JUDGMENT-By this writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner has challenged the order passed by the Second Labour Court, Nagpur (respondent No. 2) on 2-8-1976, rejecting as not maintainable an application filed by the petitioner under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. 2. The respondent No. 1 is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of Bidis and also deals in the business of tobacco and Bidi leaves. In 1970 the petitioner joined the service of the respondent No.1. In 1973 the petitioner was transferred to Waraseoni in Balaghat District of Madhya Pradesh. On 13-10-1974 the respondent No. 1 served the petitioner with a notice to show cause why be should not be discontinued from service as he had not discharged his duties as per responsibilities of the post held by him. On 17-3-1975, the petitioner received a letter from the respondent No. 1 informing him that his services would stand terminated with effect from the date of receipt of that letter and that he would be paid one month's salary in lieu of notice though he was not entitled to the same. Therefore, the petitioner served the management of respondent No. 1 with an approach notice dated 23-4·1975 calling upon the management to set aside the dismissal order and to reinstate him. This not having been done, the petitioner, on 10-7-1975 filed the application under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 claiming reinstatement with back wages and certain other reliefs. In this application the petitioner arrayed three persons as non-applicants, these being: "1. Motibhai Kariya, Manager M/s Chhottabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. Gondia, Tahsil District Bhandara, 2. Harsadbhai Dalal, Partner of M/s Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. Gondia, resident of Nadiad (Gujrat), 3. Ramanbhai Patel, Partner of M/s Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. Gondia, resident of Nadiad (Gujrat)." These non-applicants resisted the said application of the petitioner on several grounds including one that the applicant and the industry of the non-applicants were governed by the provisions of the special legislation i.e. the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and rules made thereunder, the industrial premises of the firm M/s Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. Gondia were licensed under the provisions of that Act, and therefore, the application filed by the present petitioner under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 was not maintainable. This preliminary objection of the non-applicants prevailed with the Second Labour Court, Nagpur and rejected the petitioner's application under section 78 of the Bombay Ind2al Relations Act, 1946 observing in its order dated 2-8-1976 : "9. Point No.1 :- On point No.1, I could not see how to assist the applicant to proceed with this application under section 78-D of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. This is not the first time that such an application has been brought by the alleged employee against the bidi industry. Even in the former past, number of such applications were brought by the workers or employees against the bidi industry and all such applications were under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The learned the then Judge. of the First Labour Court was of the view that the applications under Bombay Industrial Relations Act were not maintainable. The matter went to the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Nagpur Bench, and in Revision Case Nos. 166/71; 167/71 and 168/71, 100/70, 50/71, 51/71, 52/71, and 53/71 and 54/71 and 93/70, the learned Judge of the Industrial Court in his exhaustive judgment passed on 27-6-1972 held that the applications filed under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, a State Act, are misconceived and untenable. What I feel is that apart from taking the support from the view adopted by the learned Industrial Judge, when the applicant was serving a bidi industry and has lost the service because of any illegal act of termination amounting to dismissal at the hands of the employer, then the proper forum was to come to the Court under section 31 of the Bidi and Cigar Workers Act within the limitation prescribed under Rule 32 of the rules framed thereunder. The termination amounting to dismissal took place on or about 17-3-1975. The applicant allowed to pass the time and did not approach any Labour Court under section 31 of the Bidi and Cigar Workers Act and for the first time on 10-7-1975 he has come to the Court under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The termination amounting to dismissal took place on or about 17-3-1975. The applicant allowed to pass the time and did not approach any Labour Court under section 31 of the Bidi and Cigar Workers Act and for the first time on 10-7-1975 he has come to the Court under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Under these circumstances even there is no scope to convert this application under section 78-D of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act into the proceedings tinder section 31 of the Bidi and Cigar Workers Act, as the question of limitation comes in the way. 10. Mr. Shelat was of the view that the workers have gone in the High Court against the judgment passed by the Industrial Court and that the High Court has admitted the writ petitions and also had granted the stay. With a view to find out whether it was correct or so, I had given time to Mr. Shelat to furnish particulars about the writ petition and to 'show that the stay had been granted. Till today, no written information is supplied to the Court. On the contrary, Mr. Vastani Advocate for the non-applicants at the Bar has made a statement that his clients have not received any notice from the High Court nor any intimation that the writ petition has been either admitted or stay has been granted. Bidi and Cigar Workers Act being the Central Act giving full exhaustive code of appeal to redress the grievances, must be deemed to prevail over the State Act viz., Bombay Industrial Relations Act, and, therefore, the applicant ought to have come to the Court under section 31 of the Central Act. This application under Bombay Industrial Relations Act is not maintainable. Application is rejected on this legal point." 