( 1 ) BOTH the above mentioned civil revisions arise out of the two identical orders of even date viz. 7th April, 1979 of a Sub-Judge 1st Class, Delhi directing the Petitioners Ram Dass and To revise order of Shiva Charan Sub. J. 1st Class, Delhi. D/- 7-4-1970. Ram Singh etc. to file a fresh written statement in the light of the directions given in the order passed by this Court in Civil Revision No. 332 of 1975, Hari Singh v. Dharam Singh and another decided by Deshpande, J. , as his Lordship then was on 25th of August, 1976. Ironically, this is the third time that the petitioners have approached this Court, even though the controversy between the parties centres round short point viz. , what pleas are open to the legal representatives of a deceased defendant in the written statement which may be filed by them. ( 2 ) SUCCINCTLY, the facts germane to the disposal of these revision petitions are that as far back as 1965 respondents plaintiffs who are descendants of one Fattu instituted two suits, one for recovery of Rs. 4967. 63 paise (its present No. being 313 of 1978) and the other for recovery of Rs. 7617. 36 paise (its present No. being 314 of 1978) against Hari Singh, Kehri, Raghu Nath and Dharam Singh who are descendants of one Budha. Both the parties are residents of village Basaidarapur. The plaintiffs averred that both the parties from times immemorial held lands in Thok Budha of village Basaidarapur and as such they were entitled to a share in the land of Shamlat Thok Budha in accordance with the area held by them in their individual Khewat i. e. "hasab rasad raqba khewat". Shri Fattu ancestor of the respondents/plaintiffs had onesixth share in the joint khewat comprising 86 bighas, 5 biswas (pukhta) of land, as per settlement records for the year 1880. Sometime thereafter, he effected a mortgage of his land with conditional sale in favour of one Ganga Sahai. The latter instituted a regular suit (being Suit No. 13 of 1894) against Shri Fattu on the basis of the said mortgage after taking foreclosure proceedings and the suit was eventually decreed by the Extra Assistant Commissioner-Cum-Munsif 1st Grade on 15th March, 1894. The latter instituted a regular suit (being Suit No. 13 of 1894) against Shri Fattu on the basis of the said mortgage after taking foreclosure proceedings and the suit was eventually decreed by the Extra Assistant Commissioner-Cum-Munsif 1st Grade on 15th March, 1894. Eventually, in execution of the said decree, he obtaid possession of the land on 26th June, 1894 and mutation No. 96, evidencing the said fact, was duly sanctioned on 30th of May, 1896. Subsequently, Ganga Sahai sold the land to S/shri Hira, Kishan Lal, Hukam and Mohan Lal,-all sons of Budha vide sale deed dated 18th July, 1895. Since pukhta bighas were converted into Kham bighas and in the Jamabandi for the year 1894- 95, total area of the joint Khewat No. 53, Khata No. 413 was recorded as 215. bighas and 8 biswas and Shri Fatoo was recorded as having one-fifth share therein. Mutation No. 115 was entered in favour of the aforesaid ancestors of the defendants/ petitioners in respect of sale deed dated 18th July, 1895 and the same was duly sanctioned on 30th May, 1895. Thus the ancestors of the present petitioners were recorded as owners of 43 bighas and one biswa. Subsequently, another mutation of correction bearing No. 472 was recorded on 9th April, 1908 during the Settlement operations of 1908-09, inasmuch as it was noticed that only proprietary rights in the afforesaid land having been sold in favour of the mortgagee Ganga Sahai, Shri Fattoo continued to be recorded as haqdar (owner) of the Shamlat rights corresponding to the aforesaid area. The aforesaid mutation of correction was decided on 30th March, 1909 and it was ordered that the sale of land by Shri Fattoo did not carry with it entitlement to have a corresponding share in the shamlat land and as such the sons of Budha would be recorded as malik qabza while Fattoo would be recorded as haqdar shamlat. However, the order embodied in mutation No. 472 was somehow not incorporated either in misal haqivat i. e. (record of rights) prepared during the Settlement of 1908-09 on the subsequent jomabandis and as such Fattoo was not recorded as haqdar shamlat Thok Budha in respect of aforesaid area of 43 bighas and 1 biswa in the column of ownership. Thus the descendants of Shri Budha are recorded as owners of the land and not malik qabza. Thus the descendants of Shri Budha are recorded as owners of the land and not malik qabza. Hence the entries in the Jamabandi from the Settlement Year 1908-09 till now do not depict the correct state of affairs. Consequently, on the acquisition of some area of the land comprised in shamlat Thok Budha under the Re-Settlement of the Displaced Persons, Land Acquisition Act 1948, proportionate compensation regarding the same was paid to the defendant/petitioners on the assumption that they were entitled to the corresponding share in the shamlat land on account of their ownership of khewat land which had been purchased by them from Ganga Sahai who had stopped into shoes of Fattoo deceased. Feeling aggrieved the respondents/plaintiffs instituted the above mentioned two suits for recovery of the compensation wrongly paid to the defendants. ( 3 ) ALL the defendants filed joint written statement dated 13th May, 1965. Before, however, the suit could make much headway, Kehri who was defendant No. 2 in both the suits died and his sons Ram Dass and Ram Singh were brought on the record as his legal representatives. Since then the question as to what pleas are open to the legal representatives of the deceased defendant has become a bone of contention between (he parties. The stand of the respondents/plaintiffs is that under Order 22, Rule 4 sub-rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) the legal representatives can take pleas which may be appropriate to their character as legal representatives and they cannot raise a new plea which is inconsistent with the pleas already put forth by the deceased defendant. It is contended that the legal representatives of Kehri deceased in the instant suit have filed a written statement raising pleas which are not only inconsistent with the averments made by the deceased defendant but also have the effect of withdrawing some valuable admissions made by him or which were deemed to have been made by virtue of provisions contained in Order VIII, Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Code. ( 4 ) IN the previous revision petition No. 332 of 1975 adverted to above, Deshpande, J. , made the following observations: "sub-RULE (2) of R. 4 of 0. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code clearly states that the legal representatives may make any defence appropriate to their character. ( 4 ) IN the previous revision petition No. 332 of 1975 adverted to above, Deshpande, J. , made the following observations: "sub-RULE (2) of R. 4 of 0. 22 of the Civil Procedure Code clearly states that the legal representatives may make any defence appropriate to their character. This has been understood by the Supreme Court in J. C. Chatterjee v. S. K. Tandon, AIR 1972 SC 2526 (para. 11) and by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Senchurama Naidu v. Annapurani Ammal, AIR 1916 Madras 1139 to mean that it is open to the legal representatives to raise a plea which had not been raised by the deceased so long as it is not inconsistent with the stand taken by the deceased. " ( 5 ) SO, while setting aside order dated 26th March, 1975 of Smt. Manju Goel Sub-Judge, 1st Class, his Lordship directed mat, "the revision petitioners are allowed to file a written statement subject to the limitation that they do not withdraw admissions made by their deceased predecessor-in-title and do not contradict what he had said in the written statement which he had filed. Under the proviso to Order 8, Rule 5 it was for the Court before whom the written statement was filed by the deceased either to hold that vague denial by him was to be acted upon as an admission or that nevertheless the fact as admitted would have to be proved by the plaintiff otherwise. Since the Court had not given any decision in the matter, it would be open for the Court to do so now. Whether the legal representatives can make the general denials specific would depend on the exercise of the discretion by the Court to treat the vague denial as admission or to require independent proof of the fact by the plaintiff. ( 6 ) THE above abstracts have been reproduced in extenso as they have vital bearing on the decision of this petition. The legal proposition enunciated therein being binding on the parties is not under challenge so the only question for determination is whether the criteria laid by his Lordship have been correctly under stood and applied by the trial Court. The legal proposition enunciated therein being binding on the parties is not under challenge so the only question for determination is whether the criteria laid by his Lordship have been correctly under stood and applied by the trial Court. ( 7 ) ON a juxtaposition of written statement dated 13th May, 1965 which had been initially filed by the defendants including Kehri deceased and the written statement dated 8th October, 1976 now filed by the petitioners including legal representatives of Kehri deceased, there is no shadow of doubt that the latter have tried to improve upon the former written statement in several respects. However, the point in issue precisely is whether alterations/additions made by the petitioners are not in consonance with the criteria laid by Deshpande, J. in the previous revision petition. Evidently the learned Sub-Judge has vide impugned order come to the conclusion that the admissions made by the defendants in the earliest written statement are sought to be withdrawn by the petitioners and the pleas now raised are quite inconsistent with those in the original written statement filed by Kehri deceased and others. They had admitted sale of land by Shri Ganga Sahai in favour of their ancestors whereas in the written statement now filed by the defendants the factum of sale has been denied. In tile original writtenstatement, the defendants in reply to paras 2 to 5 of the plaint simply said that "the plaintiffs are put to strict proof of their averments" and they simply denied allegations contained in para 6 of the plaint. ( 8 ) IT is however noteworthy that in paras 1 to 5 of the plaint, the respondents had simply narrated facts culminating in sanction of mutation NO. 115 recorded on the strength of sale deed dated 18th July, 1896 executed by Ganga Sahai in favour of sons of Budha. Since these events relate to the hoary past stretching hack to nearly 70 years prior to the insti tution of the suit, the defendants could possibly have no personal knowledge of the same. Surely, it would have been an uphill task for them to trace back the revenue records and verify the facts before filing the written statement. So they could justifiably put the plaintiffs to proof. Surely, it would have been an uphill task for them to trace back the revenue records and verify the facts before filing the written statement. So they could justifiably put the plaintiffs to proof. It is true that the conjoint effect of Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order 8 of the Code is that a defendant who wants to deny the facts must do so clearly and explicitly and a vague or evasive reply by the defendant cannot be considered to be a denial of fact alleged by the plaintiffs. Thus, statement that "the plaintiff is put to proof of the several allegations in the plaint" or that "he does not admit correctness of the averments contained in the plaint" is generally speaking not sufficient denial within the meaning of Rules 3 and 4 of Order 8 and by virtue of Rule 5, the Court may relieve the plaintiff of the obligation of proving such allegations in his plaint as are neither specifically denied nor stated to be not admitted in the written statement. However, the rule as to non-traverse in written statement has not to be applied mechanically without applying the judicial mind. It is not a rule of thumb to be followed blindly. This is amply clear from the proviso to sub- rule (1) of Rule 5 which confers discretion on the Court to require any fact "so admitted" to be proved otherwise than by such admission. That was precisely what Deshpande, J. ruled in the previous revision petition when he said "whether the legal representatives can make the general denials specific would depend on the exercise of the discretion by the Court to treat the vague denial as admission or to require independent proof of the fact by the plaintiff. " Unfortunately the impugned order is absolutely silent on the pleadings of defendants in paras 1 to 5 of the written statement dated 13th May, 1965 and the learned Sub-Judge has simply dwelt upon their reply in para 7 of the said written statement, in construing that it was tantamount to admission of sale by Shri Ganga Sahai in favour of the ancestors of the defendants. It bears repetition that a party is expected to expressly deny the fact which lies within its knowledge. It bears repetition that a party is expected to expressly deny the fact which lies within its knowledge. Thus where the defendant has no knowledge of a fact, the Court will not be well advised to decide against the defendant on this technical ground for want of specific denial. In such a case a duty is cast on the Court to properly marshal all the facts before coming to a final conclusion and in exercising its discretion, the Court must have regard to the justice of the cause with particular reference to the relative position of the parties, and the period when the alleged events took place. Hence the instant is a fit case where the facts alleged in paras 2 to 5 of the plaint should not be deemed to have been admitted by virtue of rule of non-traverse as embodied in Rule 5 of Order VIII. ( 9 ) AS a natural corollary, therefore, it would follow that the Court ought to have required the plaintiffs to establish the factum of mortgage in favour of Ganga Sahai and execution of sale deed dated 18th July, 1895 by the latter in favour of ancestors of the petitioners. ( 10 ) AS regards para 6 of the plaint which embodies the assertion by the plaintiffs that Ganga Sahai was only malik qabza while Fattoo continued to be haqdar shamlat rights, the defendants denied the same in terms. Certainly, it cannot be said to be a vague or evasive denial, especially when it is read in the context of defendants reply in the preceding paras of the written statement. Evidently the effect of traversing allegations in the plaint is to require the plaintiff to prove all the allegations. Hence, the reply of the defendants contained in para 7 of the written statement dated 13th May, 1965 had to be read in conjunction with their reply in the preceding paragraph. Para 7 of the plaint incorporates the facts surrounding mutation of correction No. 472 while the averments made in para 8 highlight non-inclusion of the order passed in mutation No. 472 in the record of rights prepared at the Settlement of 1908-09 and subsequent Jamabandis. Para 7 of the plaint incorporates the facts surrounding mutation of correction No. 472 while the averments made in para 8 highlight non-inclusion of the order passed in mutation No. 472 in the record of rights prepared at the Settlement of 1908-09 and subsequent Jamabandis. It was in this context that the defendants Contended that "the legal presumption is that sale carries with it all the appurtenances thereto and unless a different intention is expressed or necessarily implied transfer of property passes forthwith to the transferee all the interest which the transferor is then capable or passing in the property and in the legal incidents thereof. The sale by Shri Ganga Sahai therefore, was inclusive of the Shamlat Deh rights and in case it was not so there should have been a specific mention about its exclusion in the sale deed itself. It is denied that Shri Ganga Sahai and the ancestors of the defendants were mere malik qabza of the 43 bighas and one biswa land or that Fattoo was haqdar. It is maintained that Ganga Sahai or for that matter the ancestors of the defendants were haqdars of shamlat rights pertaining to 43 bighas and one biswa land purchased by them. " So I find considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the aforesaid reply was simply an exposition of proposition of law as regards the legal consequences which flow from sale of agricultural land vis-a-vis the rights of the vendor in shamlat land and it was hardly intended to admit the factum of sale by Ganga Sahai in favour of the ancestors of the defendants. There can be no two opinions that the written statement has to be read as a whole and a stray sentence in one of its paragraphs cannot be picked up as an admission on the part of the defendants as to absolve the plaintiffs from the obligation to prove their case. ( 11 ) TO sum up, having regard to the nature of litigation between the parties, relating as it does to rights of the ancestors of the parties in shamlat land and the transactions of mortgage and sale etc. which took place in the hoary past, replies contained in the original written statement dated 13th May, 1965 of the detendants cannot be taken as admissions on the technical ground of their being evasive and vague. which took place in the hoary past, replies contained in the original written statement dated 13th May, 1965 of the detendants cannot be taken as admissions on the technical ground of their being evasive and vague. So the plaintiffs cannot be relieved of their obligation to prove the allegations contained in paras 1 to 8 of their plaint and the Court would be well justified in requiring them to prove those facts otherwise than as admissions under Rule 5 of Order 8. As a necessary corollary, therefore, it would follow that the pleas now sought to be raised by the petitioners are not, strictly speaking, contradictory or inconsistent and the same are not tantamount to withdrawal of any admission made by Kehri deceased. ( 12 ) CONSEQUENTLY, these revision petitions succeed, the impugned order is set aside and the petitioners are allowed to raise the pleas embodied in their written statement dated 8th October, 1976. The trial Court shall now proceed further in the matter as expeditiously as possible according top priority to both the suits which have already grown nearly 15 years old.