusion that no such enquiry was held and the order of deduction was passed without giving the applicant a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed deduction and thus contravened sub-section (1A) of section 10 of the Act and, therefore, the recovery was illegal. In this view of the matter the authority directed the petitioner to pay the amount to the respondent. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed. 4. Mr. S. V. Golwalkar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Authority had exceeded its jurisdiction in going into the question of propriety of the deduction made by the petitioner as, according to Mr. Golwalkar, it would appear from the impugned order that the Authority had gone into the evidence and had appreciated it. Mr. 4. Mr. S. V. Golwalkar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Authority had exceeded its jurisdiction in going into the question of propriety of the deduction made by the petitioner as, according to Mr. Golwalkar, it would appear from the impugned order that the Authority had gone into the evidence and had appreciated it. Mr. Golwalkar further pointed out that the Authority was in error in holding that the petitioner ought to have held an enquiry under the Discipline and Appeal Rules for ordering the recovery of the amount, in as much as the amount was not being recovered as a fine but only for recouping the loss caused to the petitioner for payment of the overtime allowance to the staff because of the negligence on the part of the respondent. Mr. Golwalkar submitted that the deduction was made under clause (c) of sub section (2) of Section 7 of the Act and the only thing which was required to be done by the petitioner was to follow the procedure laid down in sub-section (1-A) of section 10 of the Act read with Rule 15 of the rules framed under the Act. Mr. Golwalkar, submitted that the only thing required to be done under this sub-section was to give an opportunity to the respondent of showing cause against the deduction and this had been done by the petitioner as he had been given this opportunity twice. Thus, according to Mr. Golwalkar, the Authority was not right in going into the question of propriety of the deduction or in holding that it was necessary to hold departmental enquiry under the Discipline and Appeal Rules. 5. Before us it is not disputed by the petitioner that the deduction had been made under Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act. It was not the case of the petitioner either before the Authority or even before us that the deduction had been made by way of fine as contemplated by clause (a) of that section. As stated above, even the Authority proceeded on the assumption that the deduction had been made under clause (c) of that section. Apart from the reasons which prevailed with the Authority for setting aside the deduction, we find that on the very language of this Clause the deduction made by the petitioner cannot be held to be legal. 6. As stated above, even the Authority proceeded on the assumption that the deduction had been made under clause (c) of that section. Apart from the reasons which prevailed with the Authority for setting aside the deduction, we find that on the very language of this Clause the deduction made by the petitioner cannot be held to be legal. 6. Section 7 (2) (c) is in the following terms: "(2) Deduction from the wages of an employed person shall be made only in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and may be of the following kinds only, namely: (a) ………………. (b) ……….………. (c) deductions for damages to or loss of goods expressly entrusted to the employed person for custody, or for loss of money for which he is required to account, where such damage or loss is directly attributable to his neglect or default". It would appear that under this clause deduction for damages or loss could be made from the wages of the employee if such damage or loss is directly attributable of his neglect or default, provided the goods to which damage is caused or which are lost are expressly entrusted to the employee or the money which is lost is required to be accounted for by him. It is, therefore, clear that clause (c) comes into operation only when the loss is either of goods or of money. Here, in the present case we are not concerned with the loss of goods. Mr. Golwalkar submits that loss has been caused to the petitioner in terms of money in-as-much as the petitioner was required to pay over-time allowance to the running staff and hence it is loss of money within the meaning of the second part of the clause. The question is whether such a loss is covered by the words "for loss of money for which he is required to account". On the face of it these words imply that the loss for which the deduction is made must not only be loss of money but also such money for which the employee has to account. In other words deduction under this part of the clause will be permissible if the employee has to render account of the employer in respect of some money and that money is lost due to the negligence or default of the employee. In other words deduction under this part of the clause will be permissible if the employee has to render account of the employer in respect of some money and that money is lost due to the negligence or default of the employee. Hence in order to bring the deduction within the mischief of this part of the clause simply proving loss of money to the employer will not suffice but it must further be proved that the employee was required to account for it. Unless these two conditions, apart from negligence or default of the employee, are established the deduction will not come within the purview of this part of the clause. The very language used clearly indicates that it does not take within its fold a case of loss caused to the employer due to the negligence or default of the employee, even though such loss can be computed in terms of money, because it cannot be said to be loss of money, for which the employee is required to account. The words "for which the employee is required to account" qualify the word "money" which precedes them. Generally a person is required to account to another for money which he holds for the latter. These words introduce an element of entrustment, express or implied, such as an employee holding, recovering or collecting money on behalf of his employer. In such a case he would be bound to account for it to his employer. This construction is in keeping with the first part of the clause which speaks of deduction for damages to or loss of goods expressly entrusted to the employee. As the first part makes express entrustment of the goods necessary element for deduction for their loss, in the same manner the second part makes liability to account as necessary element for deduction for Joss of money. ]n our opinion, therefore, loss caused to the employer due to the negligence or default of the employee, though it could be computed in terms of money, is not deductible from the wages of the employee under the provisions of clause (c), sub· section (2) of section 7 of the Act. The question whether such loss can be recovered as fine under clause (a) is a different matter and we need not express any opinion on it since it does not arise in this case. The question whether such loss can be recovered as fine under clause (a) is a different matter and we need not express any opinion on it since it does not arise in this case. It is not the case of the petitioner that the said amount of loss was deducted as fine under clause (a). 7. Now sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act entitles an employee to apply to the Authority for a direction for refund of the amount if deduction is made from his wages contrary to the provisions of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 15 then contemplates an enquiry to be held by the Authority and consequently a direction for refund of the amount. Now it is an admitted position that in sub-section (2) of Section 7 no provision has been made anywhere for deduction of an amount from the wages of an employee as loss caused to the employer because of the negligence of the employee, apart from what is said in clause (c) of that sub-section. Hence if deduction is made from the wages which is not provided for by sub-section (2) of Section 7 it would be deduction contrary to the provisions of the Act and in that case the Authority would be within its power to direct the employer to repay the amount to the employee. In this view of the matter, therefore, the Authority would have been justified in directing the repayment of the amount to the respondent. 8. It is not necessary for us to go into the validity of the reasons on which the authority has directed the petitioner to make repayment to the respondent, as we find that even if we bold in favour of the petitioner on this count, the final order passed by the authority can be upheld on the question of the applicability of section 7 (2) (c) to the facts of the present case. 9. In the result the petition stands dismissed and the rule discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.