Judgment Chaudhury Sia Saran Sinha, J. 1. -this criminal revision at the instance of the petitioners arrayed as accused in Fatwah P. S. Case No.3 (12)/70 under sections 148, 324 I. P. C. and 25 Arms Act, Komal Mahto being the informant, is directed against the order dated 28th August, 1978 passed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Patna, by which he set aside the order dated 13rd Februay, 1977 of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna city, discharging the petitioners under section 251-A (2) of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1898, (hereinafter referred to as the Old Code) 2. A dispute between two factions cropped up in respect of certain lands which contained paddy crop at the relevant time. Apprehending breach of the peace, on 27th November 1970, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate deputed police and a Magistrate for preventing the same. A few days after, 1st December, one Tenni Paswan gave an information to the police about the tension between the two factions, on described by him as raiyats and the other as bataidars. Certain incident, undisputedly, took place on that date. It culminated in the institution of two criminal cases, one being Fatwah p. S. Case No.2 (J2)/70 under sections 114, 379 I, P. C. and Sec.25, Arms Act in which petitioner no.1, Baban Sharma, was the informant and the other being Fatwah P. S. Case No.8 (12)/70 under sections 148, 324 I. P. C. and sec.25 Arms Act in which one Komal Mahton was the informant. The police investigated into the two cases and submitted charge-sheet in both of them and the cases were pending before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate for disposal. It is undisputed that Fatwah P. S. Case No.2 (12)/70 is proceeding against Komal Mahton and others is which the charges have been framed against the accused. 3. When the stage of the framing of the charge against the petitioners in Fotwah P. S. Case No.2 (12)/70 reached, for the reasons stated in order dated 22nd February, 1977, which stated, inter alia, that the charges against the petitioners seemed to be groundless, they were discharged by the Magistrate. The prosecution party took up the matter in revision before the Sessions judge, Patna and the revision application was disposed of by Additional sessions Judge by order dated 22nd August, 1978. The prosecution party took up the matter in revision before the Sessions judge, Patna and the revision application was disposed of by Additional sessions Judge by order dated 22nd August, 1978. For the reasons stated in the said order, the Additional Sessions Judge was of the view that there was adequate aad sufficient evidence and circumstances to frame charges against the accused persons and, therefore, the discharge order passed by the learned Magistrate appeared to be without any jurisdiction and fit to be set aside. He, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and directed him to frame charges against the accused. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners have come up to this court in revision. 4. Shri Nagendra Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners, raised three contentions before this Court, one of which related to the scope of section 251-A (2), the other to the jurisdiction of the Additional Sessions judge in passing the impugned order setting aside the order of the Magistrate and the third to the scope of the order to be passed under section.436 of the old Code. 5. So far as the first point is concerned, as has been observed by the supreme Court in A. I. R.1972 Supreme Court 545 (Century Spinning and manufacturing Co. Ltd. , V/s. The State of Maharashtra), sub-section (2) of section 251-A has to be read along with sub-section (2) thereof. Reading the two sub-sections together it clearly means that if there is no ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges. This necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the Magistrate is entitled to consider the entire material referred to in sub-section (2 ). While considering the question of framing of charge, the Magistrate should feel that he is dealing with a very delicate matter in the sense that any observation by him beyond that required for the purposes of sub section (2) of section 251-A may prejudice the parties concerned. The Sessions Judge or even the High Court, if I may say so, while sitting in revision, has also to bear this aspect in view. The Sessions Judge or even the High Court, if I may say so, while sitting in revision, has also to bear this aspect in view. Shri Rai has taken me through the orders both of the trial court as also the Sessions Judge and I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that both have gone to the extreme in the sense that some of the observations made by them might prejudice one party or the other. Generally there is no written document of batai cultivation and a dispute concerning batai cultivation has to be decided on the preponderance of oral evidence. As pointed out by Shri rai, the statement of Chandrika Mahton before the police or the point of batai might run counter to the statements of other witnesses and as to whose version is correct will be a matter for consideration at the time of trial. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case ; so far available on the record, prima facie, I am clearly of the view that the observations of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, in his order dated 27rd February 1972, that the charge against the accused persons is groundless cannot but be said to be perverse. Even if the extreme view taken by the Additional Sessions judge in the impugned order be ignored, the materials discused therein clearly point out to the same conclusion, namely, that the charge against the accused persons cannot on the materials available so far is said to be groundless. The facts involved in the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. V/s. The State of Maharashtra (supra) are different from the facts of the instant case and in that case, as their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed, there was no question of any further evidence being led for bringing horns the charge to the appellants. Their Lordships, therefore, held that if on the existing material there is no ground for presuming them to be guilty then there can be hardly any point in framing charges and going through the formality of a trial and then acquitting them. Such a course would merely result in unnecessary harassment to the appellants without serving the case of justice. The contention of Shri Rai, therefore, that the sessions Judge, while passing the impugned order, went the scope of section 251-A most fall. 6. Such a course would merely result in unnecessary harassment to the appellants without serving the case of justice. The contention of Shri Rai, therefore, that the sessions Judge, while passing the impugned order, went the scope of section 251-A most fall. 6. This taken us to the consideration of the second contention of Shri rai. On the materials available on the record so far the reasons for which the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate ordered the discharge is, obviously, unsupportable in law and the finding arrived at by him is perverse. In such a situation, the Additional Sessions Judge cannot be said to have exceeded his jurisdiction as revisional court in setting aside the order of discharge and the contention of Shri Rai to the contrary is negatived. 7. The third contention of Shri Rai was that, in view of section 436 of the Old Code, while the Additional Sessions Judge might be entitled to set aside the order of discharge passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate he went beyond his powers in directing the trial court to frame charge against the accused and to proceed with the trial of the case. This contention of Shri Rai is sound and it must prevail. 8. Two decisions were relied upon by Shri Rai in support of his contention. One is reported in 1968 P. L. J. R.254 (Laxminarayan V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and another ). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in this case that section 436 of the Code only empowers the revisional court to order further enquiry and not to direct a trial. Their Lordships further observed that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering a trial after directing that a charge under a particular section be framed. The discharge passed in this case was that under section 253 (1) of the Old Code. Shri Rai cited and relied upon a Division Bench decision of the Andhra pradesh High Court reported in A. I. R.1962 Andhra Pradesh 236 (Fakruddin and others v, State Police, Nirmal) in support of his contention that for the purposes of powers exercisable by revisional court under section 436 of the old Code, no distinction should be drawn between the case of a discharge under section 253 and that under section 251-A, even though the requirements for judging the question of discharge or otherwise, as required by those two sections may be different. In para 5 of the said decision, their Lordships observed as follows :- - "we have no hesitation in repelling this contention and in finding, for the reasons already given, that the order of discharge in warrant cases instituted on police report is not different to nature from the one passed under sub-section (20) of Sec.253. " 9. Shri Umeshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the informant, however, contended that although the powers given to the revisional court under section 298 of the New Code appeared to be restrictive in nature, the revisional powers stood broadened in section 299 of the New Code. It would suffice to say that when there are two provisions in a statute they should receive harmonious construction and on doing so it would be apparent that while dealing with the question of disposal of complaint under section 203 or sub-section (4) of section 204 or with the question of discharge a person accused of an offence, the revisional court may direct only for further enquiry in the manner laid down in section 398 of the New Code. In this view of the matter, as rightly contended by Shri Rai, the Additional Sessions judge, while rightly setting aside the order of discharge passed by the sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, wrongly ordered for the framing of charge against the petitioners and to proceed with the trial of the case. The proper order which he ought to have made was to direct the trial court to make further enquiry into the matter, within the meaning of those terms as used in section 398 of the New Code and to decide the question of the framing of the charge or otherwise on the record. 10. The criminal revision is thus partly allowed. While the order of the Additional Sessions Judge in setting aside the order of discharge passed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate is upheld, the further orders of the additional Sessions Judge directing the trial court to frame charge against the accused persons and to proceed with the trial of the case are set aside and the case is sent back to trial court for further enquiry for a fresh decision as to the justifiability or orherwise of the framing of the charge in accordance with law, keeping in view the observations made above.