RAMA JOIS, J. ( 1 ) IN this revision petition presented under S. 13 (4) of the Karnataka Sales tax Act. 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the State Act) by a partner of a dissolved firm against the order of the magistrate rejecting his objection for the recovery of tax made on an application under S. 13 (3) of the state Act, the following two questions of law arise for consideration: (1) Whether the proceedings for assessment taken under S. 15 (2) of the state Act for assessing the sales tax payable by the dissolved firm under the provisions of the Central Sales tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the Central Act) is valid? (2) Whether the limitation for the recovery of fine fixed under S. 70 i. P. C. is applicable for the recovery of tax due under the Central Act, because the same is required to be recovered as fine by virtue of S. 13 (3) (b) of the State Act? ( 2 ) THE brief facts which have given rise toi the above question are as follows: The petitioner was a partner of a firm under the name and style r. C. Hiremath (Patil ). The firm was dealing in timber. It stood dissolved on 1-7-1963. The assessing authority made an assessment order on 19-3-1967 (Ext-'a' ). The assessment order was taken in appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority made an order on 13-1-1970 setting aside the assessment order on the ground that before the dissolution of the firm on 1-7-1. 963 there was no provision which empowered the authorities to make an assessment against the dissolved firm. Thereafter ,the legislature amended the provisions of the State Act, by Act No. 9 of 1964. Sub-sec. (2) was introduced to S. 15 specifically providing for making an assessment against a dissolved firm. S. 34 of the said Act validated all the proceedings including assessments made against the dissolved firms. In the case of S. S. Navalagi v. CTO, Jamkhondi 28 STC 580 = (1972) 1 Mys. L. J. 26 = 1972 KLJ 5. the question of validation of assessments made against the dissolved firms by S. 34 of Act, 9 of 1964 came up for consideration. In the case of S. S. Navalagi v. CTO, Jamkhondi 28 STC 580 = (1972) 1 Mys. L. J. 26 = 1972 KLJ 5. the question of validation of assessments made against the dissolved firms by S. 34 of Act, 9 of 1964 came up for consideration. This Court held that as S. 15 (2) was not introduced with retrospective effect, the validation of assessments made against dissolved firms earlier to the introduction of S. 15 (2), under S. 34 of Act 9 of 1964 was invalid. In order to get over the effect of the said judgment, the State act was further amended by Act 9 of 1970. By the said amendment S. 15 (2) was given retrospective effect and further, Section 24 of the said amending Act provided that all the assessment orders made against dissolved firms earlier shall be valid as having been made under the Principal state Act as amended by Act 9 of 1970. In view of this amendment, the appellate authority made another order on 12-8-1970 setting aside its earlier order dated 13-1-1970. The result was the order of assessment made on 19-3-1967 stood restored. At this stage it is necessary to state that Central Act was also amended by central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act no. 28 of 1969. S. 9 (2) of the said Act was given retrospective effect and by the said provision all assessments made against the dissolved firms under the central Act pursuant to the provisions under the Central Act were also validated. ( 3 ) SRI B. V. Katageri learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that in the absence of a provision in the Central Act providir for making an assessment against a dissolved firm, the order of assessment made against the dissolved firm was without authority of law. In support of his submission he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in state of Punjab v. Jullundur Vegetables syndicate (2 ). In the said case, the supreme Court held that in the absence of a provision in the concerned Sales tax Act no assessment could be made on a dissolved firm. Relying on the said judgment he argued that there was no provision in the Central Sales Tax Act providing for making an assessment against a dissolved firm and therefore, the assessment order made on 19-3-1967 was without authority of law. Relying on the said judgment he argued that there was no provision in the Central Sales Tax Act providing for making an assessment against a dissolved firm and therefore, the assessment order made on 19-3-1967 was without authority of law. As already stated, though at the relevant point of time when the assessment was made there was no provision in the state Act for making an assessment against a dissolved firm, sub-sec. 17 STC 326, SC. of S. 15 was introduced into the State act, specifically providing for making an assessment against a dissolved firm by Act 9 of 1964 and the said section was given retrospective effect, by virtue of S. 24 of Act No. 9 of 1970 and further, all the orders of assessment made earlier were validated. S. 9 of the Central Act which originally stood had adopted all the provisions of the state ]aw. The question whether subsequent amendments made to the state Act, were also applicable in respect of assessments to be made under the Central Act, specifical]y came up for consideration before a division bench of this Court in Mysore Electrical industries Ltd v. CTO V Circle, Bangalore 27 STC 559 - (1970) 2 Mys. L. J. 263. This Court held that in view of the definition of the words 'sales tax Law' and 'general Sales Tax Law' in the Central Act, read with S. 9 of the State Act, not only the State act as it stood on the date when S. 9 was