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1980 DIGILAW 164 (CAL)

Sudharani Mitra v. Hara Kumar Chakrabarty

1980-04-29

A.K.SEN, B.C.CHAKRABARTI

body1980
JUDGMENT B. C. Chakrabarti, J.: This appeal is directed against an Order dated May 3, 1975 passed in Probate Case No. 81 of 1974 of the Court of the District Delegate at Alipore. 2. The proceedings were initiated by the respondent Harakumar in his capacity as Executor appointed under the will executed by one Amiya Bala Mitra. In the said proceedings the appellants Sudharani Mitra and others were permitted on their application to file objections against the prayer for grant of probate. 3. The appellants are the widow and sons and daughters of one Sudhir Kumar Mitra since deceased. Amiya Bala Mitra the executant of the alleged will, also claims to be a widow of the said Sudhir Kumar Mitra. The will executed by her relates to 1/7th share of the assets left by Sudhir Kumar Mitra. The objection filed by the appellants in substance is as follows:– Amiya Bala was not the wife of Sudhir Kumar Mitra. She came in contact with Sudhir Mitra for some time but she had no issue by him. Claiming to be the widow of Sudhir Mitra she instituted a suit for partition being T. S. 38 of 1967 of the third Court of Subordinate Judge, at Alipore. The suit is being contested by the appellants on the ground that she was not a widow of Sudhir Kumar and consequently did not inherit any property left by Sudhir Kumar. The will set up by the propounder is not a genuine document but has been created with the ulterior object of grabbing some properties to which Amiya Bala had no right title or interest. Incidentally it may be recalled that the propounder is the son-in-law of Amiya Bala and his wife Kalyani is a legatee under the will. 4. The propuonder filed an application praying of rejection of the objection raised by the appellants. The main contention of the propounder was that the appellants have no locus standi to enter caveat and oppose the grant of probate. The learned Judge, by the impugned order, considered the prayer and accepted plea that the appellants have no locus standi. He found that the appellants having alleged that the testatrix had no interest in the subject matter of the will were not entitled to oppose the grant. On such finding, the objection put in by the appellants was rejected. Hence the appeal. 5. He found that the appellants having alleged that the testatrix had no interest in the subject matter of the will were not entitled to oppose the grant. On such finding, the objection put in by the appellants was rejected. Hence the appeal. 5. Section 283 of the Indian Succession Act contemplates issue of citations calling upon "all persons claiming to having any interest in the estate of the deceased". Mr. Sen Gupta appearing in support of the appeal argued that the appellants who are the heirs of Sudhir Kumar Mitra have such an interest to entitle them to oppose the grant of probate. It is now well settled that any interest however slight, remote or problematic it may be, is sufficient to entitle a person to enter caveat in a probate proceedings. It was therefore argued that the appellants who are admittedly heirs of Sudhir Mitra have a locus standi to enter caveat. In elucidating the scope of the expression "persons claiming to have an interest", Mr. Sen Gupta referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Nobeen v. Bhobosoondari ILR 6 Calcutta 460 where the expression has been explained to include persons having such an interest as would entitle them to maintain a suit in respect of the subject matter of such estate. 6. But it must not be lost sight of that the interest claimed must be in respect of the estate of the deceased testator. If one claims to have an interest and at the same time claims that the testator had no estate to bequeath, such a person is not entitled to intervene for such pleas are, on the face of it mutually exclusive and contradictory. It is not therefore enough to show that the appellants are interested in bringing an action in respect of the subject matter of the will. Such a suit initially instituted at the instance of the testatrix Amiyabala is in fact pending and the question whether she had any interest in the estate bequeathed by her is really within the scope of that suit. Such a question cannot be adjudicated in a probate proceedings. Consequently when the appellants deny the right title and interest of the testatrix in the estate, they cannot be called as persons claiming to have an interest in the estate of the deceased. 7. Another case relied on by Mr. Such a question cannot be adjudicated in a probate proceedings. Consequently when the appellants deny the right title and interest of the testatrix in the estate, they cannot be called as persons claiming to have an interest in the estate of the deceased. 7. Another case relied on by Mr. Sen Gupta, the case of Brindaban v. Sureswar, 10 CLJ 263 also does not help the appellant's cause. There the caveator was a reversioner under the Hindu Law. Although he has no present alienable interest in the property left by the deceased, it was held that he was substantially interested in the protection and devolution of the estate, and as such entitled to appear and be heard in a probate proceedings. It will appear from the facts of the case that the caveator did not dispute the factum of an estate in the deceased. In the context of that, it was held that the reversioner was entitled to be heard even though his problematic interest may or may not ultimately ripen into a real interest. In the present case before us the appellants have taken a totally different stand by disputing the title of the testatrix herself. 8. The next case relied on by Mr. Sen Gupta, the case of Malati v. Dhnapati, ILR (1967) 2 Cal. 684, instead of supporting the case of the appellants really goes against them. This case undoubtedly says that for asserting locus standi to file a caveat, the claimant must have or, at least claim an interest which is likely to be affected or prejudiced by the will. But this was so held in the context of facts which are totally different. In that case the claim was of an interest of tenancy in the testatrix's property. If the claim is good, the will cannot certainly displace it. This apart, the claim of tenancy itself was a controversial claim controverted by the testatrix herself. In the context of that it was observed that the claimant was claiming some interest adverse to the testatrix and as such he was not entitled to intervene. In the instant case before us, the controversy is even more pronounced, the appellants having specifically denied the title of the testator. There is no recognized authority on the basis of which it can be said that such a claimant is a proper intervenor in a probate proceedings. 9. In the instant case before us, the controversy is even more pronounced, the appellants having specifically denied the title of the testator. There is no recognized authority on the basis of which it can be said that such a claimant is a proper intervenor in a probate proceedings. 9. The interest which entitles a person to lodge a caveat must be as interest is the estate of the deceased, that is to stay, there must be no dispute as to the title of the deceased to the estate. It will bear repetition that a Court of probate does not determine questions of title to a property which a testator purports to dispose of by the will. The grant of probate does no more than establish the factum of the will and the appointment of the executor, if any, named in the will. The grant of probate therefore does not prevent the claimant to bring a suit against the executor or any other person in possession, to establish his claim to the property (See Kamalangiammal v. Sowbhagiammal, A 1931 Madras 37). 10. In the case before us such a suit is actually pending and that really is the proper forum where the dispute sought to be raised by the appellants in the probate proceedings, can be effectively adjudicated. Such being the position in law, and appellants having set up a claim adverse to the testatrix cannot have any locus standi to intervene in the probate proceedings. The learned Judge in the Court below was therefore right in rejecting the objections put forth by the appellants. 11. Mr. Sen Gupta however made an alternative case that even assuming that Amiyabala had inherited any property from Sudhir Kumar Mitra, the appellants being the admitted heirs of Sudhir Kumar Mitra, her interest would, under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 devolve upon the appellants also so that they would be entitled to question the validity of the will executed by her. In support of this contention, Mr. Sen Gupta referred to S. 16 of Hindu Succession Act which lays down the manner of devolution in respect of the property of a female Hindu dying intestate. The property shall devolve firstly upon the sons and daughters including the children of any predeceased son or daughter, and the husband, and secondly upon the heirs of the husband and so on. The property shall devolve firstly upon the sons and daughters including the children of any predeceased son or daughter, and the husband, and secondly upon the heirs of the husband and so on. Under S. 16 those in one entry would be preferred to those in any succeeding entry. In this case, Amiyabala has her daughters who would come under the first entry. Consequently the appellants could claim if at all, only if they could come within the meaning of the first entry. Mr. Sen Gupta argued that since the first entry includes the husband also along with the sons and daughters, there is no reason why the appellants as heirs of the husband would not be entitled to claim. They cannot for the simple reason that the expression "husband" in the first entry must be referable to a husband who survives the female. If the husband has predeceased the wife, there can be no question of devolution to him by because a dead person cannot inherit. Consequently the alternative case put forth by Mr. Sen Gupta must fail. 12. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed on contest. There will be no order for costs. Anil K. Sen, J.––I agree. Appeal dismissed.