( 1 ) THE petitioner-Company manufactures pharmaceutical products. It is a company incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom and has an office and factory at Bangalore. In the factory it employs 350 workmen. ( 2 ) BY its order dated 29-9-1978 and passed in its proceeding No. SWL. 804 lld. 78 the State of Karnataka (1st respondent herein), exercising its powers under S. 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act), referred an industrial dispute, which, in its opinion, existed between the workmen respondents 3 (1) to 3 (24) and the management (the petitioner) (vide Ex. A and A1), to the Addl. Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore {respondent-2 herein ). ( 3 ) AFTER being notified by the Tribunal about this reference the parties filed their respective statements. The petitioner has raised preliminary objections re. the validity of the reference (Ex.-B) contending that three persons-respondents 3 (6), 3 (7), and 3 (22) herein-were not workmen as defined in s. 2 (s) of the Act and therefore the tribunal had no jurisdiction to ontertain the reference concerning the said three employees. The petitioner further contended that the reference was void ab initio and was liable to be dismissed in limine for the reason that that a single reference dealt with the case of both workmen and non-workmen, and also for the reason that the inclusion of the case of non-workmen in that shows that the State of Karnataka had not applied its mind to the relevant facts while making this reference. In view of these preliminary objections the Tribunal framed, on 22-6-1979, the following two additional issues: (i) Whether Sri R. Krishnamachari (SI. No. 6) Sri B. S. Rajagopalan (SI. No. 3), Sri S. N. Swamy (SI. No. 2) in the point No. 1 (a) are not workmen as contended by the second party management? (ii) If so, whether the reference is vitiated in any manner? ( 4 ) AFTER framing the necessary issues including the additional issues referred to above the Tribunal posted the case for evidence on merits on all the issues. But the petitioner filed another application before the Tribunal (Ext-D) requesting it to take up the additional issues referred to above preliminarily as the same, in its opinion, touched the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. But the petitioner filed another application before the Tribunal (Ext-D) requesting it to take up the additional issues referred to above preliminarily as the same, in its opinion, touched the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. By its order dated 21-9-1979 the Tribunal rejected this request to try the two additional issues as preliminary issues and directed the parties to proceed with the evidence on all the issues simultaneously. ( 5 ) IN this petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner seeks an appropriate writ quashing the order of reference (Ex-A) and the orders of the Tribunal passed on 4-7-1979 and 21. 9. 1979 (as found at Ex-E) refusing to try the two issues referred to above preliminarily, and in the event of the Court not conceding the first request of the petitioner, then directing the Tribunal to hear and decide those additional issues preli- minarily before proceeding with the trial of the other issues. On behalf of respondents 3 (1) to 3 (24) statement of objections has been filed opposing this petition. ( 6 ) THE following three questions arise for decision in this petition: (i) Is the Tribunal competent to try at all the 2nd additional issue framed by it? (ii) Is there any issue, out of the issues framed by the Tribunal, which is required to be tried preliminarily? and (iii) Is the reference void ab-initio as contended by the petitioner in this petition. ( 7 ) LET us now consider the first question. The petitioner's contention is that not merely is the Tribunal competent to try that issue but it is required, in law, to try the same as a preliminary issue. The learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that that issue is required to be tried preliminarily because the same covers the rival contentions touching the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal to proceed with the reference. He argued that if it was found that the reference was itself void ab initio the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to deal with the matter at all. It is a fact that this issue does deal with the contention of the petitioner that the reference made by the State Government was void ab initio. It cannot be denied that this contention goes to the root of the matter touching the jurisdiction of the tribunal to deal with the alleged dispute referred to it. It is a fact that this issue does deal with the contention of the petitioner that the reference made by the State Government was void ab initio. It cannot be denied that this contention goes to the root of the matter touching the jurisdiction of the tribunal to deal with the alleged dispute referred to it. As observed by the Supreme Court in Tandur and navandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd. , v. Their Workmen 1964 (1) L. L. J. 737. and Express newspapers v. Their Workers and Staff 1962 (2) L. L. J. 227. and by this Court in P. M. Murugappa Mudaliar Ratnam Mudliar v. Raju Muddaliar 1965 (1) L. L. J. 489 = (1965) 2 Mys L. J. 73 the Tribunal will