JUDGMENT Hari Swarup, J. - This appeal has been filed by Jhabbar Singh alias Hans Raj Singh against his conviction under Section 302. I.P.C. and sentence of life imprisonment. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief was that on 20-10-1977 at about 3 p.m, at the house of Raj Bahadur Singh Jhabbar Singh, his brother, after an altercation with him and his wife Jamwantri Devi assaulted her with a kudal and thereby caused her death. Jhabbar Singh pleaded not guilty and produced one witness to contradict the prosecution evidence. 3. The story of the prosecution as disclosed in the First Information Report is that Raj Bahadur and his brother Jhabbar Singh lived in different portions of the same house. Along with Jhabbar Singh their mother also lived. Sometime before the date of occurrence, dispute took place between Jhabbar Singh and his mother with the result that his mother left the house and also gave back Rs. 20/- which Jhabbar Singh had kept with his mother. Jhabbar Singh gave this money to Jamwantri Devi. On the date of occurrence Jhabbar Singh demanded this money from Raj Bahadur Singh. He replied that the money had already been spent on agricultural operations on the field which was being cultivated by Raj Bahadur Singh on Batai basis and the liability of Jhabbar was to pay half the wages which came to Rs. 20/-. When he insisted, Raj Bahadur Singh went to borrow the money from Munna Sagar. In the meantime his wife Jamwantri Devi came out and there was a quarrel between them. She protested and said that as the money had been spent on agricultural operations there was no question of its return. This enraged Jhabbar Singh and he took up the kudal which was lying nearby and assaulted Jamwantri Devi with it which struck her on the chest. Thereafter he made a second assault on the head and the woman died on the spot. Witnesses arrived at the spot and took Jhabbar Singh into custody. He begged for mercy, but was taken along with the kudal to police station Khargoopur where first information report was lodged at 8.10 p.m. 4. The Investigating Officer conducted the preliminaries and inquest was made the next day, in the afternoon and the body was sent for autopsy. The postmortem examination was held on 22-10-1977 at 8 a.m. by Dr. Y.N. Pathak P.W. 9. The Investigating Officer conducted the preliminaries and inquest was made the next day, in the afternoon and the body was sent for autopsy. The postmortem examination was held on 22-10-1977 at 8 a.m. by Dr. Y.N. Pathak P.W. 9. The following ante-mortem injuries were found on the body of Jamwantri Devi:- "1. Incised wound 5.5 cm. x 1 cm. x brain deep on the top, left side of head 12 cm. above left ear. 2. Incised wound 6 cm. x 1.5 cm. x cavity deep on the left side front of chest upper part at the medial end of collar bone. 3. Abrasion 9 cm. x 1 cm. on the ulnar boundary right forearm." 5. Five persons were produced as eyewitnesses. They were Raj Bahadur Singh, Bansraj Singh, Zamindar Singh, Abdul Hasan and Bachan Singh. During the trial Raj Bahadur, Bansraj Singh and Zamindar Singh turned hostile. The trial court has believed the testimony of the remaining two eye-witnesses for holding that Jhabbar Singh was guilty and has accordingly convicted and sentenced him. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that after the three main witnesses had become hostile, there was no evidence left which could be sufficient for the conviction of the appellant. Raj Bahadur Singh and Bansraj Singh are brothers of Jhabbar Singh. There could therefore be reason for them to go back on their statements. It is therefore not possible for us to treat their testimony given in court as reliable. We are unable to rely on their testimony as given in court. They have not supported the prosecution case so these two witnesses go out of consideration. 7. Zamindar Singh though not a relation of the deceased has also turned hostile. His testimony is also not reliable because once a person who makes a statement though before the police immediately after the alleged incident and thereafter makes another statement in court without giving a proper explanation for his making the statement before the police, cannot be deemed to be a reliable witness. We are not relying on the statement given by him before the police as it does not form substantive evidence. But we are not prepared to place reliance on his testimony given in court in the circumstances of the present case. 8. Bachan Singh is the cousin of Jamwantri Devi. He has been relied upon by the trial court. We are not relying on the statement given by him before the police as it does not form substantive evidence. But we are not prepared to place reliance on his testimony given in court in the circumstances of the present case. 8. Bachan Singh is the cousin of Jamwantri Devi. He has been relied upon by the trial court. We have examined his testimony and do not find him to be an unreliable witness. He has given reason why he was present at the spot. His contention is that he had come to village Beerpur for making purchases and when he arrived at the house of his cousin he found the altercation going on between Jhabbar Singh and Jamwantri Devi. He alleges to have seen the entire occurrence and has described how Jhabbar Singh assaulted Jamwantri Devi. Learned counsel contends that he was just a chance witness and should not be relied upon because he had not given the reason for his presence when he was examined by the police under Section 161, Cr.P.C. That might be an omission and at that time he may not have thought it of importance to give reason for his coming to the village. In his testimony he has clearly stated that he had come for the purpose of making purchases. He has been named in the First Information Report which was lodged the same day. The police station is about eight miles from the place of occurrence. Once his name comes in the F.I.R. that makes it clear that his name was in the mind of the author at the time the report was lodged. Had he not been present his name could not have been in the F.I.R. because he was a relation of Jamwantri Devi which means that he was though not directly, indirectly also a relation of Jhabbar Singh and nobody could have been sure that he would come to depose falsely against Jhabbar Singh. This circumstance makes us accept the testimony of Bachan Singh to the effect that he was present when the assault took place and he had seen the occurrence. 