3. The petitioner has challenged this order passed by the respondent No.2. 4. At the outset Shri Pendharkar for the respondent No. 1 has taken certain preliminary objections to the maintainability of this writ petition. These are:- (1) The alternative remedy of an appeal under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 against the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 was available to the petitioner, but has not been availed by him. These are:- (1) The alternative remedy of an appeal under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 against the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 was available to the petitioner, but has not been availed by him. (2) In the proceeding under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, before the respondent No 2, the present respondent No. 1 firm was not a party. The three non-applicants arrayed in that proceeding viz. (1) Motibhai Kariya, (2) Harsadbhai Dalal and (3) Ramaribhai Patel have not been joined as respondents in the present writ petition. One of them viz., non applicant No.3 Ramanbhai Patel has expired on 8th January 1976. even during the pendency of the proceedings before the respondent No.2 and the petitioner took no steps to bring this to the notice of the respondent No.2. So the present petition is not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary parties and also because the impugned order has become final as against the three non-applicants arrayed in the proceedings before the respondent No. 2. (3) The petitioner has been guilty of laches. Beyond filing the application under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, in the Labour Court, the petitioner did not do anything further, the counsel for the petitioner did not even appear and argue the matter before the Labour Court (see para 7 of the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2 on 2-8-1976), and the counsel for the petitioner had not also furnished the particulars about the writ petition and the stay order, if any, filed in this Court against the earlier decisions of the Industrial Court. (See para 10 of the order dated 2-8-1976 passed by the respondent No.2 reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment). 5. The objection about the non-joinder of the necessary parties, has no substance. In the Labour Court the non-applicants Motibhai Kariya, Harsadbhai Dalal and Ramanbhai Patel were impleaded, not in their personal capacity, but as representing the respondent No. 1 firm M/s Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co., the first as Manager of the firm and the other two as partners of the firm. In the present petition the respondent No.1 is the firm M/s Chhotabbai Jethabhai Patel and Co. in whose favour certain rights were created by reason of the rejection of the petitioner's application under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. In the present petition the respondent No.1 is the firm M/s Chhotabbai Jethabhai Patel and Co. in whose favour certain rights were created by reason of the rejection of the petitioner's application under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. Shri Pendharkar for the respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on the decisions in Udit Narayab Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue Bihar1 and B. E. S. T. Workers' Union Bombay v. P.B. Kerkar2. These decisions are of no assistance because in those cases the persons in whose favour the rights were created by the impugned decision, and whose rights "ere likely to be affected, were not made parties at all in the writ proceeding before the High Court. As pointed out earlier, that is not the case here. This objection must, therefore, fail. 6. The objection about the latches on the part of the petitioner is equally untenable. As pointed out by respondent No.2 in the impugned order (reproduced earlier), the Industrial Court, Nagpur, had already taken the view that the workers in Bidi industry who bad been discharged, dismissed or retrenched, could not maintain application under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 because of the specific provisions of section 31 in the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. This view of the Industrial Court, was binding on the labour Court which could not, therefore, come to a contrary decision. Then there was hardly anything to be urged or argued before the labour Court and the failure of the petitioner's counsel to appear and argue the matter on the appointed date before the Labour Court or the failure of the petitioner's counsel to furnish to the Labour Court details of writ petitions filed in this Court and stay order issued by this Court in those matters challenging that view of the Industrial Court, could not possibly be considered as latches on the part of the petitioner disentitling him to file the present writ petition. In fact both the counsel before me have submitted that the above said view of the Industrial Court, Nagpur bas not yet been challenged in this Court, by filing any other writ petition and this point is being raised for the first time in this Court by this writ petition. 7. In fact both the counsel before me have submitted that the above said view of the Industrial Court, Nagpur bas not yet been challenged in this Court, by filing any other writ petition and this point is being raised for the first time in this Court by this writ petition. 7. That brings me to the preliminary objection of the respondent No. I that this writ petition is not maintainable because the alternative remedy of an appeal to the Industrial Court, Nagpur, under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, was available to the petitioner, but has not been availed by him; Shri Pendharkar has placed reliance on a Dumber of decisions; A. V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj3; The British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta4, Dwarka Prasad Bajaj v. Bisheswar Dayal Santi Swarup,5 Bherulal v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rajasthan6, Prabhakar Ramchandra Bhave v. State of Maharashtra7 and Shantilal Ambalal v. N.A. Rangaswami, Collector of Customs, Bombay8. The last two of these decisions turned on the interpretation of article 226 of the Constitution as amended by the 42nd amendment and were given during the period the 42nd amendment of the Constitution was in force, the position is now by reason of the 44th amendment of the Constitution relegated to what it was before the 42nd amendment. The rule enunciated by the above quoted decisions is not a rule limiting the jurisdiction of this Court, but is a rule laid down by the Courts for the exercise of their discretion. The alternative remedy must also be, in the circumstances of the case, an adequate alternative remedy in the sense of its being equally convenient, beneficial and effective i.e. efficacious, and this will necessarily turn on the facts of each individual case. In the instant case it is clear, the Industrial Court, Nagpur, had already taken the view in certain other cases that retrenched, discharged or dismissed employees of a Bidi industry to which the provisions of the Bidi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966, were applicable, could not maintain an application under section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. It was unlikely that the Industrial Court, Nagpur, having already taken that view, could be persuaded in an appeal to it under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, to come to a contrary decision. In that sense merely the routine formality of an appeal to the Industrial Court, Nagpur, under section 84 of the said Act could hardly be said to be an equally efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner. Moreover, this case raises an important question of interpretation of the statutory provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. After all this Court has not on this ground of alternative remedy being available to the petitioner, dismissed this writ petition in limine, but has entertained it. In these circumstances it would not be proper for this Court to exercise its discretion against the petitioner solely on the ground that there was an alternative remedy of an appeal, which, though available, has not been availed of by him. Please see in this respect observations of the Supreme Court in para 13 of the reported judgment in Hirday Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bereilly9 : - "13. An order under section 35 of the Income-tax Act is not appealable. It is true that a petition to revise the order could be moved before the Commissioner of Income-tax. But Hirday Narain moved a petition in the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court entertained that petition. If the High Court had not entertained his petition, Hirday Narain could have moved the Commissioner in revision, because at the date on which the petition was' moved the period prescribed by section 33-A of the Act had not expired. We are unable to hold that because a revision application could have been moved for an order correcting the order of Income-tax Officer under section 35, but was not moved, the High Court would be justified in dismissing as not maintainable the petition, which was entertained and was heard on the merits" (Emphasis supplied). It is true in the instant case this writ petition was filed in this Court on 22-11-1976 long after the decision of the respondent No.2 on 2-8-1976 i.e. even after the period of 30 days for’ filing an appeal under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 had expired. It is true in the instant case this writ petition was filed in this Court on 22-11-1976 long after the decision of the respondent No.2 on 2-8-1976 i.e. even after the period of 30 days for’ filing an appeal under section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 had expired. But it may be noted that in view of the proviso below section 84 (2) of that Act, the Industrial Court could accept the appeal even after the prescribed period of 30 days was over, if sufficient reasons Were shown. (See also on this point observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in para 9 of the reported judgment in) Durlabhkumar v. The District Judge, Indore10:- " Apart from that the question involved in the present case is about the jurisdiction of the District Judge and by refusing to investigate into the objections raised by the petitioner the District Judge had refused to exercise jurisdiction (vested) in him by law. Consequently this is a ground on which the petition under article 226 or even under article 227 of the Constitution could be maintainable. Consequently the petition cannot be thrown out on the objection of maintainability." In the instant petition also the question of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the petitioner's application under section 72 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 19,46 is involved. For these reasons this preliminary objection to maintainability of this writ petition must also fail. 8. Coming to the merits of the case, it is first necessary to refer to the relevant provisions in both the Acts. The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 is a Central Act enacted by the Parliament (and it will hereinafter be referred to as the Central Act). Its preamble styles the Act as an Act to provide for the welfare of the workers in beedi and Cigar establishments and to regulate the conditions of their work and for matters connected therewith. Its preamble styles the Act as an Act to provide for the welfare of the workers in beedi and Cigar establishments and to regulate the conditions of their work and for matters connected therewith. Section 31 of the Central Act is in the following terms: - "31 (1) No employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been employed for a period of six months or more except for a reasonable cause, and without giving such employee at least one months' notice or wages in lieu of such notice: Provided that such notice shall not be necessary if the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held by the employer for the purpose. (2) (a) The employee discharged, dismissed or retrenched may appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that there no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services or on the ground that he had not been guilty of misconduct as held by the employer or on the ground that such punishment of discharge or dismissal was severe. (b) The appellate authority may, after giving notice in the prescribed manner to the employer and the employee, dismiss the appeal or direct the re-instatement of the employee with or without wages for the period during which he was kept out of employment or direct payment of compensation without re-instatement or grant such other relief as it deems fit in the circumstances of the case. (3) The decision of the appellate authority shall be final and binding on both the parties and be given effect to within such time as may be specified in the order of the appellate authority." Under rule 32 of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Rules, 1968, as in force at the relevant time (i. e. prior to their amendment on 1st January 1977) the person for the time being presiding over the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was prescribed as the competent authority to hear appeals under section 31 of the Central Act. Section 39 of the Central Act is as follows :- "39(1) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises. Section 39 of the Central Act is as follows :- "39(1) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shall apply to matters arising in respect of every industrial premises. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a dispute between an employer and employee relating to- (a) the issue by the employer of raw materials to the employees, (b) the rejection by the employer of Beedi or Cigar or both made by an employee, (e) the payment of wages for the Beedi or Cigar or both rejected by the employer, shall be settled by such authority and in such summary manner as the State Government may by rules specify in this behalf. (3) Any person aggrieved by a settlement made by the authority specified under sub-section (2) may prefer an appeal to such authority and within such time as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf. (4) The decision of the authority specified under sub-section (3) shall be final." The provisions of section 40 of the Central Act, are as follows: - "40 (1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the terms of any award, agreement, or contract of service whether made before or after the commencement of this Act; Provided that where under any such award, agreement, contract of service or otherwise an employee is entitled to benefits in respect of any matters which are more favourable to him than those to which he will be entitled to under this Act, the employee shall continue to be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act. (2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as precluding any employee from entering into an agreement with an employer for granting him rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him that those to which he would be entitled under this Act. (2) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as precluding any employee from entering into an agreement with an employer for granting him rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to him that those to which he would be entitled under this Act. " Coming to the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the State Act), the provisions of section 78 and section 79 thereof are in the following terms :- "78, (1) A Labour Court shall have power to A. decide— (a) disputes regarding- (i) the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer acting or purporting to act under the standing orders; (ii) the application and interpretation of standing orders; (iii) any change made by an employer or desired by an employee in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule III except item (5) thereof and matters arising out of such change; (b) industrial disputes- (i) referred to it under section 71 or 72; (ii) in respect of which it is appointed as the arbitrator by a submission; (c) whether a strike, lockout, closure, stoppage or any change is illegal under this Act; B. try offences punishable under this Act and where the payment of compensation on conviction for an offence is provided for, determine the compensation and order its payment; C. require any employer to- (a) withdraw any change which is held by it to be illegal, or withdraw temporarily any change the legality of which is a matter of issue in any proceeding pending final decision, or (b) carry out any change provided such change is a matter in issue in any proceeding before it under this Act. D. require an employer, where it finds that the order of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service or suspension of an employee made by the employer,- (i) was for fault or misconduct committed by the employee which came to the notice of the employer more than six months prior to the date of such order; or (ii) was in contravention of any of the provisions of any law, or of any standing order in force applicable to such employee, or (iii) was otherwise improper or illegal,- of Property Act read with the proviso necessarily indicates that arrears of rent due before a transfer is one of the lessor's right as to the property transferred. Such a transferee, observes the Full Bench, stands in the same position as an heir of the deceased lessor, as what is transferred to him is all rights of the lessor as to the transferred property. The question need not be looked from the point of character of the rent due prior to the transfer but must be viewed from the angle of the right to take possession of the property which arises because the tenant then remains in arrears of rent. Such right originally vested in the lessor and on transfer of all his rights, the same vests in his transferee as per the provisions of section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Full Bench observed that the decision reported in Daya Debi's case did not take notice of a contrary view taken by the same High Court earlier, and, in any event, the Full Bench was unable to accept the position of law laid down in Daya Debi's case (supra). We have considered the reasons given by the Full Bench in depth and we are in respectful agreement with the conclusion recorded by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court. In our judgment, the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Narendra Singh Virdi's case is incorrect and we overrule the same. 14. The other reason which has led us to overrule the judgment of the Single Judge is that the decision of the Calcutta High Court on which the Single Judge relied was specifically dis-approved by the Supreme Court in the judgment delivered in Special Leave Petition No. 2257 of 1977. 14. The other reason which has led us to overrule the judgment of the Single Judge is that the decision of the Calcutta High Court on which the Single Judge relied was specifically dis-approved by the Supreme Court in the judgment delivered in Special Leave Petition No. 2257 of 1977. Shri Justice Bhagwati who spoke for the Bench observed after making reference to the Calcutta decision :- "That decision (Calcutta) has taken the view that when a claim for arrears of rent is assigned by 'A' to 'B', it loses the character of a claim for rent as soon as it is assigned and it becomes merely an actionable claim. This view is, of course, not shared by most of the High Courts and even the Calcutta High Court itself in other decisions has not accepted this view. It does appear to me that this view is not correct because it is difficult to see how a claim for arrears of rent ceases to be such when it is assigned by the owner when he transfers his properties to another". In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the Calcutta view clearly stands over· ruled. 15. One more aspect of the matter is that the decision of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court and the judgment of the Supreme Court was considered by a single Judge in the judgment delivered on August 20, 1980 in Special Civil Applications Nos. 2809 and 2811 of 1975. The question which came up for consideration was whether the defaults committed by the tenants with regard to the previous landlord can be taken advantage of by the transferee-landlords and will enure to the benefit of the transferee-landlords in order to get possession. The learned Judge considered the decision in Narendra Singh Virdi's case and pointed out that it is no longer good law in view of the subsequent decisions. The learned Judge also made reference to the judgment in Shantinath's case and distinguished it by observing that the breach or default committed by the tenant was not a continuing or repeated default, but a default committed once for all. The learned Single Judge held that the right to recover possession which arises in a lessor is capable of devolution and transfer and is capable of being exercised by his legal representatives upon whom the interest of the lessor devolves. The learned Single Judge held that the right to recover possession which arises in a lessor is capable of devolution and transfer and is capable of being exercised by his legal representatives upon whom the interest of the lessor devolves. The learned Judge further observed that purely personal rights may not be capable of such devolution but where a covenant which arises out of the property and runs with the property, then it is capable of being exercised by a person acquiring the interest on devolution, whether by law or by deed. The view taken by the Single Judge is in accordance with our view and with respect, we approve the judgment of the Single Judge and hold that the contrary view taken in Narendra Singh Virdi's case is no longer a good law. 15-A. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the view taken in Shantinath's Case by the learned Single Judge is over-ruled and we hold that the right of recovery of possession under sub-sections (a) and (b) of section 13(1) of the Act can be exercised by the successor-in-interest, either by operation of law or by act of parties, of the original landlord and such right is not restricted only to the person who was a landlord on the date of the commission of the breach. In the present case, the record clearly indicates that the breach was committed by the tenant by erecting permanent structure, a couple of months before the death of the original owner and the original owner was protesting against the said breach and was unable to institute proceedings because of the illness and confinement in the hospital. It is obvious that the original landlord had not waived his right to recover possession and as such the right did devolve upon his successor-in-interest and the respondents are perfectly entitled to claim recovery of possession on that count. On the findings recorded by the two Courts below and approved by us, the decree of eviction passed against the tenant requires to be upheld. As we are upholding the decree of eviction on this ground, it is not necessary to consider the claim of recovery of possession on the ground of nuisance, trespass and default in payment of rent. The lower appellate Court has passed the decree on the ground of nuisance and annoyance also and has declined to pass a decree on the ground of default. The lower appellate Court has passed the decree on the ground of nuisance and annoyance also and has declined to pass a decree on the ground of default. Though the arguments were advanced on behalf of the tenants and landlords in regard to those findings, it is not necessary for us to investigate the same as we are confirming the decree on the grounds covered by section 13(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. 16. Accordingly, the petition fails and the rule is discharged with costs. Rule discharged.