have to decide the issues dealing with the jurisdictional question first and preliminarily before proceeding to deal with other issues on merits. ( 8 ) AN industrial Tribunal is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It is the creature of a statute, the Act. It enjoys a degree of independence and performs specialised kinds of adjudicatory functions. It is required to function, while performing its functions, within its jurisdiction, i. e. , jurisdiction conferred on it by the Act which has created it. ( 9 ) IN any cause pending before it, if one of the parties questions its jurisdiction to deal with that matter then it would be its duty to satisfy itself that had jurisdiction, in law, to proceed with the matter. The fallowing observations of the the Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State oi maharashtra 1979 (2) S. C. C. 572. may be noted: "every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limit of its special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it and that statute also defines the conditions under which the tribunal can function, before that tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that matter have in fact arisen. This is true in respect of courts also. This is true in respect of courts also. " (para-25) ( 10 ) NOW, as observed by the Supreme Court in Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General oi Evacuee Property air 1952 SC. 319 . (Para-13) the Tribunal may lack jurisdiction to try a cause on account of the subject matter of the dispute being outside the scope of its power or not having certain essential preliminary requisites which are necessary to confer jurisdiction on it. ( 11 ) THOUGH it is stated that, whenever its jurisdiction or competency to try a cause is questioned, the Tribunal is duty bound to see that necessary facts and circumstances did exist inventing it with jurisdiction, can it be said that its jurisdiction or power to try an issue touching its jurisdiction is unlimited and extends to any length, whatever may be the grounds or reasons on which that issue is based, founded or formulated? suppose in a given case it is contended before the Tribunal that the act, its creator, itself is ultra vires and therefore the reference made to it was ab initio void or it is contended that the provision, of the Act under which that reference is made is ultra vires and therefore the reference is ab initio void, can this Tribunal of limited jurisdiction go into such questions? It is well known that the Tribunal, which is a creature of a statute, cannot examine the validity of the very statute. Even while considering the question as to whether it has jurisdiction to deal with a particular matter referred to it its powers are limited and are circumscribed by the provisions of the Act which has created it (the Tribunal) and has defined its powers. ( 12 ) IT is, therefore, necessary for us to find out the facts or grounds on which additional issue No. (ii) is raised. That issue was framed because the petitioner (the Management) has raised in its statement before the tribunal that the State Government had included in the order of reference some persons, who were not "workmen" as defined in the Act, and that that showed that the Government had not applied its mind while making that order, and that, on the other hand, it shows that it had mechanically passed the same. In effect what was contended was that the Government, while making this reference, has mechanically passed the order without applying its mind and therefore the reference was void ab initio and the reference being thus void ab initio, the Tribunal did not get jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. ( 13 ) CAN the Tribunal go into the question, in a reference made to it under the provisions of the Act, that that reference itself was bad for the reason that the State Government, which had made that reference, had not applied its mind and had mechanically passed the order or had no materials before it to make that reference? The answer to this question has to be in the negative. ( 14 ) IN Mohammed Hasnuddin's case (4) (supra) the question was whether the Court dealing with the reference made to it under S. 14 (1) of the hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, 1309f (corresponding to Sec. 18 (1) of the land Acquisition Act, 1894) had the competence to go behind the reference to find out as to whether the reference was bad, it having been made on a written application made to the authority concerned beyond the period of time prescribed therein. While upholding the powers of the court in this respect the Supreme court has made certain observations that have a bearing over this case. The Collector, who had made that reference to the Court, had done so exercising his powers under S. 14 (1) of that Act, the provision which had conferred powers on him to make that reference and was, therefore, bound to comply with every condition laid down in that provision of law i. e. , S. 14 (1 ). One of the conditions was that a person seeking reference, should have applied in writing to the Collector within a particular time. Though the court to which that reference had been made derived its jurisdiction by virtue of that reference it had power and competence to see that the authority, who had made, that reference had aded well within the bounds of law conferring powers on that authority to make that reference. Though the court to which that reference had been made derived its jurisdiction by virtue of that reference it had power and competence to see that the authority, who had made, that reference had aded well within the bounds of law conferring powers on that authority to make that reference. The following observations in Mohammed Hasnuddin's case (4) may be noted: "as observed by the Privy Council in Nusserwanjee v. Mynoodeen, 7 MIA 134, wherever jurisdiction is given to a Court by an Act of parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in that Act it is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied with, the jurisdiction does not arise. " (para25) then again at para-26 it is observed that "it follows that it is the duty of the Court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in S. 18 have been complied with. . . . . . . . . . . . " (underlining (italics) is mine ). So, what has been upheld in Mohammed Hasnuddin's case (4) was only that right of the court, the Court which had been invested with jurisdiction by that statute, to find out that in the matter of making a reference to it conditions laid down or stipulated by that statute had been satisfied. The observations of the Supreme Court in K. S. Venkatram and Co. , (P) Ltd. , v. State of Madras AIR 1966 SC 1089 . may also be noted. The said observations throw considerable light as to the jurisdiction and powers of special Tribunals. After considering various authorities their Lordships observe at para-24 as follows: "the legal position that emerges from the discussion may be summarised thus: If a statute imposes a liability and creates an effective machinery for deciding questions of law or fact arising in regard to that liability, it may, by necessary implication,, bar the maintainability of a civil suit in respect of the said liability. A statute may also confer exclusive jurisdiction on the authorities constituting the said machinery to decide finally a jurisdictional fact-thereby excluding by necessary implication 'the jurisdiction of a civil court in that regard But an authority created by a statute cannot question the vires of that statute or any of the provisions thereof whereunder it functions. It must act under the Act and not outside it. If it acts on the basis of a provision of the statute, which is ultra vires, to that extent it would be acting outside the Act. In that event, a suit to question the validity of such an order made outside the Act would certainly lie in a civil court. " in a nut-shell what is laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision is that a Tribunal, exercising limited jurisdiction, "must act under the Act and not outside it. " If one goes through carefully the observation of the Supreme Court in the authorities referred to above, what is discernible is that a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot, even while considering collateral or jurisdictional facts to determine its own jurisdiction go outside the Act of which it is the creature but must only traverse within its bounds in its search for an answer even to that question. In this context one or two other decisions of the supreme Court also may be taken node of In Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of baroda (1978) 2 SCC. 353 , the Supreme Court draws a distinction as to the powers of the courts (the High Courts and the supreme Court) on one hand and of the Tribunals constituted under the act on the other in the matter of finding out whether a reference made by the Government under S. 10 (1) of the Act does confer jurisdiction on the tribunals to proceed with the enquiry. I may usefully extract the observations of the Court at para-7 of that decision: "the reference in the case before us was made under S. 10 (1) which provides inter alia that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended it may at any time by order in writing refer the matter for adjudication as therein mentioned. The power conferred by S. 10 (1) on the Government to refer the dispute can be exercised not only where an industrial dispute exists but when it is also apprehended. From the material placed before the Government, Government reaches an adminstrative decision whether there exists an industrial dispute or an industrial dispute is apprehended and in either event it can exercise its power under s. 10 (1 ). But in making a reference under S. 10 (1) the Government is doing an administrative act and the fact that it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less admins- trative in character. The Court cannot therefore, canvass the order of reference closely to see if there was any material before the Government to support its conclusion, as if it was a judicial or quasi-judicial determination. No doubt it will be open to a party seeking "to impugn the resulting award to show that what was referred by the Government was not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the award. But, if the dispute was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act, its factual existence and expediency of making a reference in the circumstances of a particular case are matters entirely for the Government to decide upon and it will not be competent for the Court to hold the reference bad and quash the proceedings for want of jurisdiction merely because in its opinion there was no material before the Government on which it could have come to an affirmative conclusion of those matters, (vide Madras State v. C. P. Sarthy AIR 1953 SC 53 . The Tribunal, however referred to the decision of this Court in Sindhu Resettlement corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, (1968) 1 LLJ. 834 , in which this Court proceeded to ascertain whether there was in existence an industrial dispute at the date of reference, but the question whether in case of an apprehended dispute Govt. can make reference under S. 10 (1) was not examined. 834 , in which this Court proceeded to ascertain whether there was in existence an industrial dispute at the date of reference, but the question whether in case of an apprehended dispute Govt. can make reference under S. 10 (1) was not examined. But that apart, the question whether an industrial dispute exists at the date of reference is a question of fact to be determined on the material placed before the Tribunal with the cautions enunciated in C. P. Sarathy's case (supra ). In the case before us, it can be shown from the record accepted by the Tribunal itself that there was in existence a dispute which was legitimately referred by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Undoubtedly, it is for the Government to be satisfied about existence of the dispute and the government does not appear to be satisfied. However, it would be open to the party-impugning the reference (to contend) that there was no material before the Government, and it would be open to the Tribunal to examine the question, but that does not mean that it can sit in appeal over the decision of the government and come to a conclusion that there was no material before the Government. " (underlining (italics) is mine) in that case the limited question was whether there existed adequate materials when the Government made the reference, to show that there existed an industrial dispute or that one could be apprehended. The question was not that the Government had not applied its mind, or, that its actions were biased, or, that it had acted in a malafide manner. As observed in the last sentence of para-7 extracted above, the Tribunal is, no doubt, entitled to examine the question whether there existed an industrial dispute when the reference was made by the Government to it. This was not questioning the order of the authority making the reference but to find out that what had been referred to it was an industrial dispute as defined in the Act because 'the existence of such a dispute at the time of the reference alone that gives jurisdiction to it (the Tribunal) to enquire into the matter. In Rohtas Industries v. Its union AIR 1976 SC. 425 , the Supreme Court considered the scheme of the Act and the powers and jurisdictions of the authorities constituted under the Act. In Rohtas Industries v. Its union AIR 1976 SC. 425 , the Supreme Court considered the scheme of the Act and the powers and jurisdictions of the authorities constituted under the Act. At para-30 the Court has observed as follows: "the scheme of the Act, if we may silhouette it, is to codify the law bearing on industrial dispute. The jurisdictional essence of proceedings under the Act is the presence of an industrial dispute. " in that case two questions had been referred under S. 10 (a) of the Act for arbitration. The first question was as to whether the workmen who had participated in a strike were not entitled to wages and salaries for the period of the strike, and the second question was whether the Management was entitled to compensation for its loss flowing from the strike. On both questions, the arbitrator's award was in favour of the management, and on the question of compensation it was held in the award that the Company was entitled to recover from the workmen, who had participated in the strike, a compensation assessed at Rs. 18,000. This finding was questioned on the ground that an Arbitrator functioning under the Act had no jurisdiction or powers to go into this question of claim for compensation by the management. Upholding this view the Supreme Court has observed at para-30 referred to above, as follows: "in this perspective, the claim for compensation can be a lawful subject for arbitration only if it can be accommodated by the definition of an 'industrial dispute' in Section 2 (k ). Undoubtedly this expression must receive a vide connotation calculated as it has to produce industrial peace. Indeed, the legislation substitutes for free bargaining between the parties a binding award; but what disputes or differences fell within the scope of the Act? This matter fell for consideration of the "federal Court in western India Automobile Assn. (1949) 1 LLJ. 245. Without launching on a long discussion we may state that compensation for loss of business is not a dispute or difference between employers and workmen. It is not connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. (1949) 1 LLJ. 245. Without launching on a long discussion we may state that compensation for loss of business is not a dispute or difference between employers and workmen. It is not connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. We are unable to imagine a tort liability or compensation claimed based on loss of business being regarded as an industrial dispute as defined in the act, having regard to the language used, the setting and purpose of the statute and the industrial flavour of the dispute as one between the management and the workmen. " ( 15 ) IF we stretch the rationale of the above enunciation, as we ought to in appropriate cases, we may say that in this case also we are equally unable to imagine a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction arrogating to itself the power to decide on the validity of an administrative decision of the State government, which decision,. in fact, has, conferred jurisdiction on it (the Tribunal) to enquire into the dispute. As observed in 'rohtas Industries' case (8) supra the jurisdictional essence of the proceedings under the Act being the presence of an industrial dispute, if the initial jurisdiction of the Tribunal to proceed with an enquiry on a reference made under Sec. 10 (1) of the act is questioned, the only two things that it can consider at that stage preliminarily would be as to whether what had been referred to it was an industrial dispute as envisaged by S. 10 (1), and whether the Government that had made that reference was the "appropriate Government" as defined in the Act. ( 16 ) AS stated by me above, the second additional issue, referred to abbve. is based on the objection that the State' government, while making that reference, had not applied its mind to the facts of the case and had mechanicalldealt with the same. In view of what is stated above, the answer to the first question raised by me at para-6 above is that the Tribunal is not competent to try that issue at all. ( 17 ) TWO grounds are urged in challenging the validity of that reference in this Court (may see paragraphs 13. 5 and 13. In view of what is stated above, the answer to the first question raised by me at para-6 above is that the Tribunal is not competent to try that issue at all. ( 17 ) TWO grounds are urged in challenging the validity of that reference in this Court (may see paragraphs 13. 5 and 13. 6 of the petition.) firstly, what is contended, as already stated above, is that the Government had included in the category of workmen certain persons who were not workmen at all and that that show the Government had not applied its mind, but had made the reference acting mechanically. In this connection what is further contended is that not merely that fact shows that the Government had not applied its mind, but the reference being a single reference that whole reference is void for the inclusion of non-workmen in the category of workmen in that dispute. Whether certain persons who were not workmen have also been included in the category of workmen is a question, of fact to be decided by the tribunal. If the Tribunal decides that they were not workmen, it can drop their cases and proceed with the enquiry into the case of the others. Thus by itself would not be sufficient either to hold that there was non-application of the mind of the government in the matter of making this reference, or, that on account of that fact the entire reference was void. The other ground is that the order of reference is vitiated by malice in law, in that, the Government, while making the reference, had assumed certain things without any legal basis and without the facts of the case warranting such assumption. Assuming that, while making this reference, the points of reference had not been properly drawn casting the burden on the party liable to prove the allegation or averment, he or it was liable to prove, it does not, ipso facto, give rise to any presumption that the order of reference is visited by malice in law, and therefore void. None of the grounds urged in the petition, either taken singly or cumulatively, are sufficient, in my view, to quash the order of reference. Therefore, the 3rd question raised by me above is answered in the negative and against the petitioner. None of the grounds urged in the petition, either taken singly or cumulatively, are sufficient, in my view, to quash the order of reference. Therefore, the 3rd question raised by me above is answered in the negative and against the petitioner. ( 18 ) IT appears that the reference 19 now ripe for hearing and the Tribunal has already directed the parties to adduce evidence on merits on all the issues. The question is whether the contention of the petitioner (the management) that certain persons named in it were not workmen is required to be tried preliminarily. It is already stated that, even assuming that some non-workmen had been included along with the workmen, that itself will not make the entire. refef- ence bad or void. If the Tribunal, after taking evidence to be adduced before it by the parties on all the issues, comes to the conclusion that a few of those named as workmen were, in fact, not workmen it can pass appropriate or suitable orders in their cases while finally disposing of the matter. Therefore, as the issues now stand and for the reasons mentioned by me above, it is not necessary that the Tribunal should try any of the issues preliminarily. ( 19 ) IN the result, this petition is dismissed and the rule issued is discharged. ( 20 ) PARTIES are directed to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .