D. H. SHUKLA, J. ( 1 ) ). The petitioner Vishnuprasad Dahyabhai Brahmbatt submits that respondent No. 1 has filed a complaint under sec. 500 of the Indian Penal Code against him in the Court of the learned J. M. F. C; Kheda which complaint is Annexure `a being an uncertified copy of it. Prior to that the petitioner had filed a complaint against respondent No. 1 dated 6-6-1979 before Police Sub Inspector Matar. It is the grievance of the present petitioner that by filing a complaint as per Annexure B in the Matar Police Station against respondent No. 1 he did not commit any offence under sec. 500 of the Indian Penal Code as prima facie the accusation made by him against the respondent No. 1 before the P. S. I. who is wielding a lawful authority over respondent No. 1 is covered under eighth Exception to sec. 499 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitinner submits that there was not even a prima facts case of defamation against him and the learned J. M. F. C who has issued a process based on a complaint of defamation filed by respondent No. 1 has not applied his mind as to whether there is any basis for such a complaint and that in so acting he his acted without jurisdiction. In the submission of the petitioner issuing of the process by the learned J. M. F. C. Kheda against the present petitioner prima facie amounts to an abuse of the process of Court and in order to quash that order he has approached the High Court by the present application. ( 2 ) ). Mr. Barot referred me to the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code namely sec. 200 sec. 201 sub-sec. (1) and sec. 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code and while reading these three sections he emphasised that it was the intention of the Legislature in framing these sections that before a Magistrate decided to issue a process on the receipt of a complaint he must satisfy himself on the basis of the record produced before him by the complainant that there were sufficient grounds for proceeding in the matter. Mr. Barot submitted a Magistrate issuing a process on the receipt of a complaint must realise that he is doing so ex parte against the alleged accused. Mr. Barot submitted a Magistrate issuing a process on the receipt of a complaint must realise that he is doing so ex parte against the alleged accused. He must also realise that Art. 21 of the Constitution is involved when he issues a process inasmuch as a process is going to interfere with the personal liberty of the accused. It must also be realised by the Magistrate that issuance of the process involves the alleged accused in mental torture harassment inconvenience loss of time expenses and facing a litigation many a time a protracted one. The Magistrate therefore cannot and should not issue a process unless he has satisfied himself on objective test that there is a prima facie case against the accused. The issuance of the process is not something which can be had on mere asking. Mr. Barot submitted that in the instant case the learned Magistrate had issued a process on the petitioner on the basis of a complaint which had no merit at all and that there was no justification whatever in issuing the same. In support of his argument Mr. Barot cited a ruling in the case of SMT. NAGAWWA V. VEERANNA SHIVALINGAPPA KONJALGI AND OTHERS REPORTED IN 1976 CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL 1533 1976 SUPREME COURT 1947 The following observations are very germane to the question which is under consideration and it may be cited fully:-"at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one. Emphasis supplied ). It is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one. Emphasis supplied ). "it was further observed therein :-"the scope of the inquiry under sec 202 is extremely limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint (i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all averting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact in proceedings under sec. 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not. (Emphasis supplied ). "the following further observations are still more relevant :-"it is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the fact of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegation but there appears to be very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court or even the Supreme Court to substitute its own discretion for that 4f the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint if proved would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under sec. 202 which culiminates into an order under sec. 2c4. " (Emphasis supplied)THE observations then proceed to suggest circumstances wherein a process by a Magistrate should be quashed. ( 3 ) ). These considerations are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under sec. 202 which culiminates into an order under sec. 2c4. " (Emphasis supplied)THE observations then proceed to suggest circumstances wherein a process by a Magistrate should be quashed. ( 3 ) ). Those illustrative circumstances are given as under :-" (1) Whether the allegations made in the complaint or the statement of the Witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused: (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects such as want of sanction or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. " (emphasis supplied ). ( 4 ) ). Mr. Barot submitted that he was relying on the circumstances Nos. 1 and 2 wherein it would be justified to quash the order of issuing the process. ( 5 ) ). Mr. Shah submitted that what is contemplated under sec. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that the Magistrate should prima facie satisfy himself as to whether the process should be issued on the basis of the complaint or not and he is not expected to go into the possible defences which might be raised by the accused. The 8th exception to sec. 499 is obviously an exception which if proved would take the case of defamation out of the purview of sec. 499 of the I. P. Code but that is a part of the defence which the accused may ultimately take up at the trial. But such a possible defence is not required to be considered by the Magistrate Mr. 499 is obviously an exception which if proved would take the case of defamation out of the purview of sec. 499 of the I. P. Code but that is a part of the defence which the accused may ultimately take up at the trial. But such a possible defence is not required to be considered by the Magistrate Mr. Shah further submitted that it was not necessary to examine for him as to whether the defence of the accused under Exception 8 will be well-founded or not but still he suggested that it must be noticed that the emphasis is on the words good faith and patently it was the complaint of respondent No. 1 that the petitioner had proceeded against him mala fide and out of ulterior purpose. In view of these circumstances the learned Magistrate was perfectly justified in his action of issuing process on the basis of a statement on oath made by respondent No. 1. ( 6 ) ). Mr. K. J. Vaidya the learned Public Prosecutor invited my attention to two rulings on the subject. In the case of NIRMALJIT SINGH HOON V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL and OTHERS AIR 1972 SUPREME COURT 2639 the brief note is as under:-"the words `sufficient ground used in secs. 203 and 209 mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused by the evidence Or witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit and do not mean sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. The test is whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction and where there was prima facie evidence even though the person charged of an offence in the complaint might have a defence the matter had to be left to be decided by the appropriate forum at the appropriate stage and issue of a process could not be refused. Unless therefore the Magistrate finds that the evidence led before him is self-contradictory or intrinsically untrustworthy process cannot be refused if that evidence makes out a prima facie case. In a revision against such a refusal the High Court also his to apply the same test. " (Emphasis supplied ). Mr. Vaidya invited my attention also to similar observations made in the case of HERERAM SATPATHY V. TIKARAM AGARWALA AND OTHERS REPORTED IN A. I. R. 1978 SUPREME COURT PAGE 1568. In a revision against such a refusal the High Court also his to apply the same test. " (Emphasis supplied ). Mr. Vaidya invited my attention also to similar observations made in the case of HERERAM SATPATHY V. TIKARAM AGARWALA AND OTHERS REPORTED IN A. I. R. 1978 SUPREME COURT PAGE 1568. The observations run as under:"as the Magistrate is restricted to finding out whether there is a prima facie case or not for proceeding against the accused and cannot enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case and the scope of the revisional jurisdiction is very limited the High Court cannot launch on a detailed and meticulous examination of the case on merits and set aside the order of Magistrate directing issue of process against certain persons. " ( 7 ) ). In the instant case it is the grievance of respondent No. 1 in his complaint namelyit must also be mentioned that respondent No. 1 has stated in his complaint as to on what evidence he was relying. That evidence is categorically slated in paragraph 7 of his complaint. Over and above the evidence stated in paragraph 7 as I have pointed out above the learned Magistrate also recorded the statement of respondent No. 1 on oath before him. Under these circumstances I no not find any merit in the argument of Mr. Barot that the learned Magistrate has proceeded without applying his mind whatever. It must also be stated that it is not a statutory requirement anywhere that the Magistrate must pass a speaking order so far as the issuance of the process is concerned. Thebefore reading the order passed by the learned Magistrate it cannot be said that he has not applied his mind and that therefore the order is without jurisdiction. Application dismissed. .