JUDGMENT 1. - This is a batch of 75 writ petitions. They have been heard together. As common questions are involved in them, It will be convenient to dispose them of by a common judgment. 2. Learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that the reference to the facts and averments made in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 964 of 1979, S. B. Civil Writ Petition No, 1397 of 1979 and S B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1083 of 1979 will suffice. I will briefly notice them in each of the aforesaid three petitions.S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 964 of 1979 : The petitioner was recruited as Constable In the Police Department, Government of Rajasthan. He was promoted as Assistant Sub-Inspector by an order of the Superintendent of Police, Udaipur and was confirmed on June 1, 1979. He was holding the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector on June 2, 1979. The members of the police force launched and an agitation in regard to revision of their pay - scales and for betterment of their service conditions. They resorted to strike with effect from May 1, 1979. The case of the petitioner is that 322 police employees belonging to the police force, were arrested in the city of Udaipur. The petitioner was arrested "on June 1, 1979 for having contravened the prohibitory order promulgated under Section 144, Cr. P. C. and a complaint was filed against him for having committed an offence punishable under Section 1288 of the Indian Penal Code, which was later on withdrawn A first information report was registered against the petitioner land others on the ground that they had committed offence punishable under Section 3(3) of the Rajasthan Police (Incitement 1 to Disaffection) Ordinance, 1979 The petitioner was kept in judicial custody up to June 25, 1979. After the release from judicial custody, the petitioner reported himself on duty, vide letter (Annexure 2) dated June 26, 1979. He was informed by the Additional Superintendent of Police that he will be taken on duty after orders from the Government and the Police Headquarters are received. After the release from judicial custody, the petitioner reported himself on duty, vide letter (Annexure 2) dated June 26, 1979. He was informed by the Additional Superintendent of Police that he will be taken on duty after orders from the Government and the Police Headquarters are received. An order (Annexure 3) dated July 2, 1979, was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Udaipur dismissing him from service This order was accompanied by an order dated June 4, 1979, purports to have been made by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by clause (c) of second proviso to Art 311 (2) of the Constitution. The petitioner has filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the orders (Annexure 4) dated June 4, 1979 and Annexure 3 dated July 2, 1979. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No 1397 of 1979: 3. The petitioner was holding the post of Constable. A large number of police employees of police force of the Government of Rajasthan went on strike from May 1, 1979 and hereafter from later dates. Many of them were arrested and tried while in Jail. Amongst them were Shyamlal, Sukh Singh, both constables posted at Bhopalpura Police Station, Ramchander and Sunderlal constables posted at Hathipol Police Station, Chiman Singh Constable posted at Surajpol Police Station, Mad ho Singh Constable posted at Amabamata Police Station, Himmat Singh Constable posted at Police Lines, Udaipur, Nawal Singh Head Constable posted at Jalara Police Station, Bhoor Singh, Head Constable posted at S. P. Office, and Onkar Lal Constable posted in the Office of the Superintendent of Police, Udaipur. Against these persons, cases were also registered. The case of the petitioner is that except 18 persons including the petitioner none - else has been dismissed. An order (Annexure 1) dated July 5, 1979 was made by the Governor, in exercise of his powers conferred by clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, by which in the interest of the security of the State holding of an enquiry against the petitioner was dispensed with. Subsequently, by Order Annexure (2) dated July 9, 1979, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur, dismissed him from service. Subsequently, by Order Annexure (2) dated July 9, 1979, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Udaipur Range, Udaipur, dismissed him from service. The petitioner has filed this writ petition questioning the legality of the orders (Annexure 1) dated July 5, 1979 and Annexure 2 dated July 9, 1979, and has prayed that these orders may be declared invalid and void and may be quashed.S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1083 of 1979 : 4. The petitioner was appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police with effect from January 4, 1960, and he was confirmed on this post. In February 1979, Rajasthan non-Gazetted Police Employees Association was formed and the State authorities tools an exception to the same and issued notice to those, who had taken active part in the formation of the Association. The petitioner received notice (Ex. 1) dated Much 3, 19/9, by which his explanation was called. It has been stated by the petitioner that in May 1979, a charter of demands including the demand for the recognition of the Rajasthan non-Gazetted Police Employees Association was submitted by the State Executive of the Association. The petitioner has stated that the State started the harassment and victimisation of the pioneers of this Association. A statement is said to have been made by the then Home Minister on March 3, 1979 that recognition will not be given to the said Association and it is said that amongst others, this also became a cause for giving call for strike from May 23, 1979. As a result of that, strike actually started all over India. It is said that 1400 police employees were arrested in Jodhpur Division alone. Arrests were made for contravening the order promulgated under Section 144 Cr. P.C. Arrests were also made in connection with the offences under the Rajasthan Police (Incitement of Disaffection Ordinance, 1979. Against the petitioner, the case was registered under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Police (Incitement to Disaffection Ordinance, 1979, and a challan was filed. He was arrested on June 2, 1979 and was released on bail on July 7, 1979. The strike was called off in Jodhpur on' June 15, 1979. The petitioner has stated that an ,order suspending him was made on June 7, 1979, but that was not served upon him. The Order (Ex. He was arrested on June 2, 1979 and was released on bail on July 7, 1979. The strike was called off in Jodhpur on' June 15, 1979. The petitioner has stated that an ,order suspending him was made on June 7, 1979, but that was not served upon him. The Order (Ex. 7) dated July 3, 19/9, was made by the Governs in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by clause (C) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. After the 'passing of the Order (Ex. 7),dated July 3, 1979, Order (Ex. 6) dated July 3, 1979, was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jodhpur Range Jodhpur dismissing the petitioner from service. The petitioner has sought quashing of the orders Ex. 7 dated July 5, 1979 and Ex. 6 dated July 5, 1979. 5. All these writ petitions are contested by the respondents.The points, which deserve mention, are these:- (1) That Article 311(2) of the Constitution speaks of the satisfaction of the Governor and once that satisfaction is recorded, no further enquiry is necessary ; (2) that the satisfaction arrived at by the Governor for dispensing with the enquiry is not justiciable ; (3) that no separate order was required to be passed under rule 19(3) of the Rules, for, once an enquiry has been dispensed with by the Governor on his satisfaction, it was no, necessary to pass separate order. The letter and spirit of ,Art. 311(2) of the Constitution has merely been repeated in rule IV of the Rules, and (4) that the order passes under rule 19(3) of the Rules is not violated for any reasons whatsoever. Besides filing the affidavit in support of the reply, affidavit of the respondents, Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur was also filed. Besides filing the affidavit in support of the reply, affidavit of the respondents, Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur was also filed. In this affidavit, Shri L. N. Gupta has stated that the facts concerning each case of the dismissed police employees including the petitioners, were duly referred to the Home Department by Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur and having regard to the facts which were duly examined by the Deputy Secretary, Home Department, it was proposed that clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311(2) and the corresponding rule, may be invoked and that after taking into consideration all the facts and having applied the mind and having been satisfied in the interest of the security of the State, Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) was invoked. In the affidavit, it was also stated that this was again considered and approved by Shri G. K. Bhanot, Chief Secretary, by the Home Minister Shri Sampat Ram and the Chief Minister Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat. Thereafter, the papers were submitted to the Governor who after having duly considered and approved the same, issued the order dispensing the requirement of Article 3il (2) of the Constitution. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit, it was stated that the case of Shri Babulal, Constable Jalore, Sukh Singh, Constable, Udaipur, and Sabir Mohammad, Constable, Udaipur, were also put up for consideration for dispensing with the requirement of Article 311(2) and corresponding rule, but were not considered fit for being subjected to the clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 6. In these petitions, I have heard Mr. M. Mridul and Mr. M.R. Calla, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. D. S. Shishodia, Government Advocate, and Mr. Rajesh Balia Deputy Government Advocate on behalf of the respondents. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the Governor under Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the orders dismissing the petitioners from service purported to have been passed by the appointing authorities. Rajesh Balia Deputy Government Advocate on behalf of the respondents. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners have challenged the orders passed by the Governor under Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and the orders dismissing the petitioners from service purported to have been passed by the appointing authorities. So far as the dispensing with the enquiry under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) is concerned, Mr., Mridul has assailed it on three grounds:- (i) that the order in each of the cases is not a speaking order ; (ii) that there was no material on the basis of which satisfaction referred to in clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) could be arrived at ; and (iii) that the orders dispensing with the enquiry are discriminatory As regards the orders (vi) dismissing the petitioners from service, Mr. Mridul has raised the following points:- (i) that the order dismissing each of the petitioners from service is not speaking order ; (ii) that it has been made without enquiry ; (iii) that the order dispensing with the enquiry under Article 311(2; does not dispense with the enquiry envisaged by rule 16 of the Rules and therefore, an enquiry under rule 16 of the Rules was necessary ; (iv) that alternatively, even if enquiry under rule 16 could be dispensed with, some sort of enquiry was necessary before passing the order dismissing each of the petitioners from service, because:- (a) rule 19(3) only dispenses with the enquiry contemplated by rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules ; (b) any order under rule 15(3) could only be passed after Considering the circumstances of each case, that is, after consideration of all the aspects the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. (v) That the order is discriminatory and it is bad in law, for, persons, situated in similar circumstances have not been given similar treatment; and (vi) that from the order it is clear that it is an abdication of discretion. Mr. Calla adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Mridul. 8. (v) That the order is discriminatory and it is bad in law, for, persons, situated in similar circumstances have not been given similar treatment; and (vi) that from the order it is clear that it is an abdication of discretion. Mr. Calla adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Mridul. 8. With regard to orders dispensing with the requirements of Article 311 (2), it was submitted on behalf of the respondents (1) that the order dispensing with the enquiry under Clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) being based on subjective satisfaction of the Governor, is not justiciable; (2) that an order passed under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 need not be a speaking order, for if a speaking order is required to be passed, it would defeat the very purpose for which the power is to be exercised; and (3) that there was sufficient material before the Governor for passing the order and that material does not require to be disclosed; and (4) that there is no discrimination. The contentions raised in regard to validity of the order of dismissal were strongly controverted on the grounds which I will deal hereinafter. 9. I have considered the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties and have bestowed my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to them. 10. Material portion of Article 311, relevant for the present purpose reads as under: "311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in Civil capacities under the Union or a State (1) (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges : Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity Provided further that this clause shall not apply : (a)...... ...... ...... (b)...... ...... ...... (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the Security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) .... .... ...... ...... ...... (b)...... ...... ...... (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the Security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3) .... .... ...... A perusal of the order dispensing with the requirements of Article 311(2) shows that the record relating to the undesirable and illegal activities, misconduct and acts of indiscipline of the petitioner was perused by the Governor and on perusal of that record, he became satisfied that it was not expedient to hold an enquiry as envisaged by Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, for it was in the interest of the security of the State. If will be relevant there to reproduce the order Annexure 4 filed in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 964 of 1979 Udai Lal v. State of Rajasthan :- "The Governor, after having perused the record relating to the undesirable and illegal activities, misconduct and acts of indiscipline by Shri Udai Lal employed as Asstt. Sub-Inspector of Police District Udaipur, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold inquiry as is required by clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution ; The Governor, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of the second proviso of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, hereby orders that no such inquiry as is required by clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution shall be held and that the provisions of the clause shall not apply in the case of Shri Udai Lal." Mr. Mridul pressed for my consideration that the satisfaction with regard to the fact that enquiry should or should not be held and satisfaction for not holding enquiry are two different matters and it has to be ascertained whether the desirable and illegal activities, misconduct and acts of indiscipline of the petitioner could be a ground to come to a conclusion that in the interest of the security, it was not expedient to hold an enquiry. According to the learned counsel, there was no nexus between the undesirable and illegal activities, misconduct and acts of indiscipline and dispensing with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the State. According to the learned counsel, there was no nexus between the undesirable and illegal activities, misconduct and acts of indiscipline and dispensing with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the State. He substantiated his submission by adding that power given to the Governor for dispensing with the enquiry is not a power to punish. It was contended that on the basis of the material that was placed before the Governor could it be said that no enquiry should be held in the interest of the security of the State. In para 7/I/b of the writ petition it was stated that there was no material on the basis of which any authority could come to a conclusion that it was not expedient to hold an enquiry. The satisfaction for dispensing with the enquiry in terms of clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, depends upon certain conditions/circumstances mentioned therein and if there were no such circumstances or conditions, on the basis of which the Governor could come to the conclusion that it was not expedient to hold an enquiry in the interest of the security of the State, the order dispensing with the enquiry can be scrutinized. 11. The contention of Mr. Shishodia is that Governor's satisfaction is merely a subjective satisfaction. The Governor, having been satisfied, has resorted to the powers conferred upon him under Clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution in the interest of the security of the State, and as such his satisfaction cannot be questioned and it should not be made subject matter of judicial scrutiny. 12. It will be convenient to refer to the various decisions having bearing on this question. 13. In B. Eswaiaish v. State of Andhra, A.I.R. 1958 A. P. 288. , K. Subba Rao, C. J., as he then was, observed as under:- "Clause (c) of the proviso to Cl. (2) of Article 311 in terms confers unrestricted power on the Governor in the interest of the State to deprive a particular officer of the reasonable opportunity provided by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The said power is not circumscribed by any objective standards and, therefore, it cannot be questioned in a Court of law. (2) of Article 311 in terms confers unrestricted power on the Governor in the interest of the State to deprive a particular officer of the reasonable opportunity provided by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The said power is not circumscribed by any objective standards and, therefore, it cannot be questioned in a Court of law. It may be that if a party establishes by placing relevant material before the Court that the Governor made the order mala fide or for unterion purposes, the order may be set aside on the ground that it is a fraud on power. But, in this case there is no such allegation much less has any relevant material been placed before us to substantiate that the Governor has invoked his power not honestly but for ulterior proposes. We, therefore, hold that the order of the Governor made under CI. (c) is valid and if so the petitioner is deprived of the Constitutional safeguard provided for him under Article 311(2). It is not suggested that any other clause of Article 311 has been infringed in this case As there is no infringement of the constitutional safeguard the petitioner, who holds office during the pleasure of the Governor, cannot claim any protection from this Court. 14. In Mohammad Azam v. State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1958 A. P. 619. , Jagan Mohan Reddy J., speaking for the Division Bench, observed as follows:- "Where the action proposed to be taken against a member of the services specified in CI. (l) of Article 311 is under Proviso (c) of CI. (2) of Article 311. the satisfaction that it is not expedient in the interests of the security of the State to give that person an opportunity to show cause, is the satisfaction of the Rajpramukh. Is the satisfaction to be subjective or objective ? The state of person's mind cannot be determined by the objective test and as long as the President, Governor, or the Rajpramukh acted in good faith, their satisfaction cannot be enquired into in a Court of law." The matter was also considered by the Bombay High Court in Jagdish Dejiba v. Accountant General of Bombay and others, A.I.R. 1958 Bombay 283 . "......It is obvious that what the above provision of the Constitution requires is satisfaction of the President about the expediency of not giving an opportunity to the employee concerned in the interest of the security of the State. To make such matter a justiciable issue would mean that the Court should be also satisfied about such expediency and then only the order of the President passed under the powers given by the Constitution should be upheld by the Court. This would amount to substituting satisfaction of the Court in place of the satisfaction of the President. It is possible that what may satisfy the President may not satisfy the Court. This would amount to substituting satisfaction of the Court in place of the satisfaction of the President. It is possible that what may satisfy the President may not satisfy the Court. What may be found expedient by the President may not be so found by the Court. If Courts were to demand proof of such satisfaction and the evidence of material on which the satisfaction was reached the Courts would be virtually depriving the President of the powers and confidence which the Constitution in its wisdom has reposed In the President." Mudolkar J., in a concurrent opinion, held as under:- "The satisfaction of the President is only subjective and therefore, where the President has expressed that he is satisfied about a particular matter, the court had no power to go behind it." A learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, following the above view in Narendra N. Dass v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R 1962 Calcutta 481. made the following observation "In my judgment, in each of the cases set out in the proviso, the executive is relieved of the obligation to hold an enquiry or to give Government servant an opportunity to show cause." In Satvarndra Kumar Dutta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1962 Punjab 400 an identical view was taken. The decision in Mohd. Azam'o case (supra), Narendra N. Das's case, and Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 206 were noticed in Chhattar Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 Rajasthan 194 . The decision in Mohd. Azam'o case (supra), Narendra N. Das's case, and Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 206 were noticed in Chhattar Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 Rajasthan 194 . It was observed therein as under:- - "Now the satisfaction contemplated by Article 311 (2) (c) is the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority In other words, it is the satisfaction of that authority about the retention of the employee in service being prejudicial to national security or whether it is about the expediency of the dispensing with the enquiry in the interest of the security of the State." It was further observed as follows:- "We are, therefore, unable to go into that question about the sufficiency of the date on which the competent authority felt satisfied about the necessity of passing an order under Article 311 (2) (c) against the petitioner." Relying on B. Eswarraiah's case (supra), a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Akhtar v. Union of India, (1967) 2 L.L.J. 767 observed as under:- "The power conferred on the President by proviso (c) to Article 311 (2), is an executive power of the State. The satisfaction of the President about the expediency of not giving an opportunity to the employee concerned In the interest of the security of the State is not justiciable." The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurdial Singh and another v. State of Punjab and another (S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2483 of 1979) decided on November 1979 , relying on most of the decisions referred to hereinabove, laid down as under:- "To conclude on this aspect, it appears to me that trilogy of cases noticed above do not, in any way, advance the case of the petitioners nor can they even remotely be deemed to run counter to the long line of precedents noticed earlier holding to the effect that satisfaction of the Governor or the President under Article 31l(2) (c) is essentially subjective in nature and, therefore, does not permit a judicial review." Mr. H.M. Several, the learned Author of the Constitutional Law of India (Second Edition) at page 1486, has summed up the position as under:- "Under proviso (c), Article 311 (2) does not apply if the President or the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not possible to hold the enquiry provided for in Article 311 (2). As the provision leave the matter to the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, it is clear that the question whether the security of the State did require that an enquiry should not be held, is not justiciable " Having considered the aforesaid decisions, let me proceed to examine the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the satisfaction of the Governor may even it be subjective and rooted squarely in the interest of the security of the State, it is still justiciable and subject to judicial scrutiny and review. In other words, according to the learned counsel, the relevant material, on which the satisfaction of the Governor has been arrived at, can be examined and if on an examination of the material, the court finds that there existed no material for satisfaction, the order can be struck down. In this connection, reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, A.I.R. 1967 S.C.A 295 , M. A. Rasheed v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2249 and State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1977 Supreme Court 1361 . 15. In Barium Chemical's case (9), section 237(b) of the Companies Act came for consideration. In that case, the order of the Company Law Board passed under the provisions of S 237fb) of the Companies Act, 1956, was under attack. Section 237(b) of the Companies Act is quite different from CI(c) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 15. In Barium Chemical's case (9), section 237(b) of the Companies Act came for consideration. In that case, the order of the Company Law Board passed under the provisions of S 237fb) of the Companies Act, 1956, was under attack. Section 237(b) of the Companies Act is quite different from CI(c) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Shelat, J , as per the majority, observed that before the discretion conferred by S 237(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, to order an investigation can be exercised, there must exist circumstances which in the opinion of the Authority suggest what has been set out in subclasses (i) (ii), or (iii) and that if it is shown that the circumstances do not exist or that they are such that it is impossible for anyone to form an opinion there from suggestive of the aforesaid things, the opinion is challengeable on the ground of non-application or perversity or on the ground that is was formed on collateral grounds and was beyond the scope of the statute. It was observed as under:- "Though an order passed in exercise of power under a Statute cannot be challenged on the ground of property or sufficiency, It is liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fides, dishonesty or corrupt purpose. Even if it is passed in good faith and with the best of intention to further the purpose of the legislation which confers the power, since the authority has to act in accordance with and within the limits of that legislation, Its order can also be challenged if it is beyond those limits or is passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation or if there are no grounds at all for passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. In any one of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts " The word 'satisfaction' has not been used in Section 237(b) of the Companies Act. In any one of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts " The word 'satisfaction' has not been used in Section 237(b) of the Companies Act. While considering Section 237(b), there is absolutely nothing in regard to the interest of the security of the State In my opinion, Barium Chemical's case (9j is of little consequence while considering the scope of CI.(c) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the. Constitution. In support of the argument that before passing the order dispensing with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the Governor should have examined all the relevant and adequate materials on which his satisfaction was arrived at, reference was made to Rohtas Industries case (10). In that case, State of Madras v. O, P. Sarathy, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 53 was also noticed and it was laid down that State of Madras's case (13) cannot be considered as an authority for the proposition that whenever a provision of law confer certain power on an authority for its forming a certain opinion on the basis of certain facts, the courts are precluded from examining whether the relevant facts on the basis of which the opinion is said to have been form, were, in fact, existed. In this way, State of Madras case (13) was distinguished. Section 237(b) of the Companies Act, of course, confers discretionary powers. The condition precedent to the exercise of the powers under Section 237(b) of the Companies Act is the opinion of the Government and not the existence of the circumstances suggesting one or more of the specified matters. It was held that it must be interpreted in the light of its own language and subject - matter and not by referring to the construction put by other juogss on other statutes perhaps similar but not the same. In para 45, it was observed as under:- "45. The law recognizes certain well recognised principles within which the discretionary power under Section 237(b) must be exercised. there must be a real exercise of the discretion. The authority must be exercised honestly and not for corrupt or ulterior purposes. The authority must form the requisite opinion honestly and after applying its mind to the relevant materials before it. The law recognizes certain well recognised principles within which the discretionary power under Section 237(b) must be exercised. there must be a real exercise of the discretion. The authority must be exercised honestly and not for corrupt or ulterior purposes. The authority must form the requisite opinion honestly and after applying its mind to the relevant materials before it. In exercising the discretion the authority must have regard only to circumstances suggesting one-or more of the matters specified in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii). It must act reasonably and not capriciously of arbitrarily It will be an absurd exercise of discretion, if, for example, the authority forms the requisite opinion on the ground that the director in charge of the company is a member of a particular community. Within these narrow limits the opinion, is not conclusive and can be challenged in a court of law. Had Section 237(bi made the opinion conclusive, it might be open to challenge as violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution." In para 46, it was also observed:- "If it is established that there were no materials upon which the authority could form the requisite opinion the court may infer that the authority did not apply its mind to the relevant facts. The requisite opinion is then lacking and the condition precedent to the exercise of power under section 237(b) is not fulfilled." In Rohtas Industries' case (10) it was concluded that the existence of the circumstances in question was open to judicial review though the opinion formed by the Government was not amenable to review by the courts and it was held that the required circumstances did not exist in that case. 16. I had occasion to consider Barium Chemical's case (9) and Rohtas Industries case of in Sonaram and others v. State of Rajasthan and others (S. B. Civil Writ petition No 929 of 1979, along with three other writ petitions, decided on September 24, 1979) , wherein portion of para 64 form Barium Chemical's case (9), was quoted which is under:- There must therefore exist circumstances which in the opinion of the Authority suggest what has been set out in sub clauses (i), (ii) or (iii). If it is shown that the circumstances do not exist or that they are such that it is impossible for anyone to form an opinion there from suggestive of the afore - said things, the opinion is challengeable on the ground of non-application of mind or perversity or on the ground that it was formed on collateral grounds and was beyond the scope of the statute." In M A. Raeheed's case (11), the matter was considered in the light of rule 114 of the Defence of India Rules. 