JUDGMENT These two appeals at the instance of the respective defendants arise out of two suits for ejectment in respect of two tenancies in premises No. 46, Simla Road, P.S. Manicktola on the ground of reasonable requirement for own use and occupation of the plaintiff landlord who are alleged to be the when. The plaintiffs’ case in the 1st suit is that the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of two rooms with a kitchen, common bath and privy in premises No. 46, Simla Road, P.S. Manicktola at a rental of Rs. 46/- per month payable according to English Calendar month. It is alleged that the plaintiffs became the owners of the aforesaid premises by virtue of purchase on 19th April, 1967. Similarly in Title Suit no. 52 of 1971 the plaintiffs are the landlords and the defendant is a tenant in respect of the suit property. In the plaint it is stated, inter alia, that the plaintiffs are the owners by purchase and they have got no suitable accommodation and that the plaintiffs reasonably require the premises for their own use and occupation. The court of first instance held in favour of the defendants and dismissed the suits, as, according to the learned Munsif, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have no reasonable and suitable accommodation and that they have failed to prove that they require the premises for their own use and occupation. It was further held by the learned Munsif that the plaintiffs have got reasonably suitable accommodation and their requirement in the suit premises is not bonafide. 2. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decrees passed in those two suits, two appeals were preferred before the learned Additional District Judge, 6th Court, Alipore and the said appeals were heard and allowed by him. Hence the present second appeals. 3. Mr. Chakraborty on behalf of the appellants has contended firstly that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the premises in question, inasmuch as by purchase on 19th April, 1967 from the Mutuwalli they have not got any title whatsoever because the appointment of Mutuwalli herself was declared void by a court or competent jurisdiction in a suit which was decreed ex-parte at the instance of one Ali Haider. In that view of the matter, according to Mr. In that view of the matter, according to Mr. Chakraborty the suit was not maintainable at all because the plaintiffs were not the owners of the premises. Apart from the fact that the document in question has not been set at naught by any decree passed by any court of competent jurisdiction, it must be stated that after the purchase of the premises on 19th of April, 1967 the defendant acknowledged the plaintiffs as landlords. It appears from the counter foils of rent receipts that the defendant had signed the counterfoils at the back in acknowledgment of payment of the rent and it shows clearly and patently that the plaintiffs are the landlords of the defendants. Both the courts held in favour of the plaintiffs about ownership of the suit premises in question. So, the findings of fact arrived at by both the courts below cannot be agitated in second appeal. Moreover, when the defendant himself has admitted all tenant under the plaintiffs as landlords he cannot challenge the landlords’ title in view of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. In the case reported in (1) A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2335 it has been held that it is only the landlord who can terminate the tenancy and institute suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between the landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. Admittedly this case was decided on the basis of section 130 (1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act before amendment. But it appears that it does not very much make any difference in the question raised as regards the estoppal of the tenant challenging the title of the landlord inasmuch as even before amendment consideration of the ownership of suit premises was relevant in view of words "if he is owner" as in section 13(1)(f). The Supreme Court considered the question whether landlord, who is co-owner of the premises with the others, was the owner within the meaning of section 13(1)(f) of the Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The Supreme Court considered the question whether landlord, who is co-owner of the premises with the others, was the owner within the meaning of section 13(1)(f) of the Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the said decision that the tenant in a suit for ejectment is estoppd from questioning the title of the landlord. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, apart from the question of fact decided by the courts below that the plaintiffs are the owners of the premises, the defendant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlords after he has attorned to the plaintiffs and accepted the plaintiffs as landlords after purchase of the property in question on 19th of April, 1967. 4. The next question raised by Mr. Chakraborty is that the pleadings do not contain the most relevant averment to the effect that the plaintiffs landlords are not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. Mr. Mitter on behalf of the respondents, however, contended on the basis of the averment as it is that there are in the plaint, averments to the effect. The court of first in instant however, held that there is no such averment. The Court of appeal below held that there was substantial compliance of the statute and the statements made in the plaint substantially comes within the mischief of section 13 (1)(ff) of the Act. It depends on the facts and pleadings and the pleadings in the present case, in my opinion, quite clearly show that plaintiffs have averred that they have no reasonably suitable accommodation. In paragraph 2 of the plaint it has been stated that the present accommodation of the plaintiffs is quite insufficient and that they are residing jointly with the other members of the family. Moreover, it has been stated that the position of the plaintiffs is very precarious and the rooms in question are reasonably required by the plaintiff for the their own use and occupation. On the basis of these pleadings, evidence has been adduced by both the parties. Moreover, it has been stated that the position of the plaintiffs is very precarious and the rooms in question are reasonably required by the plaintiff for the their own use and occupation. On the basis of these pleadings, evidence has been adduced by both the parties. It appears that though the learned Munsif was not inclined to accept the evidence of the plaintiffs but the lower appellate court accepted the evidence and came to the conclusion on considering the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs as also by the defendants that the plaintiffs have got no reasonably suitable accommodation and if the defendant are evicted it will suffice to requirement of the plaintiffs for their own use and occupation. Mr. Chakraborty, however, contended with reference to the decision reported in (2) A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1146 (B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan) that unless averment is there the only recourse that will be open to the plaintiff is to amend the plaint and if they do not amend the plaint, the suit must fail. In my opinion reading the plaint as a whole and in particular paragraph 2, I do not find that any amendment of the plaint is required inasmuch as, in my view, the averment as required under section 13 (1) (ff) was already there in the body of the plaint which the plaintiffs had succeeded in proving in their favour before the lower appellate court. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, there is no merit in these appeals. 5. That appeals are therefore dismissed, but without any order for costs. 6. No order need be made on the application under Or. 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. 7. The prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134 (4) of the Constitution of India is refused, became I am of opinion that no substantial question of law of public importance is involved in these matters and as such I do not feel that this should be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.