introduced, but future amendments made to the State Act, also stand automatically adopted with effect from the date when the amendments are enacted. The same view was followed in A. V. Rajshekharappa v. CTO, II circle, Hubli 35 STC 379 = (1974) 2 Kar. L. J. 119. . In view of this decision it is clear that provisions of s. 15 (2) introduced to the State Act by Act 9 of 1964 as also the subsequent amendment made to the State Act by act 9 of 1970 were clearly applicable to assessments made under the Central act. Further, the Central Act itself was also amended by the amending Act 28 of 1969 and sub-sec. (2) of S. 9 of the said amending Act validated all orders of assessments made against a dissolved firm. Further, the Central Act itself was also amended by the amending Act 28 of 1969 and sub-sec. (2) of S. 9 of the said amending Act validated all orders of assessments made against a dissolved firm. Therefore, the order of the assessing authority made on 19-3-1967 levying Central Sales Tax against the dissolved firm became valid by virtue of the subsequent amendments made to the State Act and the Central act referred to above. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the petitioner however contended that the adoption of the provisions of the state Act by virtue of S. 9 of the central Act was only in respect of procedural law and not of substantive provisions. In support of this submission he relied on the decision reported in Guldas Narasappa Thimmiah Oil Mills v. CTO, Raichur 25 STC. 489. = (1970) 1 Mys. L. J. 451 = 1970 KLJ 25. . In the said case, this Court held that penalty imposed under sub sec. (2) of S. 13 of the State Act, against a defaulter in the payment of tax is not ipso facto attracted in respect of tax payable under the Central Act as there was no corresponding provision in the Central Act, and in the absence of such a substantive provision for levy of penalty in the Central Act, S. 9 of the Central Act adopting the provisions of ithe State Act for recovery of dues under the Central Act did not authorise the levy and collection of penalty. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Khemka and co (Agencies) Pvt. Ltd. State of maharashtra 35 STC 571 SC. in which the view taken by this Court in Guldas Narasappa's case was approved. We do not see any force in this submission. The provision introduced in the form of sub-sec. (2) of S. 15 of the State Act was only procedural and not substantive. The liability to pay tax under the Central Act arose on account of the charging section under the central Act. The firm which included the petitioner as partner had become liable to pay the tax. But the firm was dissolved on 1-7-1963. There was no provision in the State Act, or the central Act prescribing the procedure for making an assessment against a dissolved firm, on that day. The firm which included the petitioner as partner had become liable to pay the tax. But the firm was dissolved on 1-7-1963. There was no provision in the State Act, or the central Act prescribing the procedure for making an assessment against a dissolved firm, on that day. By a subsequent amendment made with retrospective effect, S. 15 (2) was introduced and the assessment orders made against a dissolved firm at a point of time when S. 15 (2) was not in existence were validated as if they had been made after the introduction of sub-sec. (2) of S. 15 with retrospective, effect by virtue of S. 24 of Act No. 9 of 1970 amending the State Act and S. 9 of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) act of 1969. In order to substantiate that the procedure for making assessment agsinst a dissolved firm was substantive provision, the learned counsel relied on the decision in navalgi v. CTO (1) in which S. 34 of act No. 9 of 1964 was held to be invalid on the ground that sub-section (2) of S. 15 had not been given retrospective effect and consequently the validation clause was also invalid. He argued that if S. 15 (2) of State act was considered as a procedural provision, there would have been no necessity to give retrospective effect or to introduce a validating provision and this Court struck down the validating section only on the basis that S. 15 (2) was a substantive provision. In the said decision no such point was raised or decided. Therefore, the said decision cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that a provision like S. 15 (2) of the state Act is a substantive provision. ( 5 ) APART from that, the decision of the Supreme Court in Khemka's case (6) in which S. 9 (2) of the Central act was interpreted and it was held that the said provision did not empower the levy of penalty prescribed under the State Law but not under the central Act, for default in payment of central Sales Tax itself indicates that the provisions providing for making assessment or collection of tax or penalty are only procedural. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:-"in that context, the last limb of s. 9 (2) of the Central Act viz. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:-"in that context, the last limb of s. 9 (2) of the Central Act viz. , "and the provisions of such law shall apply accordingly" mean that the, provisions of the State Act are applicable for the purpose of assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment of tax including penalty payable under the central Act. The words of the last part of S. 9 (2), viz. , "shall apply accordingly" relate clearly to the words "and for this purpose" with the result that the provisions of the state Act shall apply only for the purpose of assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement. The doctrine of ejusdem generis shows that the genus in section 9 (2) of the central Act is "for this purpose''. In other words the genus is assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment. The genus is applicable in regard to the procedure for assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment. The genus is from whom to collect and against whom to enforce. It is apparent that the extent of liability for tax as well as penalty is not attracted by the doctrine of ejusdem generis in the application of the provision of the State Act in regard to assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment of tax including any penalty payable under the Central Act. "in view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, there is no Substance in the submission made for the petitioner that the provision for making an assessment against a dissolved firm is substantive and not procedural. ( 6 ) IN the light of the above discussion we hold that the order of assessment made on 19-3-1967 became valid in view of the introduction of S. 15 (2) to the State Act with retrospective effect and validation made by s. 24 of the Amending Act of 1970 made to the State Act read with S. 9 of the central Sales Tax (amendment Act) 1969. ( 7 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the limitation prescribed Under S. 70 I. P. C. for the recovery of fine is attracted to the procedings for recovery under S. 13{3) (b) of the. State Act. ( 7 ) THE next question for consideration is whether the limitation prescribed Under S. 70 I. P. C. for the recovery of fine is attracted to the procedings for recovery under S. 13{3) (b) of the. State Act. S. 13 (3) (b) of the State Act provides that not withstanding anything contained in the code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (now the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973) on application to any Magistrate for the recovery of the tax due under the act, he could proceed to recover the said amount as if it were a fine imposed by him. Section 70 I. P. C. prescribes the period of limitation of six year's for the recovery of fine imposed under the Penal Code. 'the argument advanced for the petitioner was that 'as Sec. 13 (3) (b) of the State Act provides that the amount of Sales tax recoverable under the State Act could be recovered by a Magistrate as if it were a fine, the period of limitation prescribed under Section 70 of the Penal Code was also applicable and as in the present case it was only after more than six years from the date of the order of assessment the application, was made before the Magistrate, it was barred by limitation. We are not impressed by the submission. There is no limitation prescribed under the State Act. The amount which is required to be recovered under Section 13 (3) (b) of the State Act is the amount of tax payable under the Act. The effect of section 13 (3) (b) of the State Act is that the concerned Magistrate has to follow the same procedure as prescribed for recovery of fine under Section 421 and 422 of the Criminal Procedure code to recover the amount of tax. Therefore, the limitation prescribed under Section 70 of the Penal Code is not attracted because, the amount which is remaining to be recovered by the magistrate pursuant to an application made under Section 13 (3) (b) of the state Act is not a fine levied under the Penal Code but a tax payable under the Act. Learned Counsel however wanted to make out a case relying on Section 25 of the Karnataka General clauses Act. Learned Counsel however wanted to make out a case relying on Section 25 of the Karnataka General clauses Act. The said Section provides that Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal code and the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code for the time being in force, in relation to the issue and execution of warrants for the levy of fines shall apply to all fines imposed under any enactment, rule or bylaw unless the enactment, rule or bylaw contains an express provision to the contrary. The said Section has no application to the persent case as the amount sought to be recovered is not a fine levied under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. All that Section 13 (3) (b) of the State Act provides is that the Magistrate should follow the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code for the recovery of fine in recovering the tax payable under the Act in respect of an application made before him. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the petitioner however relied on the decision of this Court in Mohanlal preinchand v. C'to, Bagalkot 28 STC 492 = (1971) 1 Mys. L. J. 72 = 1971 K. L. J. 3. in which it was held that on an application made under Section 13 (3) (b) of the State Act, a Magistrate had no authority to recover any amount of sales tax payable under 'the State Act, which was in excess of the maximum penalty imposable by him under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure code. In this behalf it is sufficient to point out that Section 13 (3) (b) of the State Act was amended subsequently by Act No. 7 of 1972 and the following words. "notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure code 1898" were introduced at the opening part of the sub-seation. In view of the non-obstante clause introduced, learned counsel cannot derive any support from the earlier decision. ( 9 ) IN the result, we hold that the limit of time prescribed under Section 70 of the Indian Penal Code is not attracted to an application under Sec. 13 (3) (b) of the State Act. For the reasons aforesaid we make the following order. ( 10 ) REVISION petition is dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .