K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) PRIOR to 1-6-1975, the petitioner was working as the paid Secretary-cum supervisor of a Co-operative Society called as 'kurubar Wool Industry developing Co-operative Association ltd, Ranebennur' (hereinafter referred to as the Society) which is respondent no. 2 before me. He has rendered loyal and efficient service to the said Society for more than three decades and retired from service on 31-5-1975 receiving such terminal benefits that he was entitled to from the Society. ( 2 ) ON 1-6-1975, the Committee of management of the Society decided to utilise the services of the petitioner by appointing him as its 'honorary working member' on certain terms and conditions by suitably amending the existing bye-laws which did not permit the same. Accordingly, a suitable amendment of the bye-law of the society was placed before the General body meeting of the Society held on 23-9-1975 which approved the same without any modification. In accordance with the provisions of the Karnataka co-operative Societies Act of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the Rules framed thereunder, the society approached the Joint Registrar 6f Co-operative Societies, Belgaum division, Belgaum (hereinafter referred to as 'the Joint Registrar') who is respondent No. 1, to accord his approval to the said bye-law. But, unfortunately for the petitioner, respondent No. 1 taking the view, that there was no need for the appointment of an honorary 'member' and the proposed bye-law was not in conformity with S. 56 of the Act, by his order No. (D)/ AMD-SR/20/75-76 (K) dated 27-11 1975 (Ex-C), rejected the said request of the Society. Against the said order of respondent No. 1, the Society filed an appeal before the Registrar of co-operative Societies in Karnataka, bangalore (hereinafter referred to as 'the Registrar') in R. C. S. Appeal No 3 of 1976-77, who by his order dated 5-7-1976, (Ex-D) dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the order of respondent No. 1. Against the said orders of the Registrar and Joint Registrar, the Society filed a revision petition under Section 108 of the Act before the Government which by its order No. RDC 349 CWP 76 dated 6-6-1977 (Ex- e) allowed the said revision petition. The operative portion of the said order of Government reads thus: "government have gone though the recor as and also studied its working and other aspects. The operative portion of the said order of Government reads thus: "government have gone though the recor as and also studied its working and other aspects. It is one of the good working co-operative Institutions in the area which is rendering yeoman service to the weavers and other people involved in the wool industry. It is running in profit and office, be arers are taking keen interest in the development of the Society. The amendment to the bye-law now proposed is quite reasonable and it is in the interest of the Institution to utilise the services of an experienced qualified person. Therefore, the amendment now proposed to the bye-law may be registered. The order of the Registrar of Co-operative societies, rejecting the registration of this bye-law is set aside, and the petition is allowed. " in compliance of the said order, respondent No. 1 by his order No- D|mad| sr/20-75-76 (K) dated 4-3. 1978 (Ex- f) issued a certificate of approval and registration of the bye-law proposed by the Society, without specifying the date from which the said approval and registration should take effect. In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought for a writ in the nature of mandamus to respondent No. 1 to approve and register the bye-law with effect from 1. 6. 1975 or 27-11. 1975, the former being the date on which the committee of management decided to frame a new bye-law and the latter being the date on which he refused to accord his sanction. ( 3 ) THE petitioner claims that in view of the order of Government in the revision petition filed by the Society (Exhibi-E), the bye-law should be registered, in any event, from the date on which respondent No. 1 rejected the, request of the Society viz. , 27-11-1975 and not from 4-3. 1978. ( 4 ) AT the direction of the Court, the learned Government Advocate has taken notice for respondent No. 1, but he, has not filed any return. ( 5 ) SOMEWHAT surprisingly, respondent No. 2 while contending that the very revision petition filed by it before government was incompetent, has justified the action of respondent No. 1 registering the bye-law from 4. 3. 1978. But, at the hearing Sri S. C. Javali, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, in my opinion, rightly did not contend that the revision petition filed was incompetent. 3. 1978. But, at the hearing Sri S. C. Javali, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, in my opinion, rightly did not contend that the revision petition filed was incompetent. In this view, the question of examining the said contention urged by respondent No. 2 does not arise. ( 6 ) SRI M. R. Achar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that respondent No. 1 should have accorded his approval and registered the bye- law from 26 11-75 and not from 4-3-78. Elaborating his contention Sri Achar maintained that the Act, though silent, should be construed as to hold that the approval and registration should be deemed to have been effected on the former date by reason of the order of Government. In support of his contention, Sri Achar, strongly relied OP the views expressed by Lord Denning in Seaford Court estate Ltd. , v. Asher, (1948) 1 AC 291. and in his book 'discipline of Law' in the construction of statutes. ( 7 ) SRI Javali supported the action of respondent No. 1 and urged that on a true construction of Ss. 12 and 13 of the Act, a notional registration of a bye law from an earlier date was impermissible. ( 8 ) A bye-law being subordinate legislation, cannot be made in derogation of rule or an Act. A Bye- law can be tramed under and in accordance with the provisions of an Act. A legislature can enact a law retrospectively but a subordinate legislative authority cannot make a law retrospectively unless the same is expressly authorised by the enabling Act. In my opinion, tne legal principle that a decree made by a superior Court in reversal of the decree of the lower