( 1 ) IN this petition under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to permit the petitioner to engage a counsel to conduct his case which is ponding before the respondent, ( 2 ) THE petitioner is running a sweet meat stall at stall No. 4. KSRTC building, Central Bus Stand, Mysore, since 1963-64 on paying a rent of Rs. 450 per month. The case of the petitioner is that there is no fixed period of lease and that he is continued as a tenant. The respondent has issued a notice under S. 4 of the Karnataka public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to 33 the Act') to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be passed. In pursuance of that notice, the petitioner filed an application (Annexure-A) seeking permission to engage a legal practitioner as the case involves complicated questions of law and facts and as such, he is not in a position to go on with the case without the assistance of a legal practitioner. By the communication dated 5-5-1980 (Annexure-C), the respondent has informed the petitioner that the request for engaging a legal practitioner to appear and conduct the case on his behalf is rejected as there is no provision to that effect in the Act. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioner has a right to be reprer sented by a legal practitioner, in, aproceeding under the provisions of the act. ( 3 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioner that there is no provision contained in the Act prohibiting a party to a proceeding from engaging a legal practitioner to represent him in a proceeding under the Act or prohibiting a legal practitioner to appear before the competent authority in a proceeding under the Act. Therefore, it was submitted that under the Law of Agency, the party is entitled to be represented by an Agent and in a case like this, where by reason of eviction, the very business of the petitioner would be affected, he cannot find any better person as his agent than a lawyer. Therefore, it was submitted that under the Law of Agency, the party is entitled to be represented by an Agent and in a case like this, where by reason of eviction, the very business of the petitioner would be affected, he cannot find any better person as his agent than a lawyer. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the High court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of Tikamchand Sualalji Agarwal v. Joint Registrar of Co-op. Societies, AIR 1971 MP. 86 . ( 4 ) ON the contrary, Sri Ramesh, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that under Section 5 of act, the opportunity that is required to be given is personal to the party to the proceeding and as such, he is not entitled to engage a legal practitioner. At any rate, it was contended by Shri rarnesh that the discretion lies with the competent officer to permit or not to permit a party to the proceeding to engage a legal practitioner to represent him in the case; therefore, in the exercise of his discretion, the competent officer has refused to grant permission to the petitioner to engage a counsel. It was also contended that the petitioner is not, as of right, entitled to be represented by a counsel. It was further contended that the case does not involve complicated questions of law and facts and that being so, by permitting a party to the proceeding to engage a legal practitioner, the proceeding would be unnecessarily delayed. It was further submitted that there are certain legislations in which the appearance of a legal practitioner is expressly prohibited and in others, the appearance of a legal practitioner is expressly allowed and yet in some of the legislations the appearance of a legal practitioner is allowed with the permission of the concerned authority and in the case of the present enactment, there is nothing stated either prohibiting or permitting a party to be represented by a legal practitioner or a legal practitioner to represent a party in a proceeding; therefore a party to the proceeding cannot claim, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the respondent, relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme court: Ravula Subba Rao v. Commissioner of I. T. , AIR 1956 SC. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the respondent, relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme court: Ravula Subba Rao v. Commissioner of I. T. , AIR 1956 SC. 604 = 1956 SCR 577 . Kalindi v. Tata Loco and Engg. Co. , Ltd. , (1960) 2 LLJ. 228 ,. Brooke Bond India (P) Ltd. , v. Subba Raman, (1961) 2 LLJ. 417. T. Rajagopala Ayyangar v. Collector of Salt-Revenue, AIR 1937 Mad. 735 . ( 5 ) THE Act in question is intended to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Act defines the 'premises' and also the 'public premises. It is only the occupants of those premises which fall within the definition of Public premises that can be ordered to be evicted under the provisions of the Act, provided the occupants thereof are held to be in unauthorised occupation. ( 6 ) UNDER S. 3 of the Act, the State government is empowered to appoint various officers as competent officers with reference to various premises which fall within the definition of 'public premises' as stated in the Act. Under Section 4, the competent officer is required to issue notice in writing to the persons, who in his opinion, are in unauthorised occupation of the 'public premises' calling upon them to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be made. The said section further provides for showing cause by the persons to whom the notice is issued. It also provides for mode of service of notice. The said section further provides for showing cause by the persons to whom the notice is issued. It also provides for mode of service of notice. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent specifically laid stress upon the wording i. e. , "after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard" contained in Sec. 5 (1) of the Act, which reads as follows:"if, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under Sec. 4 and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the competent officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the competent officer may on a date to be fixed for the purpose, make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. "it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the words underlined (italics) in the above mentioned Section 5 (1) of the Act, would go to show that the opportunity intended to be given is 'personal' to the party and thereby the right of a party to the proceeding, and in the instant case, the right of the petitioner to be represented by a legal practitioner, is excluded. ( 8 ) S. 6 of the Act, provides for disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants. Sec. 7 of the Act, provides for recovery of rent or damages in respect of the public premises as arrears of land revenue. Under this provision, the competent officer is empowered to determine damages to be payable by the person in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. The said damages are to be determined having regard to the principles of assessment of damages as may be prescribed. No order under Sec. 7 of the Act, can be passed against a person until after the issue of a notice in writing t6 the person calling upon him to show cause within such time as may be specified in the notice, v/hy such an order should not be made. No order under Sec. 7 of the Act, can be passed against a person until after the issue of a notice in writing t6 the person calling upon him to show cause within such time as may be specified in the notice, v/hy such an order should not be made. The person against whom the notice is issued is also entitled to adduce evidence in support of his case and on consideration of the evidence adduced in the case the competent officer is required to determine the amount of damages. ( 9 ) S. 8 provides for deduction of rent due out of the salary or wages of the employee of the State Govt. or a local authority or a corporate authority to whom the public premises is allotted and in respect of which the amount of rent is due. S. 9 of the Act provides that a competent officer shall, for the purpose of holding any inquiry under the Act, have the same power as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of the following matters: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) any other matter which may be prescribed. ( 10 ) IT was submitted by the learned counsel for the parties that no Rules have been framed under the Act. S. 10 of the Act provides for an appeal against an order of eviction and determination of damages passed by the competent officer in respect of any 'public premises' under Section 5 or section 7 of the Act respectively, to the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area. ( 11 ) UNDER Sec. 11 of the Act, the order passed by the District Judge, in appeal, is made final. ( 12 ) SEC. 14 (1) of the Act provides that in case of death of a person during the pendency of the proceeding initiated against him for the determination of arrears of rent or for the assessment of the damages, the same may be continued against his legal representatives. Sub-sec. ( 12 ) SEC. 14 (1) of the Act provides that in case of death of a person during the pendency of the proceeding initiated against him for the determination of arrears of rent or for the assessment of the damages, the same may be continued against his legal representatives. Sub-sec. (2) thereof, further provides that if a person dies after determination of arrears of damages or costs, the same shall be payable by his heirs or legal representatives, but their liability shall be limited to the extent of the assets of the deceased in their hands. ( 13 ) SEC. 15 provides for recovery of arrears of rent or the damages as arrears of land revenue by the 'deputy Commissioner on the certificate issued by the competent officer to that effect. Under Sec. 16 of the act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred and no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of Sec. 7 or the damages payable under sub-section (2) of that Section, and the cost awarded to the State Government or the local authority or the corporate authority under Sub-sec. (5) of S. 10 or an> ' portion of such rent, damages or costs. ( 14 ) THUS, from the aforesaid provisions of the, Act, it is clear that serious consequences ensue out of the orders passed by the competent officer under S. 5 or S. 7 of the Act. The person against whom such orders are passed in the case of eviction, will have to vacate the public premises. In the case of an order passed under S. 7, he will have to pay the arrears of rent or the damages as the case may be. Thus, a party against whom a proceeding for eviction or for recovery of rent or damages is instituted, will be met with serious consequences. It is in this back-ground, the right of a, party to be represented by a counsel in a proceeding under the act before the competent