JUDGMENT GINWALA J. -The question which arises for consideration in this writ petition is whether the District Judge hearing an election petition under section 27 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) can order recount of votes even though sufficient grounds are not made out by the party applying for the same. This question arises in the following circumstances. 1. The petitioner and respondents Nos. 1, 5, 6 and 7 contested the elections to the Zilla Parishad held on 22-5-1979. The petitioner secured 2815, respondent No.1, 2806, respondent No.5, 1040, respondent No.6, 112 and respondent No.7, 970 Votes respectively. The petitioner having secured highest number of votes was declared elected. Being aggrieved by this result of the election, respondent No.1 challenged the validity of this election under section 27 of the Act. Respondent No. 1 inter alia contended in his petition that before the final declaration of the result, the Returning Officer had made a declaration in form No. XI under rule 60 (7) of Zilla Parishad Election Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), and that soon thereafter one Ashok Gopalrao Deshmukh, election agent of respondent No. 1, had applied to the Returning Officer for recount· of ballot papers under sub-rule (2) of rule 64 of the Rules. According to respondent No.1, Ashok Deshmukh had submitted in his application that there were mistakes committed in the counting of votes of the various candidates and also in the scrutiny of invalid ballot papers and on this ground recount of votes was necessary. Respondent No. 1 further stated that it had been brought to the notice of the Returning Officer that the counting agents apprehended that votes polled by other candidates had been wrongfully included in the votes polled by the present petitioner, in the process of counting at tables Nos. 5 and 6. According to respondent No. 1, it was mandatory for and incumbent on the Returning Officer to have granted the recount as the application made by Ashok Deshmukh was not frivolous and was made on behalf of a person who had bright chances of being elected as the difference of votes was very slender. Thus according to respondent No.1 the application of Ashok Deshmukh had been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer. Thus according to respondent No.1 the application of Ashok Deshmukh had been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer. He complained that because of the wrongful declaration of the final result by the Returning Officer, his rightful claim to be councillor had been violated and a person who according to his apprehension had secured less votes had been illegally declared elected. The only averments with regard to recount of ballot papers by the learned Judge, are contained in para. 19' of the election petition and they are as follows :- "That it is necessary to order recount of votes held in the 'Ghuikhed' Electoral Division for electing the Councillor of Zilla Parishad Amravati. It is submitted that all the ballots (valid and invalid both) polled in the election of the Councillor, Zilla Parishad, Amravati, from 'Ghuikhed' Electoral Division be ordered to be recounted and also the scrutiny of the ballot papers declared invalid be made in the interest of justice." One of the prayers made in this petition is that the learned Judge should order scrutiny and recount of the total ballot papers polled to all the contesting candidates in the election including invalid ballots and declare the amended result of the election. 2. This election petition came up for hearing before the learned Assistant Judge. The learned Judge examined respondent No. 1 and his elections agent, namely, Ashok Gopalrao Deshmukh and also the Returning Officer, namely, Anant A was are who is respondent No.4 herein. After considering the evidence of these witnesses, the learned Judge proceeded to record his order on 16-11-1979. It may be stated at this stage that the present petitioner had opposed the prayer of respondent No. I for recount or scrutiny and computation of votes as according to him, no ground was made out in that behalf. After considering the evidence which was adduced before him, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that "a case is made out for the scrutiny and computation of votes within the ambit of section 27 (5) (b) of the Act." On behalf of the present petitioner, it was submitted before the learned Judge that the scope of the said clause was very limited and if read in the context of sub-rule (2) of rule 64 of the Rules, no recount could be granted to the election petitioner unless and-until valid grounds are made out. The counsel on behalf of the petitioner sought to rely on three rulings of the Supreme Court in Baliram v. Jai Behari Lal1. Suresh Prasad v. Jai Prakash2 and Chanda Singh v. Shiv Ram3 in support of his submission. However, the learned Judge held that in the circumstances of the instant case he was inclined to think that they were not applicable to the facts of the case. It is pertinent to observe that the learned Judge held that the objection of the present petitioner to the scrutiny and computation of votes under section 27 (5) (b) of the Act could not be sustained because there is nothing in the language used in that provision to show that some grounds are required to be stated before the Court takes up the work of scrutiny and computation of votes in such election petition. However, the learned Judge held that the grounds had been made by the agent of respondent No. 1 before the Returning Officer and according to the learned Judge, that was sufficient to attract the provisions of section 27 (5) (b) of the Act. Now the only ground on which the learned Judge sought to have relied for the purpose of ordering the recount was that respondent No. 1 had in clear terms stated that the work of counting of votes was done hurriedly. In the view, which the learned Judge took, he appointed a Commissioner for carrying on scrutiny and computation of votes and it is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed. 3. Mr. A. M. Gordey the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the