JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—The petitioner herein vide registered sale-deed dated 24-1-1975 purchased two pieces of land comprising Khasra No. 424 and 429 in Mohal Sevag, Tehsil Mandi. According to the petitioner, the land in question was previously under the self-cultivation of the vendors who put the petitioner in actual physical possession of this land at the time of the sale. Soon after the sale, however, on 20 5-1973 the respondents, according to the allegations of the petitioner, cut and removed the entire crop of wheat standing on the aforesaid land resulting in a loss of about Rs. 350/- to the petitioner. The respondents were further alleged to have given open threats that they would occupy the aforesaid land and this made the present petitioner to file a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Mandi against the respondents praying for issue of perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession over the land in question and in the alternative a prayer was made that if it be found that the respondents had acquired possession during the pendency of the suit, a decree for possession be also passed in his favour. The petitioner further claimed a decree for Rs. 350/- on account of compensation for the crop. 2. Along with the suit, the plaintiff moved an application in the trial Court under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for the issue of atemporary injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the petitioner over the land in question in any manner during the pendency of the suit. 3. An ex parte ad-interim injunction was granted by the trial Court on that application. Respondent No. 1 then moved an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4, C. P. C. before the trial Court for vacation of the ex pane injunction. 3. An ex parte ad-interim injunction was granted by the trial Court on that application. Respondent No. 1 then moved an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4, C. P. C. before the trial Court for vacation of the ex pane injunction. The case of this respondent was that out of the land in dispute which comprises of two Khasra numbers, he was in exclusive possession of Khasra No. 4^9 as non-occupancy tenant since before the sale in favour of the present petitioner and that he alone bad been cultivating this land throughout The further contention of this respondent was that the entries in the revenue record had been wrongly recorded in favour of the land owner and on coming to know of the same he moved the revenue authorities for correction of such entries. The proceedings for such correction were still pending when the petitioner availing himself of the wrong entries in the revenue record approached the Court with his suit and obtained the ex parte stay order. He claimed no interest in the other Khasra No. 424. 4. The other two respondents claimed no interest in either of the two Khasra numbers. 5. The learned trial Court vide its order dated 2-7-1976 confirmed the ex parte ad-interim injunction issued against the respondent and rejected his application under Order XXXIX, Rule 4 C. P.C. In passing this order the learned trial Court appears to have been influenced by the entries in the revenue record wherein the land in question was recorded under the self-cultivation of the owner. 6. Feeling aggrieved, respondent No. 1 filed an appeal before the District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge who heard the appeal accepted the same in part and vide his order dated 26-12-1977 modified the order of the trial Court in respect of Khasra No. 429 by directing the parties to maintain status-quo ante in respect of this land. The learned Additional District Judge while modifying the order of the trial Court took into consideration the fact that before the petitioner had filed his suit, respondent No, 1 had already initiated proceedings before the revenue authorities for correction of the revenue entries as also the fact that a dispute regarding possession of Khasra No. 429 already existed inter se parti when the petitioner filed his suit. The learned Additional District Judge also took into consideration the averments made in the plaint that the respondent had cut and removed the entire crop standing on the land in question on 20 5-1975 i.e. before the institution of the suit. In view of these circumstances the learned District Judge was of the view that the claim of respondent No. 1 regarding possession over Khasra No. 429 was not baseless and under these circumstances the issue of an ad-interim injunction restraining this respondent from interfering with the possession of the petitioner was not in consonance with the basic principles laid down for the grant of such injunctions. 7. The petitioner has now approached this Court in revision. The main argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner was that the order of the lower appellate Court directing maintenance of status quo was no order in the eyes of law and in passing such an order the learned lower appellate Court had avoided to decide the point in issue between the parties, namely, as to which of the parties was in possession of the land in dispute on the date of the suit. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, without recording a definite finding regarding the factum of possession, the lower appellate Court could not have set aside the order of the trial Court whichwas well reasoned and based on facts and circumstances of the case. 8. The above contention is obviously without substance and fallacious. There is no rule of law or prudence which enjoins the Court to record any definite findings on a controversial issue of this nature while exercising its discretion in the matter of grant or refusal of a temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. On the other hand, it seems not only proper but also most desirable that the Courts at this stage refrain themselves from expressing any positive opinion on such like controversial issues which are ultimately to be decided in the suit at the conclusion of the trial. Any authoritative verdict on such like issues at the initial stage, when the parties have been afforded practically no opportunity of establishing their respective claims, would certainly prejudice the trial and may in some cases amount to non-suiting one of the parties to the suit without affording him any hearing in the eyes of law. Any authoritative verdict on such like issues at the initial stage, when the parties have been afforded practically no opportunity of establishing their respective claims, would certainly prejudice the trial and may in some cases amount to non-suiting one of the parties to the suit without affording him any hearing in the eyes of law. If at all some opinion is necessarily to be expressed for the purposes of disposal of an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 & 2, C. P. C., it is advisable that the Courts must use a guarded language and make it clear that the expression of such opinion should have no reflection on the merits of the pleas raised by either party during the course of trial. 9. It is next to be seen if the lower appellate Court was justified in interfering with the order of the trial Court granting the petitioner the temporary injunction in the terms prayed for. This would in turn involve the further question whether the trial Court in issuing the injunction in favour of the petitioner, had exhibited a proper exercise of judicial discretion. 10. Now it is beyond the pale of controversy that the grant of an injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, C. P. C. is purely within the judicial discretion of the Court, Since, however, the grant of such injunctions is rather a serious matter and the injunction is required to be issued at the initial stage without affording adequate opportunity to the parties to establish their respective contentions, the Courts are required to act with utmost care and circumspection while issuing such injunctions which it may be emphasized, need be issued only in deserving cases, 11. The principles governing the exercise of such discretion by the Courts and which are of universal application are by now well recognized. There are four conditions which a petitioner must satisfy before the Court can consider the advisability or desirability of granting a temporary injunction in his favour. Where the petitioner fails in satisfying the Court with respect to any of these conditions, the Court would be well advised in refusing to issue the injunction prayed for. There are four conditions which a petitioner must satisfy before the Court can consider the advisability or desirability of granting a temporary injunction in his favour. Where the petitioner fails in satisfying the Court with respect to any of these conditions, the Court would be well advised in refusing to issue the injunction prayed for. These four conditions on which the petitioner must satisfy the Court are: (a) That the petitioner has a prima facie case, that is to say, that he has raised a serious question which needs determination in the suit and on weighing the material before the Court the balance of probabilities would suggest that he is entitled to the relief prayed for by him, (b) That the refusal of the injunction prayed for would expose the petitioner to the risk of suffering some irreparable or substantial injury which cannot be compensated for in damages, (c) That the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner in the sense that the comparative mischief or inconvenience likely to be caused in the event of the injunctionbeing refused would be greater than that which is likely to arise in case the same is granted, and (d) That there is no other sufficient remedy open to the petitioner by which to protect himself. It is only after all these four conditions are satisfied that the Court can exercise its discretion in the matter after taking into account any other factor peculiar to the facts and circumstances of the individual case, like delay, suppression of material facts, mala fides and so on. 12. Considering the facts of the instant case in the light of the above enunciated principles, I have no hesitation in remarking that the learned trial Court while exercising its jurisdiction in the matter of grant of injunction had acted with material irregularity. As already stated it was influenced by the solitary factor that the revenue entries in respect of the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 429 were in favour of the petitioner. As already stated it was influenced by the solitary factor that the revenue entries in respect of the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 429 were in favour of the petitioner. It ignored the other factors appearing on the record, namely, that before the institution of the suit the respondent had not only entered into the land in dispute but had also cut and removed the entire crop standing thereon and the further fact that about three months before the institution of the suit, respondent No. 1 had initiated proceedings before the concerned revenue authorities for correction of the revenue entries presumably on the plea that his possession should have recorded in respect of the disputed land in the revenue record. In view of these factors it was of course not possible for the trial Court and for that matter for the lower appellate Court to arrive at any positive conclusion as to which of the parties was in actual possession of the disputed land as on the date of the suit. When the question of actual possession of the property forming the subject matter of dispute is in doubt, it is always dangerous to issue a clear injunction restraining one party to interfere with the possession of the other which injunction necessarily implies that the possession of/one of the parties has been accepted. The only safe course under these circumstances is the one adopted by the learned lower appellate Court, that is, to direct either party to maintain status quo or else there is always a risk of disturbing status qua in the garb of an order intended to maintain status quo. 13- Again in view of the facts of this case/ it cannot be said that the plaintiff-petitioner in this case would in case of refusal of the injunction prayed for, suffer any irreparable or substantial injury which cannot be compensated otherwise or that he has no other sufficient remedy to protect himself. If the petitioner is dispossessed during the pendency of the suit and remains out of possession for the duration of the suit, he has already made an alternative prayer in the suit for delivery of possession of the disputed land and in case he succeeds in the suit he can be restored to such possession. If the petitioner is dispossessed during the pendency of the suit and remains out of possession for the duration of the suit, he has already made an alternative prayer in the suit for delivery of possession of the disputed land and in case he succeeds in the suit he can be restored to such possession. As regards the loss suffered by him on account of his being out of possession, the same can be always assessed in terms of money and claimed as such. In this view of the matter it is not possible to hold that the petitioner in this case would suffer any irreparable or substantial injury in the event of the injunction being refused. The balance of convenience would also be found in favour of the respondent rather than the petitioner. 14. I am thus of the view that the order passed by the lower appellate Court is in accordance with the sound judicial principles and as such calls for no interference. This revision petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.