JUDGMENT : R.N. Misra, J. - Plaintiff-opposite party no. 1 obtained a money decree against the defendant-petitioner from the learned Subordinate Judge at Aska on the basis of a promissory note. Defendant preferred Money Appeal No. 94 of 1974 later renumbered as Money Appeal No. 11 of 1978 in the transferee Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant filed an application in the lower appellate Court for abatement of the appeal on the ground that there was no compliance with the provisions of section 18-B of the Orissa Money Lenders Act of 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and the learned appellate Judge having rejected the application; this revision has been filed. 2. Mr. Rath for the petitioner contends that section 18-B of the Act was inserted into the Act by Orissa Act 54 of 1975. Though the suit had already been disposed of and the appeal was pending, in view of the definition in section 2(q) of the word 'suit' an appeal would also be a suit. Sub-section (8) of section 18-B of the Act provides :- "No Court shall entertain any claim in respect of any loan advanced prior to the date of the order referred to in sub-section (2) unless the particulars thereof are contained in the said order and all suits in respect of such claims shall stand abated." Mr. Rath, therefore, contends that even to the appeal the provision applied and as there had already been no compliance, the lower appellate Court should have directed that the suit abated. The loan as per Ext. 1 was of the year 1969. The suit was filed on 19-6-1972 and was decreed as per judgment dated 17-10-1974. The appeal was filed on 16-12-1974. Section 18-B was inserted into the Act by Orissa Act 54 of 1975. The loan as per Ext. 1 was of the year 1969. The suit was filed on 19-6-1972 and was decreed as per judgment dated 17-10-1974. The appeal was filed on 16-12-1974. Section 18-B was inserted into the Act by Orissa Act 54 of 1975. Sub-section (1) of section 18-B of the Act provides :- "The State Government may, from time to time, by notification, require the money-lenders or moneylenders belonging to class or carrying on business in any local area, to produce before such authority and by such date as may be specified in the said notification all records relating to their business including documents evidencing advance of loans." Sub-section (2) requires the prescribed authority to scrutinise the documents with a view to determine if the transactions exceed the amount for which the money-lender obtained registration certificate and after giving reasonable opportunity to the money-lender the prescribed authority is to pass an order declaring the particulars of transactions that are within the amount specified in the said certificate. Under sub-section (8) as already indicated a mandate was cast on the Court not to entertain any claim in respect of loan advanced prior to the date of the order referred to in sub-section (2) unless the particulars of the loan were contained in the order. Statute is usually prospective in operation unless by express provision or necessary intendment it is intended to operate retrospectively. In section 18-B by itself there is no legislative indication of the Amending Act being retrospective in operation but in view of the statutory definition of 'suit', the submission of the petitioner cannot be over looked. Once a suit includes an appeal and the mandate to the Court in sub-section (8) that the suit shall abate would equally apply to the pending appeal. Since the appeal was pending and an objection had been taken and reliefs in terms of section 18-B (8) had been claimed. I am inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Rath for the petitioner that the appeal would abate if there be no compliance. Since the appeal was pending and an objection had been taken and reliefs in terms of section 18-B (8) had been claimed. I am inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Rath for the petitioner that the appeal would abate if there be no compliance. The Legislature must be imputed with the knowledge that there existed from the very commencement of the statute (Act 3 of 1939) the statutory definition of 'suit' and advisedly the Legislature while introducing the amendment in 1975 did not make any reference to appeal in section 18-B(8) as use of the word 'suit' covered the field in regard to suit as also appeal. Enforcing the requirements in respect of pending appeal may bring in an onerous duty on the plaintiff-money lender. But since the statute intended to regulate the business of money lending and the amending statute came for the purpose of imposing a greater restriction and control, to exclude appeal from the operation of the amending provision may defeat the legislative intention. 3. I would accordingly accept the submission of Mr. Rath for the petitioner and hold that the provision of sub-section (8) of section 18-B of the Act was applicable. An opportunity, however, must be given to the plaintiff respondent in the lower appellate Court to comply with the statutory requirement within a reasonable time to be fixed by the Court before an order of abatement can be passed. I accordingly vacate the order of the learned appellate Judge, and remit the matter to him. He is directed to call upon the plaintiff-respondent to satisfy the condition of section 18-B of the Act within a reasonable time to be allowed by he Court and then proceed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. There would be no order for costs. Final Result : Allowed