9. Simply because Bachan Singh was a relation of Jamwantri Devi, it does not mean that he had reason to depose against Jhabbar Singh falsely. There is no enmity shown between him and Jhabbar Singh to make him an unreliable witness. 10. 9. Simply because Bachan Singh was a relation of Jamwantri Devi, it does not mean that he had reason to depose against Jhabbar Singh falsely. There is no enmity shown between him and Jhabbar Singh to make him an unreliable witness. 10. Learned counsel has next urged that his conduct in not going to the police station and not staying with the deceased till the inquest was made, was sufficient to discredit his testimony. According to the learned counsel the normal human conduct would be to remain with his cousin who was dead. If a person dies in normal condition certainly the normal effect would be to stay till the body is removed. But we do not think that this must necessarily be a conduct of a relation when a person is murdered. Normal conduct of a man is judged in normal conditions. When the circumstances become abnormal the conduct also becomes abnormal. Hence merely because of the fact that Bachan Singh had not, gone to the police station or had not stayed till the next day when inquest was done, cannot be sufficient to discredit his testimony or to hold that he was not present when the incident took place. 11. The last witness is Abdul Hasan. He is a totally independent witness. His cross-examination has not shaken him on any material point. He has stated that he lives nearby and when he heard the quarrel, he came to the spot and saw Jhabbar Singh assaulting Jamwantri Devi. 12. To discredit the testimony of Abdul Hasan learned counsel contended that he had made a statement about the presence of Bachan Singh and as Bachan Singh was not present, his statement to that effect was false and if that was false, the entire testimony becomes unreliable. In support of this proposition he has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ishwar Singh v. State of U. P., ( AIR 1976 SC 2423 ) and Bhagwan Das v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1957 SC 589 : 1957 All LJ 722). The ratio of the observations in these two cases is that a witness who connives with the prosecution in the introduction of a witness who had not seen the occurrence is not to be relied upon. The ratio of the observations in these two cases is that a witness who connives with the prosecution in the introduction of a witness who had not seen the occurrence is not to be relied upon. The testimony of Abdul Hasan will therefore fall if we come to the conclusion that Bachan Singh was not present and Abdul Hasan had wrongly stated that Bachan Singh was present. But as held earlier we have found that Bachan Singh was present and had seen the occurrence. Abdul Hasan's statement therefore about presence of Bachan Singh does not discredit his testimony. The testimony of Abdul Hasan along with that of Bachan Singh is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant. 13. One very important circumstance in the case is the arrest of Jhabbar Singh at the spot. He was the brother of Raj Bahadur Singh and Bansraj Singh. Normally they would not have apprehended their own brother if he had not been guilty of the murder of Jamwantri Devi. In any case Jhabbar Singh would have certainly resisted his arrest and going to the police station. There is no evidence of any injury caused to him during his arrest and journey to the police station. This shows that Jhabbar Singh had not at all resisted his arrest and taking to the police station. This circumstance gives credence to the statement of the witnesses to the effect that Jhabbar Singh had repented about his action and wanted to be excused. The circumstance that Jhabbar Singh was taken to the police station immediately after the incident makes us place greater reliance on the testimony of Abdul Hasan and Bachan Singh. 14. Learned counsel laid great stress on the circumstance that two alleged witnesses Musibat and Habib had not been produced although they had been mentioned in the F.I.R. as persons who had taken Jhabbar Singh into custody immediately after the commission of the offence. The statement of the Investigation Officer is to the effect that these persons were not available for being interrogated. Musibat has been produced by the defence as a witness for the accused and he has denied that he had either seen the occurrence or participated in arresting Jhabbar Singh. The statement of the Investigation Officer is to the effect that these persons were not available for being interrogated. Musibat has been produced by the defence as a witness for the accused and he has denied that he had either seen the occurrence or participated in arresting Jhabbar Singh. The appearance or Musibat as a witness for the defence may not be sufficient to prove that he was avoiding police interrogation but certainly lends support to the statement of the police witness that he was not available for interrogation. There was thus reason for his not being produced by the prosecution Further, these two were the persons who were said to have taken Jhabbar Singh into custody. Whether they had participated in apprehending him or not the fact remains that Jhabbar Singh was lodged in the police station at 8.10 p.m. Hence their non-production cannot be sufficient to discredit the testimony of Abdul Hasan and Bachan Singh. 15. Learned counsel also laid stress on the fact that the Serologist had not found blood marks on kudal Ex. 1. The weapon was first examined by the chemical examiner and he found that Benzidine test showed positive result. According to Modi's Medical Jurisprudence (Nineteenth Edition, p. 95) the positive result comes if blood is present. Recovery memo Ex. ka. 1 shows that kudal had only small quantity of blood thereon. This circumstance is not very material because the death had been caused by a sharp-edged weapon which could be kudal. The kudal on which the Chemical Examiner had found blood had been taken along with the accused to the police station when the F.I.R. was lodged, that could therefore be the weapon with which the injuries were caused as testified by the prosecution witnesses. In these circumstances the finding of the Serologist that he did not find marks of blood on the kudal cannot be sufficient to discredit the substantive evidence of prosecution witnesses that the appellant had caused injuries by the kudal in question. 16. The earth taken from the alleged place of occurrence was chemically examined and human blood was found on it. This also corroborates the testimony of the witnesses to establish the place of occurrence as alleged by them. We are therefore of the view that the appellant had caused the death of Jamwantri Devi by assaulting her in the manner alleged by the prosecution. 17. This also corroborates the testimony of the witnesses to establish the place of occurrence as alleged by them. We are therefore of the view that the appellant had caused the death of Jamwantri Devi by assaulting her in the manner alleged by the prosecution. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly contended that on the facts established in the case the offence would be punishable not under Section 302, I.P.C. but under Section 304, I.P.C. We have found as a fact that there was a verbal altercation between the deceased and the accused. The subject matter of dispute was a sum of Rs. 20/- only. There is no evidence of any physical assault being made by the woman on the appellant. There is also no evidence to show that she had used any abusive or offensive language against Jhabbar Singh. There was therefore nothing to give provocation, much less grave provocation to Jhabbar Singh to assault her with such severe blows that caused her death. The verbal altercation in the circumstances could also not cause sudden provocation as the demand for money had already been made by Jhabbar Singh from Raj Bahadur Singh and he had gone to collect money, and the matter had been taken over by his wife Jamwantri Devi only thereafter and then alone the altercation had followed. 18. The injuries were inflicted by a weapon which in the ordinary course would have caused such injuries which may cause death. The first blow had fallen on the chest. It had caused incised wound 6 cm. x 1.5 cm. x cavity deep. It was followed up by another assault on the head which caused incised wound 5.5 cm. x 1 cm. x brain deep on the top left side of head. According to the doctor this injury was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. There is nothing which may make us hold that the injury was not intentionally caused. Even if the appellant had got enraged and had given the first blow, there was absolutely no reason for giving the second fatal blow. That was purely intentional blow and was inflicted on a vital part of the body and in such a manner that it could and was in fact sufficient to cause death. 19. Even if the appellant had got enraged and had given the first blow, there was absolutely no reason for giving the second fatal blow. That was purely intentional blow and was inflicted on a vital part of the body and in such a manner that it could and was in fact sufficient to cause death. 19. The circumstances of the case thus bring the case in condition 'thirdly' of Section 300, I.P.C. which runs as under :- "Thirdly-Culpable homicide is murder if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." Learned counsel relied upon Exception 4 of Section 300 for bringing the case out of Section 302, I.P.C. Exception 4 reads as under :- "Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner." 20. Before considering this question in the light of the circumstances of the present case, it would be useful to refer to the law laid down in State of Andh Pra v. Punnayya ( AIR 1977 SC 45 ). It was held:- "Whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is 'murder' or 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused had done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Sec. 300. Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the Court, should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of 'murder' contained in Section 300. Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the Court, should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four Clauses of the definition of 'murder' contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending respectively, on whether the second or the third Clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder', punishable under the First Part of Section 304. Penal Code." 21. According to our findings the preliminary stages have been established, and the case is covered by Clause 'thirdly' of Section 300. The only question remains whether the case falls under Exception 4. Exception 4 has various elements. First is that the homicide is caused without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. There was in the present case no fight at all. Verbal altercation cannot amount to a sudden fight in the sense it is used in Exception 4. Even if it be deemed that the appellant had acted in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel the Exception 4 will not be attracted as the appellant had taken undue advantage of the situation. The woman was without any weapon. She was a relation of the appellant and was much younger to him. He got himself armed with a deadly weapon and attacked a physically weak person. He also acted in a cruel and unusual manner. If there is a refusal to pay back Rs. 20/- by any person particularly a relation with whom the money had been kept, the killing of that person can be nothing but an unusual conduct. Attacking a woman of 18 years having with her no arms and being without any means of protecting herself, with a lethal weapon like kudal can be nothing but a cruel act. The elements necessary for bringing the case within the precincts of Exception 4 do not exist in the present case. 22. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Attacking a woman of 18 years having with her no arms and being without any means of protecting herself, with a lethal weapon like kudal can be nothing but a cruel act. The elements necessary for bringing the case within the precincts of Exception 4 do not exist in the present case. 22. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court are maintained. He is in jail. He shall remain in jail to serve out the sentence awarded to him.