Judgment M. P. Singh, J. 1. This appeal by the Union of India is from the judg ment and decree dated 23rd December, 1975, of the fourth Additional District judge, Dumka, Santhal Parganas, affirming the decision of the Subordinate judge, Deoghar, in Title Suit no.61 of 1971 with the modification that it rejected the relief for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-appel lant from removing the plaintiffs from their services in future. The title appeal in the lower appellate court abated against the heirs of deceased respondent no.10. The plaintiff respondents were substitute Gangmen. The suit was for a declaration that the termination of their services from 28th February, 1971, was illegal and void and they should be deemed to be continuing in service. It was also prayed that a decree for arrears of salary and allowances from that date till the date of reinstatment be passed. The case of the defendant appellant was that the plaintiffs were temporary substitute Gangmen and not permanent railway employees and as they were not selected by the Selection board their service had to be terminated. 2. On 20th January, 1978 while admitting this appeal only one substantial question of law was formulated by this Court : "whether thes court below were correct in law in holding that payment of compensation as per rule 2302 should have preceded the order of termination of service ?" In my opinion, the answer to this point much be in the affirmative. Rule 2302 of the Railway Establishment Manual runs as under : "2302. Termination of service and periods of notice.- (1) Service of a temporary railway servant shall be liable to termination on 14 days notice on either side provided that such a railway servant shall not be entitled to any notice of termination of his service :- (1) If the termination is due to the expiry of the sanction to the post which he holds or expiry of the officiating vacancy or to his compulsory retirement due to mental or physical incapability or to his removal or dismissal from service as a disciplinary measure after compliance with the provisions of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. (ii) When he is deemed to have resigned his appointment and ceased to be in railway employment in the circumstances detailed under Note 2 below Exception II to rule 732 (1) of the indian Railway Establishment Code, Volume I. (2) In lieu of the notice prescribed in this paragraph, it shall be permissible on the part of the Railway Administrstidn to terminate the service of a railway servant by paying him the pay for the period of notice. (3) The notice of termination of service under this paragraph should be given by an authority not lower than the appoint ing authority. (4) In the case of a railway servant or apprentice to whom the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 apply he shall be entitled to notice or wage in lieu thereof in accordance with the provisions of that Act," 3 On a perusal of the above it is quite clear that the service of a temporary railway employee can be terminated either on 14 days notice or in lieu thereof by payment to him the pay for the period of notice as provided in sub rule (2) of the said Rule. Admittedly in this case no notice for terminatin of the services of the plaintiffs was given to them. So in lieu of the notice the railway administration was bound to pay 14 days pay to them. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the railway administration was not bound to pay 14 days pay during the period of their service. He submitted that the payment could be made even after the service was terminated and that such payment was not a condition precedent to the order of termination. In my opinion, his contention is unsound. It cannot be disputed that notice for termination of the service must be given at the time when the employees are in service. The payment is in lieu of the notice. I am, therefore, of opinion that payment also must be made while the temporary employees are in service. That is the proper construction which, I think, should be put on the provisions of Rule 2302. I am further of opinion that this rule is mandatory and must be complied with. In the present case the findings of the two courts below is that the plaintiffs were not in service on 28th February, 1971. That is the proper construction which, I think, should be put on the provisions of Rule 2302. I am further of opinion that this rule is mandatory and must be complied with. In the present case the findings of the two courts below is that the plaintiffs were not in service on 28th February, 1971. In other words their services had been terminated prior to that. It is clear from the findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs were in service only upto 27th February 1971. The offer of payment was made on 28th February 1971, and 25th March 1971. As already stated they were not in service on those days. The offer, therefore, must be held to be invalid and that the order of termination was illegal and void. 4. Counsel for the appellant argued that the courts below had not considered the effect of receipt of the pay by the plaintiffs-respondents for the whole month of February 1971, on 25th March, 1971. It was urged that the plaintiffs should be deemed to be in service on 28th February 1971, also when they received the pay of that day also. The contention is devoid of any merit. In the plaint the plaintiffs clearly said that they were not allowed to work after 27th February 1971, and that the stoppage of the work amounted to their dismissal. Both of the courts below held that the plaintiffs were not in service on 28th February, 1971, when the offer was made. This is a finding of fact supported by evidence on record and the High Court cannot interfere with that. No such question was formulated by this Court. I am of the opinion that this is not a substantial question of law. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 5. In this Court Mr. P. K. Bose appearing for the defendant railway administration raised another point in relation to Sec.80 of the Code of civil Procedure. He said that the suit was not maintainable because the section 80 notice did not state the cause of action. It was pointed out that the services of the plaintiffs were terminated from 28th February, 1971, and according to paragraph 12 of the plaint the cause of action arose on 28th february, 1971, when the railway administration stopped, taking work from the plaintiffs. In my opinion, learned counsel is not right. It was pointed out that the services of the plaintiffs were terminated from 28th February, 1971, and according to paragraph 12 of the plaint the cause of action arose on 28th february, 1971, when the railway administration stopped, taking work from the plaintiffs. In my opinion, learned counsel is not right. The expression "cause of action" is not to be understood only with reference to the date mentioned in the plaint It means every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiffs to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment. In other words the cause of action means the bundle of facts stated in the plaint on which the plaintiff relies in order to get a verdict in his favour. In the present case all the necessary facts except the actual termination of service has been stated in section 80 notice. The plaintiffs also said that they had imminent apprehension of the illegal retrenchment which the railway administration was contemplating. It said in case you will still proceed to illegally retrench my aforesaid clients they will file a suit for injunction and damages against the railway administration after the expiration of two months next after the same has been delivered to you. " in my opinion, it cannot be said that section 80 notice suffers due to want of statement of cause of action. Moreover, no issue to this effect was framed in the trial court relating to the defect in section 80 notice. It is true that the trial court has mentioned in paragraph 26 of the judgment that the plaintiffs had complied with section 80 notice but 1 think that it was not done merely by way of abundant caution. It does not show that the point was really argued on behalf of the defendant. The lower appellate court in paragraph 10 of the judgment has said "in fact, no such plea was taken in the written statement nor pressed before the learned lower court. Indeed no issue was framed by the trial court in respect thereof". Mr. P. K. Bose submitted that the court of appeal below has committed an error of record in saying that no such plea was taken in the written statement. Here he is right. Indeed no issue was framed by the trial court in respect thereof". Mr. P. K. Bose submitted that the court of appeal below has committed an error of record in saying that no such plea was taken in the written statement. Here he is right. It appears that such a plea was taken in the written statement but the other observation of the lower appellate court seems to be correct. At the time of admission of the second appeal the learned counsel did argue this point relating to section 80 notice but still no question was formulated by this Court on this point. Learned counsel must not, therefore, have insisted for it. It, therefore, seems to me that the point relating to section 80 notice was waived by the railway administration. In any manner I have shown that the notice does not suffer for want of cause of action. The point thus has no force. 6. Mr. B. C. Ghose appearing for the plaintiff respondents contended that the lower appellate court erred in law in holding that section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act was not applicable to this case and that the present case was not a case of retrenchment. He submitted that every termi nation of service for any reason whatsoever would be retrenchment and hence the provisions of section 25-F which are mandatory must be complied with. Counsel urged that admittedly no notice was given as required by that section and that the plaintiffs were turned out without payment of compensation as provided therein. On the other hand, Mr. P. K. Bose argued that retrenchment was not pleaded in the plaint and hence was not open to the plaintiffs to urge this point here. His argument is that it is the case pleaded that has to be found and the plaintiffs cannot travel outside the grounds mentioned in the plaint. He further argued that the civil court has no jurisdiction to go into this question. Both parties have cited rulings in support of their contention. In the view of the case which 1 have taken it is unnecessary to embark upon a discussion on this aspect of the case. 7. For the reasons given above I hold that there is no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.