S. H. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of matrimonial proceedings. The appellant husband and the respondent wife married on 16/06/1962. On 27/03/1964 the wifes brother went to the matrimonial home of the wife who left with him. It appears that she left her matrimonial home with her brother on account of differences of opinion between the two spouses. On 23/07/1964 the husband approached Jyoti Sangh in order to obtain help from it to persuade the wife to return to him. It yielded no result. On 15/08/1965 husband is said to have made another attempt through his friend Mukund to persuade the wife to return to him. That attempt also failed. In April 1967 a third attempt was made which also failed. In August 1970 more than six years after the wife left the husband the husband sent a registered notice to the wife in which he alleged that she had wilfully deserted him. The wife did not reply to that letter. On 8/09/1970 the husband filed against the wife Hindu Marriage Petition No. 75 of 1970 for obtaining judicial separation from her. On 15/01/1971 the wife filed her written statement in that petition in which she inter alia alleged that she had left with the husband ornaments worth about Rs. 5 0 which were given to her by her parents at the time of marriage. Thereafter she did not appear in the further proceedings in that petition. On 3/02/1972 the Court passed in favour of the husband decree for judicial separation. There could not be any reconciliation between the parties for a period of two years. Therefore on 12/03/1974 the husband filed Hindu Marriage Petition No. 19 of 1974 for obtaining divorce from the wife. On 26/06/1974 the wife filed in that petition her written statement in which she inter alia claimed permanent alimony and also claimed the return of 15 Tolas of gold ornaments which she alleged that she had left with the husband. On 22/08/1974 the trial Court passed in favour of the husband decree for divorce. The trial Court rejected that wifes claim for permanent alimony and also her claim for return of 15 Tolas of gold ornaments from her husband or its monetary value. ( 2 ) AGAINST that decree wife appealed to the High Court. On 22/08/1974 the trial Court passed in favour of the husband decree for divorce. The trial Court rejected that wifes claim for permanent alimony and also her claim for return of 15 Tolas of gold ornaments from her husband or its monetary value. ( 2 ) AGAINST that decree wife appealed to the High Court. It appears that she did not challenge that part of the decree which dissolved the marriage between the parties. In other words she acquiesced in the decree for divorce which the trial Court had passed in favour of the husband. In appeal she contended that the learned trial Judge was in error in refusing to grant her permanent alimony and refusing to order the husband to return to her 15 Tolas of gold ornaments utensils clothes etc. The appeal was heard by a learned single Judge of this Court. He modified the decree passed by the trial Court and ordered the husband to pay to the wife permanent alimony at the rate of Rs. 50. 00 per month with effect from 12/03/1974 and also ordered him to return to the wife 10 Tolas of gold ornaments or pay its market price. ( 3 ) IT is that appellate decree which is challenged by the husband in this Letters Patent Appeal. ( 4 ) MR. Desai who appears on behalf of the husband has raised before us the following three contentions: (I) The trial Court had no jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings to order the return of wifes Stridhan property. (II) The wife had failed to prove that she had left in the possession of the husband ten Tolas of gold ornaments. (III) The order made by the learned single Judge in the matter of permanent alimony was unjustifiable on the facts of the case. ( 5 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned it is necessary to state that it was not raised before the learned single Judge. So far as the learned trial Judge is concerned it appears that he was conscious of it. In paragraph 12 and subsequent paragraphs he has dealt with the question whether 15 tolas of gold ornaments were the wifes Stridhan property. So far as the learned trial Judge is concerned it appears that he was conscious of it. In paragraph 12 and subsequent paragraphs he has dealt with the question whether 15 tolas of gold ornaments were the wifes Stridhan property. He was dealing with that question because unless it was joint property of the husband and the wife he did not have in matrimonial proceedings instituted under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 jurisdiction to pass any order in regard to the claim which the wife had made. Mr. Desai has invited our attention to certain provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 We are referring to sec 13 25 and 27 as they were when the present petition was instituted in the trial Court. Sec. 13 specified grounds on any one of which decree of divorce dissolving the marriage can be obtained either by the husband or by the wife. A decree for judicial separation was obtained by the husband under sec. 10. The present petition was filed by the husband under sub-sec. (1a) of sec. 13. Sec. 23a was not on the statute book then. In fact the wife had neither filed a counter claim nor instituted other independent proceedings. Sec. 25 provides for permanent alimony and maintenance. It is under this section that the wife made a claim against the husband for permanent alimony. Sec. 27 which is the most material section for the purposes of answering this Contention provided as follows at the relevant time:in any proceeding under this Act the court may make such provisions in the decree as it deems just and proper with respect to any property presented at or about the time of marriage which may belong jointly to both the husband and the wife. THIS section makes it abundantly clear that the Court in matrimonial proceedings has the Jurisdiction to make such provision as it thinks fit in respect of property which may belong jointly to both the husband and the wife. In evidence an attempt was made by the wife to show that the property which she claimed from the husband was the joint property. However it was too late for the wife to contend. In paragraph 1 of her written statements she inter alia stated as follows. When she married the husband 15 tolas of gold ornaments were given to her by her mother and brothers. However it was too late for the wife to contend. In paragraph 1 of her written statements she inter alia stated as follows. When she married the husband 15 tolas of gold ornaments were given to her by her mother and brothers. They were presented to her at the time of the solemnisation of her marriage itself. There cannot be any dispute about the fact that any property which is gifted to a girl at the time of her marriage by her parent or parents or by others is her Stridhan property and that she has an exclusively title to that property. On the pleadings therefore the wife claimed from the husband the return of 15 tolas of gold ornaments on the ground that they exclusively belonged to her as they were gifted to her at the time of her marriage by her mother and brothers. So far as the husband is concerned he stated in his evidence that what was gifted to the wife at the time of her marriage by her mother and brothers was her exclusive property and that her mother and brothers had not gifted to her more than 5 tolas of gold ornaments Even the wife in her examination in chief has follows. AT the time of our marriage I was gifted from my parental side with 4 golden bangles one necklace one Mangalsutra one earring one finger ring and one pair of Chuda and number of clothes along with cash and utensils. Gold ornaments were 15 tolas. It is the caste custom that the bride would not be offered in marriage unless she was adorned with a pair of Chuda. IT is clear therefore that the wife claimed from the husband in the matrimonial proceedings movable property which exclusively belonged to her. ( 6 ) SEC. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 expressly confers jurisdiction upon the Civil Court to make such a provision in the decree as it thinks fit in relation to any property which may belong jointly to both the husband and the wife. It does not enable the Court to make any provision in the decree in the respect of property which may exclusively belong either to the husband or the wife. The express enabling provision made in sec. It does not enable the Court to make any provision in the decree in the respect of property which may exclusively belong either to the husband or the wife. The express enabling provision made in sec. 27 in regard to the joint property rules out by necessary implication the jurisdiction of the Court in matrimonial proceedings to make any provision in such decree in respect of property which may exclusively belong either to the husband or to the wife. ( 7 ) MR. Dave who appears on behalf of the wife has invited our attention to the decision of a learned single Judge in Kamta Prasad v. Smt. Om Wati AIR 197 Allahabad 153. It was a case under Hindu Marriage Act 1955 The question which was raised before the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court was whether any direction could be given in the decree in respect of property which exclusively belonged to the wife. The attention of the learned single Judge was invited to sec. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 Construing sec. 27 it has been stated by the learned single Judge that it does not exclude the jurisdiction or the power of the Court to pass a decree in regard to the property which may belong either solely to the husband or to the wife. In his opinion such a power in the very nature of things is inherent in the legal proceedings which arise under the Hindu Marriage Act. In such cases according to him no difficulty should be experienced in dealing with the property belonging exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Since in his opinion sec. 27 did not exclude the general power of the Court to pass an appropriate decree in regard to the property belonging exclusively to either the husband or to the wife the Court could exercise the inherent power in matrimonial proceedings to make a provision in the decree in respect of property belonging exclusively either to the husband or to the wife. We are unable to concur in this view. While construing sec. 27 what we are required to bear in mind is not what it does not exclude but what it includes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Once we are able to define in terms of sec. We are unable to concur in this view. While construing sec. 27 what we are required to bear in mind is not what it does not exclude but what it includes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Once we are able to define in terms of sec. 27 the ambit of our jurisdiction the further question which we are required to answer is whether what is expressly included in sec. 27 amounts to exclusion by necessary implication of what is not included in it. To say that since sec. 27 does not exclude the power of the Court in respect of the property belonging exclusively to the husband or the wife it enables the Court to deal with such property is to legislative. It is not the function of a Court of law to legislate. Nothing would have been easier for the Parliament than to say if the Parliament had so intended that the Court in matrimonial proceedings would have the jurisdiction to deal with any kind of property belonging exclusively to the husband or to the wife or jointly to both of them. That the Parliament in its wisdom did not bring within the sweep of sec. 27 a property exclusively belonging either to the husband or the wife clearly shows that sec. 27 was not intended to confer jurisdiction upon the Court in respect of property belonging exclusively either to the husband ar to the wife. The test of nonexclusion which the learned Judge of Allahabad High Court has applied if stretched to its logical conclusion will render sec. 27 redundant because it can as well be said that since the Act in absence of sec. 27 does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Court to provide in the decree for exclusive or joint property of the spouses the Court has the jurisdiction to make such a provision in the decree even if sec. 27 is not on the statute book. ( 8 ) WE do not think in respect of substantive claims which a party may have against another and which can be the subject matter of a separate suit inherent power of the Court can be invoked in matrimonial proceedings to do what otherwise can be done in a substantive suit. In our opinion therefore sec. ( 8 ) WE do not think in respect of substantive claims which a party may have against another and which can be the subject matter of a separate suit inherent power of the Court can be invoked in matrimonial proceedings to do what otherwise can be done in a substantive suit. In our opinion therefore sec. 27 by necessary implication bars the jurisdiction of the Court to make any provision in a decree for divorce in respect of property exclusively belonging either to the husband or to the wife. The refore with great respect to him the learned single Judge was in error in decreeing in the present proceedings wifes claim against the husband in respect of the property which in terms of her pleadings exclusively belonged to her. .