Judgment :- 1. On 19-11-1969 the petitioner who was a Head Master of a Lower Primary School was kept under suspension pending enquiry by Ext. Pi order of the Manager the 2nd respondent. For various reasons the enquiry dragged on till 14-1-1970 when Ext. P2 order was passed by the Manager imposing upon the punishment or compulsory retirement as provided under R.65 (5) (V). In the mean-time, that is on 25-5-1973 the petitioner retired. Consequently this Court in O. P. No. 2590 of 1975 accepted the petitioner's challenge against Ext. P2, and it was accordingly set aside. 2. On 12-10-1976 by Ext. P5 the Manager ordered that the period of suspension between 19-11-1969 and 25-5-1973 was to be treated as eligible leave. Contending that the petitioner was entitled to full salary for the period of suspension, he challenged Ext. P5 before the Government by means of revision. The Government by the impugned order, Ext. P6 dated 19-4-1977, upheld the order of the Manager. The reason for so doing is apparently R.91 of Chapter XIV-A of the KER which refers to R.56 (1) of Part 1 of the KSR. If the latter provision was applicable the petitioner's contention was rightly rejected. The question is does it. 3. Petitioner's counsel Shri. Sugathan submits that R.91 of Chapter XIV-A of the KER. has no application to the present case, for, the petitioner was neither dismissed nor removed nor was be reinstated. The petitioner who was under suspension retired during the enquiry and the punishment of compulsory retirement was imposed upon him subsequent to retirement. That being the position counsel says R.91 is not attracted. To attract R.91, according to counsel, a person should have been reinstated after he was dismissed or removed or suspended. The petitioner was suspended but he was never reinstated. 4. R.91 reads: "When a teacher who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, Rules for the time being in force relating to Government servants, in the matter shall mutatis mutandis apply." It would appear that there are lacunae in the rule. In the first place, the rule does not refer to the punishment of compulsory retirement, which was what was imposed on the petitioner; while the punishment of dismissal and removal are specifically mentioned. That was an omission by the rule making authority. In the first place, the rule does not refer to the punishment of compulsory retirement, which was what was imposed on the petitioner; while the punishment of dismissal and removal are specifically mentioned. That was an omission by the rule making authority. The other lacuna which appears to be crucial to this case is that the rule will apply only when there is a reinstatement of a person who had been dismissed or removed or suspended. The rule does not seem to apply to cases where a person cannot be reinstated because of his retirement upon superannuation, although he would have been reinstated had he not retired. That appears to be the position here. The petitioner would have been reinstated when the order of punishment was set aside by this Court. But he could not be reinstated because he had in the meantime attained superannuation. This position is well covered under R.56(1) of Part I, K.S.R which, in the absence of the necessary nexus with R.91 of Chapter XIV-A of the K.E.R., cannot apply in respect of persons like the petitioner who have not been reinstated, but would have been reinstated. 5.These legislative lacunae cannot be filled up by judicial interpretation if such interpretation would affect civil rights. The rule-making authority has left the rule short of the present requirement. Whether the omission was intended or otherwise, the omission must go to the benefit of the petitioner. In the circumstances 1 declare that the petitioner is entitled to full salary for the period of suspension between 19-11-1969 and the date of retirement, i.e., 25-5-1973. The O.P. is allowed in the above terms. No costs. Allowed.