1971. The notification in that case, which has been reproduced in that judgment recites that the Government had formed a particular opinion. Barium Chemical's case (9), Rohtas Industries case (10) and Mr. Rasheed's case (IV were considered in Gurdial Singh's case (supra) and it was observed therein as under:- "That such a situation postulates something entirely different from what the constitutional mandate of subjective satisfaction of , a high functionary like the Governor or the President is concerned, appears to me as too elementary to call for a meticulous elaboration." In my humble opinion, Barium Chemical's case (9j, Rohtas Industries case (10) and M A Rasbeed's case (U) are wholly wide of the mark and of little consequence and relevancy in the construction of Clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311(2). It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that even though it is not open . to the Court to examine the propriety or sufficiency of the material before the Governor which led to his satisfaction but if the fact relied upon for this purpose were such that no one could reasonably arrive at the conclusion mentioned in the order the court would be competent to quash it. In Rampur Distlllary and Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Company Law Board, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1789 , the provision before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was Section 326 of the Companies Act, 1956. This section deals with the power of the Central Government to approve the appointment etc. of Managing agent and circumstances in which approval may be accorded. Sub-section (2) provides that the Central Government shall not accord its approval unless it is satisfied that the matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) exists. This section deals with the power of the Central Government to approve the appointment etc. of Managing agent and circumstances in which approval may be accorded. Sub-section (2) provides that the Central Government shall not accord its approval unless it is satisfied that the matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) exists. It was held in that case that the courts were not concerned with the sufficiency of the grounds on which the satisfaction was reached but what was relevant was the satisfaction of the Central Government about the existence of the conditions in clauses (a), (b) and (c) so that the existence of the satisfaction could not be challenged except probably on the ground that the authority acted mala fide and that if in reaching its satisfaction, the Central Government misapprehended the nature of the conditions or proceeded upon irrelevant materials or ignored re-levants, the jurisdiction of the courts to examine the satisfaction was not excluded. In Sardari Lal. Union of India and others (15), the Supreme Court which following observations made at pages 307 and 308, in Jayantilal Amritlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana, (1964) 5 S.C. 294 in regard to the satisfaction and the nature of function of the President under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, observed as under:- " On the principles which have been enunciated by this Court, the function in clause (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2) cannot be delegated by the President to anyone else in the case of a civil servant of the Union, In other words he has to be satisfied personally that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold the inquiry prescribed by clause (2)." It is, therefore, clear that the satisfaction of the Governor or the President under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) is personal and subjective. Here, I may refer to Art 361 of the Constitution. Here, I may refer to Art 361 of the Constitution. It shows that the President or the Governor is not answerable to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties except to the extent and in the manner specified in the two provisos to clause (1) of this Article and as such no court has jurisdiction to examine the facts and circumstances that lead to the satisfaction of the Governor as envisaged in Clause (c) of second proviso to Art 311 (2) except on the ground of mala tides. The power of the President or the Governor under clause (c; of second proviso to Article 311 (2) is to be exercised on his subjective satisfaction and is not examinable by the courts as is demonstrated by the language employed in the three clauses of this proviso. Clause (c) states that the dismissal or removal or reduction in rank on the grounds of conduct which has led to conviction on a criminal charges would deprive the person concerned of the opportunities contemplated by Article 311 (2). It is clear that the fact of conviction on a criminal charge is an objective fact and it can be examined whether in fact there was such a conviction to deprive the person concerned of the opportunities provided in Art 311(2). The deprivation of these opportunities under clause (b) of the proviso also depends upon the satisfaction of the authority concerned hut for that some reasons to be recorded by it in writing, are necessary that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry. Since reasons have to be recorded, the satisfaction of such an authority will be an objective as distinguished from a subjective satisfaction and the reasons will, thus be examinable by a Court of law to the extent permissible according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Barium Chemical's case (9). But this is not so in regard to clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It does not talis of any ground or reasons to be recorded. But this is not so in regard to clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It does not talis of any ground or reasons to be recorded. It is the personal satisfaction of the Governor that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry It needs to be emphasised that the words used in Clause (c) of second proviso to Article 31l (2) are satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry." in State of West Bengal and others v. Narendra Narayan Das, 1978 (1) S.L.R. 646 , it was held that The meaning of the words "in the interest of" is wider than simply the expression "security of State." The expression "in the interest of" include everything that even indirectly help the security of the State. To quote "Security of State is different from law and order or public order but maintenance of law and order as well as maintenance of public order may be in the interest of the security of Stale "Lord Parker in The Zamora (1916) (2) A.C. 77, observed as under:- " Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole Judges of what the national security requires. It would be obviously undesirable that such matters should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law or otherwise discussed in public." This dictum was referred to in Liversidge v. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 206 with the following observations by Lord Mecmillen:- "I turn now to the nature of the topics gas to which the Secretary of State is under the regulation to have reasonable cause of belief. They fell into two categories:- The Secretary of State had to decide (1) whether the person proposed to be detained is a person of hostile origin or associations or has been recently concerned in certain activities, but he has also to make up his mind; (2) whether by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control over him The first of these requirements relates to matters of fact, and it may be that a court of, law, if it could have before it all the Secretary of State's information an important 'if' might be able to say whether such information would to an ordinary reasonable cause of belief. But how could a Court or law deal with the question whether there was reasonable cause to believe that it was necessary to exercise control over the person proposed to be detailed, which is a matter of opinion and policy, not of fact? A decision on this question can manifestly be taken only by one who has not knowledge and responsibility which no court can share " The learned Judges of the Delhi High Court in Sardarilal v. Union of India and others, (1971) 3 S.C.R. 461 observed as under:- "On the other hand clause (c) of the proviso does not talk of any ground or reasons to be recorded or not. It is the personal satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry. Apart from the fact that in terms the satisfaction is with regard to the interest of the security of the State. It cannot be doubted that questions relating to the security of the State cannot be examined by a Court because such questions are primarily political questions." In Bhagban ' Chandra 'Das v. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2004 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "No doubt Article 3.1 (2) is intended to afford a sense of security to Government servants covered by sub-article (1) and the safeguards provided by sub-article (2) are mandatory. But clause (e) of the proviso to this sub-article which is designed to safeguard the larger interest of the security of the State cannot be ignored or considered less important when construing sub-article (2). The interest of the security of the State should not be allowed to suffer by invalidating the Governor's order on unsubstantial or hyper-technical grounds which do not have the effect of defeating the essential purpose of the constitutional safeguard of individual Government servant." It is to my mind, clear that the issues of the interest of security of State are not justiciable and it cannot be subjected to judicial review or scrutiny 17. It may be mentioned that if by reason of the clause (c) of second proviso to Art 311(2B), the inquiry as contemplated by Article 311(2) is dispensed with, there Is no scope for operation of the principles of natural justice or of justice or fair play which has been expressly ruled out by the aforesaid provisions in the Constitution. Rules about natural justice or fair play have expressly or by necessary implication have been excluded and it is not permissible in law to import such principles of natural justice and fair play in the Constitution. For these very reasons, it is futile to contend that the orders dispensing with the requirements of Article 311(2) are bad as they are not speaking orders. The reasons for passing the orders are apparent from them 18. Having regard to clause (c) of second proviso to Art 311(2), there is no obligation cast upon the State nor a right vested in the public servants to claim disclosure of all the relevant materials It is, however, open to the court to examine the same in the facts and circumstances of a particular case or its own satisfaction. The materials for the satisfaction of the Governor are also borne out on the record. It has been mentioned in the return that the action was taken in the interest of the security of the State after perusal of the record relating to undesirable and illegal activities, misconduct and other acts of indiscipline. Shri L.N Gupta Home Secretary, Government of Rajasthan, has also given affidavit in this connection. Reference may also made to para 9 of the return in S B Civil Writ Petition No. 1397 of 1979 Thus, there was material on the basis of which the Governor was satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it was not expedient to hold an enquiry contemplated by Art 311(2) 19. The orders dispensing with the requirements of Art 311 (2) are not violative of Article 14 being disciplinary. Each case of the dismissed police employees was separately considered before passing orders under Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2). I regret, I have not been able to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in regard to discrimination. 20. Each case of the dismissed police employees was separately considered before passing orders under Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2). I regret, I have not been able to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in regard to discrimination. 20. I respectfully agree with the view taken in Gurdial Singh's case (supra) in this regard, The impugned orders dispensing with the enquiry under Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 of the Constitution having been made by the Governor, in exercise of the special powers conferred on him by the Constitution, are not justiciable on the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The Governor was the sole Judge to determine whether it was not expedient in these particular cases in the interest of the security of the State to hold the enquiry as envisaged under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. No valid exception can be taken to the orders under Clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2). 21. This takes me to the consideration of the orders of dismissal from service passed against each of the petitioners in exercise of the powers under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules. 22. The contention of the learned Government advocate is that once the enquiry under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution was dispensed with under Art 310 (I) of the Constitution, the petitioner could be removed from service and the Rules, which have been framed under Art 309, cannot prevail According to the learned Government Advocate, even if the orders under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules are held to be not sustainable under the Rules, being not in accordance with them, still, when the order was passed by the Governor dispensing with the enquiry, the petitioners could be removed under Article 310 (1) of the Constitution, for, tenure of office of persons serving the State is at the pleasure of the Governor of the State. It may be mentioned here that specifically in any of these cases, no orders for removal from service has been passed under Article 3lo (1) of the Constitution In Gurdial Singh's case (supra), which was before a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, there was only one composite order dispensing with the enquiry under Article 311 (2) (c) of Constitution and order of removal from service under Article 310(1) of the Constitution. It will be useful here for the sake of facility, to reproduce the order, which was under consideration before the learned Judges of the Punjab and Haryana High Court:- "Whereas ASI Gurdial Singh No. 242/PTL posted at Sangrur is "guilty of such misconduct as renders him liable to removal from Punjab Government service ; And whereas the Governor of Punjab is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State of Punjab, it is not expedient to hold an enquiry against the aforesaid ASI Gurdial Singh No 262/PTL as required by clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India for his removal from Government service; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 310 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Punjab is pleased to remove the aforesaid ASI Gurdial Singh No 242/PTL from Government service with immediate effect." In the cases before me, orders dispensing with the enquiry under clause (c) of the second proviso to Art 311 (2). were passed prior in time. After passing of the orders dispensing with the requirements of Article 311 (2). orders of dismissing from service under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules were passed. The orders of dismissal make mention of dispensing with the enquiry under Article 511 (2). were passed prior in time. After passing of the orders dispensing with the requirements of Article 311 (2). orders of dismissing from service under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules were passed. The orders of dismissal make mention of dispensing with the enquiry under Article 511 (2). After the receipt of the orders dispensing with the enquiry, the concerning authority C purporting to act as disciplinary authority) passed the orders dismissing each of the petitioners from service stating that it is not in the' interest of the security of the State to retain the petitioners in service and as such they are dismissed from service After an enquiry was dispensed with under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2), no separate order of the Governor was required that in the interest of the security of the State it was not expedient to follow the procedure, laid down under rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules, but the question that arises for consideration is whether without resorting to the powers conferred under Art 310 (I), the order dispensing with the enquiry under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 (2) should be construed, as contended by the learned Government Advocate, as order of dismissal from service deposits that the order dismissing each of the petitioners from service was passed by the Disciplinary Authority under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules. 23. In this connection, it will be useful to consider Articles 309 and 310 of the Constitution Article 309 deals with recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union of State. According to Article 309, for the purpose of regulating recruitment, and conditions of service of the persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the State, the appropriate Legislature can do so by Acts, subject to the provisions contained in the Constitution. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor made the Rules. Article 310 (1) of the Constitution reads as under: "310. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Governor made the Rules. Article 310 (1) of the Constitution reads as under: "310. Tenure of office of persons serving the Union or State:- (1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person, who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all - India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union, holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State" It is necessary to notice State of U. P. v. Babu Ram, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 751 , Motiram v. N. E. Frontier Railway, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600 , N. Ramanatba v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 2641 . State of U. P. v. Babu Ram, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 751 is no longer good law after the decision of Motiram's case, as observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Samsher Singh's case. It was held therein that Articles 310 and 311 must no doubt be read together, but once the true scope and effect of Article 311 (2) is determined the scope and effect of Article 310 (1) must be limited in the sense that in regard to cases following under Article 311 (2) the pleasure mentioned in Article 310 (1) must be exercised in accordance with the requirements of Article 311. It was observed as under : "We will no doubt have to decide what oases of termination of services of permanent civil servants amount to removal; but once that question is determined wherever it is - shown that a permanent civil servant is removed from his services Article 311 (2) will apply and Article 310 (1) cannot be invoked independently with the object of justifying the contravention of the provisions of Article 311(2) " The scope of Articles 309 and 310 of the Constitution was considered in N. Ramanath's case (24) It was held therein that Article 309 is to be read subject to Art 310 and that Article 310 provides for the tenure of office of persons serving the State or Union, and according to that such office is held during the pleasure of the Governor if the post is under the State and that the doctrine of pleasure is, thus, embodied in Article 310 (1). A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in C.M. Engineer v. Jyoti Prasad had occasion to consider Articles 309, 310 and 311 (2) of the Constitution and Rule 14 (ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968. In Union of India case (23), it was observed as under:- "A Government servant serving under the Union of India holds office at the pleasure of the President as provided in Article 310 of the Constitution. But this 'pleasure' doctrine in subject to the rules or law made under Article 30y as well as the conditions prescribed under Article 311." These observations were considered in C M. Engineer's case (26). In para 19 of the report, it was observed as under : "The pleasure of the President or Governor is also subject to the express provisions of Article 311, clauses (1) and (2). The Rules framed under Article 309 provides for the procedure in which such pleasure can be exercised consistent with the mandatory provisions of Article 311 (1) and (2) and the authority by whom such pleasure is to be exercised. The relevant rules regarding tenure of office in fact are a reiteration of the conditions imposed by Article 311, clauses (I) and (2) and the procedure to be followed for giving due effect to these constitutional provisions. The relevant rules regarding tenure of office in fact are a reiteration of the conditions imposed by Article 311, clauses (I) and (2) and the procedure to be followed for giving due effect to these constitutional provisions. When, however, the provisos to Article 311 (2) operate, clause (2) of Article 311 seizes to apply and the pleasure of the President or Governor revives as being free from the fetters of Article 311(2). The Act or Rules must be subject to Article 310(1) .........The position therefore is that the pleasure of the President or the Governor cannot be fettered except by the express provisions of the Constitution like Articles 124, 148, 211, 218, 324 and also 311. If in a given case by reasons of the operation of a proviso, the clause 2 of Art 311 does not apply, the enquiry contemplated under the said clause is not required to be held before a public servant is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank. The rules framed under Article 309 relating to the procedure for holding an enquiry contemplated under clause (2) of Article 311, before imposing the aforesaid major penalties also cease to operate as such rules by themselves cannot curtail the pleasure of the President except in terms of Article 311, clause(2) whereof has in the circumstances become Inoperative. In view of the non-applicability of clause (2) of Article 311, the procedure for holding an enquiry in the case before us under Rules 9 to 13 of the Rules ceases to have operation and on the contrary, the special procedure in certain cases where any of the provisos of clause (2) of Article 311 applies, reiterated in Rule 14 of the said rules, apply with full force, leaving the disciplinary authority as a delegatee of the President or the Governor, to pass such orders, consistent with the 'pleasure' doctrine as it deems fit." The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court reached the conclusion that no enquiry for holding a disciplinary proceeding in the circumstances where a proviso to clause 2 of Article 311 operates will be available before an order of penalty is passed, as such inquiry will be inconsistent with or fetter the pleasure of the President in regard to tenure of office of a public servant. For better appreciation of the contention of the learned Government Advocate it needs to be stated that in these cases, the petitioners have been dismissed from service and they have not been removed from service The words 'dismissal and 'removal' have one distinction, viz., that the former disqualifies for future employment while the latter does not. "Dismissal" is "removal" with a prohibition super-added. Rule 14 of the Rules and deals with the nature of penalties. Clauses (vi) and (vii) of rule 14 are as under:- " (vi) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for further employment; (vii) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment " Rule 19 of the Rules provides for special procedure in certain cases. Under para 3 of rule 19, where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow the procedure laid down in rules 16, 17 and 18, the Disciplinary Authority has been empowered to pass such orders as it deems fit, after considering the circumstances of each case. The words used in para 3 of Rule 19 are "such procedure". Rule 19 begins with non-obstante clause, It reads "Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 16, 17 and 18". Rule 16 deals with departmental enquiry for imposing major penalties specified In clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 14 of the Rules. Rule 17 deals with the procedure for imposing minor penalties. Rule 18 relates to joint enquiry. In para 3 of rule 19, procedure laid down in rules 16, 17 and 18 can be dispensed with if it is expedient to do so in the interest of the security of the State Rule 14 occurs in part V of the Rules relating to discipline. The penalties specified in rule 14 can be imposed on the Government servant for good and sufficient reasons, which are to be recorded. According to para 3 of rule 19, the Governor has been empowered to dispense with the procedure laid down In rules 16, 17 and 8, if it is in the interest of the security of the State to do so. According to para 3 of rule 19, the Governor has been empowered to dispense with the procedure laid down In rules 16, 17 and 8, if it is in the interest of the security of the State to do so. This means that holding of inquiry in accordance with the procedure laid down in rules 16, 17 and 18 can only be dispensed with The disciplinary authority is, however, required to consider the circumstances of the case and, thereafter, to pass such orders as it deems fit 24. So far making on order in regard to the major penalties, the Disciplinary Authority has to consider the circumstances of the case and to pass such orders, as it thinks fit. 25. The respondents have stated in the return that the authority concerned in exercise of the powers conferred on it under para 3 of rule 19 passed the order dismissing each petitioner from service To quote from the reply in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1397 of 1979, it has been stated that "thereafter again' each individual disciplinary authority passed individual orders of dismissal in their independent application of mind to the facts and circumstances of individual case on being satisfied that retention of petitioner in the service of the State was not in the interest of the State." Para 4 of the affidavit of Shri L. N. Gupta, Home Secretary, is as follows:- "4. That the order of the Governor, State of Rajasthan was, thereafter, communicated to the Inspector General of Police, Police Hqrs Jaipur being sent to the concerned disciplinary authority. This was the procedure followed after due consideration in the case of the petitioner." In all the cases, the orders of dismissal from service have been passed under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules. 26. Having considered the returns, the orders of dismissal from service, the affidavits of the concerned authorities which passed the orders and the affidavit of Sh. L.N. Gupta, Home Secretary, in these cases, I am opinion that it is not open to the learned Government Advocate to contend that the orders of dismissal from service were passed by the concerned authorities as delegates of the Governor under Article 310(1). In this connection, Gurdial Singh's case (supra) and C. M. Engineer's case (26) are of no assistance. 27. In this connection, Gurdial Singh's case (supra) and C. M. Engineer's case (26) are of no assistance. 27. I now come to the point regarding validity of the orders dismissing the petitioners from service under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules. The learned Government Advocate, on the basis of the reasoning contained in C M. Engineer's case (26) which was decided on May 14, 1975, tried to justify them. Last part of rule 14 of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, is as under ; - " the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit " This part of rule 14 came up for consideration in Divisional Personal Officer v. T. K. Challapan, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2216 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following illuminating observations ; - "The word 'consider' merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words, the term 'consider' postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an inquiry would be a summary inquiry to be held by the disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee. It is not at all necessary for the disciplinary authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry which is dispensed with under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1968 which incorporates the principle contained in Article 311(2) proviso (a). This provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee. This provision confers power on the disciplinary authority to decide whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case what penalty, if at all, should be imposed on the delinquent employee. It is obvious that in considering ibis matter the disciplinary authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features if any present in the case and so on and so forth. (Emphasis added;. Para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules is as follows:- "The Disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as is deems fit 28. It is not in dispute that any summary inquiry was held by the disciplinary authority in these cases after hearing the dismissed police employees. Before passing order imposing penalty of dismissal from service as provided in clause (vii) of Role 14 of the Rules, it was necessary that there should have been active application of mind by the disciplinary authority alter considering the entire circumstances of the case, it was also necessary for objective determination that each police employee ' should have been heard in keeping with the sense of justice and fair pray and given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In view of the Divisional Personnel Officers case (27) which was decided on September 15, 1975, I find it extremely difficult to follow C. M. Engineer's case (26) in so far as relates to this aspect of these cases and with profound respect, express my dissent. It, therefore, follows that the orders of dismissal from service passed under para 3 of rule 19 of the Rules are not valid an hence cannot be sustained. 29. In view of this conclusion to which I have arrived at, it is no necessary to examine the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners to demonstrate that the orders of dismissal from service are bad and that in some of the cases they have not been passed by the competent authority. 30. The up - shot of the discussion made hereinabove is:- (i) that the satisfaction of the Government under clause (c) of second proviso to Act. 30. The up - shot of the discussion made hereinabove is:- (i) that the satisfaction of the Government under clause (c) of second proviso to Act. 311(2) is not justiciable and no court has jurisdiction examine the facts and circumstances that led to his satisfaction except on the grounds of mala fides The orders dispensing with the requirements of Article 31J(2) are valid. (ii) that the orders of the disciplinary authority dismissing the petitioners from service straightway are not valid as before taking final action in the matter, the petitioners were not heard in keeping with the sense of justice and fair play. 31. The result is that these writ petitions are allowed and the orders dismissing the petitioners from service are hereby quashed. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not prevent in concerned authorities from taking any disciplinary proceedings against the successful petitioners in accordance with law, if they think proper. 32. There will be stay of operation of this order for a period of eight weeks from date. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.Petition dismissed. *******