Court, should be deemed to take effect from the date of the institution of the plaint or the date of the judgment of the original Court relied on by Sri Achar, cannot be applied to cases of legislation. I will now pass on to examine whether sections 12 end 13 of the Act support the case of the petitioner. ( 9 ) 'a statute is the will of the legislature, and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute, is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it". ( 9 ) 'a statute is the will of the legislature, and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute, is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it". If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselvas in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature' (vide chapter- I 'preliminary Survey' introductory - Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition) bearing this fundamental principle in mind, I have to ascertain the true scope and ambit of Sections 12 and 13 of the act. ( 10 ) RULE 6 of the Rules regulates the procedure to be observed for amendment Of the bye-laws of a society. A proposal for an amendment preceded by a valid notice to the members has to be placed before the General Body meeting of the society, for consideration, which may accept or reject the same. In the event of acceptance the same has to be approved by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. If not, such a proposal stands rejected at the very initial stage itself, after which the question of registration will not arise for consideration. If an amendment is approved by two thirds majority at the general body meeting, then the Society has to make an application to the Registrar, which includes a Joint Registrar accompanied by the enclosures mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 of the Rules, seeking for the approval of such a bye-law. On receipt of such an application, the Registrar should examine the bye-law and if satisfied that the same is not contrary to the various clauses enumerated in sub-section, (2) of Section 12 of the act and the Rules, should register such an amendment and forward to the society, a copy of the registered amendment together with a certificate signed by him. If on such examination, the Registrar is satisfied that the amendment is violative of any one of the clauses of Section 12 (2) of the act, he can refuse the registration giving reasons for the same. Section 13 of the Act empowers the authority to specify a date on which the amendment shall come into effect. When the registrar does not specify a date sec. Section 13 of the Act empowers the authority to specify a date on which the amendment shall come into effect. When the registrar does not specify a date sec. 13 of the Act declares that the amendment shall come into force on the day on which it is registered. Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act which commences with negative words declares that an amendment of a bye-law will not be valid, unless such an amendment has been registered under the act, which necessarily means registration by the Registrar. 'negative words, are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute , imperative (vide, M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 .) s. 12 of the Act, providing for registration is an imperative or mandatory provision. A registration of an amendment is a physical and legal act and cannot be rotional. In the context, the words 'on a particular day' occurring in Section 13 of the Act, can be, construed only as a future or a prospective date and cannot be construed as a date anterior to the date of registration itself. On the other hand, acceptance of the construction suggested by Sri achar on Sections 12 and 13 of the act, would really amount to legislation which cannot be resorted by Courts in the guise of interpretation. ( 11 ) IN Seaford Court Estates Ld's case, which was later reversed by the house of Lords, but which has recently veered round to the theory of purposeful construction of statutes propounded by Lord Denning therein, the English court of Appeal was called upon to interpret sub-section (3) of Sec. 2 of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920, the language of which was not clear and did not expressly provide for a contingency that came up before it. But that is not the position in the present case. The language of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act and Rule 6 of the Rules are plain and clear and do not present any such difficulty. Lord Denning also recognises this principle in Seaford court Estates Ld's case. In this view the observations of Lord Denning in seaford Court Estates Ltd's case and in his latest book 'discipline of Law', on the construction of statutes has no application. Lord Denning also recognises this principle in Seaford court Estates Ld's case. In this view the observations of Lord Denning in seaford Court Estates Ltd's case and in his latest book 'discipline of Law', on the construction of statutes has no application. ( 12 ) UNFORTUNATELY for the petitioner, ever remembering that a hard case cannot make bad law and with a heavy heart I have reached the above conclusion which will naturally cause dejection, if not disgust to the petitioner in all that has happened to him. A reading of the resolution of the committee of management of the society and the General Body meeting (Exhibits A and B) shows the 2. honest and useful service rendered by the petitioner to the Society and its anxiety in utilising his services after his retirement, cannot now be achieved till 4. 3. 1978. But, still this is a fit case in which the society should explore the possibility of fairly settling the amounts due to the petitioner for- the period he has actually worked after his retirement, without causing him a sense of frustration in the evening of his life by exploring all such possibility and initating all such steps in that behalf, in accordance with law. I fervently hope, the Society will sincerely explore all such possibilities and render justice to the petitioner. ( 13 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I hold that the rule issued in the case is liable to be discharged. Rule issued is, therefore, discharged. ( 14 ) IN the circumstances of the case, i direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .