JUDGMENT : N.K. Das, J. - A common point of law arises in all these appeals. Admittedly, Respondent No. 1 is the proprietor and Respondent No. 2 is the Secretary of the Prajatantra Prachar Samiti. Criminal Appeal No. 131/7/ relates to non-payment of the administrative charges for the period from October, 1974 to December, 1974; Criminal Appeal No. 132/77 relates to nonpayment of provident fund contribution for the period from January, 1975 to March, 1975; Criminal Appeal No. 133/77 relates to non-payment of administrative charges for the period from April, 1975 to May, 1975; Criminal Appeal No. 134/77 relates to non-payment of administrative charges for the period from January, 1975 to March, 1975; Criminal Appeal No. 135/77 relates to non-payment of administrative charges for the period from January, 1975 to March,1975; Crime-idea Appeal No. 261/77 relates to non-payment of provident fund dues and family pension fund for the period from October, 1974 to December, 1974; Criminal Appeal No. 262/77 relates to non-payment of administrative charges for the period from August, 1974 to September, 1974; Criminal Appeal No. 263/77 relates to non-payment of provident fund contribution for September, 1974; Criminal Appeal No. 264/77 relates to non-payment of provident fund dues for May, 1974, July, 1974 and August, 1974; and Criminal Appeal No. 265/77 relates to non-payment of administrative charges for the period from May, 1974 to July, 1974. It would thus appear that the Respondents were prosecuted under Sections 14 and 14(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund Act and the Family Pension Fund Act for non-payment of provident fund dues, family pension and administrative charges for different periods. There is no dispute about the fact that the Respondents have not paid the contribution and the administrative charges and have contended that it was the Public Relation Department of the Government who bad to clear up the dues out of the dues to be paid to the Respondents. The Appellant was also aware of this fact and has attached the money and has also realised the same. 2. On the undisputed facts and circumstances stated above the only question canvassed and on which the Courts below have acquitted the Respondents is that the prosecution is barred by time u/s 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The Appellant was also aware of this fact and has attached the money and has also realised the same. 2. On the undisputed facts and circumstances stated above the only question canvassed and on which the Courts below have acquitted the Respondents is that the prosecution is barred by time u/s 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant that the wrong committed by the Respondents is a continuing wrong and, as such, the commission of offence should be deemed to be continuing from day to day and the cases are not barred by limitation, but are covered by the provisions of Section 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Prosecution reports in all these cases have been filed on 20th July, 1976. According to the provisions of Section 468(2)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prosecution should have been launched within one year from the date of commission of the offence. The offence was committed on different occasions in these cases ranging from May, 1974 to May, 1975. The latest period was May, 1975 and the due date of payment was 15-6-1975. If one year computed from 15-6-1975, even considering the latest period (the period being April, 1975 to May, 1975 in Criminal Appeal No. 133/77), it appears that the prosecution was launched beyond the period of one year. In other case, the period is earlier to April, 1975 and undoubtedly prosecution has been filed much beyond one year. These facts are admitted. 4. The question for consideration is whether the offence committed by the Respondents is a continuing one, or a completed offence. If the offence is a continuing one, then the period of limitation of one year, as contemplated u/s 468, Code of Criminal Procedure will have no application in view of the provisions of Section 472, Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant that the offence committed by the Respondents is a continuing offence. Reliance has been placed on a decision reported in Akharbhai Nazarali Vs. Md. Hussain Bhai. The decision has relied on two previous decisions, namely, G.D. Bhattar and Others Vs. The State and The State Vs. Kunja Behari Chandra and Others. The aforesaid Calcutta case as well as the Patna case relate to submission of returns under the Mines and Minerals Regulations. Md. Hussain Bhai. The decision has relied on two previous decisions, namely, G.D. Bhattar and Others Vs. The State and The State Vs. Kunja Behari Chandra and Others. The aforesaid Calcutta case as well as the Patna case relate to submission of returns under the Mines and Minerals Regulations. Relying on the aforesaid two decisions, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that non-payment of provident fund contribution and establishment charges on due dates is continuing offence and becomes punishable as soon as the Scheme comes into force. The Supreme Court had the occasion to consider a case of this nature in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and Another. That was a case under the Mines Act. The Supreme Court held: Regulation 3 read with Section 66 of the Mines Act makes failure to furnish annual returns for the preceding year by the 21st of January of the succeeding year an offence. The language of Regulation 3 clearly indicates that an owner, manager etc. of a mine would be liable to the penalty if he were to commit an infringement of the Regulation and that infringement consists in the failure to furnish returns on or before January 21 of the succeeding year. The infringement, therefore occurs on January 21 of the relevant year and is complete on the owner failing to furnish the annual returns by that day. The Regulation does not lay down that the owner, manager etc. of the mine concerned would be guilty of an offence if he continues to carry on the mine without furnishing the returns or that the offence continues until the requirement of Regulation 3 is complied with. In other words Regulation 3 does not render a continued disobedience or non-compliance of it an offence. As in the case of a construction of a wall in violation of a rule or a bye-law of a local body, the offence would be complete once and for all as soon as such construction is made a default occurs in furnishing the returns by the prescribed date. There is nothing in Regulation 3 or in the Regulations which renders the continued non-compliance an offence until its requirement is carried out. 6. There is nothing in Regulation 3 or in the Regulations which renders the continued non-compliance an offence until its requirement is carried out. 6. Subsequent to the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Madras High Court in Pankaja Mills Ltd. v. N. Sivaramakrishna Iyer 1977 Lab.I.C. 1715, had to consider the question of limatation for offences of non-payment of provident fund contributions and administrative charges. It was held that the offence was not a continuing one and the complaint filed beyond the period of limitation, as mentioned in Section 468(2)(b) was not a maintainable. The Madras High Court relied on the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and Another, and held that the situation is different at present and the validity of the prosecutions has to be examined in the light of Section 468 of the new Code. When Parliament has clearly intended that prosecution launched after a certain period will not be maintainable, it necessarily follows that complaints in respect of completed offences cannot be filed by the prosecution after the time limit prescribed by Parliament has expired unless it is found that the offences are of a continuing nature. The offence of non-payment of contribution and administrative charges is complete when the amounts were not remitted on the due date or dates. Merely because the civil liability continued to exist thereafter, it cannot be said that the non-payment constituted a fresh offence with each passing day. Relying on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the Madras High Court held that the case of Akharbhai Nazarali Vs. Md. Hussain Bhai, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the case of G.D. Bhattar and Others Vs. The State of the Calcutta High Court (on which the Madhya Pradesh High Court relied), both referred to above, are no longer good law. There is nothing in the Act or the Scheme to show that the nonpayment continues to be a recurring offence with each passing day. If the Legislature bad intended that defaults committed by the employer would be continuing offence, then that would have been clearly indicated in the Act or the Scheme. The Bombay High Court had also occasion to consider the very same question in S.V. Lachwani v. Kanchanlal Parikh and Ors. 1978 Lab.I.C. 868. If the Legislature bad intended that defaults committed by the employer would be continuing offence, then that would have been clearly indicated in the Act or the Scheme. The Bombay High Court had also occasion to consider the very same question in S.V. Lachwani v. Kanchanlal Parikh and Ors. 1978 Lab.I.C. 868. The Bombay High Court followed the decision of the Madras High Court in Pankaja Mills case 1977 Lab.I.C. 1715, and held that the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court stands impliedly overruled by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. It was also observed by the Bombay High Court that the offence of making default in paying the contribution takes place on completion of one month, and there is no continuity of It. The section does not say that on the employer making default he continues in default. If there would have been any such phraseuology then it could have been said that what is made oblsgatory is the payment and till the default continues the employer is liable. But the wording of Section 14(1-A) is very clear. It shows that the employer will be guilty if he makes a default in paying the contribution by the end of one month after the wages become due. If the Legislature intended to make it a continuing offence, then some other phraseology would have been used in the section or recurring penalty for the continuing default would have been levied. The Calcutta High Court in Devidayal Sukhani v. D.N. Das, P.F. Inspector 1978 (37) F.L.R. 360. held that as soon as an accused commits a default for a particular month he' commits an offence under the Act and as such makes himself liable to prosecution. His subsequent payment of the dues for that month does not purge him of the offence already committed nor it can be said that he continues to be an offender till the dues are paid by him. In that view of the matter section 472 of the Code of 1973, will have no application. Section 468 Sub-section (2) Clause (b) of the Code will be applicable and the period of limitation is one year from the date of commission of the offence. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence which is time-barred. In that view of the matter section 472 of the Code of 1973, will have no application. Section 468 Sub-section (2) Clause (b) of the Code will be applicable and the period of limitation is one year from the date of commission of the offence. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence which is time-barred. The Karnataka High Court in Provident Fund Inspector v. N.S. Dayananda 1979 (39) F.L.R. 224, noticed the decisions of the Supreme Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as other High Courts and has held that reading of paragraph 30(a) and 28(1) of the Scheme under the Employees' Provident Fund Act leaves no doubt that on the expiry of a particular period, offences are committed completely. If there are subsequent defaults of the type, may be for the next month or may be for the month after next and so on, it will be, in the very nature of things, another set of substantive offence committed by the employer. No provision of the Act or the Scheme lays down that if an employer makes a default in making the payment to the Fund within the stipulated time as required by paragraph 38 of the Scheme and carries on his business, he would be guilty of an offence or that the offence would continue till the default is made good. Therefore, once the defaults were made the offences were committed once and for all and became complete on the close of the due date. As such there could not be any ingredient of continuance in the offence to make it a continuing one. In paragraph-12 of the judgment, the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi and Another has been noticed and it has been explained to what extent it is applicable to the case of offence of non-payment of provident fund contribution or administrative charges. 7. The decision of the Supreme Court has been considered by different High Courts for offences under the Employees' Provident Fund Act and the Scheme thereunder, as rises in the instant cases. 7. The decision of the Supreme Court has been considered by different High Courts for offences under the Employees' Provident Fund Act and the Scheme thereunder, as rises in the instant cases. The con census view following the Supreme Court decision, which clearly explains the position is that the offences of non-payment of the provident fund contribution and administrative charges are not continuing ones and there is no bar in the statute that an institution cannot carry on business if contribution or administrative charges for one occasion are not paid. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that as there is provision in the Act for recovery of damages for nonpayment u/s 14B it will be deemed that penalty has been imposed and, as such, it should be deemed to be a continuing wrong. Recovery of the amount may be a civil due and damages can be claimed for non-payment of the dues till those are realised, but that would not make an offence a continuing one. As has been discussed above, unless the Legislature intends and makes a clear provision that the offence of a single non-payment of the dues or charges would amount to a continuing one, the same cannot be read into the statute. It may be mentioned here that the prosecution did not file any petition for condonation of delay in Criminal Appeal Nos. 131 to 135 of 1977 but filed petitions u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, after cognizance was taken, for condonation of delay in Criminal Appeal Nos. 261 to 265 of 1977, but the said petitions have been dismissed by the trial Court. 8. On the aforesaid analysis, I hold that the offences alleged are not continuing one and the prosecution reports in different cases having been launched after expiry of one year, are not maintainable and, as such, the Courts below have rightly acquitted the Respondents. 9. In the result, the appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed