SANAULLA v. SANJIVA ANNA SHETTY — 1980 DIGILAW 159 (BOM)

JUDGMENT : Kambli, J. 1. This first appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 12th July, 1973 passed by the learned Member of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for Greater Bombay in claim application No. 182 of 1969 dismissing the Applicant's application for compensation arising from a fatal accident to his son Shakil Ahmed Sanaulla. 2. The claim petition was filed by the Appellant Sanaulla son of Sadatali, a resident of District Basti in Uttar Pradesh. It is not in dispute that his son Shakil Ahmed Sanaulla, while he was riding on a motor cycle and was proceeding along Signal Hill Road, Mazgaon, Bombay, met with an instantaneous death in the accident between his motor cycle and the lorry which was at the material time, that is on 4.11969, being driven by Respondent No 1 and which was owned by Respondent No. 2 Kwik Transport Syndicate. According to the Appellant when the deceased Shakil Ahmed Sanaulla was proceeding on his motor cycle along Signal Hill Road, Mazgaon on the correct side of the road, close to the footpath, the first Respondent Sanjiva Anna Shetty drove the lorry No. BNR 6407 belonging to the second Respondent at excessive speed, without keeping proper look out, in a rash and negligent manner as a result of which the lorry dashed against the motor cycle from behind and knocked down the deceased and the lorry ran over him causing instantaneous death. According to the Appellant the accident was caused entirely due to the rash and negligent driving of Respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the driver). The Appellant alleged in his petition that the deceased at the time of the accident was aged 25 years and was in robust health and was very much attached to the family. At the time of his death he was assisting in the family business that is M/s. Chaudhari Metal Industries and M/s. Khan Mohamed Shafi Mohamed and Bros and he was intending to set up his own separate business. The Appellant alleged that the deceased would have continued to live and support the dependents for the rest of his life. He was expected to live at least till the age of 65. Due to his premature and sudden death, the dependents viz. The Appellant alleged that the deceased would have continued to live and support the dependents for the rest of his life. He was expected to live at least till the age of 65. Due to his premature and sudden death, the dependents viz. his parents, his widow and two children have lost their share which would otherwise have come to the deceased from the family properties. A loss has also been caused to the estate of the deceased. The Appellant estimated the compensation payable on account of the death of the deceased at Rs. 75,0007/-. The Appellant specifically stated in his application that the application had been filed for himself and for the benefit of the other dependents as described in paragraph 18 of the application. 3. The Respondents by their written statement denied that the motor lorry was being driven at an excessive speed in a rash and negligent manner without keeping proper lookout. They alleged that it was the motor cycle of the deceased which dashed against the lorry. It was denied that the deceased died as a result of the negligence of the Respondent No. 1. According to them on the day in question the motor lorry was proceeding towards Reay Road. At the junction of Signal Hill Road, the deceased motor cyclist with 'L' sign came from a small lane on left side and in total disregard of vehicular traffic on the road tried to proceed further as a result of which the said motor cycle dashed against the left front wheel and the cyclist fell down and received injuries. Without prejudice to these averments the Respondents stated that in any event the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. 4. The learned Member of the Tribunal framed as many as six issues. On behalf of the claimants the uncle of the deceased by name Meher Khan was examined. One Attaul Hassan was examined as an eye-witness to the accident. On behalf of the Respondents, Respondent No. 1, the driver Sanjiva Shetty was examined. The documents like the sketch of the scene of the accident, panchanama, the judgment recorded by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 1969 were also produced on record. On consideration of the evidence before him the learned Member of the Tribunal was inclined to disbelieve the eye-witness examined for the claimants. The documents like the sketch of the scene of the accident, panchanama, the judgment recorded by the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 1969 were also produced on record. On consideration of the evidence before him the learned Member of the Tribunal was inclined to disbelieve the eye-witness examined for the claimants. The learned Member pointed out that another eye-witness to the accident by name Abbas AH and a person who was admittedly riding on the pillion of the motor cycle by name Vora were not examined. On consideration of the evidence before him the learned Member was of the view that the deceased did not follow the regulations viz. Regulation Nos. 6 and 7 of the Xth Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act and that he came on the main road not caring to see the lorry which was coming at a high speed and the fault therefore, entirely was of the deceased and he was responsible for the accident. According to the learned Member of the Tribunal as per the aforesaid Regulation No. 1 it was the duty of the deceased to give way to traffic approaching the intersection on his right hand; if without doing this, the deceased took the chance of going ahead by turning to the left, he, in the opinion of the learned Member, definitely had done an act which was both rash and negligent. While coming to that conclusion the learned Member of the Tribunal referred to the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 1969. It appears that Respondent No. 1 was prosecuted for an offence u/s 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and was convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, Dadar. On appeal being preferred from the said conviction and sentence this Court acquitted Respondent No. 1. The learned Member of the Tribunal referred to the observations of this Court in the judgment in the Criminal Appeal and in particular to the observations of this Court with regard to the witnesses examined by the prosecution, at the trial. The learned Member observed that the judgment of Criminal Court was not binding on him. However, he observed that the decision of the High Court on point of law will be binding on the Tribunal because the Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court. The learned Member observed that the judgment of Criminal Court was not binding on him. However, he observed that the decision of the High Court on point of law will be binding on the Tribunal because the Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court. The learned Member further observed that the decision of the High Court on legal aspect will have a binding effect. The learned Member however went on to say in his judgment that irrespective of the judgment delivered by the High Court on an independent and analytical appreciation of the evidence, he was not inclined to believe the eye-witness examined by the claimants; the learned Member found that the deceased did not care to observe Regulations 6 and 7 of the Xth Schedule; that lorry which was heavily loaded and was coming in fast speed could not be stopped immediately. In that view of the matter the learned Member was of the opinion that the Appellant had failed to establish his case. In his view it was, therefore, not necessary to consider in detail the testimony of the driver. Referring to written statement made by the driver in the course of the investigation by the police into the accident, the learned Member was of the view that those statements would not be admissible in law. In conclusion, the learned Member held that the deceased did not observe the mandatory provisions of the two aforesaid regulations and suddenly came on the road without looking to the traffic to his right hands side, with the results that the driver got frightened and considering heavy load and the speed of the lorry he could not control and save the driver of the motor cycle. The learned Member rejected the version of the Applicant that the motor lorry had given a dash to the motor cycle from behind. According to the learned Member if the lorry had hit the motor cycle from behind the damage to the motor cycle would have been definitely much more than the damage that was noticed to the carrier of the motor cycle. Having found against the Appellant on material issues the learned Member proceeded to decide the question of damages, in case his decision on the main issues, was found to be incorrect. On consideration of the evidence adduced on behalf of the claimants, viz. Having found against the Appellant on material issues the learned Member proceeded to decide the question of damages, in case his decision on the main issues, was found to be incorrect. On consideration of the evidence adduced on behalf of the claimants, viz. the evidence of the uncle of the deceased--Meher Khan, the learned Member of the Tribunal was of the view that the deceased was not earning anything at the material time. The learned Member pointed out that none of the dependents for whom the claim petition had been filed had gone into the witness-box to prove the earning of the deceased and the consequent loss to them. According to the learned Member there was no evidence to prove that the deceased was earning anything. The learned Member was of the view that: If at all he (deceased) was getting anything, a sum of Rs. 10,000/- by way of general damages would meet the ends of justice. In view of his finding on the main issues the learned Member, however, proceeded to dismiss the application. Being aggrieved the Appellant has preferred this appeal. 5. Mr. Kudrolli, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, submitted that the finding of the learned Member of the Tribunal that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the deceased was erroneous. He submitted that on proper appreciation of the evidence on record the learned Member should have held that Respondent No. 1--lorry driver, was rash and negligent and was exclusively responsible for the accident. The learned Counsel admitted that the motor cycle of the deceased was proceeding along the Signal Hill Road and the lorry gave a dash at the back side of the motor cycle, that, according to the learned Counsel, clearly showed that the Respondent No. 1--driver was rash and negligent. The learned Counsel complained that the learned Member of the Tribunal was influenced by the decision of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1484/69. According to the learned Counsel, the evidence of eye-witness, Sanaulla should have been believed by the learned Member of the Tribunal. He contended that the learned Member of the Tribunal erred in applying the provisions of Regulations 6 and 7 of the Xth Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act to the facts of this case so far as the deceased was concerned. He contended that the learned Member of the Tribunal erred in applying the provisions of Regulations 6 and 7 of the Xth Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act to the facts of this case so far as the deceased was concerned. According to the learned Counsel, there being a junction, the lorry driver ought to have slowed down his speed and should have been on the proper look out. These precautions were not taken by him and he was driving the lorry at a fast speed. It should, therefore, have been held that he was solely responsible for the accident. Mr. Kudrolli complained that while deciding the question whether the Respondent-driver was rash and negligent the learned Member ought to have taken into consideration the evidence of the Respondent driver and certain admissions made by him. 6. Coming to the question of damages Mr. Kudrolli submitted that even if it is held that the deceased was not earning at the time of the accident, a claim for compensation could be sustained if it is established that the dependents had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits from the continuance of life of the deceased- He submitted that the learned Member of the Tribunal should have proceeded to work out the compensation on that basis and should have decreed the claim of the claimants. 