view of the learned Judge that no grounds are required to be made out by the election petitioner seeking the scrutiny and computation of votes or recount under section 27 (5) (b) of the Act is incorrect. Mr. Gordey submits that in any case if recount is sought by the election petitioner or a party to the petition, it is necessary for him to make out sufficient grounds on which he seeks the recount. He submits that a recount cannot be granted merely for the asking and particularly if no material is placed before the Court for granting the recount. He submits that a recount cannot be granted merely for the asking and particularly if no material is placed before the Court for granting the recount. He submitted that mere vague allegations in a petition or evidence could not take the place of grounds on which the Court could be satisfied that a recount is necessary. Mr. Gordey further submitted that so far as the present case is concerned no specific allegations had been made citing instances in the election petition itself as to why it was necessary to order a recount. He pointed out that in the body of the petition respondent No.1 had merely referred to the application for recount made to the Returning Officer and the rejection thereof, but no fresh grounds had been made out in the petition as to why the Court should have ordered the recount. Lastly Mr. Gordey submitted that since there was no material before the learned Judge as regards the grounds on which recount could be sought, it is not possible to say that the satisfaction of the learned Judge to order the recount was proper. Mr. Gordey therefore submitted that the order passed by the learned Judge on 16-11-1979 should be quashed. 4. As against this Mr. S. Z. Patil the learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that in the election petition which does not involve setting aside of elections on -the ground of corrupt practice and which come within the perview of clause (b) of sub-section (5)'of section 27 the Legislature has made it incumbent on the Judge hearing the petition to scrutinize and compute the votes recorded in favour of each candidate in order to come to the conclusion on the question whether any candidate in whose favour the declaration is sought has received the highest number of valid votes. In other words, according to Mr. Patil whenever an election petition is made which comes within the purview of section 27 (5) (b) of the Act the only thing need to be done by the Judge is to scrutinise and compute the votes recorded in favour of each candidate and for doing so, it is not necessary for the election petitioner to make out a case for this purpose. Mr. Mr. Patil submitted that the decisions of the Supreme Court which had been cited before the learned Judge were not applicable to the election petition under section 27 of the Act inasmuch as those decisions were based on the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In short, therefore, Mr. Patil submitted that the view taken by the learned Judge that when an election petition falls within the purview of section 27(5)(b) of the Act it is not at all necessary for the Judge to be satisfied that there are grounds for scrutiny and computation of votes, which is a duty cast upon the Judge under the said clause. In the alternative, Mr. Patil submitted that if ground had to be made out by the election petitioner for successfully asking recount the same had been amply made out by respondent No. I in his petition and had supported the same by examining himself and his election agent. 5. The question, therefore, which falls for consideration in this case is whether it is incumbent upon a Judge hearing an election petition under section 27 of the Act to scrutinise and compute the votes recorded in favour of each candidates, if the validity of the election is challenged on the grounds other than corrupt practice, without the necessity of the election; petitioner making out a reasonable case for such scrutiny and computation of votes. In this connection it would be convenient to refer to a few cases decided by the Supreme Court under the provisions of Representation of the People Act, 1951. 6. In Jitendra v. Krishna Behari4, the Supreme Court observed after referring to its decisions in Ram Sewak v. Hussain Kami/5 and Dr. Jagjit Singh v. Gaini Kartar Singh6 the basic requirements to be satisfied before an election tribunal can permit the inspection of ballot papers. are: (1) that the petition for setting aside the election must contain an adequate statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies in support of his case, and (2) the tribunal must be prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete justice between the parties, inspection of the ballot paper is necessary. are: (1) that the petition for setting aside the election must contain an adequate statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies in support of his case, and (2) the tribunal must be prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete justice between the parties, inspection of the ballot paper is necessary. Again in Sumitra Devi v. Sheo Shankar' the Supreme Court observed that where the allegations in the election petition are vague and the petition does not contain an adequate statement of the material facts and the evidence adduced by the petitioner is found unreliable and no definite particulars are also given in the application as to the illegalities alleged to have been committed is the counting of the ballot papers, the applications for inspection of ballot papers cannot be allowed. A recount will not be granted as a matter of right but only on the basis of evidence of good grounds for believing that there has been a mistake in the counting. Of course the Supreme Court further observed that it has to be decided in each case whether a prima facie ground has been made out for ordering an inspection. 7. Again in Beliram v. Jai Behari Lal the Supreme Court observed that it is settled law that sections 100 (1)(d)(iii), 101 and 102 of Representation of the People Act implicitly give the Court trying an election petition the power to order a recount or production of the ballot papers and permit their inspection by the parties. After stating this position as obtained under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, the Supreme Court went on to observe as follows: "Since an order for a recount touches upon the secrecy of the ballot, it should not be made lightly or as a matter of course. After stating this position as obtained under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, the Supreme Court went on to observe as follows: "Since an order for a recount touches upon the secrecy of the ballot, it should not be made lightly or as a matter of course. Although no cast iron rule of universal application can be or has been laid down, yet, from a beadroll of the decisions of this Court, two broad guidelines are discernible: that the Court would be justified in ordering a recount or permitting inspection of the ballot papers only where (i) all the material facts on which the allegations or irregularity or illegality in counting are founded, are pleaded adequately in the election petition, and (ii) The Court / Tribunal trying the petition is prima facie satisfied that the making of such an order is imperatively necessary to decide the dispute and to do complete and effectual justice between the parties." From what has been observed by the Supreme Court in Belirarn's case it would appear that even though it was of the view that the said provisions of Representation of the People Act and the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 clothe the Court trying an election petition with a power to order recount or production of ballot papers and permit their inspection by the parties, yet this power is hedged by certain conditions which are necessary to be observed in order to respect the secrecy of ballot. It would be clear fro m a perusal of this decision of the Supreme Court that the rules which had been laid down with regard to the conditions which govern the order of recount are independent of the provisions of Representation of the People Act or the Conduct of Election Rules, and these conditions are necessary to be observed by the Courts trying election petitions in order to maintain the secrecy of the ballot. In other words according to the Supreme Court it is as a matter of public policy that the recount of votes should not be ordered as a matter of course, but only under certain circumstances. The same view has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in a later case Suresh Prasad v. Jai Prakash. It would be apt to reproduce what the Supreme Court has said in this connection. The same view has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in a later case Suresh Prasad v. Jai Prakash. It would be apt to reproduce what the Supreme Court has said in this connection. "Before dealing with these contentions, we may recall, what this Court has repeatedly said, that an order for inspection and recount of the ballot papers cannot be made as a matter of course. The reason is twofold. Firstly such an order affects the secrecy of the ballot which under the law is not to be lightly disturbed. Secondly, the Rules provide an elaborate procedure for counting of ballot papers. This procedure contains so many statutory checks and effective safeguards against trickery, mistakes and fraud in counting, that it can be called almost foolproof. Although no hard and fast rule can be laid down, yet the broad guidelines, as discernible from the decisions of this Court may be indicated thus: The Court would be justified in ordering a recount of the ballot papers, only where: "(1) the election petition contains an adequate statement of all the material facts on which the allegations of irregularity or illegality in counting are founded; (2) On the basis of evidence adduced such allegations are prima facie established, affording a good ground for believing that there has been a mistake in counting; and (3) The Court trying the petition is prima facie satisfied that the making of such an order is imperatively necessary to decide the dispute and to do complete and effectual justice between the parties". Here again it may be noted that the observations of the Supreme Court quoted above are general in nature and are not based merely on the provision of the Representation of the People Act. It is not necessary to cite other rulings of the Supreme Court in this connection. Suffice it to say that recently it had occasion to deal with similar question in N. Narayan v. Semma/ai8. In this case after reviewing its own decisions it affirmed the three principles which had been laid down is Suresh Prasad's case which have been extracted above. 8. Suffice it to say that recently it had occasion to deal with similar question in N. Narayan v. Semma/ai8. In this case after reviewing its own decisions it affirmed the three principles which had been laid down is Suresh Prasad's case which have been extracted above. 8. From these decisions of the Supreme Court it would be abundantly clear that a recount would not be granted merely for the asking and for that purpose the election petition must contain adequate statement of all material facts, on which the allegations of irregularity or illegality are founded and unless on the basis of evidence adduced before it, the Court is prima facie satisfied that making of such an order is imperatively necessary to decide the dispute and to do complete and effectual justice between the parties. 9. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court would indicate that the principles which have been formulated with regard to the cases of recount do not necessarily flow from the interpretation of sections 100 (1)(d)(iii) or section 101 of the Representation of the People Act or the Rules made there-under. These observations are not restricted to the elections petitions under the said Act or the Rules. In our opinion these are general observations governing all elections to public bodies including local authorities like Zilla Parishads and Municipal Councils. It would appear that the basis for laying down those principles lies in the respect for secrecy of ballot and not on ,the language of the aforesaid sections of the Representation of the People Act. In our view, these principles enunciated by the Supreme Court would be applicable to all election petitions in which the question of recount arises. Hence it is not possible to accept the submission of Mr. Patil that these decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable to the provisions contained in section 27 of the Act and that the Legislature by the language of clause, (b) of sub-section (5) of section 27 has conferred unfettered powers on the Judge hearing the election petition under the said section to scrutinise and compute the votes if the validity of the election is challenged on the ground of irregularity in counting. It is not possible to go thus far as it would lead to an anomalous result. 10. It is not possible to go thus far as it would lead to an anomalous result. 10. In this connection it may be noted that sub-rule (2) of rule 64 of the Rules enables a candidate or his election agent to apply to the Returning officer for a recount of all or any of the ballot papers stating the grounds on which he demands such recount. It would, therefore, appear that during the process of election when recount is sought at the hands of the Returning Officer, the candidate applying for the same has to state the grounds on which he seeks the recount. Now if the interpretation, which has been put by Mr. Patil on clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 27 is to be accepted, it would be obligatory on the Judge hearing an election petition to order scrutiny and computation of ballot papers as soon as a candidate who could not obtain recount at the hands of the Returning Officer for want of valid grounds challenges the election merely alleging that there had been irregularity in counting ballot papers. It would thus appear that an anomalous situation would arise. viz. that even though a candidate was not successful in obtaining a recount before the Returning Officer for want of sufficient grounds, would get the same done before the Judge bearing, the election petition by merely asking for it. We do not think that the Legislature could have ever intended such a result. 11. Clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 27 of the Act has to be read, in the context of sub-section (2) of that section. It would appear that after an election petition is made under sub-section (l) of section 27, the Judge has to make an inquiry under sub-section (2) thereof. It is thereafter that the question of application of clause (b) of sub, section (5) of the said section would come into play. It is not possible, therefore, to say that clause (b) does not contemplate any sort of inquiry before the Judge enters upon the scrutiny and computation of votes under that clause. In other words, it is not possible, as has been said by Mr. Patil, to accept that whenever an election petition for recount of votes is made, the Judge has to scrutinise and compute the votes without any inquiry. For this purpose Mr. In other words, it is not possible, as has been said by Mr. Patil, to accept that whenever an election petition for recount of votes is made, the Judge has to scrutinise and compute the votes without any inquiry. For this purpose Mr. Patil makes a distinction between clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (5), and submits that though clause (a) contemplates an inquiry, no such inquiry bas been indicated in clause (b). In our view this submission is without any force since as said above, sub-section (2) makes an inquiry obligatory in all cases and it is sub-section (2), which governs sub-section (5). In our view, the question about the Judge exercising his powers under subsection (5) or under the two clauses thereof would arise only after the inquiry contemplated in sub-section (2) is held. It was in this context that it was not necessary for the Legislature to have stated again in clause (b) that the scrutiny and computation of votes should follow an inquiry. Now in cases coming under clause (b), as said above an inquiry would be held by the Judge under sub-section (2) and this inquiry would necessarily be directed against the grievance of the election petitioner that the validity of the election is affected because of the irregularity and illegality in counting the votes. It is here that the question of making out grounds for recount would arise. It is in this inquiry that the Judge would have to be satisfied by the election petitioner that there has been in fact such irregularity or illegality in counting the votes and this can be done by not making vague allegations, but by giving necessary details so that the other party may be in a position to meet that. In our opinion, there is nothing in the language of clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 27 or for the matter of that in the language of sub-section (2) of section 27 to indicate that the Judge has to enter on a scrutiny and computation of votes ipso facto and without the necessity of his being satisfied with regard to the grounds thereof. In the view which we take, we cannot agree with the learned Judge on the point that no grounds are required to be made out for obtaining scrutiny and computation of votes under section 27 (5) (b) of the Act. In the view which we take, we cannot agree with the learned Judge on the point that no grounds are required to be made out for obtaining scrutiny and computation of votes under section 27 (5) (b) of the Act. In our view, this view of the learned Judge is contrary to the principles which have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases cited above. 12. The position, therefore, is that it was incumbent on respondent No. 1 to have made in his election petition and adequate statement of all the material facts on which the allegations of irregularity or illegality in counting of votes are founded. It was further necessary for him to adduce evidence to establish such allegations prima facie so as to afford a good ground for believing that there had been a mistake in counting. It was thereafter that the learned Judge had to be satisfied that an order for recount was imperatively necessary to decide the dispute and to do complete and effectual justice between the patties. 13. Seeing the present case in the light of these principles, it would appear that respondent No. 1 has not only not made statement of all material facts on which his allegations of irregularity or illegality in counting are founded, but he has also not made a statement which comes any where near such a statement. Respondent No.1 merely stated in the petition that his demand for recount should have been allowed because there was very slender difference of votes secured by him and the present petitioner. It would, therefore, appear that the ground on which respondent No. 1 sought a recount was irrelevant. Now this cannot be by itself without more a ground for recount. There is an initial presumption in favour of the validity of the acceptance and rejection of ballot papers by the Returning Officer and this presumption cannot be lightly brushed aside, by making a vague allegation that an irregularity in counting must have been committed because of slender margin in the votes of two rival candidates. Now apart from not making any clear statement and allegation in the election petition itself, it would appear that even in the evidence adduced before the learned Judge, no such material had been placed. Now apart from not making any clear statement and allegation in the election petition itself, it would appear that even in the evidence adduced before the learned Judge, no such material had been placed. It would be pertinent to note that respondent No. 1 was not himself present at the time of counting of votes. He has unequivocally admitted in his cross examination that he had no idea as to the time taken for counting of votes and the number of tables set up .for the same. Not only that, he was frank enough to admit that he could not state at what stage and on which table irregularities in the matter of counting had crept in. Now in order to support his contention with regard to the irregularity in counting, be examined his election agent, namely, Ashok Despmukb. He stated that for counting the votes of Ghuikhed Electoral Division eight tables were set up and three clerks did the work of counting on each table. He then narrated the process which was adopted for counting of those votes. He stated that the work of putting the ballot papers in different boxes was hurriedly done and many times, the agents were not in a position to see the ballot papers and some times the ballot papers were being put in the wrong boxes. Therefore, he asked the three clerks at his table to do the work properly and correctly, but he was told to approach the Tahsildar, if he had any grievance. He further· says that he then approached the Tahsildar. He was asked to keep quiet and make his grievance at the time of final result if there was any difference in the votes secured. He says that he had made an application to the Tahsildar making this grievance alter the counting was over, but it was rejected. He specifically stated that he had made this grievance about table No.2 and a similar grievance was also made by the other agents of respondent No. 1 to him. He admitted that in the application so made he had not given details of the grounds on which he suspected mistakes in the counting of votes. In his statement which was recorded by the Returning Officer on this applications Ashok had stated that there was no reason for the other agents of respondent No. 1 to take any objection to the counting. In his statement which was recorded by the Returning Officer on this applications Ashok had stated that there was no reason for the other agents of respondent No. 1 to take any objection to the counting. When this statement was brought to his notice in cross examination, he got over it by stating that it was wrongly recorded. It would, therefore, appear that though no specific grounds had been made out and no material allegations had been made in the application before the Returning Officer under rule 64 (2) of the Rules, Ashok came out with some allegations in his evidence. Now it is pertinent to note that the averments which Ashok made in his evidence do not find place even in the election petition. Apart from this, it is to be noted that the only grievance which Ashok could make in his evidence about the counting is only to the effect that the counting work was hurriedly being done and some times the ballot papers were put in the wrong boxes. There is nothing to indicate as to how many such ballot papers were and in what boxes they were wrongly put. It would, therefore, appear that these are vague allegations unfounded on facts and instances. As against this, the Returning Officer has been examined by the present petitioner before the learned Judge and he clearly contradicted what Ashok had said in his evidence. 14. Reading the evidence of Ashok and the Returning Officer, therefore, it should have become abundantly clear to the learned Judge that no specific grounds had been made out by respondent No. 1 in support of his demand for a recount. 15. The position, therefore, which emerges from the above discussion is that respondent No.1 had failed to make the necessary averments in his election petition and had not adduced any evidence to satisfy the Judge that there was any necessity of recount. In such circumstances, it is difficult to uphold the finding of the learned Judge that this was a fit case where recount should be allowed. In the view which we take, therefore, the order passed by the learned Judge on 16-11·1979 deserves to be quashed. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute and the order passed by the learned Judge on 16-11-1979 is hereby quashed. In the view which we take, therefore, the order passed by the learned Judge on 16-11·1979 deserves to be quashed. 16. In the result, the petition is allowed. The rule is made absolute and the order passed by the learned Judge on 16-11-1979 is hereby quashed. Respondent No. 1 shall pay the costs of this petition to the petitioner and shall bear his own. Petition allowed.