Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a driver attached to 2 Kerala Girls' Battalion N.C.C., Quilon. He was suspended on 29-12-1972 pending enquiry into a charge of misappropriation of petrol. The enquiry was conducted on 6-2-1973, although the petitioner was absent on the occasion. The enquiry officer found that the petitioner was guilty of the charge. He was accordingly removed from service with effect from 3-4-1973 by order of the Director of N.C.C. (the 2nd respondent). The petitioner filed an appeal on 7-5-1973 before the 1st respondent, the Government of Kerala. The petitioner contended that he had no notice of the enquiry and the finding arrived at without hearing him was therefore invalid. This contention was finally accepted by the Appellate Authority, but as late as 26-5-1975. The petitioner was subsequently reinstated as from 4-2-1976. The complaint of the petitioner is that notwithstanding his reinstatement, the period of his absence from duty between 29-12-1972 when he was suspended and 4-2-1976 when he was reinstated has not been treated as period spent on duty, but only as eligible leave, as stated in Ext. P6. 2. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent it is stated that the enquiry was originally notified to commence on 29-1-1973 at 10.30 a.m. Due notice was issued to the petitioner by registered post with acknowledgment due as well as by hand. That notice was received by the petitioner on 25-1-1973. Nevertheless he did not turn up for the enquiry on 29-1-1973. Consequently the enquiry had to be postponed to 6-2-1973 and a notice was duly sent to the petitioner by registered post, but without acknowledgment due. When the petitioner did not turn up for the second time the enquiry was conducted in his absence. 3. The Appellate Authority, however, accepted the petitioner's contention that, for the enquiry which took place on 6-2-1973, he did not receive the notice, which was sent to him by registered post, until 7-2-1973. Consequently the Appellate Authority by Ext P1 order dated 26-5-1975 set aside the order of removal dated 3-4-1973. Ext. P1 further stated that the appellate order was not a bar against fresh enquiry. However, no fresh enquiry was conducted. Nor was the petitioner immediately " reinstated. He had to wait for more than eight months. He was reinstated by the 2nd respondent as late as 4-2-1976 4. Ext. P1 further stated that the appellate order was not a bar against fresh enquiry. However, no fresh enquiry was conducted. Nor was the petitioner immediately " reinstated. He had to wait for more than eight months. He was reinstated by the 2nd respondent as late as 4-2-1976 4. The order of suspension dated 29-12-1972 cannot in the circumstances of this case be regarded as unjustified. There was a strong prima facie case against the petitioner. However, the enquiry failed not for want of evidence, but for want of notice. The enquiry was held to be violative of natural justice and was accordingly set aside by the Appellate Authority. In my view the suspension in itself was therefore justified. But what is not justified is the long delay in disposing of the petitioners' appeal which was presented to the Appellate Authority as early as 7-5-1973. That appeal did not see the light of day for more than two years. It is indeed strange that an 'appeal of this kind should have been delayed so long by the Appellate Authority. If the appeal had been disposed of within a reasonable time, and the Appellate Authority had come to the same finding as it did on 26-5-1975, it could have either ordered a fresh enquiry or reinstated the petitioner dropping the enquiry. Either of those things could have been done without delay. But it was not done. I am told that no enquiry is contemplated owing to nonavailability of witnesses who have since been transferred to places far outside Kerala This contingency would not probably have occurred had the appeal been disposed of urgently and an enquiry conducted immediately thereafter Whatever that be, for no fault of the petitioner the enquiry was delayed for more then two years. Although the original order of punishment dated 3-4-1973 was set aside on 26-5-1975, the petitioner was not reinstated until 4-2-1976. The period between 26-5-1975 and 4-2-1976 is deemed to be a continuation of the original suspension as per R.10(4) of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules. During that period also no enquiry was conducted, as it could have been done. It thus took the authorities till 4-2-1976 to decide that it was futile to hold an enquiry. 5. The entire period of suspension commencing from 29-12-1972 and continuing till 4-2-1976 (by virtue of R.10(4) of the CCA. During that period also no enquiry was conducted, as it could have been done. It thus took the authorities till 4-2-1976 to decide that it was futile to hold an enquiry. 5. The entire period of suspension commencing from 29-12-1972 and continuing till 4-2-1976 (by virtue of R.10(4) of the CCA. Rules) has to be, in my view, split into two stages for the purpose of deciding the question whether the petitioner is entitled to have any part of it treated as duty. R.56(2) in Part I of the Kerala Civil Service Rule reads: "(2) Where such competent authority holds that the officer has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was wholly unjustified, the officer shall be given the full pay to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed, compulsorily retired or suspended, as the case may be, together with any allowance of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension."(emphasis supplied) This sub-rule postulates an order saying that the suspension was unjustified before the period of suspension can be treated as duty. No such order was made in the present case. R.56(2) would not in terms therefore apply. Nevertheless, can the petitioner who was kept under suspension be denied the benefit of R.56(2) for the whole period from 29-12-1972 to 4-2-1976? 6. As I stated earlier, the order of suspension in itself was justified and the principles stated by this Court in Messiah Das v. State of Kerala (1978 KLT.160) apply to the facts of this case. For the period commencing from 29-12-1972 and ending on 3-4-1973 the suspension was undoubtedly justified. On 3-4-1973 the petitioner was removed from service. He cannot therefore have any claim to be treated as on duty for the period he was reasonably kept out of service. His appeal was filed immediately after the order of removal. If that appeal had been disposed of within a reasonable time (say, within six months) and he had been immediately reinstated, as in fact was done eventually, he would have had the benefit of his service from then on; or, alternatively, if there was a disposal of the appeal within a reasonable time, as stated above, and if a fresh enquiry was conducted immediately thereafter, the petitioner would have known his fate without undue delay. In the present case he was kept out of work for too long a time by unreasonable delay in the disposal of the appeal and the final decision of the authority to reinstate him. In the circumstances I would treat the appeal, which was finally disposed of in favour of the petitioner and which did not lead to any further enquiry, as having been disposed of within six months from the date of his presenting it on 7-5-1973. I would thus divide the period of break into two, the first part of it ending on 7-11-1973 (this being the date on which the period of six mouths from the date of lodging the appeal expired) and the second part ending on 4-2-1976 when he was reinstated. The first part of the break will be treated as ordered under Ext. P6 i.e. as eligible leave. The second part of the break was the result of unreasonable delay on the part of the. authorities. Principles of fairness require that the period between 7-11-1973 and 4-2-1976 should be treated as duty The petitioner is entitled to full benefits for that period as per the relevant rules The respondents shall accordingly consider the petitioner's case and pass appropriate orders in the light of what is stated above as urgently as possible but in any case, in view of the long lapse of time, within six months from the receipt of a copy of this judgment. The O.P. is allowed in the above terms. No costs.