Judgment :- 1. The petitioner has come up with this writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing respondents 2 and 3, the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, Kottayam, and the State of Kerala, respectively to take immediate necessary action to prevent the 1st respondent, the licensee of toddy shop No. 52 of Mannanam Abkari Range from conducting the said toddy shop in a building comprised in Sy. No 907/14 situated very close to his residence 2. The averment in the writ petition in substance is that though toddy shop No. 52 had all along been conducted and, even according to the specifications in the auction notification, was required, to be conducted, in a building which belonged to one Kunneparambil Padmanabhan, situated about a kilo-" metre away from Sy. No. 907/14, instead of conducting it there, it is being conducted in Sy. No 907/14. According to the petitioner, there is a lower primary school and a Guru Mandiram at a distance of less than 400 metres from the building where the toddy shop is being conducted, and, therefore, it is being done in violation of the provisions contained in sub-rules (I) and (2) of R.6 of the Kerala Abkari Shops (Disposal in auction) Rules, 1974 (the Rules). The above mentioned sub-rules of R.6 are as follows: "(1) No licensee of any toddy, arrack or foreign liquor shop shall be permitted to sell or possess toddy, arrack or foreign liquor or coco brandy outside the local limits specified in his licence: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to the sale or possession of toddy, or arrack in any toddy or arrack sub-shop (2) No toddy, arrack or foreign liquor shop other than a toddy or arrack sub-shop shall be located outside the limits notified in the Gazette under R.4. but with the previous sanction of Assistant Excise Commissioner it may be removed from one place to another within such limits. but with the previous sanction of Assistant Excise Commissioner it may be removed from one place to another within such limits. But no shop other than Foreign Liquor wholesale shop shall be located in, or removed to a place (a) within an area declared as a project area; or (b) within 400 metres from any School, Temple, Church, Mosque or burial ground: Provided that the Board of Revenue may, for sufficient reasons, permit any shop to be located in or removed to a place referred to is clause (a) or clause (b) subject to such restrictions and conditions, if any, as may be imposed." 3. The 1st respondent in her counter affidavit has disputed the correctness of the averment in the writ petition that the toddy shop was being conducted in the prohibited area. According to her, there was no school, nor a place of worship, within the prohibited distance of 400 metres. It is also contended that the writ petition has been filed at the instance and instigation of one Parvathi Bhargavi, a co-owner of the property comprised in Sy. No. 904/14, who had already filed a suit O.S. No. 49 of 1980 for a perpetual injunction restraining her from using the building in that property for accommodating the toddy shop; she has also averred therein that I. A. No. 242 of 1980 in that suit, for an interim injunction, was heard and dismissed on 17 41980; and there is no ground made out for the issue of a writ of mandamus as prayed for in the writ petition. 4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent, the State of Kerala, it is stated interalia that the 2nd respondent, the Assistant Excise Commissioner, Kottayam, through his subordinate officers had conducted enquiries on the basis of a petition filed by the people of the locality against the functioning of the shop in that locality, and it was found that the lower primary school and the S.N.D.P. Guru Mandiram referred to in the petition were situated more than 400 metres away from the toddy shop. In the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner it is stated inter alia that the enquiry, if any, got conducted by the 2nd respondent through his subordinates was opposed to ail principles of natural justice, and the 2nd respondent should have conducted the enquiry himself, without delegating it to his subordinates. In the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner it is stated inter alia that the enquiry, if any, got conducted by the 2nd respondent through his subordinates was opposed to ail principles of natural justice, and the 2nd respondent should have conducted the enquiry himself, without delegating it to his subordinates. It is reiterated that on a proper investigation it could be seen that the school was situated within 400 metres from the building where the toddy shop was functioning. It is further pointed out chat the Advocate Commissioner deputed in O.S. No. 49 of 1980 had reported that the distance from the toddy shop to the school and S. N. Mandiram was 347 metres as the crow flies, and only 372 metres through the road. 5. The counsel for the Ist respondent and the Government Pleader appearing for respondents 2 and 3 submitted that the petitioner is not an aggrieved party inasmuch as he is not the manager of the lower primary school or a person having anything to do with that school. They submitted that be is in the position of a busybody claiming to champion the causes on behalf of the public at large, without himself having anything to do with it. Two decisions of the Supreme Court in K S. Shenoy v. Udipi Municipality (AIR. 1974 SC. 2177) and J. H. Desai v. Roshan Kumar (AIR. 1976 SC. 570) are relied on by the respondents. This argument that the petitioner is only a busybody or a way-farer, and has, therefore, no locus standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court, in my view, proceeds from the wrong premises that he was not an "aggrieved person", giving a too narrow and rigid connotation to that concept, without noticing that with the change of times and the needs of the people, reflected in the various legislations, it has evolved itself into an elastic concept. Whether one is an "aggrieved person" or not would depend upon the variable and diverse factors' like the content and intent of the statute of which the contravertion is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury caused to him. Whether one is an "aggrieved person" or not would depend upon the variable and diverse factors' like the content and intent of the statute of which the contravertion is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury caused to him. In this case the petitioner is not a total stranger inasmuch as, as a person residing very close to the building in which the toddy shop is being carried on, he is a person interested in the subject-matter. As a resident of the locality it was only reasonable for him to expect that within a radius of 400 metres from the school, people will be free from the nuisance and disturbance that would naturally result from conducting a toddy shop, and in that sense he was a person having at least indirect, if not direct, interest in the matter. In this view he is entitled to seek redressal of his grievance that the toddy shop is being located in a place within 400 metres from the school in violation of sub-rules (1) and (2) of R.6 of the Rules. As Lord Denning would put it (Regina v Paddington Valuation Officer and another Ex parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. 1966 (I) Q. B. 380 at 401): "The Court would not listen, of course, to a mere busybody who was interfering in things which did not concern him. But it will listen to anyone whose interests are affected by what has been done" Certiorari being discretionary remedy, the discretion of the Court extends to permit as application to be made by any member of the public who might have some interest in the matter. Recent cases would indicate that the term "aggrieved person" has been used to take in from within a wide field. 6. The parties are at variance on a question of fact as to whether toddy shop No. 52 has been permitted to be located within 400 metres from the lower primary school. Reliance is placed on the report of the Commissioner in O.S. 49 of 1980 by the petitioner, stating that the Commissioner has found the distance as the crow flies to be 347 metres and the distance through road to be 372 metres. Reliance is placed on the report of the Commissioner in O.S. 49 of 1980 by the petitioner, stating that the Commissioner has found the distance as the crow flies to be 347 metres and the distance through road to be 372 metres. The Commissioner, however, does not appear to state precisely from where the distance has been taken, from the toddy shop building to the school building or from the boundary of the property in which the school or toddy shop building is situate. Whether the distance was taken by the officers subordinate to the 2nd respondent, as the crow flies or through the road or way also is not clear. No doubt, there is no provision. in the rules as to bow the distance has to be reckoned. In such circumstances, to avoid ambiguity and to ensure uniformity in the application of law, guidance has to be sought from the provisions of S.10 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125, (Act VII of 1125), corresponding to S.11 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, (Act X of 1897) which provides as follows: "10. Measurement of distances. In the measurement of any distance, for the purposes of any Act. that distance shall, unless a different intention appears, be measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane." 7. Now that the toddy shop was being conducted for the last four months in the premises in Sy. No. 907/14, I think, ends of justice would be met it a direction is given to the respondents that when the abkari year expires on 31-3-1981, the shop should not be allowed to be conducted in the present premises in Sy. No. 907/14, unless an officer not below the rank of the Assistant Commissioner of Excise satisfies himself personally that the distance between the school and the building in which the toddy shop is to be conducted is outside the distance of 400 metres measured in a straight line on a horizontal plane or as the crow flies. The writ petition is disposed of with the above direction. There will be no order as to costs. Carbon copy of this judgment will be granted to the Government Pleader free of charge and to the counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the 1st respondent on usual terms if applied for in that behalf.