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1980 DIGILAW 170 (GUJ)

PARSHOTTAMDAS RAMDAS PATEL v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AHMEDABAD

1980-09-22

G.T.NANAVATI, S.H.SHETH

body1980
S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) ALL these petitions raise common questions of law. Therefore they are decided by this common judgment. ( 2 ) AHMEDABAD Municipal Corporation has framed Town Planning Scheme No. 29 which was provisionally sanctioned on 21st Novel 1968 and finally sanctioned on 1/02/1976. All the lands with which we are concerned in this group of petitions are comprised in Town Planning Scheme No. 29. They are agricultural lands. Survey No. 126/1/1 and Survey No. 171/1/1 in Special Civil Application No. 3295 of 1979 (and no other lands species in that petition) and all lands with which at other petitions are concerned have been reserved under the Town Panning Scheme for construction of houses for the employees of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. On 31/03/1976 Government of Gujarat issued notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in respect of the aforesaid lands. It was published on 8/04/1976 Enquiry under sec. 5a of the end Acquisition Act was held. Thereafter on 27/03/1979 declaration under sec. 6 of the land Acquisition Act was made and it was published on 5/04/1979. The lands are sought to be acquired under the aforesaid notifications for a public purpose viz. construction of houses for the employees of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. ( 3 ) PRIOR thereto on 26/08/1974 Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation passed a Resolution in which it was resolved that the aforesaid lands be purchased at the rate of Rs. 43 per square yard under an agreement which was entered into with the owners of those lands. However the lands were not actually purchased. ( 4 ) ON 17/02/1976 the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Land Ceiling Act for the sake of brevity) came into force and under that Act all the aforesaid lands were declared as vacant lands. Therefore the petitioners filed statements before the Competent Authority as required by that Act. Since proceedings under the Land Ceiling Act commenced proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were slowed down. ( 5 ) THE petitioners felt that their lands were not governed by the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act. Therefore they filed these petitions R which they prayed for quashing the proceedings in respect of the aforesaid lands pending before the Competent Authority under the Land Ceiling Act and for directing the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with land acquisition proceedings. Therefore they filed these petitions R which they prayed for quashing the proceedings in respect of the aforesaid lands pending before the Competent Authority under the Land Ceiling Act and for directing the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with land acquisition proceedings. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the petitioners Mr. Nanavaty has raised three contentious before us : (1) Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament in so far as the State of Gujarat is concerned. (2) The aforesaid lands are not vacant lands and therefore the proceedings under the Land Ceiling Act are liable to be quashed. (3) Land Acquisition officer should proceed to make the award under Land Acquisition Act in respect of the lands which are under acquisition. ( 7 ) BEFORE we proceed to deal with these contentions it is necessary to make it clear that this judgment will govern all lands with which Special Civil Applications Nos. 3480 of 1979 3481 of 1979 3648 of 1979 668 of 1980 669 of 1980 889 of 1980 and 1205 of 198 are concerned and only Survey No. 126/1/1 and Survey No. 171/1/1 with which Special Civil application No. 3295 of 1979 is concerned. It shall not gown other lands which have been specified in Special Civil Application No. 3295 of 1979 because they are admittedly vacant lands. ( 8 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned it is necessary to refer to Entry 18 in the State List in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. indisputably the impugned legislation has been enacted by Parliament under Entry 18 in the State List. It is not within the legislative competence of Parliament to enact a legislation in respect of a subject which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislature unless such legislation falls within the exceptions contained in Part XI of the Constitution. Art. 252 makes one such exception. It is not within the legislative competence of Parliament to enact a legislation in respect of a subject which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislature unless such legislation falls within the exceptions contained in Part XI of the Constitution. Art. 252 makes one such exception. Clause (1) thereof provides as under:if it appears to the Legislatures of two or more States to be desirable that any of the matters with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws for the States except as provided ill Articles 249 and 250 should be regulated in such States by Parliament by law and if resolutions to that effect are passed by all the Houses of the Legislatures of those States it shall be lawful for Parliament to pass an Act for regulating that matter accordingly and any Act so passed shall apply to such States and to any other State by which it is adopted afterwards by resolution passed in that behalf by the House or. where there are two Houses by each of the Houses of the Legislature of that State. THE preamble to the Land Ceiling Act in terms states that in pursuance of Clause (1) of Art. 252 of the Constitution Gujarat Legislature has passed the resolution that the matters falling within Entry 18 in the State List should be regulated by Parliament by law. It is clear therefore that the impugned Act has been passed by Parliament under Entry 18 of the State List read with clause (1) of Art 252 and the resolution passed by Gujarat Legislature. ( 9 ) HOWEVER it has been argued b) Mr. Nanavaty that within the meaning of Art. 252 (1) Legislature means not only the Legislative Assembly where there is only one close of Legislature or Legislative Assembly and Legislature Council where there are two Houses of Legislature but also the Governor. According to him consent of the Governor was not obtained in the instant case and therefore even through Gujarat Legislative Assembly had passed the resolution under clause (1) of Art. 252 it was not sufficient to enable the Parliament to make the impugned law for the State of Gujarat This question has been salted by the Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA V. VALLURI BASAVAIAH CHOUDHARY AND OTHERS ETC. AIR 1979 S. C. 1415. AIR 1979 S. C. 1415. A similar question arose before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in relation to the impugned legislation. It was contended before the Andhra Pradesh High Court which upheld it that consent of the Governor was necessary in order to clothe the Parliament with full authority to make impugned legislation under Entry 18 in the State List. The Supreme Court in appeal has held that the expressions Legislature as well as Houses of Legislature used in Art 252 do not carry the same meaning as the expression Legislature carries under Art. 168. For the purposes of Art. 252 the expression Legislature or the expression Houses of Legislature means the Legislative Assembly where there is only one House of Legislature or the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council where there is a bicameral Legislature. For the purposes of Art. 252 (1) Governor it has been held by the Supreme Court does not form a part of the Legislature. Therefore the first part of the contention raised by Mr. Nanavaty is without any substance and is rejected. ( 10 ) IT has been further argued by him that in the State of Gujarat there are two Acts in force viz the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1947 and the Bombay Land Revenue Code. According to him therefore the Land Ceiling Act could not have been passed in respect of the State of Gujarat because the subject matter of all three Acts overlap. It is not necessary for us to consider what result will be produced if they overlap because we are of the opinion that they do not overlap. The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1947 deals with the agricultural Lands. Bombay Land Avenue Code deals both with the agricultural lands as well as nonagricultural lauds. So far as Bombay Land Revenue Code is concerned all that Mr. Nanavaty has argued is 3th permission to convert an agricultural land for nonagricultural purposes is required to be taken under Bombay Land Revenue Code. Sec. 2 (q) of the impugned Act defines vacant land in the following term:vacant land means land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration but does not include. . . . . . . . . . Sec. 2 (q) of the impugned Act defines vacant land in the following term:vacant land means land not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration but does not include. . . . . . . . . . VACANT land to which the Land Ceiling Act applies is therefore land which is not being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture. It is clear therefore that the land which are principally used for agriculture are excluded from the purview of the Land Ceiling Act. Therefore provisions of the Land Ceiling Act do not come in conflict with the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1947 which govern agricultural lands and the relevant provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The second part of the first contention which Mr. Nanavaty has raised is therefore without any substance and is rejected. In the result the first contention fails. ( 11 ) THE second contention which Mr. Nanavaty has raised is that the aforesaid lands are not vacant lands within the meaning of that expression given in sec. 2 (q) of the Land Ceiling Act According to him therefore proceedings before the competent authorial under the Land Ceiling Act are without jurisdiction and therefore are liable to be quashed. The facts on which he has relied and about which there is no controversy are that since 1965 permission to build upon the aforesaid lands had not been granted because they were forming a part of the green belt around the cite of Ahmedabad. Secondly since 1976 the aforesaid lands have been the subject matter of land and canalization proceedings under Land Acquisition Act. thirdly they are reserved for a public purpose under Town Planning Scheme No. 29 framed by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation under the Bombay Town Planning Act. There is no dispute about the fact that the aforesaid lands are situate in Ahmedabad Urban Agglomeration. In order to examine this contention it is necessary to turn again to definition of vacant land given in sec. 2 (q ). There is no dispute about the fact that the aforesaid lands are situate in Ahmedabad Urban Agglomeration. In order to examine this contention it is necessary to turn again to definition of vacant land given in sec. 2 (q ). The relevant part of the diffusion reads as under: vacant land means lands not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration but does not include (I) land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The expression urban agglomeration has been defined by sec. 2 (n ). The relevant part of the definition is as follows :urban agglomerations (A) in relation to any State or union territory specified in column (1) of Schedule means (i) the urban agglomeration specified in the corresponding entry in column (2) thereof and includes the peripheral area Specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) thereof Ahmedabad Urban Agglomeration land is specified at Serial No. 4 in Entry 4 in SCHEDULE I to the Land Ceiling Act. The aforesaid lands are situated within the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area which forms the major part of the Ahmedabad Urban Agglomeration. Urban land has been defined by sec. 2 (o) of the Land Ceiling Act and the relevant part of the definition is as follows:urban land means - (i) any land situated within the limits of an urban agglomeration and referred to as such in the master plan;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . There are several Explanations to clause (o) of sec. 2 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act Explanation (C) reads as follows:notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture. MASTER plan has been defined by sec. 2 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act Explanation (C) reads as follows:notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture. MASTER plan has been defined by sec. 2 (h) in the following terms: master plan in relation to an area within an urban agglomeration or any part thereof means the plan (by whatever name called) prepared under any law for the time being in force or in pursuance of an order made by the State Government for the development of such area or part thereof and providing for the stages by which such development shall be carried out. Town Planning Scheme No. 29 framed under the Bombay Town Planning Act is in our opinion a master plan within the meaning of that expresssion used in Explanation (C) referred to above. Therefore so far as the permissibility of the building activity under the building regulations on the aforesaid lands is concerned three propositions arise. Firstly on account of the fact that the aforesaid lands were included in the green belt around the city of Ahmedabad no building activity was permitted till 1975. In 1975 6 belt was abolished. Therefore the aforesaid lands became free from restrictions which flowed from the existence of the green belt. Secondly with the coming into force of the Town Planning Scheme No. 29 framed under the Bombay Town Planning Act no building activity is permissible on the aforesaid land because they are reserved for a public purpose. Sec. 29 of the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 after Asia provides as follows:29 (1) On or after the date on which the local authoritys declaration of intention to make a scheme under sec. 22 or the notification issued by the State Government under sec. is published in the official Gazette (a) no person shall within the area included in the scheme erect or proceed with any building or work or remove pull down. 22 or the notification issued by the State Government under sec. is published in the official Gazette (a) no person shall within the area included in the scheme erect or proceed with any building or work or remove pull down. alter make additions to or make any substantial repair to any Bulldog part of building a compound wall or any drainage work or remove are in earth stone or material or sub divide any land or charge the user of any land or building unless such person has applied for and obtained the necessary permission which shall be contained in a commencement certificate granted by the local authority in the form Described. Sec. 29 of the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 in our opinion is a building regulation within the meaning of that expression used in sub clause (1) of clause (q) of sec. 2 of the Land Ceiling Act. Therefore it is not permissible to build upon the aforesaid lands by virtue of the embargo placed upon building activity under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 2a of the bombay Town Planning Act 1954 In that behalf. we may note that the expression building regulations has been defined by the Land Ceiling Act. Sec. 2 (b) defines it as follows:in this Act unless the context otherwise requires. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) building regulations means the regulations contained in the master plan. or the law in force governing the construction of buildings. THEREFORE building activity is not permissible on the aforesaid lands by virtue of the provisions of seen 29 (1) of the Bombay Town Planning Act 1954 ( 12 ) THE third proposition emerges from the notifications issued under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the aforesaid lands. Notification under sec. 4 was issued in 1976. Declaration under sec. 6 was made in 1979 Clause Seventhly in sec. 24 of the Land Acquisition Act provides as follows:but the Court shall not take into consideration seventhly any outlay or improvements on or disposal of the land acquired. commenced made or affected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication of the notification under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1 ). IF the petitioners are not entitled by virtue of the said provision in sec. commenced made or affected without the sanction of the Collector after the date of the publication of the notification under sec. 4 sub-sec. (1 ). IF the petitioners are not entitled by virtue of the said provision in sec. 24 to reimbursement of outlay or improvement which they may make on the aforesaid lands certainly they will not out of prudence construct or build upon them. Clause Seventhly in sec 24 therefore operates as a restriction on the building activity on the after said lands. ( 13 ) OUR attention has been invited by Mr. Nanavaty to the decision of the Death High Court in SMT. SHANTI DEVI V. THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY UNDER U. L. (C. and R.) ACT 1976 DELHI AND OTHERS AIR 1980 DELHI 10 The question whether the land in that case was vacant land within the training of sec. 2 (q) of the Land Ceiling Act arose before Delhi High Court. That land was under acquisition because notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 was issued. In view of the operation of notification issued under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 Delhi High Court held that building activity was not permissible on that land as no prudent person would construct on land already notified under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act as he would get no compensation for it unless the construction was made with the permission of the Collector. Therefore in the opinion of the Delhi High Court for all intents and purposes effect of the notification issued under sec. 4 was that building activity was not permissible on that land. Therefore plots of land belonging of the petitioner in that case were excluded from the total holding of the petitioner in that case for the purposes of computing Content land under the Land Ceiling Act. ( 14 ) IN reply it has been argued by Mr. Takwani that expression pot permissible under the building regulations in force used in sub clause (1) of sec. 2 of the Land Ceiling Act means total impermissibility in the matter of building activity upon the lands in question and not qualified permissibility. In other words according to Mr. ( 14 ) IN reply it has been argued by Mr. Takwani that expression pot permissible under the building regulations in force used in sub clause (1) of sec. 2 of the Land Ceiling Act means total impermissibility in the matter of building activity upon the lands in question and not qualified permissibility. In other words according to Mr. Take any if construction of a building can be undertaken with the permission of the Land Acquisition Officer in case of a land which is under acquisition or with the permission of the Collector or the local authority in a case where there is a Town Planning scheme or a master plan in force subs a land cannot be said to be falling within the exception carved out by sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of sec. 2 of the Land Ceiling Act. Such a land according to him is one upon which building activity is permissible. We are unable to accede to the contention raised by Mr. Takwani. Nonpermissibility contemplated by sub-clause (i) of clause (q) of sec. 2 in the Land Ceiling Act is not total impermissibility but it means absence of unfettered permissibility subject indeed to the ordinary building byelaws of the concerned local authority. ( 15 ) IN the view which we have taken we are of the opinion that since the aforesaid lands are subject matter of land acquisition proceedings and since they are included in Town Planning Scheme No. 29 of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation they are not vacant lands within the meaning of sec. 2 (q) of the Land Ceiling Act. Therefore the provisions of Land Ceiling Act do not apply to the lands in question. The proceedings before the competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act are therefore liable to be quashed. ( 16 ) THE next contention which Mr. Nanavaty has leased is purely consequential. If proceedings in respect of the aforesaid lands before the competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act are liable to be quashed obviously the land acquisition proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer must go on. The Land Acquisition Officer cannot sit on fence and wait for the decision by the competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act. If proceedings in respect of the aforesaid lands before the competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act are liable to be quashed obviously the land acquisition proceedings before the Land Acquisition Officer must go on. The Land Acquisition Officer cannot sit on fence and wait for the decision by the competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act. In the view which we have taken the Land Acquisition Officer is liable to be directed to proceed ahead with the land acquisition process endings and to make award in respect of the aforesaid lands. ( 17 ) IN the result all petitions are allowed. Proceedings under Land Ceiling Act in respect of the after said lands pending before respondent No. 2 the competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act are quashed as the aforesaid lands are not vacant lands under the Land Ceiling Act. However we are not issuing to the Land Acquisition Officer a writ of mandamus in all these cases because he has not been made a party to these proceedings. The declaration which we have made in respect of the land acquisition proceedings does not in our opinion suffer from any infirmity because the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation for whose benefit the land acquisition proceedings have been instituted is a party to these proceedings. Rule in each of the petitions is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. .