Judgment B.P.Jha, J. 1. In a writ application, these petitioners pray for quashing Annexures 4 and 5. Annexure 4 contains an order passed by the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, and Annexure 5 contains an order passed by the Commissioner in revision. 2. The relevant facts are these: On 19th December, 1925, Soney Lal Choudhary, Ras Bihari Choudhary, Sons of Gopal Choudhary, and Siaram Choudhary Son of Janak Lal Choudhary executed a usufructuary mortgage bond, which was registered on 2nd January, 1926, in favour of Sk. Bhikhari, with respect to 5 bighas 7 kathas 2 dhur of land, for a loan of Rs. 425/-. The heirs of Soney Lal Choudhary and Siaram Choudhary applied under Sec.12 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 (Bihar Act XXII of 1975 hereinafter referred to as the Act), for recovery of possession of the mortgaged lands. The President gave assent to this Act on 20th March, 1975, and it came into force at once. By Annexure 4, the Land Reforms Deputy Collector directed the heirs of the mortgagee, the petitioners, to deliver possession of the mortgaged lands to the heirs of the mortgagors (respondents Nos 4 and 5). The petitioners preferred a revision application before the Commissioner under Sec. 46 of the Act. The commissioner, in revision, upheld the order of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. In other words, both the authorities concurrently directed the petitioners to deliver possession of the mortgaged lands to the heirs of the mortgagors. This writ application has been filed against the orders passed by the land Reforms Deputy Collector and the Commissioner under the provisions of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 . 3. On these facts, learned Counsel for the petitioners challenges the validity of the impugned orders on the basis of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ram Rup Kuer and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors., 1978 0 BBCJ 282 . In that case the Division Bench has held that if a suit for redemption is barred by limitation then in that case an application under Sec.12 of the Act is not maintainable. The present case can easily be distinguished from the above Division Bench case. In the present case, the heirs of the mortgagors brought a title suit for redemption against the heirs of the mortgagee. The matter ultimately came to the High Court in second Appeal No. 994 of 1956. The present case can easily be distinguished from the above Division Bench case. In the present case, the heirs of the mortgagors brought a title suit for redemption against the heirs of the mortgagee. The matter ultimately came to the High Court in second Appeal No. 994 of 1956. This Court by its judgment dated 8th May, 1959 (vide Annexure 1), was pleased to uphold the decree of redemption passed by the trial Judge in the title suit. After passing of the final decree by the High Court in second Appeal No. 994 of ] 956, the mortgagors decreebolders did not put the decree in execution as required by Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. According to Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, a decree is required to be put into execution within three years from the date of the final decree or order of the appellate Court. It is an admitted position in the present case that the decree was not at all put into execution by the mortgagors decree-holders. 4. When the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974 , came into force, the heirs of the mortgagors filed an application under Sec.12 of the Act for recovery of possession of the mortgaged lands. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of the case involved in the earlier Division Bench decision do not apply to the facts of the present case. In that case no suit for redemption was filed. Without filing a suit, the heir of the mortgagor had filed an application under Sec.12 of the Act. In that circumstance the Division Bench held that as the suit for redemption was barred by limitation, no application under Sec.12 of the Act was maintainable. Thus, I am of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of the present case are quite different and distinct from the facts and circumstance of the earlier Division Bench decision. 5. It is relevant at this stage to quote Sec.12 of the Act which runs as follows: 12. Usufructuary mortgages and their redemption. Thus, I am of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of the present case are quite different and distinct from the facts and circumstance of the earlier Division Bench decision. 5. It is relevant at this stage to quote Sec.12 of the Act which runs as follows: 12. Usufructuary mortgages and their redemption. - Not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement, the principal amount and all dues in respect of an usufructuary mortgage relating to any agricultural land, whether executed before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied and the mortgage shall be deemed to have been wholly redeemed on expiry of a period of seven years from the date of the execution of the mortgage bond in respect of such land and the mortgagor shall be entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged land in the manner prescribed under the rules Provided that if the mortgage bond had been executed before the commencement of this Act nothing in this section shall entitle the mortgagor to claim any accounts or profits from the mortgagee by the reason of the benefit of redemption of the mortgage under this provision. Explanation. - Nothing in this section shall be construed to confer a right of effecting usufructuary mortgage of land oh persons who do not possess transferable rights in such land. On a bare reading of Sec.12, it is clear that it proceeds with a non obstante clause, i.e. "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement." Thus, the very opening words sugguest that the provision of Sec.12 shall have overriding effect over any other existing law. It will have overriding effect even if there are contrary enactments contained in any law or in any agreement. In other words, it is a special law which will prevail upon the general law. In this connection, in Pretty V/s. Solly, 1859 26 Beav 506. It will have overriding effect even if there are contrary enactments contained in any law or in any agreement. In other words, it is a special law which will prevail upon the general law. In this connection, in Pretty V/s. Solly, 1859 26 Beav 506. Romilly M. R. stated as follows: The rule is, that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. Whenever there is a general statute and a special statute, the question arises which one will control the other. The answer will be that the special law will control the general law. The special law will override the provisions of the general law. The general law provides that a suit for redemption will lie under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question further arises as to whether the Code of Civil Procedure will apply or the special law will apply in respect of a certain special or local law. The answer is given in Sec. 4(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which runs as follows 4. Savings. - (1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. Thus, Sec. 4(1) specifically lays down that where any special or local law prescribes a certain special form of procedure, that procedure shall prevail over the general procedure as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is, therefore, clear that by enactment of Sec.12 in the Act, the legislature intended to frame a special law in respect of recovery of possession concerning a usufructuary mortgage bond. By this legislation a mortgagor is not required to file a suit for redemption under the Code of Civil Procedure, He is not required to pay back the loan to the mortgagee. He is also required to levy execution in respect of the recovery of possession of the mortgaged property. By this legislation a mortgagor is not required to file a suit for redemption under the Code of Civil Procedure, He is not required to pay back the loan to the mortgagee. He is also required to levy execution in respect of the recovery of possession of the mortgaged property. It is, therefore, clear that special legislation shall override the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or the Limitation Act, 1963 or any other enactment. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or Court-fees Act or any other enactment shall apply for the Limited purpose for which they are mentioned in the Act or the Rules. 6. At present, there are two ways to recover possession of the mortgaged lands, one, by filing a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure and, the other, by filing an application under Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act. In the present case, it is not necessary for the party to file a suit. Without filing a suit the mortgagors can get the relief of recovery of possession under Sec.12 of the Act. The Act lays down a complete machinery in itself. In Chapter IV of the Bihar Money Lenders Rules 1975, a complete procedure has been laid down as to the manner in which recovery of possession can be made in respect of a mortgaged land. It is relevant to quote Chapter IV of the Bihar Money Lenders Rules, 1975 , which runs as follows Chapter IV Resumption of Land by Mortgagor under Sec.12. 9. Procedure in case of resumption of mortgaged property by a mortgagor from the mortgagee under Sec.12 of the Act. - (1) On the expiry of the period of mortgage as mentioned in Sec.12 of the Act, the mortgagor shall send a notice in Form M. I. 4 requiring the mortgagee to deliver possession of the mortgaged property within twenty days from the date of notice and, (2) A copy of the notice shall also be sent by registered post with . acknowledgment due by the mortgagor to the Anchal Adhikari within whose jurisdiction the mortgaged property is situated. 10. Filing of application by mortgagor to eject the mortgagee in case of latters failure to put the mortgagor in possession. acknowledgment due by the mortgagor to the Anchal Adhikari within whose jurisdiction the mortgaged property is situated. 10. Filing of application by mortgagor to eject the mortgagee in case of latters failure to put the mortgagor in possession. - (1) If on the expiry of the period of notice in Form M. L. 4, the mortgagee fails or refuses to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor, the mortgagor shall file an application in Form M. L. 5 to the Collector within whose jurisdiction the mortgaged property or any point thereof is situated, to eject the mortgagee from the mortgaged property. (2) The application shall bear a Court fee stamp of such value as may be payable for it under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (Act VII of 1870) for the time being in force for an application and shall be accompanied with the form of the notice in Form M. L. 6 in triplicate. (3) On receipt of application from the mortgagor for ejecting the mortgagee the Collector shall issue a notice in M. L. 6 to the mortgagee or his legal representative to show cause by a date to be specified in the notice why the mortgagor should not be put in possession. (4) If no cause is shown on or before the date specified in the notice or by such other date as may be extended by the Collector or if the cause shown is, in the opinion of the Collector, not satisfactory, he shall pass an order in writing to eject the mortgagee from the mortgaged property and put the mortgagor in possession and for that purpose he may use such force as may be necessary. (5) The delivery of possession will be effected in the manner prescribed for the purpose in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). 7. If an Act sets out a complete machinery in order to achieve a certain object then in that case the Court or the party should not look at any other enactment. In other words, the Provisions of the other existing law shall not be looked into while following the procedure laid down in Sec.12 of the Act. 7. If an Act sets out a complete machinery in order to achieve a certain object then in that case the Court or the party should not look at any other enactment. In other words, the Provisions of the other existing law shall not be looked into while following the procedure laid down in Sec.12 of the Act. I am of the opinion that neither the Indian Limitation Act nor the Code of Civil Procedure nor the Transfer of Property Act nor any other enactment shall apply in a case where an application under Sec.12 of the Act has been filed. The other enactments shall apply for the limited purpose for which they are mentioned in the Act or the Rules. 8. A reference was made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Pafiquenneasa V/s. Lal Bahadur Chetri -- . In this case, their Lordships were considering Sec. 5(1) of the Assam Non - Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act (hereinafter called the Assam Act). The wordings of Sec.12 of the Act. and Section 5 of the Assam Act are identical. It is relevant to quote Sec. 5 (i) of the Assam Act: Notwithstanding anything in any contract or in any law for the time being in force (a) where under the terms of a contract entered into between a landlord and his tenant whether before or after the commencement of this Act, a tenant is entitled to build, and has in pursuance of such terms actually built within the period of five years from the date of such contract, a permanent structure on the land of the tenancy for residential or business purposes, or where a tenant not being so entitled to build, has actually built any such structure on the land of the tenancy for any of the purposes aforesaid with the knowledge and acquiescence of the landlord, the tenant shall not be ejected by the landlord from the tenancy except on the ground of non-payment of rent: (b) where a tenant has effected improvements on the land of the tenancy under the terms whereof he is not entitled to effect such improvements, the tenant shall not be ejected by the landlord from the land of the tenancy unless compensation for reasonable improvements has been paid to the tenant. While interpreting that section, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were of the opinion that ordinarily a legislation should be prospective in operation unless it is intended to be retrospective in operation. On the basis of the wordings of Sec. 5(1)(a) of the Assam Act, their Lordships held that it was retrospective in operation. In that case the landlord had filed a suit for ejectment against the tenant under the terms of tenancy before the Assam Act came into force. The contention on behalf of the landlord was that when the suit was filed by the appellant, he had acquired the right to eject the tenant under the terms of the tenancy. It was also contended that where vested rights were affected by any statutory provision, the said provision should normally be construed to be prospective in operation and not retrospective. These contentions of learned Counsel for the landlord were rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Their Lordships were of the opinion that the intention of the Legislature in framing Sec. 5 was to give it retrospective operation. In this circumstance it was held by their lordships that the suit for ejectment filed against the tenant was not maintainable in view of Sec. 5.(1)(a) of the Assam Act. 9. Relying on the Supreme Court decision, I hold that the intention of the Legislature in framing Sec.12 of the Act was to give it retrospective operation. The intention of the Legislature was that if the term of seven years in respect of the usufructuary mortgage relating to an agricultural land had expired, either before or after the commencement of the Act then in that case two consequences shall occur, viz (1) that the mortgage amount shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied and (2) that the mortgage bond shall be deemed to have been wholly redeemed. The words deemed to have been explained by the Privy Council in Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay Presidency V/s. Bombay Trust Corporation Ltd., AIR 1930 PC 54, as follows Now when a person is deemed to be something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in reality that something the Act of Parliament requires him to be treated as if he were. In other words, the intention of the Legistature was that after the expiry of seven years of a usufructuary mortgage bond relating to an agricultural land, it will be deemed that the amount mentioned in the mortgage bond has been fully satisfied and the mortgage bond has been wholly redeemed. It is not at all,necessary to deposit the mortgage amount under Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act and it is also not at all necessary to bring a suit for redemption under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure because of the deeming clause as mentioned in Sec.12. 10. In my opinion, the Act is retrospective in operation. In this connection, " Crates on Statute Law" (7th edition at page 396) was referred to which runs as follows Sometimes a statute, although not intended to be retrospective will in fact have a retrospective operation. For instance, if two persons enter into a contract, and afterwards a statute is passed, which as Cockburn C. J. said in Duke of Devonshire V/s. Barrow etc. Co., "engrafts an enactment upon existing contracts" and thus operates so as to produce a result which is something quite different from the original intention of the contracting parties, such a statute has, in effect, a retrospective operation Similarly, if a statute is passed which renders the performance of a contract impossible, the rule of law is that the contract is frustrated by supervening impossibility. 11. So far as the question of application of Limitation Act is concerned I am of the opinion that the Limitation Act applies by virtue of its Sec.3 to suits instituted, appeal preferred or application arising out of a suit By virtue of Sec.29, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to other special or local law unless it is expressly prohibited by the provisions of that special or local law. By Sec.28 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 if a suit is not filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act the party will have no right to file such a suit. By Sec.28 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 if a suit is not filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act the party will have no right to file such a suit. In other words the right to file a suit within a certain period shall be governed by the Limitation Act It is for this reason that the learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that as the decree was not put into execution within three years under Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the mortgagors were not entitled to file an application under Section 12 of the Act, I am unable to accept this argument. I am of the opinion that whether the decree has been executed or has not been executed, Sec.12 of the Act applies to the case of the mortgagors. 1 am further of the opinion that no suit for redemption is necessary to be filed I am thus of the opinion that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply so far as Sec.12 of the Act is concerned. Wherever the legislature intends to apply the provisions of the Limitation Act, it has been specifically mentioned in the statute. The special law always lays down its own law of limitation The reason for my opinion is that Sec.12 proceeds with the non obstante clause and as such this clause will have overriding effect on any statute. 12. The law raised in this case may be summarised thus: - Sec.12 of the Act will apply after the expiry of seven years of a usufructuary mortgage relating to an agricultural land. By virtue of Sec.12, after the expiry of seven years, the Mortgage amount shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied and the mortgage bond shall be deemed to have been fully redeemed. If these conditions are satisfied then the Revenue authorities shall direct recovery of possession to the mortgagors. Sec.12 of the Act proceeds with the non obstante clause and as such it will have overriding effect on any other statute. The provision of Sec.12 is a special law and it will prevail over the provisions of any other enactment in force. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or Court-fees Act or any other enactment shall apply for the Limite 13. The provision of Sec.12 is a special law and it will prevail over the provisions of any other enactment in force. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or Court-fees Act or any other enactment shall apply for the Limite 13. I am of the opinion that the land Reforms Deputy Collector and the Commissioner were fully justified in directing these petitioners to deliver possession of the mortgaged lands to the heirs of the mortgagors (respondents Nos. 4 and 5) under Sec.12 of the Act, as the conditions laid down under the Act have been fully satisfied. In view of the concurrent findings as contained in Annexures 4 and 5, I am unable to interfere with the orders in question. 14. In the result, the application is dismissed without costs. M.P.Verma, J. 15 I have had the advantage of hearing the judgment delivered by my learned Brother B.P. Jha. My learned Brother has enunciated the principle of automatic redemption of the usufructuary mortgage as laid down in Sec.12 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1974, in a most lucid style and I am in full agreement with my learned Brother to all what he has said. 16. In my attempt to put my own reasonings for the dismissal of this writ application, I may be just repeating some of the facts which have been dealt with so elaborately. In the case of Ram Rup Kuer and other V/s. The state of Bihar and Ors., 1978 0 BBCJ 282 , their Lordships, on the facts of that case, came to a finding that the right, title and interest of the mortgagors extinguished before Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act came into force. In other words, their lordships gave a finding that there was no subsisting mortgage then. It has been further held that on a plain reading of Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act, it is explicit that it applies in cases where the mortgage subsists, So far as the instant case before us is concerned it will be seen that respondents Nos. It has been further held that on a plain reading of Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act, it is explicit that it applies in cases where the mortgage subsists, So far as the instant case before us is concerned it will be seen that respondents Nos. 4 and 5 who are the heirs of the mortgagors, filed the title suit numbered 53/14 sometime in the year 1953 in the Court of Munsif at Samastipur for redemption of the said sudbharna deed and the matter came up to the High Court in Second Appeal No. 994 of 1956, wherein a preliminary decree for redemption was passed. I further find from the judgment of the High Court, which is Annexure I to the writ application, that the plaintiffs were directed to pay the sudbharna-money along with the other money found to be due to the defendants mortgagees after final accounting by a pleader-commissioner. These facts have been clearly stated in paragraph five of the writ application. It has been seen that respondents Nos 4 and 5, who are the heirs of the mortgagors inistead of getting a pleader commissioner appointed kept silent for long and did not take any step for execution thereof. I further find that when the suit was filed the money was also deposited under Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act which, of course, was found to be inadequate. In my opinion, the money deposited remains the property of the person depositing it till it is withdrawn, and it can well be said that till the mortgagee accepts the deposit in full satisfaction of his claim, the mortgage will be deemed to be subsisting. As long as the equity of redemption remains intact, the mortgagor cannot be prevented from taking any action, muchless, an action under Sec.12 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act. The right of redemption is not extinct unless the final decree is passed. In the present case, on the facts stated above, it is obvious that the case did not culminate into a final decree. 17. The relevant decision with regard to Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act appears in paragraph seven of the judgment reported in 1978 Bihar Bar Council Journal 282, at page 286. In the present case, on the facts stated above, it is obvious that the case did not culminate into a final decree. 17. The relevant decision with regard to Sec.12 of the Money Lenders Act appears in paragraph seven of the judgment reported in 1978 Bihar Bar Council Journal 282, at page 286. In order to make the provisions of this special enactment inapplicable, their Lordships, in deciding the case, have taken recourse to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, in order to find whether or not the right, title and interest of the mortgagors stood extinguished on the date the special Act came into force. It appears to me that attention of their Lordships was not drawn to the non obstante clause, which are the opening words of Sec.12 of the Act, making all other Jaws to the contrary inapplicable to a mortgage, for exercising power by the authorities under the Money Lenders Act. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, their Lordships have said that none appeared at the time of hearing of the application on behalf of the respondents before the court, but none the less I respectfully agree with the principle laid down by their Lordships in the said case that the mortgagor cannot take shelter under the cover of Sec.12 of this special enactment of the Bihar Money Lenders Act when the right, title and interest are extinguished. But the case before us is quite different. I am of the view, as stated above, that the mortgage in the present case subsists and the mortgagors are within their right to resort to the provisions of this special enactment, in spite of the fact that the mortgagors knocked the door of the Civil Court for redemption of the mortgage. 18. I am of the view, as stated above, that the mortgage in the present case subsists and the mortgagors are within their right to resort to the provisions of this special enactment, in spite of the fact that the mortgagors knocked the door of the Civil Court for redemption of the mortgage. 18. I would like to refer to the third paragraph (which is the relevant paragraph) of Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act in this connection: Where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, the Court shall, before paying to him the amount so deposited, direct him to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor and at the cost of the mortgagor either to re-transfer the mortgaged property to the mortgagor or to such third person as the mortgagor may direct or to execute and (where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) have registered an acknowledgment in writing that any right in derogation the mortgagors interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished. A plain reading of this paragraph of Section 83 clearly indicates that for the extinction of the mortgagees right in the mortgaged property, a retransfer by the mortgagee to the mortgagor of the mortgaged property seems to be essential. Sec.12 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act 1974, provides for a statutory redemption of the mortgaged property and also provides for the mortgage having been fully satisfied by a deeming clause which acts retrospectively, computing the period of seven years commencing from the date of execution of the mortgage, whether executed before or after the commencement of the Act. In my opinion, a legal fiction is created by this deeming clause and the mortgage will be deemed to have been redeemed and satisfied if the period of seven years passes from the date of execution of the deed itself, either before or after the commencement of the Act. In the instant case, as has been stated above, the sudbharna deed was executed and registered sometime in the year 1926 and by virtue of this deeming clause the mortgage bond will be deemed to have been redeemed long back in the year 1933. 19 The provisions of Sec.12 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act are further controlled by the clause reading thus "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement". 19 The provisions of Sec.12 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act are further controlled by the clause reading thus "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement". The expression "anything having the force of law" has been purposely underlined by me as it has a definite legal concept and import which seems to embrace within its fold even the concluded judgment of a Court of law concerning such property and this brings the same to a naught. By virtue of this deeming provision in Sec.12 of the Bihar Money Lenders Act, the mortgage in question stood satisfied sometime in the year 1933 and the loan would be deemed to have been wholly redeemed and there is no law which puts any embargo upon the mortgagors right in their making an application under Sec.12 for recovery of possession of such mortgaged land despite their having resorted to the ordinary civil remedy under the Transfer of Property Act or having failed to comply with the orders of the Court passed in the said suit filed by the heirs of the mortgagors. In the circumstances referred to above, I have already said that I entirely agree with my learned Brother that this application should be dismissed. It accordingly fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.