JUDGMENT S. Narain, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the District Judge, Motihari dismissing the appeal tiled by the appellant against a decision of the trial court by which it had decreed the suit or the plaintiff-respondent declaring that in accordance with a private partition, the lands specified in schedule 2 of the plaint had been allotted to the plaintiff, Ramji Rai and the lands in schedule 3 had been allotted to defendant no.1. 2. The appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge as time barred after rejecting the prayer for condonation of the delay. It was not disputed before the lower appellate court, and it is not disputed before this court either, that the appeal filed before the learned District Judge was time barred by 56 days, the judgment having been passed on 29.6.1974 and the appeal before the learned District Judge having been filed on 1.10.1974. The only question for consideration, therefore, is whether the learned District Judge acted illegally in rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of the delay, filed by the appellant. Though the appeal was filed on 1.10.1974, this application for condonation of delay was filed on 26.2.75. Long after it was pointed by the office that the appeal was time barred by 56 days. The ground put forward in the application under section 5 of the limitation Act, for condoning the delay was the illness of the appellant. It was alleged that the appellant was suffering from fever and arthrities and he was advised by the doctor to take rest with restriction of movement during the period or his treatment, namely from 1.7.74 to 26.9.1974. A medical certificate purporting to have been granted by Dr. Sitaram Pd. Civil Assistant Surgeon Sadar Hospital, Motihari was filed along with the petition in support of the plea of illness. The petition itself was not only not supported by an affidavit but it was neither verified nor even signed by the appellant and accept for the aforesaid medical certificate no evidence was led in support of the plea of illness. The learned District Judge, after hearing the learned Advocate for the appellant on the date find for bearing of the application, passed the following order on 14.7.1975. "Heard learned lawyer for the appellant on the admissibility of appeal. The learned District Judge, after hearing the learned Advocate for the appellant on the date find for bearing of the application, passed the following order on 14.7.1975. "Heard learned lawyer for the appellant on the admissibility of appeal. The memo of appeal was presented on 1.10.74, which is time barred by one month. The medical certificate filed to explain away the delay does not seem attractive and is, therefore, rejected. The prayer for condonation of the delay is, therefore, rejected and the appeal is dismissed." 3. When this appeal came up for admission on 10.7.1978 on which date it was admitted the leaned Judge of this court who admitted the appeal framed the substantial question of law as follows :- "The substantial question of law involved in this case is as to whether the order under appeal should indicate reason for not accepting the case made out under section 5 of the Limitation Act." I have already set out the order passed on appeal and in my opinion, it is manifest that the order has given reason for not accepting the case made out in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The case for condonation of the delay made out in the aforesaid application, was as I have already stated, the illness of the appellant and a medical certificate was filed in support of the plea of illness. When the learned District Judge stated that the medical certificate filed to explain away the delay does not seem attractive and is, therefore, rejected, he obviously meant that the medical certificate could not be accepted and, therefore, the explanation for delay which wall sought to be supported by that medical certificate must be rejected. The ground given for rejecting the application, therefore, clearly is that the applicant had failed to substantiate his plea of illness. It cannot, therefore, be said that the learned District Judge has given no reason for rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and, therefore, his order is erroneous in law on that account. 4. The ground given for rejecting the application, therefore, clearly is that the applicant had failed to substantiate his plea of illness. It cannot, therefore, be said that the learned District Judge has given no reason for rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and, therefore, his order is erroneous in law on that account. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the learned District Judge should not have rejected the application in limine without affording the petitioner an apportunity of leading evidence in support of the allegations in the petition if he was not inclined to issue notice of the application to the respondents merely on the basis of the application and the medical certificate filed on behalf of the appellant. In my opinion the learned District Judge was not bound to issue notice of the application if he was of the opinion that there was no credible material in support of the allegations made. As I have already pointed out, the application was neither verified nor supported by an affidavit. As observed by Das Gupta, J. speaking for the Supreme court in the case of Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd. Vs. Dye and Chemical workers Union and others the mere fact that the statements were made can never be taken in proof of the fact that the statements were correct. So far as the medical certificate is concerned, as was pointed out by the Supreme Court in that very judgment if a person is to prove that he was ill on a particular date, the mere filing of a certificate of a medical man that he was ill on that date is not accepted as evidence to show that he was ill. Therefore, there was no credible material in support of the illness of the petitioner which was put forward as the sole ground for condonation of the delay. If in these circumstances, the learned District Judge held that the explanation put forward was not worthy of acceptance, it cannot be held that he acted perversely or illegally in so doing. Therefore, there was no credible material in support of the illness of the petitioner which was put forward as the sole ground for condonation of the delay. If in these circumstances, the learned District Judge held that the explanation put forward was not worthy of acceptance, it cannot be held that he acted perversely or illegally in so doing. Whether the delay should be condoned or not is a matter in the discretion of the court which has to consider the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and in second appeal this court cannot interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. I am unable to say that in the present case the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden is on the party who asserts a statement to be correct to prove the same by relevant and acceptable evidence. There was not even prima facie evidence in support of the explanation for the delay and thus, the dismissal in limine of the application cannot be said to be illegal. It was not part of the duty of the court to advise the appellant to adduce evidence either by filing an application in support of the averments or by leading oral evidence. In my opinion, therefore, the appeal is without merit and no ground for interference has been made out. 5. As the appeal must fail on the merits, it is not necessary to consider the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the appeal is not maintainable as the memorandum of appeal filed in this court is not accompained by the certified copy of the decree under appeal. 6. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.