7. As against this Mr. Trivedi, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, contended that the finding of the learned Member of the Tribunal that the deceased did not observe the rule of the road, that he came on the main road without following the Regulations 6 and 7 in the Xth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act and that the accident was therefore, solely due to the rash and negligent conduct of the deceased, was correct. He contended that the driver of the lorry had a precedence over the vehicles coming from the lane on its left side and that there being no junction there he was not bound to slow down his speed. According to the learned Counsel if the lorry of the Respondent would have given a dash to the motor cycle from behind there would have been much more damage to the motor cycle and the person riding on the pillion of the motor cycle would have also been injured. Mr. Trivedi contended that evidence of Sanaulla examined by the claimants was rightly rejected. Mr. Trivedi contended that evidence of Sanaulla examined by the claimants was rightly rejected. He also submitted that the learned Member of the Tribunal was right in drawing adverse inference from the non-examination of the other eye-witnesses Abbas Ali and the pillion rider Vora. 8. Coming to the question of damages Mr. Trivedi contended that none of the claimants were examined before the Tribunal. The Respondents were, therefore, deprived of eliciting some useful information in their favour from their cross-examination; that the claimants, therefore, are not entitled to any damages. 9. Now, the sketch of the scene of offence is at Exh. A on record. It would appear from the evidence and also the sketch and it is not disputed that the lorry was proceeding from north to south towards Reay Road. The deceased came from a lane on the left side. It is also not disputed that the accident took place at the junction of the Signal Hill Road. On going through the evidence on record and on hearing the submissions made on both sides we are unable to agree with the learned Member of the Tribunal that accident took place solely due to the rash and negligent driving of the motor cycle on the part of the deceased. 10. Negligence has not been defined, but the classical concept of it is well known. It is said that negligence is the act or omission to do something which a reasonable man would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In short it is the absence of due care and caution expected of a prudent driver. The test for inferring negligence is whether the driver exercised due care and caution which is expected of a prudent driver. 11. As observed by a Division Bench of this Court in Shakuntala v. State of Maharashtra 1976 A.C.J. 368 (Bom.): When a person is using the road he owes a duty to other users who also owe a duty to him but the driver of a vehicle must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions, which can be reasonably foreseen and which will be likely to injure other persons on the road. A person in the control of a motor vehicle must keep a good look-out in all directions of the road, on the sides and in front of him and if he does so it would naturally be expected that he would be able to notice a person walking or riding a cycle in front of him. Having noticed another user of road whether in the form of a pedestrian or cyclist or another vehicle in front of him, whether going in the same or opposite direction, it at once becomes his duty to adjust the speed of the vehicle in such a manner that it becomes under his complete control and he may stop it instantaneously in case of necessity so as to avoid an accident. 12. Now Regulation 6 in the Xth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that: The driver of a motor vehicle shall slow down when approaching a road intersection, a road junction or a road corner and shall not enter any such intersection or junction until he has become aware that he may do so without endangering the safety of persons thereon. 13. Mr. Trivedi, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, tried to submit that the provisions of this rule are not attracted to the facts of this case, as on the spot where the accident took place there was no intersection or a road junction. Now the word 'junction' has not been defined in the act. The dictionary meaning of the word 'junction', as can be seen from Oxford Dictionary is 'joining, joint, meeting place'. There can be no doubt that at or about the place where accident occurred on the main road beyond lane from which the motor vehicle came, there was a meeting point of the road and the lane. Apart from this the Respondents in paragraph 7 of their written statement while giving their version of the accident have stated: at the junction of Signal Hill Road, the deceased motor cyclist with 'L' sign came from a small lane in the left side. That the accident took place at or near the junction is thus admitted. Apart from this the Respondents in paragraph 7 of their written statement while giving their version of the accident have stated: at the junction of Signal Hill Road, the deceased motor cyclist with 'L' sign came from a small lane in the left side. That the accident took place at or near the junction is thus admitted. If the Respondent-driver was approaching a road intersection or a road junction it was his duty as provided in Regulation 6 not to enter such intersection or junction without first slowing down the speed and until he became aware that he could enter the intersection or junction without endangering the safety of the persons thereon. Obviously, the Respondent driver failed to observe the provisions in this regulation. Apart from the evidence of eyewitness examined by the claimants even the learned Member of the Tribunal has found that the Respondent No. 1 was driving the lorry at a fast speed. It is also on evidence that there was a caution board at the place of the junction. In view of all these materials that emerge from the evidence on record it was clearly the duty of the Respondent No. 1 to take all the precautions incorporated in Regulation No. 6. It is clear from the evidence that he failed to take those precautions. 14. Now the plea of Respondents in their written statement was that the deceased, in total disregard to vehicular traffic coming on the road, proceeded further as a result of which the said motor cycle dashed against the left front wheel of the lorry and the cyclist fell down and received injuries. Respondent driver in his deposition, however, stated that after he came a little ahead of the furniture shop, National Arts Products, which is at the junction of the gully and the road, something struck his lorry. The cleaner told him that some one had fallen from the motor cycle and they were two persons. According to the Respondent-driver the motor cycle hit his diesel tank on the left side of the lorry behind the driver's cabin and before the rear wheel. He stated that the motor cycle hit the diesel tank. Now this version is at variance with the version in the written statement. According to the Respondent-driver the motor cycle hit his diesel tank on the left side of the lorry behind the driver's cabin and before the rear wheel. He stated that the motor cycle hit the diesel tank. Now this version is at variance with the version in the written statement. The driver admitted in his cross-examination that he had informed Chandrajit Issardas who is the partner of the firm and who had given