Judgment Vishwanath Mishra, J. 1. Both these applications have been heard together. The petitioner in both the cases is the same, namely, Shri B.L. Khatri. During the relevant period (1976 to 1978) he was General Manager of Maghahatu-buru Iron Ore Project which is owned by National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC) a Government of India undertaking. The said Iron Ore Project is in Bihar itself. Sri Khatri, in the capacity of General Manager, used to go out on tours to Ranchi, Secundrabad and other places, and was under the rules entitled to certain allowances. While submitting the bills, however, he used to submit inflated bills and charge more than he was entitled to. Two criminal cases one for Ranchi tour and other for Secundrabad tour have been instituted against him and cognizance has been taken in both of them, in one case under Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code and in both under Sections 468/ 471 and 420/465 of the Indian Penal Code. Both these applications have been filed under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for quashing the cognizance in those cases. The informant in both the cases is Sri R.K. Bhatacharjee, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C. B. I. Ranchi. The case-wise details are given below: Cr. Misc. No. 2384/80; According to the F.I.R. (annexure1 and the charge-sheet, Annexure 2 to the petition) he went to Secundrabad (Hyderabad) on 13 occasions during the period 24-9-1976 to 17-11-1977. He always stayed therein Hotel Park Lane. On return he used to submit inflated travelling allowance bills (T. A. bills) by committing forgery and thus obtained pecuniary benefit for himself by misusing his official position as public servant. The charge-sheet is, however, in respect of only three following instances (1) He went to Secundrabad on 22-11-1976, and left in the evening of 23-11-1976. He paid only Rs. 105/- as room charge but actually charged Rs. 220.00 by committing forgery in the receipt thus he received an excess amount of Rs. 115/- from NMDC. (2) He went to Hyderabad on 5-5-1977 stayed in the same hotel and left on 6-5-1977. He paid Rs. 110.00 as room charges but claimed Rs. 130.00 in his T. A. bill and thereby received Rs. 20.00 in excess of the amount he was entitled to. 115/- from NMDC. (2) He went to Hyderabad on 5-5-1977 stayed in the same hotel and left on 6-5-1977. He paid Rs. 110.00 as room charges but claimed Rs. 130.00 in his T. A. bill and thereby received Rs. 20.00 in excess of the amount he was entitled to. (3) He reached Hyderabad on 20-5-1977, stayed in the same hotel and left on the same day. He paid Rs. 105/- as the room charge but actually took from NMDC Rs. 130.00 through his T. A. bill and thereby received an excess amount of Rs. 25/-. The order of cognizance is annexure 4 which shows that cognizance was taken under Sec. 420 of the Indian Penal Code on 22-2-1980. Cr. Misc. No. 2629/80. As shown by the F.I.R. (Annexure 18) Sri Khatri made ten trips to Ranchi between 14-6-1977, to 27-8-1977 and on each occasion he submitted inflated T. A, bills, but the charge-sheet has been submitted only in respect of following three items: (1) Sri Khatri reached Ranchi on 16-10-1977 and stayed at South Eastern Hotel. He left on 17-10-1977. He paid Rs. 72/- only as lodging charges to the hotel but dishonestly charged Rs. 120.00 from NMDC in his T. A. bill. (2) He reached Ranchi on 18-10-1977 stayed in the same Railway hotel and left on 19-10-1977. Again he paid Rs. 72/- only as lodging charges but took from NMDC Rs. 112.50 (3) He reached Ranchi on 27-7-1977 stayed in the same hotel and left on 30-10-1977. He paid Rs. 216/- as lodging charges but dishonestly received from NMDC as sum of Rs. 390/-. Annexure 4 is the order of cognizance which was taken against him on 22-2-1980 for offences under Sec. 468/471 and Section 420 read with Sec. 465 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. It would be advantageous at this stage itself to give the modus operandi of Sri Khatri. As would appear from the counter affidavit, Sri Khatri was entitled, besides the travelling allowance and daily allowance, to charge for accommodation in any hotel up to Rs. 130.00 per day, but on all the occasions said above, he had actually paid less than that amount, though in the T. A. bills he showed Rs. 130.00 as room rent. In the hotels, besides room rent, he used to purchase cigarettes etc. but he was not actually entitled to charge NMDC for all that. 130.00 per day, but on all the occasions said above, he had actually paid less than that amount, though in the T. A. bills he showed Rs. 130.00 as room rent. In the hotels, besides room rent, he used to purchase cigarettes etc. but he was not actually entitled to charge NMDC for all that. The hotel used to give him bills with break- ups of the charges. When he used to pay the hotel he also used to receive from the hotel receipt of payments. Because he was entitled to accommodation charges of Rs. 130.00 per day, he used to make some interpolations in the final receipt of the hotel to show that the room charges were at the rate of 130.00 per day, even though actually he used to pay lesser amount as room charges or accommodation charges. The break-ups of bills of the hotels, he did not use to give with his T. A. bills. When this matter came to the knowledge of the Central Bureau of Investigation (C. B. I.), an investigation was made in which the allegations were found to be correct. The interpolations in some of the bills have also been examined by the handwriting expert before submitting charge-sheet against the petitioner. 3. The petitioner denies to have had any knowledge about the alleged interpolation in the hotel bills and about the submissions and the presentations of his T. A. bills. His case is that he always used to be accompanied by his subordinate officers who used to make all arrangements in the hotels and make payments (after taking money from him) and take receipts and bills. It is also said that the receipts used to be given in the office by the staff. The office used to prepare T. A. bills and only after being audited by the Accounts Department the final bills used to be presented before him for signature. It is, therefore, said that it was never with his knowledge that any extra amount was taken from NMDC through his T. A. bills Further it is said that if any-excess was found to have been drawn by him, it was civil liability and he could have been very well asked to pay the amount back, which was never done. It is, therefore, said that it was never with his knowledge that any extra amount was taken from NMDC through his T. A. bills Further it is said that if any-excess was found to have been drawn by him, it was civil liability and he could have been very well asked to pay the amount back, which was never done. The last but not least is a point that the offence if any is an offence under Sec. 5(1)(d) of Prevetion of Corruption Act, (for brevity P. C. Act), and as such, no prosecution could be launched against him without previous sanction of the competent authority as required by Sec. 6 of the P. C. Act. I may here itself mention that it is only the last ground which has been seriously urged at the time of argument. 4. Counter affidavits have been filed to both the petitions. The affidavits have been sworn by the same Sri R.K. Bhatacharjee who has lodged the F.I.R., investigated the case and had submitted the charge-sheets. It is stated that the petitioner has been charged in each case in respect of three items only, simply because of restriction imposed by Sec.219 of the Code. It appears that a departmental enquiry was also started against him which has been stayed by the Delhi High Court. It is said that account department which used to check the bills had no knowledge about the forgery committed in the receipts which were within the full knowledge of the petitioner in whose own pen the interpolations appear. He therefore, cannot be heard to say that he had no knowledge as to what was being done. It is also stated that the handwriting expert has found that "room rent one day" has been added by Mr. Khatri in receipts granted by Hotel Park Lane. The suppressions of the break up charges has also been alleged. So far the question of sanction under the P. C. Act is concerned, the reply of the State is that it was no part of the business of the petitioner as public servant to make interpolations in the bills and thereby receive from NMDC amounts to which he was not entitled and, therefore, he is not being prosecuted under Section 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act, and as such no sanction under Sec. 6 of the P. C. Act is necessary. At the time of argument Mr. Pandey appearing for the State stressed that if the offence would come both under the P. C. Act and Indian Penal Code, it is the choice of the State to prosecute him under one or the other enactment. 5. The cases have been argued before me within a very narrow compass. On behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Mulla has argued that these are cases in which provisions of P. C. Act cant be by passed or camouflaged by prosecuting the petitioner under Penal Code. This argument is based on assumption that the offence, if any, would come within P. C. Act, though according to him no offence under any enactment is made out. Mr. Pandey appearing for the State of Bihar has argued that if these cases come both within P. C. Act and Indian Penal Code it is the choice of the State to prosecute him either under P. C. Act, or Indian Penal Code, though in the counter affidavits, case of State is that offence under P. C. Act was not made out against the petitioner; and so he is being prosecuted under provisions of Indian Penal Code. 6. Before considering the points raised it would be useful to make mention of certain salient features in connection with the cases of corruption resorted to by a public servant Till before 1947, the corruption cases also used to be lodged under the provisions of Indian Penal Code. Mostly those cases used to be under Sec.161 of the Indian Penal Code (public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act), Sec.165 (public servant obtaining valuable thing, without consideration, from person concerned in proceeding or business transacted by such public servant) and Section 409 (criminal breach of trust by public servant or by banker or agent). In 1947 it was found necessary to have more effective provisions for prevention of bribery and corruption and in view of that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947) was enacted. This Act created a new offence known as "criminal misconduct." Sec. 5(1) of the P. C. Act defines criminal misconduct. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Sec. 5 of the P. C. Act relate to sentence. This Act created a new offence known as "criminal misconduct." Sec. 5(1) of the P. C. Act defines criminal misconduct. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Sec. 5 of the P. C. Act relate to sentence. Sub-section (4) of Sec. 5 says that the provisions of this section shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any other law and the public servant shall not be exempted from any proceeding which might be instituted against him apart from this section. Sec. 5(A) says that no officer below the officer of certain grade can investigate the cases. Sec. 6 says that no Court shall take cognizance of certain offences including criminal misconduct. Section (5), without the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government or the authority competent to remove him from the service (details narrated in the section). Section 7 permits even an accused to be a witness for himself. Here reference may be made of Sec. 4 which raises certain presumptions against a public servant. The P. C. Act, it would appear, was enacted both for the purposes of bringing to book corrupt public servants who used to escaps because of certain technicalities, and also to safeguard honest officers from being unnecessarily harassed. The sanction required under Sec. 6 of the P, C. Act gives the relevant Government or competent authority an opportunity of examining the case thoroughly and coming to the conclusion as to whether the officer should be prosecuted or not. 7. I would now refer to Sec. 5(1) of the P. C. Act which defines criminal mis-conduct. There are five clauses in it. Clause (a) deals with offence which is to a great extent covered by Sec.161 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly Clause (b) covers the offence under Sec.165 and Clause (c) offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. Needless to say that compared with Sections 161, 165 and 409 Indian Penal Code the offences under Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sec. 5(1) of the P. C. Act have certain additions and alterations. So far offences in Clause (d) and (e) of Sec. 5(1) are concerned, there are no direct prallels in the Penal Code. Clause (e) refers to possessions of a public servant which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for and are disproportionate to his known sources of income. That has nothing to do with the case before me. So far offences in Clause (d) and (e) of Sec. 5(1) are concerned, there are no direct prallels in the Penal Code. Clause (e) refers to possessions of a public servant which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for and are disproportionate to his known sources of income. That has nothing to do with the case before me. Clause (d) is of the importance for the purpose of these cases, which runs as follows; 5(1)(d). A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct- If he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. This section is wide enough to include reimbursement through inflated T. A. bills. If the T. A. bill is in any way inflated it would certainly be a corrupt practice. and the means employed will be illegal and whenever T. A. bill is presented by a public servant it is done in the capacity of his being public servant. If through inflated T. A. bills a public servant gets for himself more money than to which he is entitled, it will certainly amount to obtaining pecuniary advantage. Thus prima facie it appears that the petitioner in both the cases would be liable under Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C, Act. And if he will be so liable, the previous sanction of the competent authority will be necessary before taking cognizance in accordance with Sec. 6 of the P. C. Act. There is no dispute on the point that in the instant case no sanction has been obtained. 8. Here itself I mention that according to the State the offence committed by the petitioner does not come under Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act but comes under Sec. 420 of the Indian Penal Code which runs as follows: Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. This is the case in the counter affidavits, though at the time of argument Mr. Pandey urged a different point altogether and did not address on the point as to whether the offence committed by the petitioner in both the cases comes under Section 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act or under Sec. 420 of the Indian Penal Code. 9. It would thus appear that there may be cases falling squarely either under P. C. Act or under the Indian Penal Code. For such cases there would be no difficulty because for a case under P. C. Act sanction is a must and for a case which comes only under the Indian Penal Code no sanction is necessary. But there may be cases on the margin or cases which may come both under P. C. Act and Indian Penal Code. It is only a situation which presents the difficulty. For dealing with such cases, the authorities relied upon by both the sides have to be considered. 10. Mr. Mulla has placed much reliance on a Supreme Court case of Basirul Haq and Ors. V/s. State of West Bengal -- . One N. H. lodged an information before police that D. N. had murdered his mother and had taken her to cremation ground. The S. I. of police along with N. D. S. H. and others arrived there, got the dead body taken out of the burning pyre but did not find any injury on the dead body. The dead body was sent for postmortem examination which also did not disclose any injury whatsoever. The police found the complaint to be false but did not submit any prosecution report under Section 182 Indian Penal Code. D. N. however, filed a complaint against N. H., B. H. and others. They were originally tried for charges under Sections 297 and 500 Indian Penal Code and were convicted. The Sessions Judge, however, acquitted them in appeal holding that only offence under Sections 182 and 211 Indian Penal Code were made out. For prosecution under Sec.182 Indian Penal Code, a complaint in writing by a public servant was necessary in accordance with Sec.195 of the Code but that was not there. The Sessions Judge, however, acquitted them in appeal holding that only offence under Sections 182 and 211 Indian Penal Code were made out. For prosecution under Sec.182 Indian Penal Code, a complaint in writing by a public servant was necessary in accordance with Sec.195 of the Code but that was not there. The question whether a Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence under Sections 297 and 500 Indian Penal Code when he could not take cognizance under Sec.182 Indian Penal Code was permissible or not was referred by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court to Full Bench. The Full Bench answered it in negative, i.e. that the Magistrate was not debarred. The appeal was remanded to the Sessions Judge for hearing on merit. The Sessions judge dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence. The there was an appeal in the High Court which was summarily dismissed. The matter came to the Supreme Court where it was contended that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance under Sections 297 and 500 Indian Penal Code as the facts disclose offence under Sec.182 Indian Penal Code for which no proper complaint had been filed. The contention was negatived for reasons which are not necessary to be detailed here. Mr. Mulla has however, placed great reliance on the observation made by their Lordships in para 14 of the reported Judgment which runs as follows Though, in our judgment, Sec.195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the Court or of the public servant is required. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the Court or of the public servant is required. In Other words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in Sec.195, Criminal Procedure Code. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of Sec.195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it. Though the Prevention of Corruption Act was not under consideration in that case, the aforesaid quotation had been relied upon for drawing an analogy. Reliance was placed yet in another Supreme Court case of Durga Charan Naik and Ors. V/s. State of Orissa -- ., There the clash was between Section 353 Indian Penal Code (assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty) and Sec.186 Indian Penal Code (obstructing public servant in discharge of public function). For prosecuting under Sec.186 sanction was necessary under Sec.195 of the Code. Their Lordships compared the ingredients of both the sections and found them indistinct. It was, therefore, held that Sec.195 of the Code did not bar the trial of the accused for a distinct offence under Sec.353, Indian Penal Code, though it may be practically based on same facts as for prosecution under Sec.186 Indian Penal Code. Again in para 8 of the Judgment their Lordships have reiterated the very same principle of Bashirul Hagues case (supra). Again in para 8 of the Judgment their Lordships have reiterated the very same principle of Bashirul Hagues case (supra). The observations made in paragraph 8 of this authority are practically the same as the observation made in paragraph 14 of Bashirul Haques case Here also it has been reiterated that the provisions of Sec.195 cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages and merely by change of garb or label an offence which is essentially an offence covered by the provisions of Sec.195, cannot be taken cognizance of by misdescribing it. Reliance has been placed also on a Division Bench case of Bombay High Court in M/s. Phoenix Mills Ltd. V/s. Central Bureau of Investigation, 1972 0 BLR 87. The petitioners there, were charge-sheeted for an offence under Sec.120 (b) Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 5 of the Imports and Customs (Control) Act 1947. The allegation was that they had entered into a criminal conspiracy to dispose of certain imported goods. Under Sec. 6 of the Imports and Customs (Control) Act, 1947 a sanction was a must before taking cognizance of the offence under Sec. 5 of that Act. It was held that the allegations contained in the charge-sheet disclosed primarily and essentially an offence squarely falling within the ambit of Section 5 of the said Act, and the mandatory provision of Sec. 6 of that Act could not be permitted to be avoided or circumvented by seeking to prosecute the petitioner only under Sec.120-B Indian Penal Code. The Bombay High Court has also taken guideline from the Supreme Court case of Bashirul Haque and has referred to the same question to which I have referred earlier. The last case referred to by Mr. Mulla is a single Bench case of this very High Court reported in K.P. Sinha V/s. Aftabuddin, AIR 1955 Pat 453 . I cannot do better than quoting the last two sub-paras of Para 6 of that judgment which run as follows: In my judgment, where the facts mentioned in the complaint give rise to two offences one of which required either a complaint by the Court concerned or a sanction by the prescribed authority, the prosecution could not be started under the section which did not require any complaint by the Court or sanction necessary in law for taking cognizance of the case and thus to evade the provisions of sanction. In the present case, the offence disclosed in the complaint is in truth and substance an offence under Sec.161 of Penal Code or Sec. 5(1)(d) of Act II of 1947; the offence disclosed might also come under Sec.384 of the Penal Code. The prosecution under the first two sections require sanction under Sec. 6 of Act II of 1947 while the offence under Sec.384 did not require any sanction. In my judgment, upon the authorities, it is established that the law relating to sanction cannot be evaded by proceeding against the accused for an offence not requiring sanction. That would be, in my opinion, clear evasion of the law of sanction." 11. Before examining the cases under consideration it would be desirable in my opinion to examine the case cited by Mr. Pandey, appearing on behalf of the State. The first case is of Om Prakash V/s. The State, AIR 1955 All 275 . It was a Full Bench case heard by three Judges each giving separate judgments. There the clash was between under Sec. 409 Indian Penal Code and 5(1)(e) of the P. C. Act. I have already shown above some similarity between the two provisions. Chaturvedi, J. held that the rule of sanction laid down in Sec. 6 of the P. C. Act has no application when a public servant is prosecuted under the general law. This was also the view taken by Randhir Singh. Mr. Mulla, who has argued these two cases before me was a party to that judgment as a Judge of that Court and in his opinion the prosecution of a Public Servant under Section 409 Indian Penal Code without necessary sanction was barred by Sec. 6 of the P. C. Act. That revision was, however, dismissed in accordance with the majority view. The very same case went to the Supreme Court which upheld the majority view of the Allahabad High Court vide. -- . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while giving their finding have taken into consideration the ingredients of Sec. 405 Indian Penal Code and Sec. 5(1)(c) and (d) of the P. C. Act and have shown that the ingredients are different which in turn means that the offences are distinct and separate. Mr. Pandey has drawn my pointed attention to para 28 of the Judgment. Mr. Pandey has drawn my pointed attention to para 28 of the Judgment. Necessary portion of which is quoted below: There can, therefore, be no doubt whatever that Sec. 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act creates a new offence called "criminal misconduct" and cannot by implication displace the offence under Sec. 405, Penal Code. In this connection it is useful to compare Sections 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b) with Sections 161 and 162, Penal Code. As has already been referred to, these two sections are aggravated forms of Sections 161 and 162, Penal Code and the intention cannot be to abrogate the earlier offence by the creation of the new offence. These two offences can co-exist and the one will not be considered- as overlapping the other. Here itself I may mention that -- was not referred in this case. On the analgoy of these two cases Mr. Pandey could have contended that the offence under Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code is distinct and separate from the offence under Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, but as I have already said the ingredients of both the sections have not at all been discussed at the time of argument. I may repeat to say that learned Counsels of neither party argued as to whether the offences are distinct or not. In my opinion the facts of the case of Om Prakash are quite different from the cases of the petitioner here. That was the case under Sec. 405 Indian Penal Code which is directly referable to Section 5(1)(c) of the P. C. Act just as Sec. 5(1)(c) of the P. C. Act is referable to Sec.161 Indian Penal Code and Sec. 5(1)(b) of the P. C. Act is referable to Sec.165 Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter, the ingredients of Sections 161, 165 and 405 Indian Penal Code can very well be compared with the ingredients of Sec. 5(l)(a), 5(1) b) and 5(l)(c) of the P. C. Act respectively. The position with respect to Sec. 5(1)(d) is however different. This is not directly referable to Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code or any other section of Penal Code. Any number of cases of corruption can be brought within the ambit of Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act. The position with respect to Sec. 5(1)(d) is however different. This is not directly referable to Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code or any other section of Penal Code. Any number of cases of corruption can be brought within the ambit of Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act. No authority has been cited before me to say if an offence under Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act is distinct and separate from the offence under Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter, the guideline has to be taken from Basirul Haqs case (supra) which has been followed in so many other cases including a Patna case as mentioned above. 12. The position therefore is that it has to be examined whether in the instant case there is evasion of the rule of sanction required under the P. C. Act. For that it has to be considered whether in "truth and substance" the offence of both the cases is offence under Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act or under Section 420 or other Sections of Penal Code. With this background I may now examine the case of the petitioner. 13. In both the cases the simple and main allegation is that the petitioner has submitted inflated T. A. bills and has withdrawn certain excess amount. The quantum of the excess drawn is not of importance though Mr. Mulla, in course of his arguments laid great stress as to how such a big officer drawing a salary of Rs. 3000.00 per month could overdraw only such small amounts. The amount is, however, irrelevant if the ingredients of the section are satisfied. Comparing prima facie Sec. 5(l)(d) of the P. C, Act with Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code, in my opinion, the allegations against the petitioner come squarely within the ambit of Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C. Act, The corrupt and illegal means of submitting inflated T. A, bills is however abuse of position as public servant, and the pecuniary advantage gained for himself is also there. Hence all the ingredients of clause (d) seem to be fully satisfied in these two cases. Hence all the ingredients of clause (d) seem to be fully satisfied in these two cases. So far Section 420 Indian Penal Code is concerned the position is not free from difficulty, It is only by some legalistic exercise that the offence may be brought under Sec. 415 Indian Penal Code (cheating), The elements of fraud and dishonesty may complicate the problem. Assuming that it comes under Section 415, the question will be whether the petitioners case will come under Sections 417 or 420 Indian Penal Code. Sec. 417 will be non-cognizable whereas Section 420 will be cognizable. NMDC which is said to have been cheated, also does not seem to have any grievence in the matter. The complaint or information was not lodged by NMDC, A number of NMDC officers have sworn affidavites in favour of petitioner, copies of which have been enclosed to the petition. Hence it would be only presumptive at this stage to say that offence under Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code is made to against the petitioner. A reading of the first information reports (Annexure 1 of both cases) and charge-sheets (Annexure 2 of both cases) unmistakably show that the allegation against the petitioner was of obtaining pecuniary benefit by misusing his official position as a public servant, The first information reports of both the cases do show that action was intended to be taken also under Sec. 5(1)(d) read with Sec. 5(2) of the P. C. Act, though the charge-sheet is only under certain sections of Indian Penal Code. The investigation of the cases was also done by an officer authorised under Section 5 of the P. C. Act. The copies of the first information reports were also sent to the Special Judge, Patna who tries P. C. Act cases. There is thus no doubt that the initial intention was to prosecute him for criminal mis-donduct (P. C. Act) but when the sanction of the competent authority was not accorded or obtained charge-sheets were filed only for offences under the Penal Code. 14. In Cr. Misc. No. 2384 of 1980 the cognizance has been taken for offence under Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code only, but in Cr. Misc. No. 2629 of 1980 cognizance has been taken for offences under Sections 465, 468, 471 also besides Section 420. Sec. 465 is for committing forgery. 14. In Cr. Misc. No. 2384 of 1980 the cognizance has been taken for offence under Sec. 420 Indian Penal Code only, but in Cr. Misc. No. 2629 of 1980 cognizance has been taken for offences under Sections 465, 468, 471 also besides Section 420. Sec. 465 is for committing forgery. The specimen handwritings of petitioner were taken, but as would appear from para 18 of both the petitions the handwriting expert could not come to a clear opinion if interpolation were in the pen of the petitioner. Ext.8 to both the applications is the copy of the report of the handwriting expert. In the counter affidavits the State have taken a plea that the handwriting expert has found interpolations to be in the pen of the petitioner, but no copy of report has been attached. Sec. 468 applies only to cases where forgery is for the purpose of cheating. But as would appear from the discussions aforesaid the case of cheating stands on a very doubtful footing. Under Sec. 471 Indian Penal Code the offence is using as genuine a forged document when the forgery itself has not been prima facie established and when the charge of cheating is on extremely shaky grounds there can be no meaning in persuing the charges under Sections 465, 468 and 471 Indian Penal Code either Needless to repeat the difficulties in the way of charge under Section 420 Indian Penal Code. 15. The aforesaid analysis sufficiently shows that in "truth and substance" there are cases under Sec. 5(1)(d) of the P. C, Act right from inception and not under Sections 420, 465 and 468 or 471 Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter, the prosecution of the petitioner under the aforesaid Sections of Indian Penal Code would amount to evading the provisions of Sec. 6 of the P. C. Act by changing the garb or label of the offence, which cannot be permitted. I may add that my findings should be taken as confined to the cases under consideration, based on facts thereof. 16. Before parting with this case, I may also refer to the case of Amendra Nath Roy V/s. State -- , relied upon by Mr. Pandey. That was a case where Roy had been convicted under Sec. 409 Indian Penal Code. 16. Before parting with this case, I may also refer to the case of Amendra Nath Roy V/s. State -- , relied upon by Mr. Pandey. That was a case where Roy had been convicted under Sec. 409 Indian Penal Code. The appeal was dismissed and when the plea of sanction under Sec. 6 of the P. C. Act was taken it was ruled out on the ground that the offence under Sec. 5(1)(c) and 09 are distinct offences. An argument was also made on basis of Sec.26 of General Clauses Act which runs as follows; Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. Their Lordships while discussing this observed as follows: The choice lies with the prosecutor as to whether the offender should be prosecuted and punished under one or other of the two enactments under both of which the act or omission complained of might fall. This choice of the prosecutor is always there and if the authorities in any p10:19 AM 9/9/200510:19 AM 9/9/2005icular case decide on a prosecution under the prevention of Corruption Act then and then only the question of sanction would arise and not otherwise. Mr. Pandey arguing for the State of Bihar has laid great stress on the above excerpt. This principle can have, however, no application when the case is found to be one of evasion of rule of Section under the P. C. Act (vide para 15 (supra). 17 In view of my discussions aforesaid, it is clear that both the cases suffer for want of proper sanction and as such the cognizance taken in both of them is without jurisdiction. Prosecution of the petitioner would, therefore, amount to abuse of the process of the Court. Both the applications are, therefore, allowed and the orders of cognizance contained in annexure 4 to both the petitions are quashed.