JUDGMENT Subramonian Poti, J. 1. These are appeals from the same decree passed in O.S. No. 51 of 1967 of the Sub Court of Parur. A.S. No. 733 of 1974 is an appeal by the 10th defendant, the Union of India, representing the Southern Railway Administration and A.S. No. 737 of 1974 is by defendants 1 to 7, the first defendant being a firm and defendants 2 to 4 being partners thereof. The suit was for recovery of money. The first defendant firm, M/s Pareed Pillai and Brothers, of which the Managing Partner was the second defendant was carrying on business in cocoanut oil. The activity of the firm consisted mainly of exporting cocoanut oil from the State to places in India outside the State. The plaintiff in the suit is the Federal Bank Limited with its Head Office at Alwaye. The first defendant firm also had its office at Alwaye. The firm and its partners defendants 1 to 4 were availing of banking facilities with the plaintiff bank from the very commencement of their business, one an overdraft account with a limit of Rs. 50,000 and the other a documentary bills accounting facility with a limit of Rs. 5,00,000. It was the practice of defendants 1 to 4 to book consignments of cocoanut oil in tins at the Railway Stations Alwaye, Irinjalakuda and Chalakudy to various parties outside State to take the railway receipts in respect of such consignments to plaintiff Bank and endorse them in favour of the Bank and to draw the proceeds through their accounts on the basis of such endorsement as also by handing over bills of exchange. When amounts were realised by the bank on bills being retired at the destination station the accounts of the firm were being duly credited with such realisations. In the suit the claim is for the amount outstanding from defendants 1 to 4 on account of their dealings with the Bank. The case is that as on 30th December, 1963 a sum of Rs. 4,43,897-93 was the balance due to the Bank. Out of this a sum of Rs. 3,65,390.75 was said to represent the amount due to the Bank by reason of purchase of 25 railway receipts specifically mentioned in the A Schedule to the plaint. The case is that as on 30th December, 1963 a sum of Rs. 4,43,897-93 was the balance due to the Bank. Out of this a sum of Rs. 3,65,390.75 was said to represent the amount due to the Bank by reason of purchase of 25 railway receipts specifically mentioned in the A Schedule to the plaint. The railway receipts were all endorsed in favour of the Bank by one or other of defendants 1 to 4 in the usual course of business. The goods represented by these railway receipts are said to have not been delivered at the destination stations and consequently the plaintiff bank is said to have lost to the extent of the amount paid on the strength of endorsement of the railway receipts. The 10th defendant had taken the goods for delivery but had failed to deliver and is therefore sought to be made liable in respect of the value of the goods represented by these 25 railway receipts. That is the sum of Rs. 3,65,390.75. By some subsequent adjustments the total amount due to the plaintiff Bank from defendants was reduced and it is only the sum of Rs. 4,27,143.08 that is mentioned in the B valuation statement that is claimed as due. Of this, the amount due from the 10th defendant towards purchase value of the 25 railway receipts as damages on account of the failure of the 10th defendant to deliver the goods is the amount mentioned in the A statement namely, Rs. 3,65,390.75. The Bank claims to be a bona fide transferee for value of 25 railway receipts on account of endorsements on account of which the Bank is said to have become the owner of the goods and the Bank claims that it is entitled to have value of the goods represented by the railway receipts. 2. Defendants 5 to 7 are impleaded because they had guaranteed the payment of amounts due from defendants 1 to 4. The decree is prayed for also against the properties in Schedules B to I 3. The suit was contested by defendants 1, 3, 5 7, 8, 9 and 10. The firm and its partners as well as the guarantors disclaimed their liability. The decree is prayed for also against the properties in Schedules B to I 3. The suit was contested by defendants 1, 3, 5 7, 8, 9 and 10. The firm and its partners as well as the guarantors disclaimed their liability. The 10th defendant the Union of India, contended that the railway receipts issued by the employees of the railway were so issued because of fraud and collusion between the employees of the railway on the one hand and the first defendant firm and their agents on the other. It is further said that though the railway receipts show consignment of cocoanut oil at the Railway Stations at Alwaye, Irinjalakuda and Chalakudy no consignments were actually tendered or delivered to the railway and therefore there was no obligation on the railway to deliver the goods at the destination. The allegation in the plaint that the plaintiff bank is a bona fide transferee for value is denied and it is further contended that in any event the liability of the railway administration must be considered in the light of S.73 and 78B of the Railways Act and if so, so long as the goods are not seen delivered to the railway no cause of action would arise even at the instance of the plaintiff bank. The plaintiff filed three replications and we are concerned only with the first and the 3rd replication filed in answer to the amended written statement. 4. In support of the case of the parties P.W. 1 the Managing Director of the plaintiff bank was examined and Exts. P-1 to P-1067 were marked. On the side of the defendants 12 witnesses were examined and Exts. B-1 to D-593 were marked. 5. On the evidence the court found that on the basis of endorsements of the railway receipts the plaintiff bank could sustain a claim for recovery of the amount covered by the said railway receipts and that the plea that the said railway receipts were obtained by fraud and collusion has to be found in favour of the plaintiff in the suit since the bar k was a bona fide endorsee for value of the railway receipts. The court further held that the case that the goods were not delivered had to be found against. In this view a decree was granted to the plaintiff bank for the sum of Rs. The court further held that the case that the goods were not delivered had to be found against. In this view a decree was granted to the plaintiff bank for the sum of Rs. 3,65,390.75 claimed in the A valuation together with interest up to the date of suit and also future interest. For the amount of the plaint claim all the defendants were made liable. Though this appears to be the finding the decretal portion of the judgment and consequently the decree is quite ambiguous if not plainly inconsistent. We will come to that in due course. 6. According to the Union of India representing the Southern Railway Administration no decree ought to have been granted against the 10th defendant. The learned counsel Sri Rama Shenoi ably assisted by his junior counsel Sri M. C. Cherian has taken us through the evidence in the case to support his challenge to the finding of the court below that goods represented by the railway receipts had been consigned to the railway. A finding on this, we consider, is of importance because the relevance of the other questions naturally depend upon this finding. On the assumption that the evidence in the case would not establish delivery of goods in respect of the 25 consignments represented by the disputed 25 railway receipts Sri Shenoi contends that the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree in a suit based on false documents and that if the railway receipts are not supported by goods the bank cannot maintain a suit against the railway because it is not a bona fide transferee. It is further urged that there is no question of any right of a bona fide transferee arising for consideration under such circumstances since the railway receipts is not a negotiable instrument. It is the contention of Sri Shenoi that it is only in the case of a negotiable instrument that a bona fide purchaser for value will get a higher right than his transferor. It is the contention of Sri Shenoi that it is only in the case of a negotiable instrument that a bona fide purchaser for value will get a higher right than his transferor. If the railway receipt is merely a document of title and does not fall within the category of negotiable instruments, the right of a transferee would not in any way be better than that of the transferor, and consequently if the transferor, the firm, or its partners could not sue the railway administration on the strength of the railway receipts against which goods had not been actually delivered the position of the bank would not be any better. It is also contended by learned counsel Sri Shenoi that there is no scope for any plea of estoppel on the part of the bank. We may also refer to another plea urged, but not with the same vehemence, that the court which tried the suit had no jurisdiction to try it. 7. The last of the pleas could be disposed of easily. It is not in every situation that the court interferes in appeal on a finding of want of jurisdiction on account of wrong place of suing. In this case the plea is that consignments relating to the suit transactions were those booked not only at Alwaye but at Irinjalakuda and Chalakudy also and therefore the suit in respect of the last two set of transactions will not lie in the Parur Court. No doubt such objection could have been taken as to the place of suing in the court of first instance. But in appeal the court will not entertain such a plea unless it is further shown that prejudice has been caused to the party concerned by resorting to the court in which the suit was filed. No such prejudice is urged by counsel and therefore we need not go into the question further. 8. Now we will come to the main question in the case. Before we go into the facts in this case we may consider a plea raised by the plaintiff bank in answer to the defendant's case namely that the railway administration is estopped from contending that the bank cannot sue on the railway receipts. 8. Now we will come to the main question in the case. Before we go into the facts in this case we may consider a plea raised by the plaintiff bank in answer to the defendant's case namely that the railway administration is estopped from contending that the bank cannot sue on the railway receipts. The plea of estoppel is based on the case that but for the railway receipts being issued by the railway administration the plaintiff bank would not have negotiated the receipts and on the strength of receipts being endorsed to them paid money to defendants 1 to 4. It is categorically stated in Para.2 of the replication dated 10th November, 1964 in answer to the written statement of the 10th defendant thus: "The 10th defendant is estopped from raising any of the contentions set forth in the above paragraphs in this suit. In the face of the declaration contained in the railway receipts, believing which, the plaintiff has advanced the amounts covered by them it is not open to the 10th defendant to plead as against the plaintiff that there were no goods delivered to the railway" The railway receipt certainly contains an admission that goods have been received by the railway for the purpose of being consigned and further embodies an agreement to convey it to the destination shown by the consignor. Therefore it contains a representation that goods have been received and if normally a party acts on the faith of such representation and prejudices himself the party making the representation would be estopped from denying the truth of the facts represented. Therefore as contended in the replication if on the faith of the representation implied by the issue of the railway receipts that goods have been delivered at the Stations Alwaye, Irinjalakuda and Chalakudy amounts had been paid to the defendants by the plaintiff on obtaining endorsements on such railway receipts the railway administration may be estopped from contending as against the bank that goods had not been delivered. On facts that does not appear to be the case here. That is because it has come out in evidence and it is not now disputed before us that in the case of these railway receipts payments were made in anticipation of production of the railway receipts. On facts that does not appear to be the case here. That is because it has come out in evidence and it is not now disputed before us that in the case of these railway receipts payments were made in anticipation of production of the railway receipts. There is said to be a clandestine practice no doubt frowned upon by the bank authorities of discounting clean bills, bills which are not supported by documents. In the case of the 25 railway receipts the railway receipts were no doubt produced but it was only a few days after the clean bills were discounted. Hence payments were evidently not made because of any representation contained in the railway receipts and as such the plea of estoppel must fail. No doubt, Sri. Joseph Augustine learned counsel for the plaintiff bank attempted to sustain the plea of estoppel on the approach that it was because the railway receipts were produced soon after the payments that the bank had no occasion to take any action and otherwise they would have had occasion to take proceedings earlier. This is not the circumstance of estoppel pleaded in the replication and therefore we need not concern ourselves with it. 9. Before we go into the evidence we will consider the right of an endorsee of a railway receipt. As rightly pointed out by Sri Shenoi the court below seems to think that an endorsee of a railway receipts stands in the same position as a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument and therefore apart from finding that goods have been delivered on the railway and therefore for failure to deliver the goods at destination the railway must be made liable the court has found that a decree against the Union of India is warranted also on the ground that the bank as transferee in good faith for value is not affected by the defect, if any, in the document of title. It is contended by Sri Shenoi that this view is erroneous. 10. A negotiable instrument is defined in S.13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as meaning a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer. A railway receipt is evidently not one of the documents referred to as a negotiable instrument in the said definition. 10. A negotiable instrument is defined in S.13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as meaning a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer. A railway receipt is evidently not one of the documents referred to as a negotiable instrument in the said definition. But the practice of negotiation of railway receipts is well established in commerce and therefore railway receipt is a negotiable documents as understood by the law merchant. It is a symbol of the goods and handing over of the railway receipts would be a handing over of the document of title of the goods which may pass symbolic possession to the transferee provided such handing over is either with the intention to pass property in the goods or to pledge the goods with the transferee. Hence a document of title such as a railway receipt or a bill of lading has the character of negotiability in a limited sense. That is not to say that it is a 'negotiable instrument' which term has a technical significance under the Negotiable Instruments Act. A negotiable instrument, by virtue of the provisions of the Act passes on to a holder in due course, a person who comes by the negotiable instrument honestly and for value, a right much larger than the right held by the transferor. That incident does not arise in the case of a transfer of documents considered negotiable under the law merchant. We may, in this context, refer to a passage in the decision of the Supreme Court in Morvi Bank v. Union of India ( 1965 (3) SCR 254 ). The position is summed up at page 264 of the report thus: "The law on the subject, as we conceive it may be stated thus: An owner of goods can make valid pledge of them by transferring the railway receipt representing the said goods. The general rule is expressed by the maxim nemo dat quod non habet, i.e., no one can convey a better title than what he had. To this maxim, to facilitate mercantile transactions, the Indian law has grafted some exceptions, in favour of bona fide pledgees by transfer of documents of title from persons, whether owners of goods or their mercantile agents who do not possess the full bundle of rights of ownership at the time the pledges are made. To this maxim, to facilitate mercantile transactions, the Indian law has grafted some exceptions, in favour of bona fide pledgees by transfer of documents of title from persons, whether owners of goods or their mercantile agents who do not possess the full bundle of rights of ownership at the time the pledges are made. To confer a right to effect a valid pledge by transfer of documents of title relating to goods on owners of the goods with defects in title and mercantile agents and to deny it to the full owners thereof is to introduce an incongruity into the act by construction. On the other hand, the real intention of the legislature will be carried out if the said right is conceded to the full owner of goods and extended by construction to owners with defects in title or their mercantile agents." The position has been succinctly stated in Law and Practice of Banking by Milnes Holden at page 269 thus: "The Act did not make bills of lading negotiable instruments. The essential characteristics of a negotiable instrument are (i) the property therein is capable of being transferred by delivery (either with or without endorsement according as to whether the instrument is in favour of order or bearer), (ii) a bona fide transferee for value obtains a title free from equities, and (iii) the holder can sue on the instrument in his own name. The second characteristic implies that a transferee who gives value in good faith may be able to obtain a better title then his transferor had for example, a bona fide transferee for value of a bill of exchange can obtain a good title from a thief. It is this quality that is lacking in the case of a bill of lading. A transferee takes it subject to any defects in the title of prior parties." What is said of bills of lading applies with equal force to a railway receipt. Anson in the Law of Contract, 24th Edition at page 448 expresses the same idea thus: "But a bill of lading differs from the negotiable instrument with which we have just been dealing: In the first place, its endorsement transfers a remedy in rem, the right to claim specific goods, whereas a negotiable instrument confers only a remedy in personam, the right to be paid a certain sum money......................................................... A bill of lading, then, is a contract assignable without notice; it so far resembles a conveyance that it gives a title to property, but it cannot give a better title, whether proprietary or contractual, than is possessed by the consignee." Our attention has been drawn to the Commentary on the Negotiable Instruments Act by Bhashyam and Adiga on S.13. Divorced from its context the statement therein may perhaps be misleading. It is said at page 162 of the treatise thus. "By the use of the word 'means' in sub-section (i) it was not intended to restrict the definition of a negotiable instrument only to the three kinds of instruments mentioned therein." Evidently what the commentator meant could have only been that negotiability is not confined to the instruments defined in S.13 as negotiable instruments. It will be safer to refer to documents which are not negotiable instruments under the Act but which are really negotiable under the law merchant as negotiable documents to distinguish them from negotiable instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Act. 11. The result or our discussion is that an endorsee of a document of title (which a railway receipt is - see S.137 of the Transfer of Property Act) does not confer on a transferee better rights than a transferor and even if he might have taken the transfer bona fide for value he cannot claim rights which his transferor did not have. Therefore, if in this case we find that the goods had not been booked and the railway receipts therefore are really not documents of title transferring property or operating as pledges of the property, merely because the Bank took the receipts on payment of value and without knowing the real facts the Bank may not be entitled to a decree. So, the crucial question in this case is whether the railway receipts have been issued without receiving the goods for consignment. 12. In the circumstances of the case the consideration of the question of burden of proof becomes relevant. In this case on whom does the burden lie to show that goods had not been received by the railway administration notwithstanding the admitted issue of railway receipts? The learned counsel Sri Shenoi does not seriously contend that despite the issue of the railway receipts the burden is on the plaintiff. In this case on whom does the burden lie to show that goods had not been received by the railway administration notwithstanding the admitted issue of railway receipts? The learned counsel Sri Shenoi does not seriously contend that despite the issue of the railway receipts the burden is on the plaintiff. But he submits that such burden on the Railway authorities has been discharged by the evidence in the case. The railway receipt, as we have already indicated, is evidence, so far as third parties are concerned, of entrustment of goods at the stations mentioned therein for the purpose of consigning them. It contains an admission of the receipt of the goods by the railway. An admission is not conclusive evidence. It is open to the party to prove that notwithstanding the admission the facts are otherwise. But in the face of such admission the burden would necessarily be on the railway administration to show that the goods were not received. The court below seems to have made the same approach. 13. There is a case for the railway administration that the first defendant firm has been carrying on a fraudulent game in collusion with the railway employees at Alwaye, Irinjalakuda and Chalakudy. We are concerned in this case with 25 railway receipts marked as Exts. D-105, D-107, D-112, D-116, D-119, D-122, D-125, D-126, D-130, D-132, D-137, D-155, D-159, D-163, D-168, D-174, D-180, D-186, D-190 and P-802, P-807, P-851, P-837, and P-832. Of these 7 are really photostat copies of the railway receipts. The railway receipts show booking of cocoanut oil not in wagon loads but in small quantities, though quite often two bookings on the same day would normally be a wagon load. But in such cases the parties have chosen to book under two railway receipts. It is suggested for the plaintiff that this might be because of the difficulty of getting allotment of wagons. Whatever that be the practice is seen to be that even when consignment of two bookings at a station on the same day could be a wagon load it is consigned by separate railway receipts. The earliest of the 25 railway receipts is that issued on 2nd February, 1963. It is not as if for the first time that the first defendant firm and its partners consigned cocoanut oil only by 2nd February, 1963. The earliest of the 25 railway receipts is that issued on 2nd February, 1963. It is not as if for the first time that the first defendant firm and its partners consigned cocoanut oil only by 2nd February, 1963. They have been consigning cocoanut oil to various parties in North India for many years past. It has come out in evidence that as on 2nd February, 1963 itself there were many consignments of cocoanut oils which remained to be loaded, consignments for which railway receipts had been issued to the firm but which had not been despatched. Yet, this would be so, for, the railway is seen to take its own time to despatch goods entrusted to it for despatch. The 25 railway receipts cover the period from 2nd February, 1963 to 24th April, 1963. It is not as if these are the only consignments entrusted at the three railway stations mentioned earlier. According to Sri Shenoi for the period from 2nd February, 1963 to 23rd May, 1963 fifty-five railway receipts have been issued indicating booking of 15,415 tins of cocoanut oil. It is not as if there has been no despatch of goods after 2nd February, 1963. In fact after 2nd February, 1963, 16,660 tins are said to have been loaded and they were covered by 54 railway receipts. Sri Shenoi invites our attention to Ext. D-90 in support of this. The number of cocoanut oil tins so despatched is more than the goods booked after 2nd February, 1963 and these might take in goods which had been booked prior to 2nd February, 1963 but remained to be loaded for despatch. It is also the admitted case of the 10th defendant that none other than defendants 1 to 4 had booked cocoanut oil from Alwaye, Irinjalakuda and Chalakudy during the relevant period. What is seen from the evidence in this case is that all the transactions could not have been bogus. The dispute could only be whether as against some of the railway receipts goods were entrusted to the railway or not. That, it is conceded, is the case of the railway. Of course that alone could be the case, for if goods were not entrusted to the railway in regard to any railway receipt there could not be deliveries of cocoanut oil at the other end in respect of some of the railway receipts. That, it is conceded, is the case of the railway. Of course that alone could be the case, for if goods were not entrusted to the railway in regard to any railway receipt there could not be deliveries of cocoanut oil at the other end in respect of some of the railway receipts. In fact there could not have been delivery of 16,660 tins of cocoanut oil after 2nd February, 1963. Assuming that there was fraud in entrusting the cocoanut oil tins represented by the railway receipts, it could have been only in respect of some of the railway receipts and not all. The case of the plaintiff Bank appears to be that even that may not be the case and there might have been manipulation later. To this again, we may refer in the contest of the evidence in this case. 14. D.W. 1, the Travelling Inspector of Accounts, Southern Railway had on 23rd January, 1963, on which date he had made an inspection noticed considerable delay between the booking and despatch of cocoanut oil consignments offered by a particular party, namely the first defendant firm. He also noticed that though the party had always offered cocoanut oil in tins for despatch in such quantity as would satisfy a wagon load scale of rate that was being offered in two separate consignments but clubbed together to get the benefit of wagon load scale of rate. He had pointed out the loss to the Government on this account. He seems to have made a surprise inspection on 25th May, 1963 suspecting that possibly the delay in despatch was on account of issue of railway receipts in advance in anticipation of later booking. On taking stock of outward goods at Alwaye station he found only 43 tins of cocoanut oil against 3,525 tins booked under 13 invoices from 2nd February, 1963 to 24th April, 1963 to different parties and he also found 2,807 empty tins, a portion stacked inside the goods shed and a portion outside, in the platform. These were covered by tarpaulins which bore the stencilled mark "A. P. Pillai" referring to the first defendant firm. The shortage was reported by him. These were covered by tarpaulins which bore the stencilled mark "A. P. Pillai" referring to the first defendant firm. The shortage was reported by him. Similar shortage was found on inspection carried out by him at the Chalakudy and Irinjalakuda stations and this was what led to the finding out of the practice indulged in by the railway staff said to be in collusion with the first defendant and its agent. Based on this learned counsel Sri. Shenoi contended that there is sufficient evidence in this case to assume that there was fraud in that in at least some of the bookings either cocoanut oil as such was not delivered at all or a part of the consignment alone was delivered as cocoanut oil the rest being empty tins. Though it is necessary that goods consigned to the railway should bear the mark of the consignor it is said that in none of these cases there were any mark in the cocoanut oil tins. The lower court has referred to this aspect of the matter and also pointed out that this is the case not only with the cocoanut oil consigned by the first defendant but in respect of several other consignments at the Stations. Reference has particularly been made to Ext. D-296(a), 296(c), 296(e), 296(g), 296(j), 296(l), 296(n), 296(p), and 296(r) to show that the railway administration is in the habit of receiving goods without private mark of the parties concerned. Evidently therefore when the consignment bore no private mark and also did not indicate that it related to any particular consignment under a particular railway receipt any goods entrusted by the first defendant firm could be despatched as against any booking by the first defendant. In other words, if there was a practice of entrusting cocoanut oil tins at the railway station, say at Alwaye and these tins were being stacked either in the goods shed or in the platforms and further if the despatch of the goods took a fairly long time, as and when the goods were despatched it would not normally be expected that the despatch would be of the identical cocoanut oil tins entrusted as part of one consignment when that consignment was being loaded. So long as the cocoanut oil tins did not differ from each other in weight or description and could not be identified, one would expect that as against a railway receipt the despatch would be of that number of cocoanut oil tins from out of that remaining in the station. 15. From Ext. D-90 report made by D.W. 1 it can be seen that serial Nos. 146 to 160 as well as serial Nos. 407 to 416 were booked prior to 2nd February, 1963. The Inspector's report gives the invoice numbers, the date of booking, the station from which it is booked, the station to which it is booked, the number of tins, weight and the date of loading besides further remarks offered in respect of some. The date of loading of these items are seen to be after 2nd February, 1963. Thus even in respect of goods entrusted with the railway prior to 2nd February, 1963 a substantial portion has been actually loaded after 2nd February, 1963. Similarly it is only in respect of goods represented by 33 railway receipts that there is a complaint that goods were not actually loaded and consequently not delivered at the destination. The present suit concerns 25 railway receipts and in respect of others there are other litigations in other courts outside the state. It is the agreed case that goods covered by other rail way receipts Hooked after 2nd February, 1963 had been delivered. We have already mentioned that 16,660 tins have been loaded after 2nd February, 1963. This is much more than the number of tins required to cover the 25 railway receipts which concerns only 7,480 tins. So long as the goods in respect of each consignment is not identifiable separately and evidently not intended to be so identified and so long as a larger quantity than that covered by the disputed 25 railway receipts have been loaded after 2nd February, 1963 one cannot say that the goods represented by the disputed 25 railway receipts have not been received by the railway. The best that could be said is that in respect of some consignments goods were not produced by the party while in respect of some the goods were produced or part of the goods were produced. The best that could be said is that in respect of some consignments goods were not produced by the party while in respect of some the goods were produced or part of the goods were produced. Whether it is in respect of the 25 railway receipts which are the subject matter of this suit that there was any deficiency is a matter on which there is no evidence. Nobody speaks to it, nobody could speak to it. Unless we are in a position to assume that that would have been the case on other materials, we cannot hold so. That is why we consider that the burden of proof has relevance in this case. The railway administration has failed to discharge the burden of showing that despite the issue of railway receipts in respect of the consignments, relating to the disputed transactions there has actually been no entrustment of the goods with the railway at Alwaye, Irinjalakuda and Chalakudy. No doubt, witnesses have been examined to prove the transactions in respect of consignments at these places, D.W. 1, 5 and 6 being examined to speak to the practice at Alwaye Station. D.W. 3 and 9 at Chalakudy Station and D.W. 1 and 7 at Irinjalakuda Station. The employees in those stations at the relevant time also are not in a position to say that the goods were not received as against these consignments. Reference is made in the judgment to Ext. D-194, a statement by D.W. 3 who was working as Station Master at Chalakudy. In his explanation also he has not stated that goods were not tendered by the defendants but he mentions that the goods tendered against the concerned forwarding notes were loaded for some other invoices. The relevant portion of his statement reads thus: "I found that this consignment received by me on account of the invoices has been loaded for some other invoices. I have not got any through or transit invoices. No consignment also on hand." This only shows the possibility of goods being loaded against other railway receipts either because the goods are not particularly identifiable or because whatever goods were available were being loaded against earlier railway receipts. I have not got any through or transit invoices. No consignment also on hand." This only shows the possibility of goods being loaded against other railway receipts either because the goods are not particularly identifiable or because whatever goods were available were being loaded against earlier railway receipts. Assuming that there was some corrupt practice indulged in by the first defendant firm in collusion with the staff of the railway administration, it would not justify assumption that the specific goods covered by the railway receipts were not handed over to the railway administration. It is possible they were, but goods represented by other railway receipts were not. Hence we agree with the court below that the railway receipts cannot be found to be unsupported by goods. 16. If goods have been entrusted for carriage to the railway and on the strength of the railway receipts issued by the railway administration the plaintiff bank has taken endorsement of the railway receipts and paid the value to the first defendant firm or its partners and later found that the goods were not delivered the plaintiff bank would be entitled to claim damages as against the 10th defendant which had so failed to deliver the goods. Hence the decree granted against the 10th defendant would stand so far as it concerns goods in respect of which the claim remained unsatisfied. 17. Learned counsel Sri Shenoi further pointed out that even assuming that the goods have been entrusted by the first defendant firm to the railway administration for carriage the plaintiff would not be entitled to the decree now granted as against the 10th defendant. As against the other defendants the suit is based on accounts and there is no challenge to the accounts. So far as the claim against the Union of India is concerned the accounts have no bearing. It is only the claim for damages on account of the 10th defendant having failed to deliver the goods represented by the railway receipts that gives the cause of action. It is said that though a schedule in the plaint details the fact of purchase of 25 railway receipts this is belied by the accounts inasmuch as A schedule item 22 is not an item which has been purchased by the bank and no such purchase is reflected by the D.B.P. Account of the Bank. It is said that though a schedule in the plaint details the fact of purchase of 25 railway receipts this is belied by the accounts inasmuch as A schedule item 22 is not an item which has been purchased by the bank and no such purchase is reflected by the D.B.P. Account of the Bank. The plaint schedule item 22 is in respect of railway receipt No. C. 95664. That railway receipt is D. 128. The Plaintiff has made a claim under that railway receipt also as if it is one purchased by the plaintiff. If it has been purchased it must necessarily be reflected in Ext. P-18, the D.B.P. register. It is not so reflected. There is no case that any transaction of purchase as such has been made. The case of counsel for the plaintiff bank at the hearing is that clean Bill No. 73 was for 700 tins of cocoanut oil and on the strength of the clean bill amount was advanced by the bank in anticipation of the firm supplying the railway receipt for 700 tins later. It is said that on the firm furnishing such railway receipts later, the said railway receipts would have been shown against the said clean bill. That was not done in this case because when the railway receipts were produced they showed only booking of 350 tins not corresponding to the clean bill and therefore no entry was made in the D.B.P. register. It goes without saying that as it stands now it is not seen that as against the said railway receipt any purchase had been made and amount advanced. Therefore the case of the 10th defendant in regard to A schedule item 22 succeeds. The 10th defendant will not be liable for the amount covered by that railway receipt. 18. Now we come to 5 other transactions in the D.B.P. register. In this context we have to notice that some of the transactions in respect of which we are granting relief to the plaintiff by affirming the decree of the court below to that extent are transactions whereunder clean bills were originally purchased by the bank and these were later supported by railway receipts furnished. The irregularity is seen to have received the notice of the bank at later stage and the bank is seen to have ratified the action. The irregularity is seen to have received the notice of the bank at later stage and the bank is seen to have ratified the action. Of course, that alone they could have done then. Though in the context of the plea of estoppel we said that the railway administration would not be estopped since payments were made as against clean bills subsequently supported by railway receipts and therefore payments were not made on the strength of the representation of the railway receipts, when suing on the basis of endorsement on the railway receipts the plaintiff may be entitled to claim even on the basis of a subsequent endorsement. That is because in respect of the amount due to them they have a right of a pledgee as against the goods represented by the railway receipts. But in respect of clean bills where no railway receipts have been subsequently handed over there is no case for a claim for the plaintiff against the 10th defendant. That is now in respect of defendants 1 to 7 the claim happens to be for an amount larger than that against the 10th defendant. If it is seen from the accounts that in respect of the railway receipts purchased by the plaintiff bank, there has been satisfaction of any of the items there would be no scope for a decree against the 10th defendant in respect of such item. It is pleaded by the 10th defendant that there has been such satisfaction in respect of certain items of purchase by reason of adjustments of the amounts due thereunder by the bank taking new bills from the party. If money is due to the plaintiff bank from the 10th defendant by reason of the non delivery of the goods represented by any specific railway receipt and consequently entry in the D.B.P. register is reversed by the bank on advice about failure to return the bill, if towards the amount due to the Bank consequent upon this fresh bills are executed by the party either supported by railway receipts or as clean bills and these are purchased by the bank and the proceeds adjusted towards the earlier claims such earlier claims will not survive. According to the learned counsel Sri Shenoi in the D.B.P. account a reversal entry will normally be made if by the date fixed for retirement of bill there is no advice of retirement. According to the learned counsel Sri Shenoi in the D.B.P. account a reversal entry will normally be made if by the date fixed for retirement of bill there is no advice of retirement. The consequence is that there will be an entry of reversal in the D.B.P. register. If subsequently the bill is realised that will of course be shown in the account. The 25 cases which are subject of the suit are cases where according to the plaintiff there have been such reversal but no subsequent realisation. But according to Sri Shenoi even in respect of the transactions where there has been adjustment and consequent satisfaction the plaint claim is laid. It is pointed out that out of the 25 transactions mentioned in the plaint in respect of certain purchases of bills on the date of reversal in the D.B.P. register the firm or its partners had executed fresh bills with intent to satisfy the claims under the bills in respect of which reversal entries are made and if that is done there cannot be a claim in regard to the bills which have been so adjusted and also bills executed afresh. But learned counsel Sri Joseph Augustine points out that there is no claim in respect of any bill executed afresh in satisfaction of the bills which are the subject of the suit. Having gone through the statement filed by Sri Shenoi we find that the dispute concerns particularly 5 documentary bill purchases which are Nos. 21 and 22, 38, 43 and 44. What is said in respect of numbers 21 and 22 is that the reversals were made on 29th March, 1963 on the bills being not retired before the date fixed for retirement and in satisfaction of the claims under the two bills adjustment was made by executing 2 fresh bills represented by D.B.P. Nos. 68 and 69 supported by railway receipts as well as hundies. If on 29th March, 1963 to satisfy the claim in respect of D.B.P. 21 and 22 amounting to Rs. 33,000 two documentary bill purchases, No. 68 and 69 for the same amount are effected so as to adjust the accounts under the earlier claim, relief based on D.B.P. 21 and 22 must fail because the claim is not alive. If on 29th March, 1963 to satisfy the claim in respect of D.B.P. 21 and 22 amounting to Rs. 33,000 two documentary bill purchases, No. 68 and 69 for the same amount are effected so as to adjust the accounts under the earlier claim, relief based on D.B.P. 21 and 22 must fail because the claim is not alive. This will depend on whether the documentary bills 68 and 69 purchased by the bank on 29th March, 1963 is really an independent transaction or one by way of adjustment in satisfaction of the claim under D.B.P. 21 and 22. If that is an adjustment so as to satisfy the earlier claim the latter must be fund to be not alive as having been satisfied and therefore the suit will not lie in respect of D.B.P. 21 and 22. This is the case with the other 3 items also. D.B.P. No. 38 supported by the railway receipt is seen reversed on 9th April, 1963 and according to Sri Shenoi, a transaction of purchase of a clean bill without the railway receipt bill No. 75 is resorted to by the bank on the same date for a sum of Rs. 13,100 which it is said would cover D.B.P. 38. With regard to D.B.P. 43, dated 25th February, 1963 there is a reversal on 16th April, 1963 and it is said that fresh D.B.P. 78 which is a clean bill without a railway receipt for the identical sum of Rs. 16,850 was executed by way of adjustment to satisfy the claim under D.B.P. 43. The 5th D.B.P. No. 44 of the date, 25th February, 1963 was reversed on 16th April, 1963 and on the date of reversal there is a fresh purchase of clean bill without railway receipt that being bill No. 79 for the identical sum of Rs. 16,850 and that is said to satisfy bill No. 44. If these 5 bills Nos. 21, 22, 38, 43 and 44 have been so adjusted and the bank has been satisfied in respect of the claims these cannot be urged in the suit again. Merely because on the same day there are purchases of clean bills or bill support by railway receipt and that happens to be for the same sum one need not assume that the earlier claim is satisfied. Merely because on the same day there are purchases of clean bills or bill support by railway receipt and that happens to be for the same sum one need not assume that the earlier claim is satisfied. That is because it is possible that in the regular course bank may be purchasing clean bills and accidentally it may happen that it is for identical sum covered by the bills in respect of which there are reversal entries on the same date. The mere fact of there being transactions for the same quantity of oil or value need riot be taken as meaning that the later transactions of purchase of bill by the bank is in satisfaction of the earlier transaction. Therefore if that were the only evidence we would have accepted the case of the plaintiff. But we have something more which material we consider to be quite relevant. Our attention has been drawn to Ext. D-2. Consequent upon the materials which came to light when the irregularity first came to the Bank's notice, the bank seems to have conducted a thorough investigation to apportion the blame on the appropriate officers of the bank. Evidently the bank felt that without complicity at the lower level what did happen would not have been possible. Against the specific instructions of the bank that clean bills are not to be purchased the bank officers were seen to be adopting the practice of purchasing clean bills and advancing amounts under clean bills anticipating railway receipts to be produced in due course. Possibly whenever money was needed clean bills were prepared and produced without supporting railway receipts at that time. It is possible that such railway receipts could be obtained only on occasions when obliging persons were at the relative counters at the railway station. Whatever that be as a result of the investigation the bank charged some of its officers with misconduct. Ext. D-2 is a notice issued by way of a charge to one of such officers. That mentions the irregularity. One of the irregularities pointed out is that of accommodating the customer by taking fresh bills when they had to meet the obligation under the old bills. In this context reference is made in Ext. D-2 particularly to these five transactions. It is mentioned in Para.3 of Ext. That mentions the irregularity. One of the irregularities pointed out is that of accommodating the customer by taking fresh bills when they had to meet the obligation under the old bills. In this context reference is made in Ext. D-2 particularly to these five transactions. It is mentioned in Para.3 of Ext. D-2 thus: "You failed to take note when the bills of M/s A. Pareed Pillai and Brothers took unusually longer times for realisation since 14th November, 1962, that the business of the party had fallen. But you want on purchasing new bills and adjusting to long outstanding bills. (eg.)......" Items 18 and 19 in the list which followed showed as follows: D.B.P.No Date of parchase Amount Adjusted from new parchase on ** ** ** ** 21/63 25 1 - 1963 16,500 00 29 3 - 1963 22/63 28 1 - 1963 16,500 00 29 3 - 1963 The examples given indicate the transactions in respect of bill Nos. 21 and 22. In regard to bill No. 38 there is a similar statement as item 21 where the adjustment is shown Rs. 6,435 and further there is a mention in Para.14 of Ext. D-2 that D.B.P. No. 73, 74 and 75 were adjusted to the long outstanding D.B.P. No. 25 and 38 and the balance allowed to be withdrawn by the firm. In regard to item 43 there is a similar entry in Para.3 of Ext. D-2 as item 22 and is further mentioned in Para.15 that the amounts under bill Nos. 43 and 44 are adjusted from out of D.B.P. Nos. 76, 77, 78 and 79. In regard to item 44 there is a similar entry as 23rd item in Para.3 and it is mentioned in Para.15 of Ext. D-2 that it is similarly adjusted. Ext. D-2 is issued on behalf of the bank and would have been so issued only after considerable deliberation. It would have been issued after properly looking into all the materials. It reflects the case of the bank. There is no case for P.W. 1 that the statement in Ext. D-2 is wrong. There is no case in the court below or here that these particular statements are wrong. Therefore we give due weight to these statements as admissions party of adjustments. Therefore we are not accepting finding such adjustment in the light of the categorical admission contained in Ext. D-2. D-2 is wrong. There is no case in the court below or here that these particular statements are wrong. Therefore we give due weight to these statements as admissions party of adjustments. Therefore we are not accepting finding such adjustment in the light of the categorical admission contained in Ext. D-2. That would mean that in respect of these five bills the railway administration will not be liable to the plaintiff bank. In respect of the other transactions the plaintiff bank may be entitled to their claim against the 10th defendant. D.B.P. Nos. 21 and 22 correspond to railway receipt shown as item Nos. 1 and 2 in A Schedule. D.B.P. No. 38 corresponds to the railway receipt shown as item 3 in the plaint A schedule. The D.B.P. 43 covers two railway receipts shown as items 4 and 5 in the plaint A Schedule. D.B.P. 44 also covers two railway receipts shown as items 6 and 7. Besides this there is a railway receipt shown as 22 in the plaint A schedule not supported by D.B.P. register. The relief the 10th defendant would get here will be in respect of plaint A schedule item No. 1 to 7 and 22. The amount covered by these would come to Rs. 88,441.27. In regard to this amount there would be no liability against the 10th defendant and to that extent the 10th defendant succeeds in this appeal. The 10th defendant succeeds also in regard to claim for interest prior to the suit. It is said that there is no basis pleaded or shown to justify the grant of interest on the claim for damages against the 10th defendant for the period upto the date of suit. That is evidently so. Our attention has been drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. W. P. Factories ( AIR 1966 SC 395 ). Interest at 6 per cent will be confined to the amount decreed as from the date of the plaint. 19. The plea of the counsel for the appellant in A. S. No. 733 of 1974 based on S.73 and 78B of the Railways Act need not detain us, for, that question would arise for consideration only in the event we find that the goods in respect of the 25 railway receipts have not been entrusted with the railway and there has been fraud. In the absence of such finding, there is no question of applying S.73 and 78B of the Railways Act. 20. There is an obvious error in the judgment as well as in the decree of the court below. The 10th defendant is sought to be made liable for a sum of Rs. 3,76,756. It is mentioned in the judgment that the plaintiff is allowed to recover a sum of Rs. 4,27,143.08 from defendants 2 to 6 and the 10th defendant. That cannot be the case. If the liability of the 10th defendant is limited to Rs. 3,76,756 there cannot be a decree for the whole amount against the 10th defendant. Again, the statement that the plaintiff shall recover the above amount (amount decreed against the 10th defendant) from the 10th defendant only is also wrong. That is contrary to what was said earlier. That is inconsistent. No attention has been paid in passing a proper decree. There is a petition for correction of the decree at the instance of the plaintiff seeking to correct this to make it accord with the findings in the case. We have heard that petition also. That there is mistake in the decretal portion is not disputed here. We think that there is the obvious error which calls for correction. We therefore correct the decree to read as granting the plaintiff a decree to recover a sum of Rs. 4,27,143.08 as on the date of suit from defendants 2 to 6 from the assets of the first defendant firm and by sale of B, C, D, E, F, H and I Schedule properties. Out of this sum, the 10th defendant is also made liable to the extent of Rs. 2,76,949.48 as on the date of suit. The plaintiff is entitled to interest, at 6 per cent on the amount decreed from the date of suit till the date of realisation. The lower court has directed credit to be given for certain amounts and credit will be given for these amounts accordingly. The appellant will be entitled to costs proportionate to its success from the plaintiff and the plaintiff will be entitled to its costs in proportion to its success from the 10th defendant. 21. Now we come to the other appeal A. S. No. 737 of 1974. That is by defendants 1 to 7. The claim against defendants 1 to 7 is based upon accounts. 21. Now we come to the other appeal A. S. No. 737 of 1974. That is by defendants 1 to 7. The claim against defendants 1 to 7 is based upon accounts. The genuineness of the accounts has not been disputed. It has not been shown how the amount claimed in the suit is not due from the defendants, when such claim is seen supported by the accounts. Defendants 5 to 7 are guarantors and therefore they are liable as such. There does not appear to be very serious contest in the appeal. The court fee paid is also nominal. The whole field of contest made in the lower court seems to be raised in the appeal also but valuation is on a sum of Rs. 37,293. This is because in the valuation it is assumed that for the entire plaint claim the 10th defendant has been made liable and for the sum for which the 10th defendant has been made liable defendants 1 to 7 are not liable and therefore defendants 1 to 7 are found liable only for interest. Learned counsel submitted that the appeal concerns only interest. Nothing has been shown to disturb the finding of the court below. Hence A. S. No. 737 of 1974 is dismissed with costs to plaintiff only. Counsel for the appellant in A. S. No. 733 of 1974 made an oral application for certificate for leave to the Supreme Court under Art.134 A of the Constitution. Similar oral application is made by the first respondent in A. S. No. 733 of 1974 for certificate for leave to Supreme Court. Learned counsel Sri Achan also makes oral application for certificate for leave to the Supreme Court against the decision in A. S. No. 733 of 1974 on behalf of respondents 2 to 8. The appellants in A. S. No. 737 of 1974 also have made an oral application for certificate for leave to the Supreme Court against the decision in A. S. No. 733 of 1974. We see no reason to grant leave to any of these parties, for, we see no substantial question of law of general importance calling for decision by the Supreme Court arising in these cases. Leave refused.