JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. 1. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation has preferred this, appeal under S.82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 against the order dated 30th April, 1968 of the learned Judge', Employees' Insurance Court, West Bengal, dismissing the application made by the Corporation; inter alia, for adjudicating that the respondents as employers were liable to make employees' contribution in respect of the incentive bonus paid to their employees during the period from 1st January, 1963 to 30th June, 1965 and for recovery of Rs. 6213.01 p. from them towards the arrear contribution on account of the said payment of incentive bonus. 2. The principal point in this appeal, is whether the learned Judge, Employees' Insurance Court, West Bengal, was correct in holding that the incentive bonus paid by the respondent employers during the aforesaid period was the wages as defined in S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and whether or not the respondent-employers were liable to make employees' contribution to the Fund in respect of the sums paid to their employees as incentive bonus during the period 1st January, 1963 to 30th June, 1965. 3. It is not disputed that during the relevant period the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 applied to the factory of the respondents and as principal employers, the respondents were required to pay in respect of their every employee both employees' contribution and employers contribution. It is also undisputed that the Government of West Bengal Labour Department, by an order dated 5th August, 1962 had referred the industrial disputes between the employers of the engineering establishments mentioned in List 1 attached to the said order and their workmen to the 7th Industrial Tribunal. The petitioners establishment was included in the said list attached to the reference. On 9/30th April, 1964 the learned Judge: 7th Industrial Tribunal made an interim award in respect of the said disputes between the engineering establishments and their workmen. The petitioners establishment was included in the said list attached to the reference. On 9/30th April, 1964 the learned Judge: 7th Industrial Tribunal made an interim award in respect of the said disputes between the engineering establishments and their workmen. The learned Judge, 7th Industrial Tribunal recorded that the engineering establishments mentioned in the Schedule A of his order and their workmen had filed joint petitions stating that there were no disputes between them' in respect of the issues referred for adjudication and their cases should be at once disposed of by no dispute awards Accordingly, the learned Judge made a no dispute award in respect of the establishments mentioned in the Schedule A to his order. The learned Judge, 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, by his interim order further recorded that the engineering establishments mentioned in Schedule - A to his order and their workmen had filed petitions of compromise setting out the terms upon which the disputes between them had been amicably settled and they prayed for passing a compromise award in those terms. Accordingly, the learned Judge made an award in respect of the establishments mentioned in Schedule-B and their workmen in terms of the said compromise. It is undisputed that the establishment of the respondents was included in the Schedule-B attached to the said interim award of the 7th Industrial Tribunal. The Part-Y of the said compromise contained the Incentive Bonus Scheme set out at pages 28 to 31, Part II of the paper book of the appeal the said interim award of the learned Judge, 7th Industrial Tribunal was published in the extraordinary issue of the Calcutta Gazette dated 28th May, 1964. 4. The learned Judge of the Employees' Insurance Court, West Bengal in his impugned order has held that the incentive bonus was payable by the respondent employees according to their choice and not in terms of contract of employment as claimed by the Corporation. We are unable to accept this finding because the same is vitiated by substantial errors of law. We have already mentioned that admittedly the incentive bonus was payable by the respondent-employers in terms of the Scheme which formed part of the compromise award in respect of the establishments specified in the Schedule-B of the said award and their workmen. We are unable to accept this finding because the same is vitiated by substantial errors of law. We have already mentioned that admittedly the incentive bonus was payable by the respondent-employers in terms of the Scheme which formed part of the compromise award in respect of the establishments specified in the Schedule-B of the said award and their workmen. After its publication in the official gazette the said award had become enforceable and was also binding upon all parties to the dispute. The said compromise award in terms of the sub s. (6) of S. 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 continued to be binding notwithstanding the expiry of the period of its operation under sub-s. (3) of S.19 of the Act. The respondent-employers did not plead or prove that they had given any notice intimating their intention to terminate the said award. 5. Mr. Debesh Mukherjee, learned advocate for the appellant, in this connection, has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in South Indian Bank Ltd v. A.R. Chacko, AIR 1966 SC 1522, paragraphs 6 and 7. Dasgupta, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court in A.R. Chacko's case (supra), inter alia. laid down that after the period of operation of an award it continues to be binding thereafter on the parties until notice has been given by one of the parties of the intention to terminate it and two months have elapsed from the date of such notice. It was further observed that the expiry of the period of operation of an award has nothing to do with the question as to the period for which it will remain binding on the parties thereto. Mr. Mukherjee has also placed reliance upon the letter decision of the Supreme Court in Management of the Bangalore Wollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 585 , which distinguished the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Western India Match Co, Ltd Vs. Western India Match Co. Ltd AIR 1966 SC 976 and held that so long as the previous award still remains binding, points settled in that award cannot be considered in a fresh reference Further, an award ceases to be binding on the parties only after the periods of two months elapses from the date of clear intimation to terminate an award. 6. Ltd AIR 1966 SC 976 and held that so long as the previous award still remains binding, points settled in that award cannot be considered in a fresh reference Further, an award ceases to be binding on the parties only after the periods of two months elapses from the date of clear intimation to terminate an award. 6. In this connection, we may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 803 , In the said case a settlement was arrived at between the Life Insurance Corporation and its employees for payment of annual cash bonus to Clause III and Class IV employees for certain years and the said settlement was approved by the Central Government under Regulation 58 of the Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1960 The Supreme Court by majority held that Class III and Class IV employees had absolute right to receive annual cash bonus in terms of Clause 8(ii) of the settlement and it was not competent for the Central Government to issue another contrary direction which could have the effect of compelling the Life Insurance Corporation to commit a breach of its obligation under S. 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The majority decision in Madan Mohan Pathak's case (supra), was that the annual cash bonus payable under the Settlement dated 24 the January, 1974 accrued from day to day though payable at the end of the relevant financial year or on retirement or resignation. The said annual cash bonus was, therefore, held to be a debt due and owing from the Life Insurance Corporation to each Class III and Class IV employees and therefore, property of those employees within the meaning of S 31 (2) of the Constitution. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to refer to the other parts of the decision in Madan Mohan Pathak's case (supra). 7. In the instant case, we have already observed that the respondent-employers did not either plead or prove that they had given notices in terms of sub-s. (6) of S.19 of the Industrial Disputes Act terminating the aforesaid award. 8. The learned Judge of the Employees' Insurance Court also erred in law in finding that the parties to the award made by the 7th Industrial Tribunal had eventually rejected the award in respect of the incentive bonus. 8. The learned Judge of the Employees' Insurance Court also erred in law in finding that the parties to the award made by the 7th Industrial Tribunal had eventually rejected the award in respect of the incentive bonus. His said finding is not consistent with the other finding of the learned Judge that the said award stood terminated so far as it related to payment of incentive bonus. We have already indicated that there was no pleading or proof of the fact that the respondent-employers had terminated the said award in accordance with sub-s. (6) of S.19 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 9. In our view, there was neither requisite pleading nor evidence for drawing an inference of an intention on the part of the employer and the employees to terminate the aforesaid award relating to payment of incentive bonus. The Supreme Court in Workmen of Western India Match Co. Ltd's case (supra) upon consideration of the correspondence between the parties and also because of the management's agreement to refer the dispute in question for adjudication had concluded that the management was precluded from objecting to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the ground that no formal notice as contemplated in S.19(2) of the Act was given. 10. In the instant case, the respondent-employers in paragraph 5(e) averred that the principals suggested by the award did not continue but they had given way to ever changing practices which were found in course of day to day working to be better, convenient and more suitable for the purpose of production. The respondents had further pleaded that as a matter of fact, the old principles, if any, became outmoded and unsuitable. But at the hearing the respondents failed to substantiate those aforesaid allegations. Loknath Agarwal, witness No.1 for the opposite parties, had admitted about the existence of the aforesaid award which, inter alia pointed out payment of incentive bonus. We are unable to accept the further claim of the said witness that the employers themselves had framed the scheme for incentive bonus and it was not framed to compromise with the workers. The opposite party witness No.1 had also admitted that the incentive bonus was being paid to their workers. We are unable to accept the further claim of the said witness that the employers themselves had framed the scheme for incentive bonus and it was not framed to compromise with the workers. The opposite party witness No.1 had also admitted that the incentive bonus was being paid to their workers. There was no evidence in support of the claim of the witness No. 1 for the opposite parties that the quantum of incentive bonus to a particular worker varied according to their judgment at different times. The said witness did not even state that the said compromise award had been terminated either in accordance with S. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act or by any subsequent agreement, conduct of the parties. At the some times in cross-examination, Loknath Agarwal the opposite party witness No.1. admitted that payment of incentive bonus was not stopped at any time during the period of claim i.e. 1.1.1963 to 30.6.1965. Merely because the employers might have paid to some of their workers amounts as incentive bonus in excess of what would have been payable according to the aforesaid award was no evidence of the fact that the parties had rejected the award or that the said award stood terminated. In fact, there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence on record in support of the said finding of the learned Judge that the award providing for incentive bonus had been either rejected or the same had been terminated. We, accordingly, conclude that t\e aforesaid award of the 7th Industrial Tribunal (Ext. B2) continued to remain binding upon the parties. D.P. Jadav, who was a Head Clerk of the respondent opposite parties, was a formal witness proving certain entries in the books of the employers. He had admitted in cross-examination that he could not say with reference to the record whether there were instances of variation from the rates given by the award of the Industrial Tribunal. The learned Judge of the Court below failed to consider that D.P. Jadav. Opposite party witness No. 2 in his cross-examination admitted that he was only saying from his memory about the payments of incentive bonus to Baljit Ram, Phagu Hajam and Kedar Nath. The learned Judge of the Court below failed to consider that D.P. Jadav. Opposite party witness No. 2 in his cross-examination admitted that he was only saying from his memory about the payments of incentive bonus to Baljit Ram, Phagu Hajam and Kedar Nath. Therefore, on the ground of alleged deviation in the matter of payment of incentive bonus to these workers the learned Judge of the court below could not have inferred that the award in question had been either rejected or terminated. We conclude that during the relevant period the aforesaid interim award of the 7th Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal (Ext. B2) continued to remain binding upon the respondent-employers and their workman. 11. The Court below has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Braithwaite & Co, (India) Ltd. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1968 SC 43 . In our view, the decision in M/s Braithwaite & Co's case (supra), is distinguishable on facts and the said Supreme Court decision does not support the view taken by the court below that the incentive bonus payable in the instant case was not part of the wages of, he workmen employed by the respondents. 12. Sitting singly, one of us in Rayrolle Burn Ltd v. The Employee, State Insurance Corporation & anr. 1979 (2) CLJ 205 recently considered the point indicated above. We approve of the view expressed in Rayrolle Burn Ltd's case (supra). In M/s. Braithwaite & Company's case (supra), Inam was payable under a scheme made by the company and not under any binding conciliation or award under the Industrial Disputes Act The Supreme Court had reversed the decision of this court and held that the payment of the said Inam was not an implied condition of employment of the worker concerned within the meaning of the 1st Part of the definition of the word 'wages' in S. 2(22) of the Employees' State insurance Act 1948. Under the scheme considered by the Supreme Court, the employers had reserved their right to withdraw or vary the conditions of the said Scheme without assigning any reason or without any agreement with the employees concerned. Further, Inam in the said case could become non-payable for reason for which the employees were not at all to blame and for which the employer itself might be responsible. Further, Inam in the said case could become non-payable for reason for which the employees were not at all to blame and for which the employer itself might be responsible. Thus, the ratio of the decision M/s. Braithwaite & Co's case (supra), was that then payment and withholding of incentive bonus depended upon the employers' unilateral decision, then the said provision for payment of incentive bonus could not be considered as one of the conditions of employment of the workmen. Thus, the real point for determination in case would be to consider the terms and conditions under which incentive bonus is payable. When incentive bonus is in the nature of a bounty and can be paid or withheld according to the unilateral decision of the employer, such payment cannot be considered as one of the conditions of employment of the workmen. If on the other hand, the employer has no such discretion and it is obligatory upon it to pay incentive bonus and he is not entitled to make any departure according to its sweet will from the Incentive Bonus Scheme, then the employees fulfilling the requirements of the said Scheme have a vested right to receive incentive bonus as a put of their remuneration. 13. We may now proceed to consider the provisions of the Scheme under which the incentive bonus was payable by the respondent-employers to their workmen during the relevant period. We have already observed that the said scheme forms an integral part of the interim award by the 7th Industrial Tribunal in respect of the industries specified in the Schedule-B of the said award The said award until terminated was binding upon the parties. Unlike in M/s. Braithwaite & Co.s case (supra), the instant Scheme under the interim award did not confer any authority upon the employers to unilaterally withdraw or modify the provisions of the incentive bonus scheme So long as the award in respect of the Schedule-B industries remained binding the workmen fulfilling the conditions of eligibility were entitled to receive incentive bonus. The said incentive bonus was made dependant upon the efficiency of the workers and was proportionate to the efficiency attained in production. But merely because payment of incentive bonus was subject to attainment of certain level of efficiency it did not mean that such bonus was not one of the implied conditions of employment of the workmen. 14 Mr. The said incentive bonus was made dependant upon the efficiency of the workers and was proportionate to the efficiency attained in production. But merely because payment of incentive bonus was subject to attainment of certain level of efficiency it did not mean that such bonus was not one of the implied conditions of employment of the workmen. 14 Mr. Mitra has drawn our attention to the provision in the incentive bonus Scheme under which the management reserved its right to transfer a man or men from one group to another or from one machine to another. But this cannot be considered equivalent to management reserving its right to revoke or modify .he Scheme in question. On the other hand, under the scheme itself one of the conditions was that the management would have the right to transfer a minor men from one group or from one machine to another. The provision for disqualification also were in the nature of conditions which have to be fulfilled for acquiring right to receive incentive bonus. 15. The Court below has also found that the incentive bonus was payable at interval exceeding two months Therefore, the same was not wages. The Court below, in our view, has not thereby correctly interpreted the provision in the scheme regarding the mode of payment. According to the said scheme, the incentive bonus would be accounted quarterly each quarter ending on the last date of March, June, September, and December every year and was to be paid within 15 days from the end of the quarter. At the same time, under the Scheme the management could grant advances against earned incentive bonus every month on the clear understanding that the same would be adjusted at the end of quarterly accounting period. Thus, the mere fact that the accounting of the incentive bonus earned was to be made quarterly did not mean that the payments were also made quarterly at intervals longer than two months Loknath Agarwal in the concluding pan of his cross-examination stated that the incentive bonus could be granted by the management to the workers every month in advance on the clear understanding that the same would be adjusted at the end of quarterly accounting period. Further, according to the said witness, during the period from 1st January, 1963 to 30th June, 1965, payment of incentive bonus was never stopped. 16. Further, according to the said witness, during the period from 1st January, 1963 to 30th June, 1965, payment of incentive bonus was never stopped. 16. The learned Judge of the court below has also referred to the provision in the Scheme for execution of the period for computation of incentive bonus. The said clause refers to the period which the main producing machines may remain idle due to causes which are beyond the control of the management and therefore, it cannot be held that the said provision gave a discretion to the employer to discontinue payment of incentive bonus. Another point was that the apprentices were not entitled to get incentive bonus although apprentices were employees It may be that in respect of a class of employees payment of incentive bonus did not form part of the terms and conditions of their employment. But this cannot be a ground for holding that even in respect of those workmen to whom incentive bonus was payable under the Scheme, the same did not form part of the conditions of their employment. 17. It was also not relevant whether or not the employers in making contribution of the provident fund included or excluded the incentive bonus payable to the workmen. 18. Upon a consideration of the Scheme as framed under the aforesaid interim award, we conclude that the incentive bonus was payable by the respondent-employers to their workmen as a part of their wages within the meaning of S. 2(22) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The learned Judge of the Court below had committed substantial error of law by dismissing the cause brought by the appellant, Corporation. 19. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the court below. Let a declaration be made that the incentive bonus paid by the respondent employers to their employees according to the Incentive Bonus Scheme under the award of the 7th Industrial Tribunal published On 28th May, 1964 form part of the wages of the said workmen. The Respondents were liable to make employer's special contribution and the employees' contribution in respect of the payment of the said incentive bonus under the said award. We direct the learned Judge. Employees Insurance Court to commute the amounts of contribution in accordance with law and in terms of our judgment. The Respondents would be liable to pay the said computed amount. We direct the learned Judge. Employees Insurance Court to commute the amounts of contribution in accordance with law and in terms of our judgment. The Respondents would be liable to pay the said computed amount. There will be no order as to costs. No decree made be drawn up in this appeal. Let a copy of the order be communicated to the court below expeditiously. Maitra J: I agree. Appeal allowed.