JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiff's Second Appeal in a suit for declaration that the order of suspension dated 5th September, 1968 and the order of removal from service dated 7th November, 1968 passed against the plaintiff were illegal and void. The plaintiff was a Class IV Civilian Employee of the Defence Service. At the relevant time the plaintiff was posted in the Station Workshop, E.M.E., Meerut Cantt. as a Civil Messenger. The plaintiff was suspended from service on 5th, September, 1968. Three charges were framed against him the that while functioning as a civil messenger during the period 21st August, 1968 at about 9.45 hrs. he quarrelled with and manhandled Sri Badri Prasad, a civil messenger of the same unit; (2) that he absented himself from duty during the period of 2nd July, 1968 to 7th August, 3968, and (3) that he absented himself from duty from 13 hrs to 16 hrs on 5th August, 1968. These charges were framed by the Commanding Officer of the Station Workshop, E.M.E., Merrut Cantt., and Board of 3 Officers was appointed to en-quire into the charges in accordance with the procedure prescribed by R. 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. After considering the report and the recommendation of the Board of Enquiry the Officer Commanding gave the plaintiff an opportunity to show cause against the punishment which he proposed to inflict on the plaintiff. The plaintiff made a representation dated 14th October, 1968 and after considering the matter again and the representation made by the plaintiff, the Officer Commanding directed the removal of the plaintiff from service by his order dated 7th November, 1968. 2. Several grounds were raised by the plaintiff in support of his contention that the order removing from service was bad in law. They have been considered item wise by the lower appellate court. It is not disputed, rather it was admitted, and it is clear from a perusal of the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, that the said rules apply to the plaintiff although he was a civilian employee of the Defence Service. But he was not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution (See Lakhraj v. Union of India; AIR 1971 SC 2111 ). But he was not entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution (See Lakhraj v. Union of India; AIR 1971 SC 2111 ). Mr A.R. Dubey, learned counsel for the appellant, contended firstly that the plaintiff was appointed by a Lt. Colonel but was removed by an officer who held the rank of Major and that, therefore, he was removed by an authority inferior in rank to the appointing authority who appointed him and secondly that the plaintiff was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the disciplinary proceedings in accordance with the relevant rules. 3. Having heard Mr. Dubey, I find that there is no merit in either of the two contentions. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Lekhraj v. Union of India (supra) it is indisputable that the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution was not available to the plaintiff and that he could only invoke the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 which apply to him by reason of the provisions of those rules themselves. Rule 2 (c) defines the Central Civil Service and a Central Civil Post to include a civilian service of civilian post, as the case may be, of the corresponding class in the Defence Service. Rule 12 (2) of the said rules which defines the authority competent to inflict the penalties specified in Rule 11, says that any of the penalties specified in the rule may be imposed on (a) a member of Central Civil Service other than the General Central Service, by the appointing authority or the authority specified in the Schedule in this behalf or by any other authority empowered in this behalf by a general or special order of the President. The lower appellate court has in this context relied upon Ex. A-18 which shows that the officer commanding the Unit was the appointing authority in relation to Class IV Civilian Employees like the plaintiff. The order of the plaintiff's removal from service was passed by the Commanding Officer of the Station Workshop E.M.E. Therefore, it could not be said that there was any violation of Rule 12 and the order of the plaintiff's removal from service could not be said to be invalid on that ground. 4. The order of the plaintiff's removal from service was passed by the Commanding Officer of the Station Workshop E.M.E. Therefore, it could not be said that there was any violation of Rule 12 and the order of the plaintiff's removal from service could not be said to be invalid on that ground. 4. With regard to the other ground, the lower appellate court has found as a fact, relying on the statement of the plaintiff himself in the witness box, that the enquiry was conducted in his presence on several dates, the witnesses were -questioned in his presence, that he was himself examined and was allowed to produce his witnesses in defence and that he was told that it was proposed to remove him from service, and further that the plaintiff never demanded any paper or any opportunity which he might not have been afforded during the enquiry and never made any grievance of want of reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the course of enquiry, in the representation which he made to the Disciplinary Authority in response to the show cause notice against the proposed punishment. The lower appellate court has also observed that the Presiding Officer of the Board of Enquiry Major K.N. Santhana appeared as a witness (D.W. 1) and stated on oath that the plaintiff had admitted the allegations of charges framed and that, therefore, there was no question of any cross-examination by the plaintiff of the witnesses examined in the course of enquiry. Mr. Dubey was unable to show that these findings recorded by the lower appellate court suffer from any error of law. He merely tried to rely on the judgment of the trial court but as rightly observed by the lower appellate court, the trial court had wrongly proceeded to consider the case as if it was sitting in appeal against the findings of the Board of Enquiry. 5. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.