ORDER A.N. Varma, J. -This is a landlords petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is directed against orders passed by respondents 1 and 2 dismissing an application filed by the petitioners under Section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The material facts are these. The petitioners filed the aforesaid application under Section 21 of the Act on the ground that they were residing in a house which originally belonged to the petitioners father. The father of the petitioners executed a will on 10-10-1979, by which the house in which the petitioners are at present residing was bequeathed in favour of their mother. This house is known as "Basaya Bhawan". The father of the petitioners having died, their mother has thus become the sole and exclusive owner of the said house. The mother has served a notice on the petitioners to vacate the portion of the house which is in their occupation. Since the petitioners have been dis-inherited by their father, they purchased the house in dispute. The petitioners are, under the circumstances stated above, in urgent need of the accommodation purchased by them which is in occupation of the heirs of the original tenant Damodar Chand Sharma. The tenants have acquired in a vacant state two quarters. Under Explanation I to Section 21 (1) they are debarred from objecting against the petitioners application. On a comparison of the needs of the landlords with those of the tenants, the land-lords are likely to suffer much greater hardship than the tenants. 3. The tenants contested the application. They asserted that the plea about the will is entirely without any basis. No such will was executed by the petitioners father. The landlords are residing comfortably with their mother in "Basaya Bhawan". The quarters which the tenants are said to have acquired are not available with them. In any case, the said quarters have been acquired on hire purchase agreement only by Gopal Krishna and Jitendar Mohan Sharma and not by others, and hence Explanation T will have no application in any case. 4. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the petitioners application except for a small piece of land. Both the tenants and the landlords preferred appeals from the decision of the Prescribed Authority. 4. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the petitioners application except for a small piece of land. Both the tenants and the landlords preferred appeals from the decision of the Prescribed Authority. The landlords were aggrieved by the rejection of their application for release of the main residential building while the tenants were aggrieved by that part of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority by which some land had been directed to be released in favour of the landlords. 5. The appeal of the tenants has been allowed by the learned District Judge while that filed by the landlords has been dismissed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the learned District Judge fell into a manifest error of law in taking the view that the will has not been proved according to law. He contended that Evidence Act not having been made applicable in its strictness to the Act in question it was not necessary for the petitioners to have proved the will as is required under the Evidence Act The learned District Judge, therefore, erred in law in holding that secondary evidence was not receivable or that circumstances had not been established justifying admission of secondary evidence. I find no substance in this argument. While it may be true that the Evidence Act does not apply in its strictness to the aforesaid Act, where a serious dispute arises as to the-existence or genuineness of a will the Court cannot be said to be wrong in insisting on the production of the original; will itself or on the standard of proof oh the will as required by the Evidence Act. In the case of Mewa Lal v. Addl District Judge (1978 All Rent Cas 308), this Court had occasion to consider a similar question which was raised before this Court. K. C. Agarwala, considered the argument in the light of the provisions of the U. P. No. XIII of 1972 Act and came to the conclusion that the normal law relating to the proof of the wills must apply even to the proceedings under U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. I agree with respect, with the statement of the law. There is, therefore, no substance in the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioner. 7. I agree with respect, with the statement of the law. There is, therefore, no substance in the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioner. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that even if the first Explanation was held not to be applicable to the facts of the present case, the learned District Judge should still have taken into consideration the fact that the tenants or some of them had acquired "m vacant state" a residential accommodation in the same city. In the counter-affidavit, which has been filed in this Court it has been averred that the tenants never in fact acquired "in vacant state" any quarters and that though under the hire purchase agreement those quarters have been allotted to the tenants, the tenants, however, never came into possession over the said quarters. Same assertions were made in the courts below also in the various affidavits filed in support of the tenants case. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the tenants have acquired or available with them any alternative accommodation. This argument, therefore, also fails. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners then contended that the learned District Judge fell into manifest error of law in rejecting the petitioners application for release even in regard to the appurtenant land, the release of which they had specifically claimed in the application. Learned counsel urged that the finding of the learned District Judge on this question is based upon misreading of the petitioners application under Section 21 of the Act in which the petitioners had categorically claimed that the land in question was needed to enable them to do business therein. He urged that there was also a prayer to that effect in the application. Learned District Judge has erred in observing that the petitioners had not taken up any such plea. In my opinion, there is no misreading of the pleadings. The land which the Prescribed Authority had released was the land which was marked by letters FGHI. That land is in front of the Kothi in dispute. This land is obviously different from the land referred to in paragraph No. 4 of the application under Section 21 of the Act. In my opinion, there is no misreading of the pleadings. The land which the Prescribed Authority had released was the land which was marked by letters FGHI. That land is in front of the Kothi in dispute. This land is obviously different from the land referred to in paragraph No. 4 of the application under Section 21 of the Act. Besides, on the finding of the learned District Judge that if this land is excluded from the tenancy of the respondents, they will have no access to the road from the house in dispute, the finding of the learned District Judge that the said land cannot appropriately be excluded from the tenancy of the respondents, cannot be said to be wrong or unjustified. 9. Besides this finding recorded by the learned District Judge, there is also a finding that on a comparison of the relative hardship, the tenants will suffer to a much greater extent than the landlord. This finding has not been demonstrated to be wrong. On this finding alone, the application of the landlords was liable to fail and was, therefore, rightly dismissed 10. There is no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.