instructions to draw the written statement. He states that he had informed Chandrajit that the motor cycle dashed against the diesel tank. He asserts that he did not tell him that the collision was with the left front wheel. However, the written statement as pointed out above, clearly states that the motor cycle dashed against the left front wheel of the lorry and the cyclist fell down. It will appear from the evidence of Respondent that he has made a number of statements before the Tribunal which are contrary to what he had stated before the police. For example, he admitted that he had told the police that the left rear wheel of his lorry passed over the motor cycle driver. In his evidence before the Tribunal he wanted to say that he had blown the horn as there was a caution board. However, before the police he had stated that he had not blown horn for cautioning the motor cyclist. He admitted that he had stated before police that he did not caution the motor cyclist nor blew horn because the incident occurred suddenly. He does not say in his deposition that he had slowed down the speed when he approached the junction. The averments, therefore, in the pleading viz. written statement that there was a collision between the motor cyclist and motor lorry in which the motor cycle and the left front wheel of his lorry came in contact would have to be preferred to the statements made by him before the Tribunal to the effect that the motor cycle hit his diesel tank on left side. According to the version of the Appellant the lorry of the Respondent gave a dash to the backside of the motor cycle as a result of which the carrier at the backside was damaged. Now Mr. According to the version of the Appellant the lorry of the Respondent gave a dash to the backside of the motor cycle as a result of which the carrier at the backside was damaged. Now Mr. Trivedi the learned Counsel to the Respondent submitted that had the lorry given a dash to the motor cycle from behind the man riding on the pillion would have been hurt. He also stated that in case the dash was given by the lorry to the motor cycle there would have been more damage to the motor cycle. The panchanama, however, shows that there were a few broken pieces of the carrier. There is some substance in the submission made by Mr. Trivedi. If the motor lorry would have given forcible dash to the backside of the motor cycle the person riding on the pillion would have received injuries. However, even if there may not be a forcible dash given by the lorry at the backside of the motor cycle, if as a result of the collision the deceased happened to be thrown of the motor cycle and in that process if he came under the wheel of the lorry the question would be whether that was due to the rash and negligent driving of the Respondent-driver. If the collision between the motor cycle and the lorry has been established and if it is further established that as a result of that collision the deceased was thrown off the motor cycle and came under the wheel of the lorry, the Respondent driver would be clearly responsible for the injuries sustained by the deceased and his consequent instantaneous death, if the collision was due to the rash and negligent act of the Respondent. We have pointed out above that the Respondent lorry driver was rash and negligent in not taking the precautions before his entering the junction of the road. It was the duty of the Respondent-driver to avoid acts or omissions which could reasonably have been foreseen and which would have injured the other persons on the road. The evidence of the eye-witness Sanaulla examined for the claimants shows that the lorry was coming in a high speed. Even the Tribunal, as we have indicated above has found that the lorry which was heavily loaded came at high speed. The evidence of the eye-witness Sanaulla examined for the claimants shows that the lorry was coming in a high speed. Even the Tribunal, as we have indicated above has found that the lorry which was heavily loaded came at high speed. It was the duty of the Respondent-driver, therefore, to slow down the speed before entering the junction and to adjust the speed in such a manner that the lorry came under his complete control and he could stop it instantaneously in case of necessity so as to avoid the accident. Even if the version of the claimant's eye-witness Sanaulla that the left front wheel of the lorry hit against the rear side of the motor cycle is not accepted in toto, it would appear from the other evidence on record especially the averments in the written statement of the Respondent that there was a collision between the motor cycle and the left front wheel of the lorry and that the lorry was in a high speed would again be borne out from the fact that the skid marks of the tyres were seen for a distance of 23.35 meters from the place of impact. The caution board which admittedly was seen by the Respondent driver should have put him on his guard and he should have adjusted the speed of the lorry in such a manner that it remained under his control and he could stop the vehicle instantaneously in case of necessity. The Respondent driver having failed to take all these precautions it must be held that the accident in question was due to his rash and negligent act. 15. The next question is whether the accident was due solely to the rash and negligent driving of the Respondent-driver. On consideration of the evidence on record we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the deceased was also rash and negligent. Regulation 7 in the Xth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that: The driver of a motor vehicle shall on entering a road intersection, if the road entered is a main road designated as such, give way to the vehicles proceeding along that road and in any other case give way to all traffic approaching the intersection on his right hand. 16. Mr. 16. Mr. Kudrolli, the learned advocate for the Appellant, submitted that the provision in Regulation 7 would not be attracted because there was no road intersection at the spot. However, it must be remembered that regulations in Schedule X are of general nature. If the regulations did not apply in terms, the principles thereunder could be taken into consideration for determining respective liabilities of the parties. See Maya Mukherjee v. Orissa Co-operative Insurance Society 1978 A.C.J. 292 (Orissa). Assuming there was no road intersection on the spot as observed by this Court in the case of Shakuntala Shridhat Shetty v. State of Maharashtra 1976 A.C.J. 368 (Bom.), the driver of vehicle has to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which can be reasonably foreseen. A person in the control of a motor cycle must keep a good look-out in all directions of the road, on the sides and in front of him and if he does so it would naturally be expected that he would be able to notice a person walking or a vehicle coming in front of him. It is not in dispute that the lorry was running on the main road and the deceased was coming on that road from a ane. Even if, therefore, the provisions in Regulation 7 did not apply in terms, the principles embodied therein would apply. Before coming on the main road it was the duty of the deceased to slow down his speed and to be on the look-out to see whether some vehicle or a pedestrian Was coming along the main road. The witness examined for the claimants Sanaulla does not throw any light on the question whether the deceased had taken these precautions. The claimants have not examined the rider on the pillion, Mr. Vora, or the other eye-witness to the accident viz. Abbas Ali, to show the manner in which the accident took place. The panchanama, Exh. B, which has been brought on record by consent shows that there is a furniture shop by name National Art Products just at the junction of the lane and the main road. It further shows that the point of impact was just opposite the furniture shop. Even the witness Sanaulla says that the accident occurred at 20 to 25 feet away from the National Art Products. It further shows that the point of impact was just opposite the furniture shop. Even the witness Sanaulla says that the accident occurred at 20 to 25 feet away from the National Art Products. This shows that the deceased must have entered the main road without being on the lookout for the vehicles coming on the main road. The lorry was coming in speed. Had the deceased waited even for a second or two before he entered the junction he would have been able to avoid the lorry coming in speed. It appears that without taking precautions to see whether any vehicle was coming along the main road, the deceased came on the main road and the accident occurred, just at the junction of the main road. Mr. Kudrolli, relying on the evidence of Sanaulla wanted to submit that the lorry hit against the rear side of the motor cycle. In support of his submission, he further pointed out that the carrier of the motor cycle was damaged. He, therefore, wanted to submit that the motor cycle was proceeding ahead and the lorry dashed against it from behind. The deceased motor cyclist was therefore, not responsible for the accident; that the accident was solely due to the rash and negligent act of the Respondent. It is not possible to accept this submission. If the accident would have occurred at some considerable distance from the junction and it would have been proved that the lorry gave a dash to the motor cycle from behind, it would have been possible to say that the motor cycle had already come on the main road for some considerable distance and the driver of the lorry without controlling the speed, gave a dash to the motor cycle. As the panchanama and the evidence of Sanaulla shows the accident occurred just at the junction of the lane and the main road near the National Art Products It would appear from this material that both the motor cycle and the lorry entered the main road almost simultaneously. As we have pointed out above had the deceased been on the proper look out or had he waited for a second or two, at the junction before entering the main road, the accident would not have occurred at the junction or at a distance of 20 to 25 feet from the junction. As we have pointed out above had the deceased been on the proper look out or had he waited for a second or two, at the junction before entering the main road, the accident would not have occurred at the junction or at a distance of 20 to 25 feet from the junction. It further appears from the evidence that there was a 'L' plate on the motor cycle. It, therefore, appears that the deceased was just learning the driving. He must not be conversant with the rules of the road. One more circumstance that requires to be noticed is that the point of impact is at a distance of 2.80 meters from the eastern edge of the road. The width of the road is about 12 30 meters. The point of impact was at a distance of 2.80 meters on the left side of the lorry. The lorry would naturally have required another 7 or 8 feet for its running along the road. It could, therefore, be said that the lorry was not being driven quite close to the eastern side of the road. On the contrary it can be said that the motor cycle was being driven at a distance of about 8 feet from the eastern edge of the road. Had the deceased kept a little closer to the eastern edge of the road, the accident, in all probability would have been avoided. For all these reasons we are inclined to hold that though it is not established that the accident took place solely due to the rash and negligent driving of the deceased, but his rash and negligent driving did contribute for the occurring of the accident. The proximate cause of the accident is, in our view, due to the rash and negligent driving, both of the lorry driver as well as of the deceased. 17. The Tribunal referred extensively to the observations of the judgment of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 1979 referred to above. Mr. Trivedi did not rely and quite rightly upon the findings recorded in that judgment. Even though the learned Member of the Tribunal has observed that he was coming to the conclusion independently of the judgment delivered by the High Court, he has referred to the observations and findings of the High Court, extensively. Mr. Trivedi did not rely and quite rightly upon the findings recorded in that judgment. Even though the learned Member of the Tribunal has observed that he was coming to the conclusion independently of the judgment delivered by the High Court, he has referred to the observations and findings of the High Court, extensively. He has observed that even though the decision of a criminal Court is not binding on the Tribunal, the decision of the High Court on a point of law will be binding on the Tribunal. He went on to say that the decision of the High Court on legal issue will have a binding force. If the judgment of this criminal appeal is perused, it will appear that the decision therein rested mainly on the appreciation of evidence. Without dilating further on this point it may be stated that the degree of negligence and standard of care required to be proved in a criminal proceeding and that required to be proved before a civil Court or Motor Claims Tribunal are different. When the findings in the Criminal case are based on the evidence recorded in that case, those findings would obviously be non-relevant while considering the question whether the rash and negligent conduct on the part of the Respondent is proved in a civil action which would have to be decided on the evidence recorded in that proceeding itself. It is clear from the judgment of this High Court that certain witnesses examined there have not been examined before the Tribunal. The material which was not available in the criminal case has been there on the record before the Tribunal. The judgment, therefore, in the criminal appeal recorded by this Court would be of not much assistance to the Respondents and Mr. Trivedi rightly did not place reliance upon that judgment. 18. That takes us to the question of compensation. The learned Member of the Tribunal disbelieved the evidence of Mehar Khan, the uncle of the deceased, who stated that after the deceased failed in Intermediate Science Examination he came to Bombay. He was residing with him. He was assisting him in his business and he was learning the same. As he was his nephew he gave him money for expenses. Mehar Khan stated that he paid Rs. 600/- to Rs. 700/- for his expenses and family expenses. He was residing with him. He was assisting him in his business and he was learning the same. As he was his nephew he gave him money for expenses. Mehar Khan stated that he paid Rs. 600/- to Rs. 700/- for his expenses and family expenses. He, however, admitted that he had no proof except his word. The learned Member of the Tribunal in paragraph 15 of his order discussed the evidence of Mehar Khan and has given reasons for disbelieving that evidence. We are generally in agreement with the reasons recorded by the learned Member in coming to the conclusion that there was no satisfactory evidence that the deceased was earning anything. However, it is well settled that even if deceased was not earning at the time of the accident the claim can be made by his dependents if it is established that the dependents had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits from the continuance of the life of the deceased. See C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair 1970 A.C.J. 110 (S.C.), Jullunder Municipality v. Jagdish Kaur 1978 A.C.J. 359 (P. and H.) and Abdul Mohamad Agra and Another Vs. Peter Leo D'Mello and Another, A learned singe Judge of this Court in the case of Abdul Mohamad Agra and Another Vs. Peter Leo D'Mello and Another, has oberved that: Actual earning of money or money's worth by the deceased or his contribution to the support of the Plaintiff at or about the time of death is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action under the Fatal Accidents Act; what is required is that the Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of life. Now the question is as to how the compensation has to be ascertained. This question was considered by Division Bench of this Court in Nepoleon Fernandes v. Union of India 1977 A.C.J. 20 (Bom.). This Division Bench observed: The main criteria in assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act is the value of dependency multiplied by an appropriate number of years of purchase. The mode of assessment is beset with difficulties and depends on many imponderables. But the Court has to do its duty and come to a finding as to what should be the quantum of damages. It may not be made with mathematical accuracy but would depend on facts of each case. The mode of assessment is beset with difficulties and depends on many imponderables. But the Court has to do its duty and come to a finding as to what should be the quantum of damages. It may not be made with mathematical accuracy but would depend on facts of each case. The Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. The figure of damages is not a simple multiplication with the period that the deceased expected to live and the amount per year during that time which he would have supplied to the support of his dependents. The amount is to be discounted for the purpose of lump sum payment instead of being spread over for a period of years. The fact that the deceased may have suffered from illness or disease or from some disabling factor must also be taken into consideration. Where the deceased left behind him his parents and widow and a child, the fact that though the widow and son would be expected to live as long as he would have lived if he had not been killed, his parents would not be expected to live in normal circumstances for the entire period of the deceased's putative life, must also be considered. It is also necessary to consider that the deceased would not have earned only his present income during his entire life but would have received increments from time to time. Longevity in the family is also a factor to be considered. 19. Now in the instant case the deceased was of the age of 24 when he met with the fatal accident. The evidence of Mehar Khan shows that after he failed his Inter-Science Examination he came to Bombay. Even though agreeing with the learned Member of the Tribunal we are inclined to hold that there is no satisfactory evidence that the deceased was earning anything at the time of the accident, it is not suggested that he was not an able bodied young man. It is reasonable to presume that he was capable of earning and would have in due course earned certain amounts either in service or in business. Having regard to the fact that he had studied upto Intermediate Science examination we are inclined to hold that he could have earned atleast Rs. 400/- per month at the beginning. It is reasonable to presume that he was capable of earning and would have in due course earned certain amounts either in service or in business. Having regard to the fact that he had studied upto Intermediate Science examination we are inclined to hold that he could have earned atleast Rs. 400/- per month at the beginning. Now the deceased is survived by his two parents, aged 48 and 45 years respectively, his wife aged 22 years, a daughter aged 4 years and a son aged 9 months. Assuming that the deceased who was residing at Bombay at the time of the accident would have spent about Rs. 200/- for his personal expenses he could have provided his dependents an amount of about Rs. 200/- per month. u/s 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act just compensation is to be awarded to the dependents. Damages which would represent the loss of dependence over a period of number of years have to be awarded as the just compensation. One of the methods adopted is the method of multiplier for arriving at the just amount to be awarded to the dependents. This method has been recommended as one of the best methods by the Supreme Court in its various decisions. See Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.M.K. Veluswami 