JUDGMENT - R.S. BHONSALE, J.:---The petitioners M/s. Premier Rubber Cable Industries, a partnership firm, have filed this petition challenging the order dated 29th November, 1975, passed by the learned Judge of the Employees Insurance Court, Bombay dismissing the application filed by the petitioners against the respondent Employees State Insurance Corporation for a declaration that the persons employed in the Head Office of the petitioners were not employees as defined in the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. The petitioners, a partnership firm, consists of two partners and owns a factory at Dombivli in Thane district. The Head Office of this firm is in the Fort area in Bombay and, according to the petitioners, therefore, beyond the factory premises. It is a separate commercial establishment registered under the Shops and Establishments Act. The Head Office is also registered under the Bombay Sales Tax Act and Central Excise Act. In the application the contention of the petitioners was that the persons working in the Head Office were in no way concerned with the work done at the factory, nor was the said work done by such employees either preliminary or incidental to the work of the factory. Some of the employees were in fact earning in excess of Rs. 500/- per month and, therefore, were not covered by the provisions of the said Act. The persons working in the Head Office which is the establishment were, therefore, not employees within the meaning of section 2(9) of the Act. A further contention was raised that the State Government, i.e. the appropriate Government, not having issued notification under section 1(5) in the Official Gazette covering the establishment of the petitioners in question, the petitioners were not liable to pay any amount of contribution to the Employees State Insurance Corporation. The demand made by the Corporation for Rs. 9, 8-9/- as insurance contribution, was, therefore, vexatious, baseless and illegal. It was further contended that sections 45-A and 45-B of the Act did not apply to the establishment of the petitioners. 3. The petitioners had made a reference to certain correspondence that ensued between the petitioners and the respondent Corporation. It was contended that the claim of the Corporation to recover the insurance contribution was barred by limitation inasmuch as the cause of action having arisen in January 1968, the demand was made beyond the period of limitation. 4. 3. The petitioners had made a reference to certain correspondence that ensued between the petitioners and the respondent Corporation. It was contended that the claim of the Corporation to recover the insurance contribution was barred by limitation inasmuch as the cause of action having arisen in January 1968, the demand was made beyond the period of limitation. 4. These contentions of the petitioners before the Employees Insurance Court were tried to be repelled by the respondent Corporation on number of grounds. Firstly, it was contended on behalf of the respondent Corporation that consequent to the amendment of the Act with effect from January 28, 1968, the person employed for wages on any work connected with the administration of the factory or establishment or any part, department or branch thereof or with the purchase of raw materials for, or distribution or sale of the products of the factory or establishment stood covered in addition to the persons working in the factory. The scope of coverage of persons has been widened after this amendment. It was, therefore, contended that the persons working in the Head Office stood covered with effect from January 28, 1968. The dues which the respondent Corporation had sought to recover from the petitioners for the period from January 28, 1968 to December 31, 1979, as per the report of the Insurance Inspector came to Rs. 13,079/- as E.S.C. and Rs. 9,829.30 as E.C. The petitioners were bound to pay interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date when the dues became payable. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the respondent Corporation that no notification under section 1(5) of the Act was necessary and the demand made by it was just, fair and legal. 5. In the Employees State Insurance Court the petitioners examined on their behalf the Shoukatalikhan Haji Akkan Khan who was the Chief Accountant at the relevant time. The State Insurance Corporation adduced no oral evidence. In support of its claim, the petitioners accountant had tried to make out a case that the factory was situated at Dombivli and the Head Office was situated in Fort area in Bombay and, therefore, these employees were not on the wage roll of the factory and their wages were not entered in the accounts of the factory. In support of its claim, the petitioners accountant had tried to make out a case that the factory was situated at Dombivli and the Head Office was situated in Fort area in Bombay and, therefore, these employees were not on the wage roll of the factory and their wages were not entered in the accounts of the factory. The admissions which the Chief Accountant gave in the cross-examination are of considerable importance and since they will assist in determining the matter, they are enumerated as follows :--- (1) The Head Office purchases raw materials required for the factory. (2) The Head Office sells the finished products of the factory. (3) The sales are effected at the Head Office. The Head Office did purchase some articles of some other companies also in the Head Office. All the accounts were maintained at the Head office. The entries in the accounts books of the Head Office disclosed that the Head Office had made payments for factory expenses. (4) The Head Office used to pay wages and other expenses at the factory. The Head Office used to purchase rubber required for the factory. The Head Office used to pay debts of the factory and it had also spent for some repairs or constructions effected in the factory. 