JUDGMENT R. S. Singh, J. - This is a defendants second appeal against the decree and judgment dated 11-11-1971 of the additional Civil Judge, Bijnor affirming that of the trial court. 2. The suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed for possession after ejectment of the defendant-appellant from the shop in suit and for recovery of Rs. 304 with pending and future damages at the rate of Rs. 40/- for the use and occupation of the shop in suit. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent on the allegations that the defendant-appellant was his tenant of the shop in suit at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month. The shop in suit was constructed in the year 1954 as such the provisions of the Us P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Old Act) were not applicable to it. It was further alleged that the defendant-appellant was in arrears of rent with effect from 15-11-1967 and the plaintiff-respondent served a notice on the defendant-appellant on 4-5-1968 for the recovery of arrears of rent Mid ejectment. But the defendant-appellant neither paid the arrears of rent nor vacated the shop in suit, hence the suit. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant-appellant on the ground that the shop in question was not constructed in the year 1954. It was pleaded that the provisions of the Old Act were applicable to the shop in suit. It was further alleged by the defendant-appellant that the rent of the shop in suit was Rs. 30/- per month. The defendant-appellant wanted permission of the plaintiff-respondent for the installation of the electricity in the shop in suit. This permission was granted by the plaintiff-respondent on the condition of enhancement of the rent of the shop in suit by Rs. 10/- per month. The defendant-appellant agreed for payment of Rs. 40/- per month as rent, but later on the plaintiff-respondent refused permission for the installation of the electricity. Thereupon the defendant-appellant demanded back a sum of Rs. 10/- on account of the enhanced rent paid by him. The plaintiff-respondent felt annoyed and filed the present suit. It was further alleged that the defendant-appellant remitted the rent to the plaintiff-respondent through post office but the same was refused by him. It was also pleaded that the notice dated 2-5-1968 served by the plaintiff-respondent on the defendant-appellant was illegal. 4. The plaintiff-respondent felt annoyed and filed the present suit. It was further alleged that the defendant-appellant remitted the rent to the plaintiff-respondent through post office but the same was refused by him. It was also pleaded that the notice dated 2-5-1968 served by the plaintiff-respondent on the defendant-appellant was illegal. 4. The trial court decreed the suit for ejectment from the shop in suit and for recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 304/- with mesne profits of pending and future at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month. The defendant-appellant preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial court which was also dismissed by the lower .appellate court. The defendant-appellant has, therefore, come to this Court in second appeal against the decrees of the courts below. 5. During the pendency of this appeal in this Court, the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force with effect from 15-7-1972. Section 40 of the Act provides that where an appeal or revision arising out of a suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply is pending on the date of commencement of this Act, it shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 39 which shall mutatis mutandis apply. Consequently, the defendant-appellant moved an application claiming benefit of Section 39 of the Act on the ground that the shop in suit has become subject to the provisions of the Act and he had made necessary deposits as contemplated by Section 39 of the Act that he had absolved himself from the liability of the ejectment. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent did not dispute about the applicability of Section 40 of the Act. But he contends that the necessary deposits as contemplated by Section 39 of the Act have not been made on behalf of the defendant-appellant. Therefore, he is not entitled to claim benefit of Section 39 of the Act and cannot be absolved from the liability of his ejectment. There is no dispute between the parties that the total rent calculated at the rate of Rs. 40/- from 15-11-1967 to 15-7-1972 (when the Act came into force will come to Rs. 2240/- and after adding the costs of the courts below it will come to Rs. There is no dispute between the parties that the total rent calculated at the rate of Rs. 40/- from 15-11-1967 to 15-7-1972 (when the Act came into force will come to Rs. 2240/- and after adding the costs of the courts below it will come to Rs. 2473.41 P. There is further no dispute on the point between the parties that up to 4-7-1972 the defendant appellant had deposited Rs. 2415.00 in this Court. Further he deposited Rs. 40 on 10-8-1972 and Rs. 198.00 on 14-8-1972. In this way the total amount deposited by the defendant appellant before 15-8-1972 comes to Rs. 2653.00. According to the learned counsel for the appellant on the date when the Act came into force, he had deposited the entire money due except an amount of Rs. 58.41P. and he was liable to deposit this remaining amount together with interest and the costs of the litigation of this Court but he had deposited much more than the amount required to be deposited as by the time he had already deposited Rs. 40.00 on 10-8-1972 and Rs. 198-00 on 14-8-1972. According to the learned counsel for the respondent the defendant appellant was required to deposit the interest on all the amounts which were not deposited at the due time as the plaintiff is entitled to get interest on every months rent if not deposited when it fell due and that the amount of Rs. 198.00 was deposited after 15-8-1972, Therefore, this amount could not be taken into consideration as it was not deposited within one month of the commencement of the Act. 6. Now the dispute between the parr ties narrows down as to whether the defendant-appellant was required to deposit the amount by way of interest if monthly rent was not paid or deposited at the end of every month or if rent had already been deposited when the Act came into force he is not liable to deposit any amount by way of interest even if the monthly rent had not been deposited by him at the end of every month. The other controversy is on the point .that where the deposit has been made through tender then in that case whether the date of actual deposit will be the date of deposit or it will relate back to the date of tender presented before the Court. 7. The other controversy is on the point .that where the deposit has been made through tender then in that case whether the date of actual deposit will be the date of deposit or it will relate back to the date of tender presented before the Court. 7. The first controversy depends on the interpretation of Section 39 of the Act which runs as follows: "39 Pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under regulation for the first time- In any suit for eviction of a tenant from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on the date of commencement or from the date of his knowledge of the pendency of the suit, whichever be later deposits in the court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and the landlords full costs of the suit, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) or in cls. (b) to (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evidence where necessary : Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed twenty-five rupees per month need not deposit any interest as aforesaid." This provision contemplates deposits to be made on behalf of the defendant-appellant within one month of the commencement of the Act the entire amount of rent and damages, if any, for the use and occupation calculated at the same rate as rent together with interest thereon at the rate of 9 per cent per annum and the costs of the suit. In other words, if the rent has not already been paid or deposited before the commencement of the Act it has to be paid along with interest and the costs of the suit. But if the entire rent had already been paid before the commencement of the Act the question of payment of interest within thirty days of the commencement of the Act will not arise. In Bhopal Singh v. Hardeo Sahai, (1978 Rent. But if the entire rent had already been paid before the commencement of the Act the question of payment of interest within thirty days of the commencement of the Act will not arise. In Bhopal Singh v. Hardeo Sahai, (1978 Rent. CC (Suppl) 379) it has been held as follows: "While considering this question it would be necessary to keep in mind as 'to whether any amount was due from the defendants on the date the shop in question became subject to the provisions of the Act. If no amount was due then the question of payment of interest will not arise". In Ram Kripal v. Mukat Lal (1978 All WC 183) certain amount was deposited in the court by the order of the lower appellate court and the question arose whether the necessary amount as contemplated under Section 39 of the Act should be deposited within one month of the commencement of the Act. It was held that "Section 39 is in the nature of beneficial legislation and is intended for the protection of all the tenants. To apply beneficial legislation in a restricted sense or in a very literal perspective would not be in consonance with the purposes of the Act. The real intention of the legislature in enacting Section 39 appears to be to have the entire amount of rent, damages and interest etc. which are actually outstanding against the defendant, deposited in court. Therefore, if the deposit has already been made under orders of the court which fully or partly satisfied the claim of the plaintiff its repetition would reduce the provision to a mere ritual and would defeat the object of the Legislature". 8. In the instant case as well, the rent and the costs except Rs. 58.41 P. were also deposited by the order of the Court before the commencement of the Act. The deponent appellant was required to deposit the remaining amount of the rent together with interest and costs of this appeal in this Court to get the benefit of S. 39 of the Act. The defendant-appellant has further deposited Rs. 40.00 on 10-8-1972 and Rs. 198.00 through a tender presented before the Court on 14-8-1972 though actually deposited after 15-8-1972. 9. The defendant-appellant has further deposited Rs. 40.00 on 10-8-1972 and Rs. 198.00 through a tender presented before the Court on 14-8-1972 though actually deposited after 15-8-1972. 9. The next question for consideration is whether the amount deposited in 25-8-1972 on the basis of the tender presented before the Court on 14-8-1972 will be a deposit made on 25-8-1972 or it will date back to 14-8-1972 and will be deemed to be deposited on 14-8-1972. The answer to this question depends on the interpretation of the word 'deposit. In Bhola Nath v. Pyare Lal (1975 All WC 489) while considering Section 20 (4) of the Act it has been held by the learned single Judge of this Court that submitting tender by the tenant to the court for depositing money in bank would not fulfil requirements of sub-section (4) it is not the passing of tender which secures benefit. It is the actual payment or tender of rent by tenant to the landlord which is intended to be complied with for relieving tenant from eviction. But a contrary view has been taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in Kamta Prasad Jain v. Om Prakash (1966 All LJ 1108), which runs as follows: "When payment has to be made in Court it is in view of the prevailing practice, made by filing a tender and delivering the money to the treasury or bank in accordance with the order passed by the court on the tender. The tender, therefore, is like a negotiable instrument; it represents and produces cash and is treated as such by courts. Generally payment by a negotiable instrument is understood to be conditional. When cash has been deposited in accordance with the directions made on the tender, the payment relates back to the date of the filing of the tender; and in law the date of payment is the date when the tender was presented to the court." The learned single Judge while deciding the above case has relied on the case of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Mst. Gomti v. Lachman Das Champa Ram (AIR 1934 All 817) wherein it has been held that it is settled law that a bona fide tender amounts to payment unless there is a suggestion that the applicant was not in a position to make the payment at the time when he filed the tender in Court. In this case it was observed that according to the rule of practice which has been made with due regard to the administrative convenience of the Court, cash is not received by the Court. But it is to be deposited in the treasury, then the tender is merely an offer to the Court of payment if it is prepared to accept the amount therein entered and if for its convenience the Court directs the person offering payment to deposit elsewhere the person liable to pay should be deemed to have done his part of the undertaking when he offered to pay. In the instant case there is no suggestion that the appellant was not in a position to make the payment. 10. In view of the aforesaid Division Bench case of Mst. Gomti (supra) the money deposited through a tender will relate back to the date of presenting the tender before the Court. In this view of the matter I hold that in the present case the money deposited on 25-8-1972 on the basis of the tender will relate back to 14-8-1972, the date when the tender was presented before the Court. I also hold that the appellant was liable to deposit interest on the amount of the rent which remained un-deposited before 15-7-1972 when the Act came into] force and he was not liable to pay any interest on the amount which was already deposited before the commencement of the Act. Taking into consideration all the amounts deposited within one month of the commencement of the Act. I find that the provisions of Section 39 of the Act have been substantially complied with and the appellant is entitled get the benefit of the same. 11. In view of what has been discussed above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed and the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. The amounts deposited in Court shall be withdrawn by the plaintiff-respondent. However, there will be no order as to costs.