officer, requires to be examined. Thus, a party against whom a proceeding for eviction or for recovery of rent or damages is instituted, will be met with serious consequences. It is in this back-ground, the right of a, party to be represented by a counsel in a proceeding under the act before the competent officer, requires to be examined. ( 15 ) FROM S. 5 (1) of the Act, which is quoted above in extenso, it is clear that therei is no prohibition contained in the said section prohibiting a person to the proceeding being represented by a legal practitioner. As a result of eviction, if a person is occupying the public premises for his residential purpose, he will be thrown out on the street. If a person is occupying the said premises for the purpose of running a business, his business will be paralysed. Thus, in either case, a person against whom, an order of eviction is passed will have to face serious consequences which may, in a given case, affect his person or his business. ( 16 ) THERE is no provision in the Act, either expressly allowing a party to be represented by a legal practitioner just as Section 5a (2) of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 and S. 57 (5) of. the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or expressly prohibiting a legal practitioner to appear in any proceedings before the tribunal just as S. 48 (8) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. At the same time, a plain and natural meaning of the words contained in S. 5 (1) and 7 (3) of the Act, does not at all exclude or take away the right of a person to be represented by his agent under the Law of Agency as incorporated in the Contract Act. ( 17 ) THE contention of Sri Ramesh, the learned counsel for the respondent, that the words "after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard" occurring in Section 5 of the Act would mean only an opportunity to be given to the party in person and not to his agent or authorised representative, cannot be accepted. The aforesaid words do not exclude the right of a person to be represented by his agent or a legal practitioner. The aforesaid words do not exclude the right of a person to be represented by his agent or a legal practitioner. The wordings contained in Rule 55 of the Civil services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules, which came up for consideration in the case of T. Rajadopala Ayyangar v. Collector of salt-Revenue (5) are not similar and this aspect of the matter will be adverted to subsequently. Even the very decision of the Supreme court, in the case of Ravula Subba rao v. Commissioner of I. T. (2) which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, clearly lays down that apart from certain exceptions such as, when the act to be performed is personal in character or is annexed to a public office, or to an office involving fiduciary obligations, the law is well settled that whatever a person can do himself, he can do through an agent. The relevant portion of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme court, in Ravula Subba Rao's case (2) is as follows: -"according to the law of England and that is also the law under the indian Contract Act, 1872- "every person who is sui juris has a right to appoint an agent for any purpose whatsoever, and that he can do so when he is exercising a statutory right no less than when he is exercising any other right". Per Stirling, j. in Jackson and Co. , v. Napper: In re. Schmidts' Trade-Mark (2 ). This rule is subject to certain well known exceptions as when the act to be performed is personal in character, or is annexed to a public office, or to an office involving fiduciary obligations. But apart from such exceptions, the law is well settled that whatever a person can do himself, he can do through an agent. It has accordingly been held that "at common law, when a person authorizes another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person authorizing it". Per Blackburn, J. in The Queen v. Justices of kent (4 ). The appellant is therefore right in his contention that unless the statute itself enacts otherwise, an application which a partner has to sign would be in order and valid, if it is signed by his authorised agent. Per Blackburn, J. in The Queen v. Justices of kent (4 ). The appellant is therefore right in his contention that unless the statute itself enacts otherwise, an application which a partner has to sign would be in order and valid, if it is signed by his authorised agent. The question then is whether there is anything in the Act, which requires that an application under Section 26-A should be signed by the party personally. "thus it is clear that in law, the right of a person to authorise another to do an act which he can do himself cannot be held to be taken away unless the statute either expressly or by necessary implication takes away such a right. In the instant case, as already pointed out, from the wordings of Sec. 5 (1) of the Act, it cannot be held that the opportunity intended to be given is confined, to a party in person and not to his agent, as such, such a contention cannot be accepted. The words "after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard", having regard to the nature of the proceedings and the serious consequences that ensue as a result of an order passed either under sec. 5 or under See. 7 of the Act, cannot be interpreted that the said words have get the effect of giving an opportunity to a party in person and not to his agent. Further, it cannot also be interpreted that the said words by implication take away the right of a person to be represented by an agent. In Ravula Subba Rao's case, the Supreme Court, on the basis of the wordings contained in S. 26-A of the Income Tax Act and the relevant rules framed thereunder, held that the application is required to be signed by the partner in person and the signature by an agent on his behalf is invalid. The relevant portion of that judgment, is as follows:"to sum up, the Indian Income-tax act is a self-contained Code exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein, and its provisions show an intention to depart from the common rule, qui facit per alium facit per se. The relevant portion of that judgment, is as follows:"to sum up, the Indian Income-tax act is a self-contained Code exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein, and its provisions show an intention to depart from the common rule, qui facit per alium facit per se. Its intention again is that a firm should be given the benefit of S. 23 (5) (a), only if it is registered under Sec. 26-A in accordance with the conditions laid down in thai Section and the rules framed thereunder And as those rules require the application to be signed by the, partner in person, the signature by an agent on his behalf is invalid. "thus, the aforesaid decision of the supreme Court which was relied upon by. the learned Counsel for the respondent in support of his contentions, is not of any assistance. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decision in the case of T. Rajagopala ayyangar v. Collector of Salt-Revenue (5 ). In the said decision, the right of a party to be represented by a counsel came up for consideration with reference to the wordings contained in Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The relevant portion of the Rule as quoted in the judgment on the basis of which it was held that the said rule excluded the right of a party to be represented by a Counsel, is as follows: 'no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of a service. . . . unless. . . . . . he has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself," the relevant portion of the judgment of Beasley, C. J. , is also as follows:"there being no common law right to be represented by counsel and if there are statutes directing how a person is to be heard as in the case referred to, then the words of the statute alone afford a solution of the question. Are there any words in R. 55 which sufficiently clearly show how the person charged may appear at the enquiry? The rule provides that the person charged shall be required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person and to have such witneses called as he may wish. The rule provides that the person charged shall be required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person and to have such witneses called as he may wish. In my view the words "to be heard in person" must be given their natural and ordinary meaning; and the other provisions already referred to appear to me to be consistent with an appearance in person and not by agent or counsel and adopting the method of construing a statute preferred by Lord coleridge, C. J. in (1889) 23 Q,b,d, 29, I look at the words used which appear to me to be sufficiently plain to give effect to them, That being so, in my view they exclude the appellant from being heard by counsel or otherwise than in person. "cornish, J. who agreed with Beasley, c. J. , also took the same view haying regard to the wordings contained in rule 55, the relevant portion of which is as follows:"r. 55 limits the Government servant's right to be heard "in person". In (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 29, it was held that a right given by statute to a person to be heard "by himself" meant that he had no right to be heard by anybody but himself; and i cannot but think that the right given by R. 55 to be heard "in person" is similarly restricted to the person of the Government servant. ". Thus, it is clear that the aforesaid decision turned upon the wordings contained in Rule 55 of the Civil services (Classification, Control and appeal) Rules. The wordings in Sec. 5 (1) of the Act, as already quoted above, are not similar to the wordings contained in Rule 55 of the aforesaid c. C. A. Rules. Even Sec. 7 (3) of the act also does not contain similar wordings. It specifically provides that no order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) thereof shall be made against any person until after the issue of a notice in writing to the person calling upon him to show cause within such time as may be specified in the notice why such order should not be made, and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been, considered by the competent Officer. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the present case. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon two more decisions of the Supreme Court viz. , kalindi v. Tata Loco and Engg. Co. , ltd. , (3) and Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Subba Raman (4 ). The decision in the case of Kalindi v. Tata Loco Engg. Co. Ltd (3) has been relied upon in the case of Brooke Bond India Ltd. v. Subba Raman (4 ). Therefore, it is not necessary to make a detailed reference to the case of Brook Bond India Ltd. , (4 ). Both the cases relate to the domestic enquiry held by the management against a workman. The question that arose for consideration was as to whether the refusal of the workman's request to be represented at the enquiry by a representative of the Union, vitiated the enquiry. In this connection, it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Kalindi v. Tata Loco and Engg. Co. (3), as follows:"accustomed as we are to the practice in the Courts of Law to skilful handling of witnesses by lawyers specially trained in the art of examination and cross,-examination of witnesses, our first inclination is to think that a fair enquiry demands that the person accused of an act should have the assistance of some person, whp even if not a lawyer may be expected to examine and cross-examine witnesses with a fail, amount of skill. We have to remember however in the first place that these are not enquiries in a court of law. It is necessary to remember also that in these enquiries fairly simple questions of fact as to whether certain acts of misconduct were committed by a workman or not only fall to be considered, and straightforward questioning which a person of fair intelligence and knowledge of conditions prevailing in the industry will be able to do will ordinarily help to elicit the truth. It may often happen that the accused workman will be best stated, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken against him and to examine witnesses in his favour. It is helpful to consider in this connexion the fact that ordinarily in enquiries before domestic tribunals the person accused of any misconduct conducts his own case. It may often happen that the accused workman will be best stated, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken against him and to examine witnesses in his favour. It is helpful to consider in this connexion the fact that ordinarily in enquiries before domestic tribunals the person accused of any misconduct conducts his own case. Rules have been framed by Government as regards the procedure to be followed in enquiries against their own employees. No provision is made in these rules that the person against whom an enquiry is held may be represented by anybody else. When the general practice adopted by domestic tribunals is that the person accused conducts his own case, we are unable to accept an argument that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a charge sheet of misconduct against a workman he should be represented by a member of his union. Besides it is necessary to remember that if any enquiry is not otherwise fair the workman concerned can challenge its validity in an industrial Dispute. Our conclusion therefore, is that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his union, though of course an employer in his discretion can and may allow his employee to avail himself of such assistance. " (Emphasis supplied) thus it is clear that the aforesaid decision shall only govern the enquiries held by thq management against a workman. The enquiry held by the competent officer under the Act, cannot be equated to a domestic enquiry held by the management against a workman though the competent officer who is empowered to hold an enquiry under the Act and pass orders under Sections 5 and 7 of the Act, cannot be equated to a Civil Court, but he is a quasi judicial tribunal exercising the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of holding an enquiry under the Act in respect of the matters i. e. , (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents and any other matter which may be prescribed. The proceeding held by the competent officer under the Act, is a civil proceeding in Respect of the rights of a party with reference to the public premises. Therefore, the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme court are also of no assistance to the learned Counsel for the respondent. ( 20 ) IN this connection, it is very pertinent to notice a decision of the court of Appeal in the case of Pett v. Greyhound Racing Assi. Ltd. ,1963 WLR 1471 = (1968) 2 All. E. R. 545. In that case, their Lordships have held that when a man's reputation and livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth, he also has a right to speak by a counsel or solicitor. Lord Denning, M. R. , while considering the question as to whether a person has a right to be legally represented, has stated thus:"now the point arises: Has the trainer a right to be legally represented? The club object to any legal representation. Their secretary says in his affidavit: "if legal representation were allowed as of right, the delay and complications that this would cause would largely frustrate the stewards' intention to conduct their meetings expeditiously and with complete fairness. "mr. Eveleigh on behalf of the association, says that the procedure is in the hands of the stewards. If they choose to say: "we will not hear lawyers", that is for them, he says, and it is not for the courts to interfere. I cannot accept this contention. Mr. Pett is here facing a serious charge. He is charged either with giving the dog drugs or with not exercising proper control over the dog so that someone else drugged it. If he is found guilty, he may be suspended or his licence may not be renewed. The charge concerns his reputation and his livelihood. On such an inquiry, I think that he is entitled not only to appear by himself but also to appoint an agent to act for him. Even a prisoner can have his friend. The general principle was stated by Stirling J. in Jackson and Co. The charge concerns his reputation and his livelihood. On such an inquiry, I think that he is entitled not only to appear by himself but also to appoint an agent to act for him. Even a prisoner can have his friend. The general principle was stated by Stirling J. in Jackson and Co. v. Napper (7)"that, subject to certain well- known exceptions, every person who is sui juris has a right to appoint an agent for any purpose whatever, and that he can do so when he is exercising a statutory right no less than when he is exercising any other right. "this was applied to a hearing before an assessment Committee in Reg. v. Assessment Committee of St. Mary abbotts, Kensington, (1891) 1 QB. 378 CA. It was held held that a ratepayer had a right to have a surveyor to appear for him. Once it is seen that a man has a right to appear by an agent, then I see no reason why that agent should not be a lawyer. It is not every man who has the ability to defend himself on his own. He cannot bring out the points in his own favour or the weaknesses in the other side. He may be tongue-tied or nervous, confused or wanting in intelligence. He cannot examine or cross- examine witnesses. We see it every day. A Magistrate says to a man: "you can ask any questions you like"; whereupon the man immediately starts to make a speech. If justice is to be done, he ought to have the help of someone to speak for him. And who better than a lawyer who has been trained for the task? I should have thought, therefore, that when a man's reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth. He also has a right to speak by counsel or solicitor. " thus, under the Act in question also, in the event of an order of eviction being passed, if a person is occupying a public premises for the purpose of running a business, his business will be paralysed, thereby, his livelihood will be affected. He also has a right to speak by counsel or solicitor. " thus, under the Act in question also, in the event of an order of eviction being passed, if a person is occupying a public premises for the purpose of running a business, his business will be paralysed, thereby, his livelihood will be affected. Even in the case of occupation of the premises for residential purpose also, by reason of eviction, the occupant will be thrown out of the premises and as a result thereof, he will have to face so many difficulties, Therefore, it is a case in which having regard to the consequences that flow out of an order of eviction or out of an order passed under Sec. 7 of the Act, it is not possible to hold that a person is either deprived or taken away of his right to be represented by an agent and the interests of justice also to require that he should have such a right to speak through his counsel. ( 21 ) IN the case of Tikamchand Sulalji agarwal v. Registrar, Co-operative societies (1), following the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Pett v. Greyhound Racing Assi. Ltd. while dealing with the question regarding the right of a party to be represented by a legal practitioner, it ha,s been held as follows: 7. The right to be represented by a legal practitioner, except when a person is charged of a criminal offence, is not a fundamental right so far as proceedings in Civil Courts are concerned, right to representation by a legal practitioner is conferred on a party by Order 3 Rule 1 of the code of Civil Procedure. As regards tribunals and quasi-judicial authorities. in the absence of any specific statutory provision, a party's right to representation by a counsel is based on the law of agency and principles of natural justice. Subject to exceptions, a person can appoint an agent for any purpose and the agent so appointed may be a lawyer. So a person who can appear in a proceeding by an agent can appoint a lawyer to be his agent. Again when a person's reputation or livelihood or any matter of serious import is involved, natural justice may require that he can be represented. if he so desires, by a lawyer; Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd. , (8 ). So a person who can appear in a proceeding by an agent can appoint a lawyer to be his agent. Again when a person's reputation or livelihood or any matter of serious import is involved, natural justice may require that he can be represented. if he so desires, by a lawyer; Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd. , (8 ). ( 22 ) THUS from what is stated above, it follows that even before the quasijudicial authorities, in the absence of any specific provision contained in the statute taking away the righ of a person to be represented by an agent or by a counsel based on the law of agency and principles of natural justice, subject to certain exceptions as stated in Ravula Subba Rao's (2) referred to above, such as when the act to be performed is personal in character or is annexed to a public office or to an office involving fiduciary obligations a person is entitled to be represented by an agent and there cannot be a better person than a lawyer as an agent. Thus, a person against whom a proceeding is initiated by the competent officer under the Act, is entitled to be represented by a counsel. Consequently, it follows that the order passed by the respondent refusing to grant permission to the petitioner to engage a counsel is unsustainable. . ( 23 ) ACCORDINGLY, the impugned communication dated 5-5-1980 produced as annexure-C, is hereby quashed and it is declared that the petitioner has got a right to be represented through a counsel of his choice, in the proceeding in question. ( 24 ) COPY of the order may be supplied to the parties within a week. --- *** --- .