6. Apart from these admissions given by the Chief Accountant, a number of other contentions were raised by the learned Counsel appearing before the Employees Insurance Court. A number of decisions of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court were cited before the learned Judge and after considering all of them, the learned Judge held, firstly, that the persons employed in the Head Office of the petitioners were employees as defined in the Act. The persons employed were, therefore, insurable employees and the petitioners were not entitled to get a declaration prayed by them. He further held that the claim made by the respondent Corporation for recovery of the contribution was not barred by the limitation and in view of these findings the learned Judge dismissed the application of the petitioners and granted Rs. 50 /- as costs to the respondent Corporation by his order dated November 29, 1975. 7. When this petition was called out for hearing and final disposal, Mr. 50 /- as costs to the respondent Corporation by his order dated November 29, 1975. 7. When this petition was called out for hearing and final disposal, Mr. Jaykar the learned Counsel who is appearing for the respondent Corporation, raised the preliminary objection that the petitioners were not entitled to seek resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court unless they had exhausted all the remedies available to them under the Act itself. He pointed out that under section 82, the appeal was provided and such appeal could be filed in the High Court if it involved substantial question of law and the period of limitation for filing such appeal under this section was 60 days. 8. It was also contended by Mr. Jayankar that the order passed by the learned judge of the Employees Insurance Court being in the nature of the money decree, the petitioners would have been required to deposit the entire decretal amount before being heard on merits by this Court and, therefore, the writ petition as presently filed was not maintainable because the petitioners have not chosen to exhaust the alternative statutory remedies. 9. There is great force in the argument of Mr. Jayakar. When there is a statutory remedy provided, it is not explained by the petitioners as to whether such a remedy is not equally efficacious in getting the relief prayed by the petitioners. After all, the jurisdiction. Article 226 is an extraordinary jurisdiction to be exercised very sparingly and it is also a discretionary remedy. 10. However, now that Mr. Talaulikar has been heard on merits of the case, these contentions need not detain us. Mr. Talaulikar, the learned Counsel made three submissions. Firstly, he contended that the State Government not having issued the requisite notification as contemplated under the provisions of section 1(5) of the Act, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Act were applicable to the establishment of the petitioners, inasmuch as it was registered under the Shops and Establishments Act as well as Sales Tax Act and Central Excise Act and was not connected with the factory, as it was far away from the premises of the factory at Dombivli and, therefore, it was altogether a different establishment. Secondly, his contention was that this Head Office or establishment of the petitioners was doing the agency work and, therefore, the persons working there would not be covered by the provisions of the Act. The next contention of Mr. Talaulikar based on the second one was that out of 63 employees, some workers were exclusively doing the work of other firms, that is to say, agency work of other companies and was not connected with the factory of the petitioners and these persons were not liable to be insured under the provisions of the Act and could not be termed as employees within the meaning of section 2(9) of the Act. 11. Admittedly the demand for dues of the respondent Corporation from January 28, 1968 to December 31, 1970, was made on 4th January, 1974. This means that after the amended definition came into force from January 28, 1968, the Corporation had demanded the insurance contribution from the petitioners. In view of this, the first contention of Mr. Talaulikar is wholly misconceived, inasmuch as there is no need for issuance of any notification under section 1(5) of the Act as the amended definition itself covers the employees in respect of whom the Corporation has sought to recover the insurance contribution. 12. As pointed out above, a number of arguments were advanced before the learned Judge of the Employees Insurance Court and the authorities cited but, in our view, it is not necessary to refer to any of them since the point raised by Mr. Talaulikar as to whether the persons engaged in the administrative and other work in the Head Office are covered by the provisions of the Act is fully covered by the decision of this Court in (Boehringer Knoll Ltd. Bombay v. Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bombay)1, 1977 Mh.L.J. 389. In that case the facts were that the petitioner company admittedly owned a factory at Kolshet Road, Thana, where pharmaceutical products were manufactured and where about 400 persons were employed. These employees were covered by the E.S.I. Act and the company was paying the necessary contribution under the provisions of the Act. The dispute centered round the question as to whether the petitioner company was liable to pay insurance contribution in respect of the employees employed at the Head Office and the branch offices. These employees were covered by the E.S.I. Act and the company was paying the necessary contribution under the provisions of the Act. The dispute centered round the question as to whether the petitioner company was liable to pay insurance contribution in respect of the employees employed at the Head Office and the branch offices. In the course of the judgment to which one of us (Chandurkar J.) was a party, the amended definition of employee in the factory was construed to include workers engaged in connection with the administration of factory or with purchase of raw materials or distribution or sale of the products of the factory and were held to be insurable workers. The new amended inclusive definition was interpreted by the Division Bench in the said judgment and it was held as follows : "Having regard to the purpose in amending by the Employees State Insurance (Amendment) Act No. 44 of 1966, the definition of "employee" in section 2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act and to the fact that the Act is a piece of beneficial legislation the words employees in factory in section 38 must be liberally construed. It cannot be held that the benefit of the Act in spite of the amended definition in section 2(9) is confined only to a person working in the factory as such. Notwithstanding the fact that the definition of factory was not enlarged to take into its fold the categories of employees who are included in the amended definition, the Court is bound to give effect to the intendment and purpose behind the intendment. It cannot be ignored that section 38 is made subject to the provisions of the Act. Consequently administrative staff connected with administration of the factory or the purchase of raw materials, or the distribution or sale of the products of factory must be regarded as insurable employees though no notification under section 1(5) is issued in that respect". It was further held as follows: "The amendement made in the definition of employee by the Employees State Insurance (Amendment) Act 44 of 1966 has used words of widest possible amplitude and if the work in respect of which a person is employed has some nexus with the activity referred to in the definition, there is no reason why such an employee will not fall within the inclusive part of the definition of employee. The object of the amendment clearly was to bring in an amendment which would include within the category of insurable employees, the members of the administrative staff engaged for sale and distribution and allied functions. The test which Parliament has introduced in section 2(9), Employees State Insurance Act by converting the original definition of employee which was an exhaustive definition into an inclusive definition has to be found in the newly added portion." It was also held in that case that the activities of the employer at the Head Office squarely fell within the extended part of the definition of "employee". The import and purchase of raw materials and export of finished products, distribution of products and canvassing for boosting up the sales of the finished products will obviously be the work in connection with raw materials or for "the purchase of distribution or sale of the products of the factory." 13. In the present case also the Chief Accountant has given certain admissions which we have already referred to above and it is difficult for us to persuade ourselves to hold that the activities carried on by the members of the staff at the Head Office, such as purchasing raw materials required for the factory, effecting sale of the finished products of the factory in the Head Office, making payments of the factory expenses in the Head Office as also paying the wages and the expenses at the Head Office was not the work connected with the administration of the factory or the establishment or with the purchase of raw materials or for distribution or sale of the products of the factory or establishment. There is, therefore, no force in the contention of Mr. Talaulikar that the persons working in the Head Office are not the employees within the meaning of the inclusive definition as amended by the Act 44 of 1966 with effect from January 28, 1968. When Mr. Talaulikars attention was drawn to the decision of this Court referred to above, he fairly conceded that his contention was squarely covered by the said decision of this Court. 14. When Mr. Talaulikars attention was drawn to the decision of this Court referred to above, he fairly conceded that his contention was squarely covered by the said decision of this Court. 14. As far as the next two contentions which are connected with each other that the Head Office was also doing agency work of other companies and some section of the workers was doing exclusively the work of other Companies were concerned, we find no reference in the grounds in the petition and it is not possible for us to deal with the factual aspect of the contentions raised for the first time in this Court. Whether certain workers were exclusively doing the work of certain other companies, is a question of fact and it was open to the petitioner to persuade the respondent Corporation that these members of the staff were not liable for contribution. Again we cannot go into the question at this stage that the petitioners were doing the agency work of some companies. There is absolutely no reference any where in this petition and it is not proper to raise such a question for the first time at this stage. The liability of the petitioners to have their employees who were earning Rs. 500/- per month before the amending Act 38 of 1975 came into force on 1st August, 1975, insured, was inescapable and we do not see how the petitioners by reason of these questions can now escape such liability. In our view, the questions raised in this petition are fully and squarely covered by the decision of this Court referred to above and we do not see any substance in any of the contentions raised above. 15. In the result, the petition in must fail and is dismissed. Rule discharged with costs. Petition dismissed. -----