JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal as well as appeals mentioned in the Schedule annexed to this judgment filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, are directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, delivered on September 6, 1971. 2. 39 writ petitions were filed by the traders of Gangapur City, Udaipur, Ajmer and Beawar towns, challenging the validity of the rates of octroi duty on certain commodities on the ground that it was obligatory upon every Municipal Board or Municipal Council to levy (i) a tax on annual letting value of the buildings or lands or parts thereof situated within the municipality; (ii) an octroi on goods and animals brought within the limits of municipality for the consumption, use or sale thereof; and (iii) a tax on profession and vocation. The State Government brought about uniform pattern of levy of tax on annual letting value of the buildings. But the State Government, which is the taxing authority under the provisions of Section 104 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (to be hereinafter referred to as `the Act'), has, in the matter of octroi duty imposed different rates in different municipalities and the difference, having no nexus with the object to achieve, is outrageous. It adversely affects the traders, dealing in cloth, utensils, items of 'Kirana' such as saffron, menthol, globe, cardamom, mace, nutmeg immamon, cumin seeds, pistachio, betel nuts, raisin, cashew nuts, asafoetida, camphor, honey etc. The traders dealing in these items and having their shop; and business within the municipal limits of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Ganganagar and Bikaner, are required to pay octroi duty on advalorem basis. These two systems create such significant disparity in the imposition of octroi and in the method of its recovery as the dealers, carrying on business within the municipal limits of Ajmer, Beawar and Gangapur City are deprived of their fundamental right to carry on unrestricted trade or business. The difference being immoderate, the charging of the octroi on advalorem basis, in pursuance to the Government Notifications dated April 8, 1968, in Gangapur City; dated Febuary 19, 1967 in Ajmer, and, dated June 25, 1963, in Beawar, are liable to be struck down. 3. As regards the writ petitions Nos. 1973 of 1969, 1079 of 1969 and 4 of 1969, filed by the traders of Gangapur City as well as writ petitions Nos. 3. As regards the writ petitions Nos. 1973 of 1969, 1079 of 1969 and 4 of 1969, filed by the traders of Gangapur City as well as writ petitions Nos. 912 of 1969, 913 of 1969, 1066 of 1969, 1109 of 1969, 1418 of 1969, 1565 of 1969 and 1016 of 1969, filed by the traders of Beawar town, relating to the charging of octroi on the imports of cotton, silken, terelene, and woollen and other clothes within the limits of respective municipalities, the learned Judge held that the rates were outrageous in comprison to the octroi rates imposed in Jodhpur, Jaipur, Ganganagar, Bikaner, Parbatsar, Ajmer and Udaipur municipalities. On the basis of the above findings, he allowed the above noted writ petitions. The writ petitions Nos. 244 of 1970, 1244 of 1969, 1246 of 1969, 1250 of 1969, 1253 of 1969 and 1254 of 1969, relating to the octroi impost on cigarettes, cigars, biris and tobacco in the Municipalities of Beawar and Ajmer. learned Judge held that they were outrageous in comparison to the impost of duty on the above noted items in Jodhpur and Ganganagar. On the basis of the above findings he allowed the above noted writ petitions and quashed the relevant Notifications, imposing octroi on the ground that they were hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 4. Learned Judge by the impugned judgment allowed writ petitions Nos. 911 of 1969, 912 of 1969, 913 of 1969, 1000 of 1969, 1012 of 1969 and 1018 of 1969, filed by the traders of Beawar relating to 'Kirana'. He also allowed writ petitions Nos. 1005 of 1969, 1166 of 1969, 912 of 1969, 913 of 1969, 911 of 1969, 1253 of 1969, 1215 of 1969, 1246 of 1969, 1244 of 1969, 1170 of 1969, 1254 of 1969, 1966 of 1969, 1117 of 1969, of 1969 , 1110 of 1969, 1113 of 1969, 1417 of 1969, 1247 of 1969, 1119 of 1969 and 2228 of 1969, pertaining to items such as stationery, cosmetics, radios, surgical goods, crockery articles, colour paints, sanitary items, rubber goods, motor parts etc. filed by traders of Beawar. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the above noted judgment, the Municipal Councils of Ajmer. Beawar and Gangapur City have come up in appeal to this Court. 6. filed by traders of Beawar. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the above noted judgment, the Municipal Councils of Ajmer. Beawar and Gangapur City have come up in appeal to this Court. 6. The question which needs to be determined is whether after the commencement of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, octroi at the different rates in different municipalities could be recovered. It is well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution does not forbid reasonable classification. In order, however, to pass the test of reasonably permissible classifications two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification can be founded on different basis such as geographical or according to its object or occupation or the like. What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. 7. In (1) Ram Krishan Dalmia V. Justice S.R. Tendolkar & ors. AIR 1958 SC 538 (in para 12) an anonymous judgment of five Judges, His Lordship Hon'ble S.R. Das C.J., speaking for the Court, laid down five criteria to adjudge constitutional validity of a particular law. They are:- "(i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought the notice of the Court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the Court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the Court will uphold the validity of the law, as it did in Chiranjitlal v. Union of India (B) (supra', State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (C) (supra), Kedar Nath Bajoria V. State of West Bengal, 1954 S C R 30 (I), V.M. Syed Mohammed & Company V. State of Andhra, 1954 S C R 1117 (J) and Budhan Choudhry V. State of Bihar (A) (supra). (ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the Court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did in Ameerunnissa Begum V. Mahboob Begum, 1953 SCR 404 (K) and Ram Prasad Narain Sahi V. State of Bihar, 1953 SCR 1 129 : (AIR 1953 S C 215 ) (L). (iii) A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions but may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of' the validity or otherwise of such a statute the Court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the Court will strike down the statute if it does not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute itself. In such a case the Court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal V. Anwar All Sarkar (D) (Supra), Dwarka Prasad V. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 S.C.R. 803 : (A I R 1954 S C 224) (M) and Dhirendra Kumar Mandal V. Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, 1955-I S C R 224 : (A I R 1954 S C 424) (N). (iv) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at the same time lay down a policy or principle for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification; the Court will uphold the law as constitutional, as it did in Kathi Raning Rawat V. The State of Saurashtra (E) (Supra). (v) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things to whom their provisions are Intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the principle laid down by the statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such selection or classification. If the Government in making the selection or classification does not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, it has been held by this Court, e.g. in Kathi Raving Rawat V. The State of Saurashtra (E) (supra) that in such a case the executive action but not the statute should be condemned as unconstitutional." 8. We would like to observe that there is presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment. It must be assumed that the authority concerned or legislature understands dan correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and that laws or notifications are directed to problems made manifest by experience and the discrimination, if any, are based on adequate grounds, vide (2) State of Bombay V. Balsara AIR 1961 SC 318 . It must be assumed that the authority concerned or legislature understands dan correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and that laws or notifications are directed to problems made manifest by experience and the discrimination, if any, are based on adequate grounds, vide (2) State of Bombay V. Balsara AIR 1961 SC 318 . A legislation cannot be struck down as discriminatory if any state of facts may reasonably be conceived to justify it : vide (3) Haram Singh V. R.T.A. 1954 SCR 279 . In (4) Ganpat Rai Sanwar Mal V. State of Rajasthan it has been observed that different municipalities have different sources of income and there is nothing to hold that the petitioners were selected by the State Government to be discriminated against others. The burden is upon the person who impeaches the law as a violation of the guarantee of equal protection. It is thus to be presumed, unless contrary is shown, that the administration of a particular law is done or would be done not with an evil eye and unequal hand". To make out a case of denial or equal protection of laws under Article 14 of the Constitution a plea of differential treatment is by itself not sufficient for an applicant pleading for equal protection of the law. He must make out not only that he has been treated differently from others, but that he has been so treated from persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis and such differential treatment is unjustifiably made. For instance, mere plea that the traders in cigars and cigarette of Ajmer are required to pay higher octroi duty than other persons in similar trade in some part of Rajasthan is not sufficient to make out a case of infringement of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Admittedly different municipalities have different sources of income and there is nothing to hold that the petitioners were singled out by the State Government to be discriminated. Octroi impost cannot be struck down as discriminatory unless the Court finds that it singled out a particular municipality without having any difference peculiar to that municipality or class of municipalities. But that is not the case here. 9. Octroi impost cannot be struck down as discriminatory unless the Court finds that it singled out a particular municipality without having any difference peculiar to that municipality or class of municipalities. But that is not the case here. 9. It does not require much argument to advance that it is for the petitioner who makes a grievance regarding discrimination to place proper facts before the Court by way of pleadings showing as to how he has been discriminated amongst his equals so that it may enable the respondent to formulate his case and bring cut the grievance to the best advantage. Pleadings are of vital importance. If there is no pleading of the necessary facts in a petition for redress of grievance, the petitioner has to face discomfiture on that account. It appears that in the case on hand the petitioner merely assumed that the existence of Notification relating to the octroi duty, which imposed octroi tax in Ajmer, Beawar, Gangapur City being dissimilar to the octroi imposed elsewhere in Rajasthan in law discriminatory. 10. The writ petitions are singularly deficient in furnishing particulars, which may justify the plea of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. The sere plea of differential treatment set up by it is not sufficient. Accordingly the writ petitions filed by the petitioners in the above noted cases, are liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. In (5) Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt. etc. v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. and others AIR 1980 SC 1 , Hon'ble P.N. Shinghal J. in the concurring judgment, placing reliance on (6) Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. (1964) 6 S.C.R. 846 , held that it was necessary for the petitioners to plead and establish the necessary facts to enable a proper enquiry into the allegations of unequal or discriminatory treatment. On the facts of that case it was held that in the absence of the necessary pleadings, it could not be said that inequality was so clearly writ Marge on the face of the impugned statute in its application to the district of South Kanara only and that it was perilously near the periphery of unconstitutionality. On the facts of that case it was held that in the absence of the necessary pleadings, it could not be said that inequality was so clearly writ Marge on the face of the impugned statute in its application to the district of South Kanara only and that it was perilously near the periphery of unconstitutionality. The learned Judge also observed in, pars 37 of the judgment that differential treatment arising out of the application of the law so continued in different region of the same reorganised State did not, therefore, immediately attract the clause of the Constitution prohibiting discrimination. 11. On the parity of the above reasoning, we would hold that there is no material on record as may justify the inference that a differential hostile treatment had been made out to the traders of Ajmer, Gangapur City and Beawar. Thus, the very basis of striking down the Notifications, imposing octroi duty in the above noted municipalities, on the ground of being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution disappears. 12. It is a matter of common knowledge that Rajasthan is territorially a big State comprised of not less than 22 covenanting States and some other territory which was formerly British Indian territory viz Ajmer Marwara including Beawar and other pockets which once formed parts of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. For evolving a tax structure, historical and geographical conditions as well as capacity of the people to pay tax and sources of income in each municipality, could legitimately be taken into consideration to meet their demands for discharging primary and secondary functions, provided in Chapter VI of the Act. 13. A perusal of the charts filed by the writ petitioners showing different rates of octroi duties levied on different items brought within the municipalities reveal that prima facie a different treatment appears to have been accorded to the persons carrying on business within the municipal limits of Ajmer, Beawar and Gangapur City. But that by itself cannot be a ground for declaring the recovery as ultravirus. The State is undoubtedly enjoined by Article 14 of the Constitution not to deny to any person equal protection of the laws within the territory. However, it has been held in a number of cases by Hon'ble the Supreme Court that continuance of unequal laws which are reasonably justified for historical or geographical reasons could be upheld. The State is undoubtedly enjoined by Article 14 of the Constitution not to deny to any person equal protection of the laws within the territory. However, it has been held in a number of cases by Hon'ble the Supreme Court that continuance of unequal laws which are reasonably justified for historical or geographical reasons could be upheld. It should he remembered that the Municipal Board, Ajmer and Beawar are the oldest municipalities in Rajasthan. Prior to the merger of Ajmer into the State of Rajasthan and before the enforcement of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, the Ajmer and Beawar Municipalities were governed by Ajmer Merwara Municipalities Regulations, 1925 (Regulations No. 6 of 1925). Under that Regulations taxes were imposed in pursuance to its Section 26. The procedure prescribed in the Regulations was that a Committee elected by the representatives of the public, was formed to examine the octroi on particular items invited public objections and thereafter recommendations were sent to the Government and then rates were imposed. In various Notifications, issued from time to time by the Chief Commissioner of Ajmer Merwara octroi duty was being charged on cigarettes and cigars and other items mentioned in the writ petitions on ad valorem basis on the enforcement of the Act, the Municipal Councils of Beawar and Ajmer after following the procedure laid down therein had suggested to the Government to impose octroi duty on various items at the rates suggested, which recommendation was accepted by the State Government and the octroi duty was imposed at the rates proposed. 14. The learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petitions regarding, medicines, has observed that Jodhpur and Jaipur markets were developing a, whole-sale markets for medicines. The learned Judge further observed that the arguments advanced by Mr. Kasliwal could not be said to be wholly devoid of force and that there was rationality in the difference of octroi duty in Jaipur and Jodhpur as compared to rates in other places like Beawar, Ajmer, Udaipur etc. regarding medicine. The above noted observations very well apply to the case of cigarettes, cigars and many other goods. The impost of octroi duty on these items on percentage basis in Ajmer, Beawar and other places can be justified on the same reasoning. 15. Every Municipality is required to discharge primary and secondary functions, as mentioned in Chapter VI of the Act of 1959. The impost of octroi duty on these items on percentage basis in Ajmer, Beawar and other places can be justified on the same reasoning. 15. Every Municipality is required to discharge primary and secondary functions, as mentioned in Chapter VI of the Act of 1959. Sources of revenue are provided in Chapter VII. Every Municipality also gets State grant to meet budget provisions as provided by Section 277 of the Act. Each Municipality required to prepare accounts and budget estimates, keeping in view the total expense which a municipality or Corporation is required to incur. Budget estimates are prepared and examined by the standing committee. The budget estimates are prepared by the Commissioner and the same are examined by the Standing Committee after obtaining necessary details and informations as it deems fit. 16. The budget estimate contains proposals of rates and municipal taxes and, thereafter the budget estimates are placed before the Municipality or the Corporation, which considers the same. The entire procedure provided under the Act safeguards and lays down adequate guide-lines in the matter of taxes. The budget estimates as financially passed are required to be submitted to the State Government for sanction. The State Government retains the power to modify any part of budget estimates. The State Government has also reserved the power to modify the rate of taxes which a Municipality or Corporation is empowered to recover and the same can be levied at varied rates at different places or can be withdrawn from a particular place. 17. The members of a municipality are elected representatives of the public. They know peculiar needs of each municipality and the paying capacity of the residents of that area. They are also conscious of the fact that they will have to face the electorate after the expiry of three or more years. The municipalities or the Corporations, while finding out the sources of income to meet the total expenses likely to be incurred by them, always keep and are expected to keep in view the benefit of the people, whom they represent. Even one Corporation, or any one municipality can be taken as a lass by itself for the purpose of levying taxes. 18. Even one Corporation, or any one municipality can be taken as a lass by itself for the purpose of levying taxes. 18. The learned Single Judge, while discussing the history of octroi duty with reference to the report of the Committee set up by the Government of India to study local conditions in the year 1951, referred to the recommendations of the Committee, which reads as under:-- "The rate should be prescribed generally on ad valorem basis." 19. To us there appears to be inherent and inconsistency in charging octroi duty on weight basis on all qualities of articles brought within municipal limits for consumption. The difference in the values so great between different articles inter se that there can be no reasonable nexus with the object to be achieved by charging octroi on weight basis. The Notification, imposing octroi duty on weight basis on cigarettes, cigars, biries, cloth and other articles in the municipalities at Jaipur, Jodhpur. Ganganagar or other places appears to be apparently arbitrary and there is inherent disparity. Thus under those Notifications residents and dealers living and working within the limits of the same municipality are required to pay the same rate of octroi duty on the goods of their need though they are of different qualities and lower costs, making a substantial difference in value. The net result is that the entire burden of taxes falls on the persons who can pay less. It discriminates in favour of the members of an affluent class, which, in fact, can better bear the burden. Treating the nexus as class by itself is discriminatory. Striking down the Notification imposing octroi duty on ad valorem basis on the basis of Notification under which the octroi duty is being charged on weight basis and which by itself suffers from bias or discrimination, would not lead to substantial justice. 20. As already mentioned above, different municipalities having different sources of revenue, different rates of octroi duties on different items, are fixed by the State Government at the instance of the municipalities so that they may be able to meet the expenses needed in discharge of their public welfare obligations. 21. Apart from the above, total collection of octroi duty on different items is required to be related to the total cost incurred or required to be incurred by each municipality for discharging its primary and secondary functions. 21. Apart from the above, total collection of octroi duty on different items is required to be related to the total cost incurred or required to be incurred by each municipality for discharging its primary and secondary functions. The octroi duty is charged only from persons, who import particular articles for sale, consumption and use within the particular area, constituting municipal limits, 22. In (7) Gopal Narain v. State of U P. AIR 1964 SC 370 . it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that -Board can select a part of municipal area for the imposition of tax or taxation." In the same case it was further held that it could also be that the amenities required in one part of the municipal area might be different from those required in another part of the municipality. It could also be that a part of a particular area, because of the nature of the soil, distance from the well-developed part of the city or for historical reasons, might call for a larger investment for development compared to other parts of the municipality. If so, different parts of a Municipality may require special treatment in the matter of provisions of amenities. It would thus be reasonable to collect the power of taxation in a part of a municipality with separate treatment. It has also been observed in the same case that a municipality can impose higher rates of tax in a part of the city, if that part, because of its peculiar situation or otherwise, has to be provided with special amenities, throwing a heavy financial burden on the municipality. 23. Thus, if different rates of taxation can be justified in different parts of one municipality, it does not stand to reason why different rates of octroi duty cannot be levied in different municipalities, keeping in view their development, historical and geographical reasons, existence and location of large industries. It is well-known that in cities like Jaipur and Jodhpur the Urban Improvement Trust is required to perform many of the duties of the municipalities which are required to be performed by municipalities in small towns like Beawar and Gangapur City, District Sawai Madhopur and as such even if octroi is charged at lesser rates in big cities on items which are imported in huge quantities, they can meet their expenses and discharge their obligatory duties. 24. 24. After the decision of the impugned judgment the Rajasthan Government examined the position and introduced in the Legislative Assembly, Rajasthan Municipalities (Amendment) Bill, 1975 (Bill No. 38 of 1975). This Bill was published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra, dated January 9, 1976. Under clause (4) of the Bill the proposed amendment of Section 104 of the Rajasthan Act No. 38 of 1959 was published. After full discussion regarding the pros and cons of the amendment, the Rajasthan Legislature was pleased to amend Section 104 of the Act: vide Amendment No. 10 of 1976. The following sub-section (2) was inserted in Section 104:- "(2) A direction under sub-section (1) may provide for the levy of of taxes at different rates in different municipalities having regard to their varying local conditions and needs, and on the same considerations and by a like direction, the State Government may, from time to time - (i) vary uniformly or differently in relation to different municipalities, the rates of taxes levied, or (ii) withdraw any tax levied by any municipality." The amended provisions of Section 104 of the Act as noted above have been inserted with retrospective effect by a `deeming provision'. It will be worth while to note here that the amended provision could not be considered either in the impugned judgment or other judgments, as that was introduced later on. The amended section was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court while deciding D.B. Special Appeal No. 30 of 1969 decided on December 20, 1978, by the counsel appearing before that Bench. As such the decision given in that case does not cut the ice. 25. Statement of objects and reasons published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated January 9, 1976, for amending Section 104 of the Act reads as under:- "Experience gained from the working of the Act has brought to light difficulties and lacunae in its administration which may involve the State in wasteful litigation. 25. Statement of objects and reasons published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated January 9, 1976, for amending Section 104 of the Act reads as under:- "Experience gained from the working of the Act has brought to light difficulties and lacunae in its administration which may involve the State in wasteful litigation. It was, therefore, expedient to amend the Act to provide for the following matters:- (i) (ii) (iii) empowering the Boards to levy taxes at different rates and in different Municipalities having regard to their varying local conditions and to vary uniformly or differently in relation to different municipalities the rates of taxes or to withdraw any tax already levied; (iv) ........................" This amendment in the Act has been made to cure an existing evil. The Legislature is expected to know the need and will of the people. The Government which has been vested with the power to continue or to apply different rates of taxes is managed by the elected representatives. The validity of the amendment of the Act has not been challenged in any of the writ petitions or in appeals and as such the charging of octroi duty on the goods imported within the municipal limits of Ajmer, Beawar, Gangapur City and other place for sale, use or consumption on advalorem basis cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, simply because it is different when compared with other municipalities. 26. This Court while exercising its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or its appellate powers is not bound to issue a direction unless the injury alleged to be suffered by the petitioner-respondents can be held to be of substantial nature. The octroi duty is charged only on persons who import particular articles for sale, consumption and use within particular area constituting municipal limits. Thus the traders doing business within the territorial limits of a municipality or Corporation cannot be said to have been discriminated amongst people placed in similar circumstances. 27. The net result of the above discussion is that in the absence of sufficient material on record placed by the parties, we are unable to hold that the petitioner-respondents are being discriminated deliberately by the impugned Notifications or a substantial injury leading to miscarriage of justice is being suffered by the respondents. 28. With the above observations the appeals are allowed. 28. With the above observations the appeals are allowed. The judgments delivered by the learned Single Judge in all the writ petitions out of which these appeals arise, are set aside. The respective writ petitions are dismissed. The parties are ordered to bear their own costs. 29. The amount of Single Bench dated if any, refunded to the respondents in pursuance to the order of the" Popular House v. State of Rajasthan and others ," shall be realised back by the concerned municipalities and the respondent are directed to deposit the same with the concerned municipalities within two months (from The stay orders passed by this Court during the pendency o the today. The stay orders passed by this Court during the pendency of the appeals shall stand vacated and the amount deposited as 'Amanat' in various municipalities shall form part of the consolidated funds of the municipalities. *******