1958 A.C.J. 179 (S.C.), Bai Nanda v. Shivabhai Shankerbhai Patal 1966 A.C.J. 290 (Gujarat) and C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair 1970 A.C.J. 110 (S.C.). The two important factors to be derived at when the multiplier method is to be adopted are: (1) The figure of annual dependency which is the basic figure representing the multiplier; and (2) Number of years purchase representing the multiplier. The figure of annual dependency can be worked out by finding out the net income obtained by the deceased at the time of his death and the amount expended by him for personal expenditure, from the amount of net income. The remainder would represent the amount spent by him for the dependents plus the amount saved for future. If there is satisfactory evidence regarding the amount spent by him for his dependents the figure of the amount so spent should be taken as the basic figure for calculating the loss of dependency. The remainder would represent the amount spent by him for the dependents plus the amount saved for future. If there is satisfactory evidence regarding the amount spent by him for his dependents the figure of the amount so spent should be taken as the basic figure for calculating the loss of dependency. Now in the case before us, even if there is no such evidence, we feel that it would be reasonable to hold that the deceased would have to spend an amount of Rs. 200/- per month for his dependents. The deceased was living in Bombay at the material time. It appears from the evidence of Mebar Khan that he had come to Bombay for starting some business. It is reasonable to assume that he would have spent for his personal expenses at best an amount of Rs. 200/-. It is in evidence that father of the deceased is owning a land of about 25 bhigas in his village in U.P. Mehar Khan stated in the deposition that the parents of the deceased were farmers and only have 25 bhigas of land and they were having good crops. The deceased however, was a married person having a wife and two children. It is not proved that he was having any service or business at the material time. It is also likely that he would have taken some time to secure some service or to start and establish in some business. Having regard to this we think it reasonable to hold that the deceased would have been able in due course to secure an income for about Rs. 400/- per month and having regard to the further fact that his parents were farmers and they were cultivating the land be would have to spend about Rs. 200/- per month for his family including his wife and two children and the parents. 20. The next question is with regard to choice of a suitable multiplier on the basis of years purchase. This multiplier has to be chosen having regard to the peculiar facts of each case. For example if it is found that the deceased pre-maturely died at very young age then it would be proper to take a higher multiplier. Having regard to the individual facts of the case the court have to apply different multiplier in each case. This multiplier has to be chosen having regard to the peculiar facts of each case. For example if it is found that the deceased pre-maturely died at very young age then it would be proper to take a higher multiplier. Having regard to the individual facts of the case the court have to apply different multiplier in each case. 15 or 18 years' purchase was considered to be a proper multiplier in some cases. In a recent decision given in Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Sudhakar 1977 A.C.J. 290 (S.C.), the Supreme Court has applied 20 years' multiplier, keeping in view the fact that when the deceased died she had still 30 years service to be performed. While determining what would be the proper multiplier system, the current or probable rate of interest is also taken into consideration, though some High Courts while considering the proper multiplier have held that the interest theory should not be taken into consideration because in context of Indian conditions it is too unrealistic to be adopted for determining the damages. One of the reasons advanced against the theory of taking interest into consideration while selecting a proper multiplier is that the adoption of interest theory presumes that the claimants would invest the amount of claim in the bank which would ensure the amount of monthly dependency. However, as pointed out by Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Lachman Singh v. Gurmit Kaur 1979 A.C.J. 170 (P. and H.) this presumption is not always well founded in the set of Indian conditions wherein banking habit and safe stock investment have not taken roots even in the middle class residing in towns; that it is much less so in the rural area. However, it would not be proper to say that the rate of interest should never be taken into consideration. However, if the rate of interest should be taken into consideration for the purpose of choosing a proper multiplier, only that rate can be taken into account, which would ensure the safety of the invested amount and which is not likely to suffer fluctuations in the market. Now in the instant case we think it would be proper having regard to all the circumstances of the case to take 20 years' purchase to be a proper multiplier. Now in the instant case we think it would be proper having regard to all the circumstances of the case to take 20 years' purchase to be a proper multiplier. While taking the above multiplier we are taking into consideration the following circumstances: (1) It is not proved that the deceased was actually earning anything at the time of the accident. However, in view of the fact that he had studied upto Inter Science and he was able bodied young man he would have begun earning in due course of time. (2) Ages of dependents : We have pointed out above that the age of the father of the deceased was 48 years that of his mother 45 years, age of the wife was 22 years and the ages of his two children were respectively 4 years and 9 months. (3) The deceased would have earned more than the amount of Rs. 400/- which we have taken as his earning at the beginning, in course of time. His personal expenditure also would have been accordingly increased. (4) The parents have some source of theirs to fall back upon. (5) The deceased's daughter who is of 4 years, would get married after, some time and that his son aged 9 months would begin earning for himself after he attained majority. So far as the parents and the wife are concerned, we have taken that expectancy of their life would be about 65. Having taken the amount of dependency at Rs. 200/- per month the yearly amount of dependency would work out to Rs. 2,400/-. Adopting the multiplier of 20 the amount would come to Rs. 48,000/-. To this it would be reasonable to add some amount in the form of loss of expectation of life of the deceased. We think it reasonable to grant to the claimants on this account some conventional amount at Rs. 5,000/-. Wife of the deceased would also be entitled to some amount by way of loss of husband's consortium and we would take that amount to Rs. 5,000/-. The total amount of compensation thus payable would work out to Rs. 58,000/-. As we have worked out this amount taking an income of the deceased at Rs. 400/- and without considering possible increase in future we think it reasonable to round up the figure of compensation at Rs. 60,000/-. 5,000/-. The total amount of compensation thus payable would work out to Rs. 58,000/-. As we have worked out this amount taking an income of the deceased at Rs. 400/- and without considering possible increase in future we think it reasonable to round up the figure of compensation at Rs. 60,000/-. The next question is relating to apportionment of the liability. We have held above that the accident was due to rash and negligent act of the Respondent driver as well as the deceased. The question is what should be the proportion of their liability. It is urged by Mr. Kudrolli, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, that Respondent-driver was driving a heavy vehicle like lorry. As against this, deceased was driving a motor cycle. The lorry was being driven at a fast speed. The proportion of the liability therefore, as between the Respondent-driver and the motor cyclist--the deceased, should according to Mr. Kudrolli, be fixed at 90 to 10. We are unable to agree with it. As against this Mr. Trivedi submitted that the lorry was being driven on a main road and the driver of the lorry had precedence over vehicles coming from the lane. He, therefore, submitted that the proportion of liability as between the Respondent-driver and the deceased should be 10 to 90. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we feel that the deceased who was riding on the motor cycle was equally guilty of not observing the rules of the traffic. We have said above that before he came on the main road, had he waited for a second or two to see whether the road was clear, accident would have been averted. According to regulations in Xth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act, the vehicles running on the main road would have precedence. We would, therefore, fix the proportion of the responsibility at 50 : 50. The compensation, therefore, payable to the dependents of the deceased would come to Rs. 30,000/-. Coming to the apportionment between the dependents, we think it reasonable to give Rs. 5,000/- to parents, Rs. 5,000/- each to the two minors and Rs. 15,000/- to the widow of the deceased. The compensation, therefore, payable to the dependents of the deceased would come to Rs. 30,000/-. Coming to the apportionment between the dependents, we think it reasonable to give Rs. 5,000/- to parents, Rs. 5,000/- each to the two minors and Rs. 15,000/- to the widow of the deceased. We also think it proper to direct that so far as the compensation to be awarded to the minors is concerned the Tribunal will invest the same in some nationalised Bank in the name of the two minors. We are told that the lorry was insured with M/s. South Indian Insurance Company Limited for a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. We would direct the said insurance company to deposit an amount of Rs. 20,000/- and interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal viz. from 12th July, 1973. We would further direct that the rest of the amount viz. Rs. 10,000/- with interest thereon at the same rate from the date of the order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shall be recovered by the Petitioner-Appellant from Respondents 1 and 2 viz. the driver Sunder Shetty and the owner Kwick Transport jointly and severally. We would further direct that the proportionate cost of this appeal and also the cost of the Petitioner before the Tribunal shall be borne by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 only. We would quantify the cost before Tribunal at Rs. 250/- and before this Court as per schedule. We would further direct that the amount of Rs. 20,000/- and interest thereon as ordered above should be deposited by the insurance company in the trial Court within 2 months from today. Out of the amount of Rs. 20,000/- and interest deposited by the insurance company: (1) A sum of Rs. 3,000/- shall be invested by the Registrar, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Greater Bombay in a nationalised Bank in the name of the minor Affhraut Kumari Sayeeda Shakil Ahmed to be paid over to her on her attaining the age of majority and a further sum of Rs. 3,000/- to be likewise invested in the name of the minor Affhraut Iqbal Ahmed to be paid over to him on his attaining the age of majority. (2) A sum of Rs. 3,000/- to be likewise invested in the name of the minor Affhraut Iqbal Ahmed to be paid over to him on his attaining the age of majority. (2) A sum of Rs. 1,500/- shall be paid over to each of the parents of the deceased i.e. Affhraut Sanaulla Sadat Ali and Affhraut Aminabai Sanaulla. (3) The balance sum of Rs. 11,000/- with the amount of interest to be deposited by the insurer be paid over to the widow of the deceased i.e. Mrs. Zaibunnisa Shakil Ahmed. 21. Out of Rs. 10,000/- and interest and costs, if recovered from the opposite parties i.e. Respondents 1 and 2: (1) A sum of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees two thousand only) shall be invested by the Registrar, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Greater Bombay, in a Nationalised Bank in the name of the minor Affhraut Kumari Sayeeda Shakil Ahmed to be paid over to her on her attaining the age of majority and a further sum of Rs. 2.000/- (Rupees two thousand only) be likewise invested in the name of the minor son Iqbal Ahmed to be paid over to him on his attaining the age of majority. (2) A sum of Rs. 1,000/- (One thousand only) shall be paid over to each of the parents of deceased, i.e, Affhraut Sanaulla Sadat Ali and Affhraut Aminabai Sanaulla. (3) The balance sum of Rs. 4,000/- with the amount of interest and costs, if recovered from the opposite parties shall be paid over to the widow of the deceased Mrs. Zaibunnisa Shakil Ahmed Affhraut. If any contingency arises in respect of the amount ordered to be deposited in the Bank, e.g. at the time of the marriage of the daughter or othewise, or for any other reasonable cause, liberty to apply to Accidents Claims Tribunal. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed as indicated above.