DWARKA PRASAD, J.—These two appeals have been filed against the award dated April 15, 1971 passed by the Arbitrator appointed under sec. 9(1) (b) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1952). Shri Updesh Naram Mathur by his award dated April, 15, 1971 awarded compensation to Rao Narayan Singh of Masuda for the acquisition of his properties. Appeal No. 54 of 1971 has been filed by Rao J^arayan Singh of Masuda while appeal No. 56 of 1971 has been filed by the Union of India against the aforesaid award. 2. The property commonly known as Masuda House,situated at Ajmer, inclusive of buildings and lands appurtenant thereto measuring about 70 bighas and 14 biswas belonging to Rao Narayan Singh were requisitioned by the Union of India in the year 1963, for the purposes of Central Reserve Police Force stationed at Ajmer (hereinafter referrd to as "C.R.P.") under Sec. 29 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 (hereinafter called the Act of 1962). The Deputy Inspector General of C.R.P. Ajmer took possession of the building and lands on April 24, 1963. Subsequently, the building and the lands were acquired under Sec. 36 of the Act of 1962 for the purposes of C.R.P, Ajmer by the order of the Collector, Ajmer dated April 20, 1967. A notice under Sec. 36(2) of the Act of 1962 was served upon Rao Narayan Singh on May 5, 1967 and as such the earlier order of requisition of the said property came to an end on May 5, 1967 and the property stood acquired from the aforesaid date and became vested in the Central Government under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 36 of the Act of 1962. In the meantime the Act of 1962 ceased to remain in force from July 10, 1968. The Collector, Ajmer offered a lump sum amount of Rs. 5,32, 594/-oh September 9, 1968 under Sec 8(1) of the Act of 1952 to the owner Rao Narayan Singh of Masuda on behalf of the Central Government, as compensation for the acquisition of his property, but the said offer was rejected by Rao Narayan Singh on September 20, 1968 on the ground that it was grossly inadequate and arbitrary. As such proceedings for appointment of an arbitrator were taken under Sec. 8(l)(b) of the Act of 1952. As such proceedings for appointment of an arbitrator were taken under Sec. 8(l)(b) of the Act of 1952. Shri Updesh Narayan Mathur, who was then working as Joint Legal Remembrancer to the Government of Rajasthan, was appointed as the arbitrator under Sec. 8(1 )(b) by the State Government on August 23, 1969 for the determination of compensation in respect of the acquired property. The arbitrator issued notice to the parties and Rao Narayan Singh filed a statement of his claim on January 31, 1970, claiming compensation for land @ Rs. 10/-per Sq. yard and the value of the building known as Masuda House as Rs 2,50,000/-. He also claimed solatium for the compulsory acquisition besides compensation. The arbitrator by his award dated April 15, 1971 determined the following amount as compensation payable to the owner, Rao Narayan Singh: (a) Building Masuda House, its out houses, parks, trees, water tanks, electric and Sanitary Fittings etc., and appurtenant structures. Rs. 2,50,000/- (b) 74 Bighas and 14 Biswas of adjacent land at Rs. 7.50 per Sq. yd. (c) Loss of access of and utility of about 3 Bighas and 2 Biswas of land in Khasra No. 3844. Rs. 2,000/- (d) Interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the award to the date of final payment, on the total amount. (e) Solatium @ 15% over and above the market price of Rs. 7.50 per Sq.yd. for the lands only. 3. It was also declared by the Arbitrator that Rao Narayan Singh was the owner and proprietor of the property and the entire amount of compensation in respect of the acquired property was to be paid him by the Central Government. 4. As mentioned earlier, both the parties have filed appeals in this Court, being dis-satisfied with the award given by the Arbitrator. Rao Narayan Singh contends in his appeal that the amount of compensation should be increased while the Union of India in its appeal has taken the stand that the amount awarded by the arbitrator as compensation was highly excessive and must be reduced. When both these appeals came up for hearing before this court on an earlier occasion, it was held by the order dated August 9, 1974 that the appoint-ment of the arbitrator under Sec. 8(l)(b) of the Act of 1952 was illegal and as such the entire award was set aside, as a whole. When both these appeals came up for hearing before this court on an earlier occasion, it was held by the order dated August 9, 1974 that the appoint-ment of the arbitrator under Sec. 8(l)(b) of the Act of 1952 was illegal and as such the entire award was set aside, as a whole. Rao Narayan Singh went in appeal against the aforesaid order of this court dated August 9, 1974 in the Supreme Court and his appeal was accepted by the order dated April 14, 1976. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that in view of proviso (b) of Sec. 25(1) of the Act of 1952 and in view of the provisions of Article 258 of the Constitution, the State Government could appoint an arbitrator as a delegate of the Central Government. It was also held by their Lordships that there was no material distinction between the provisions of the Act of 1952 and the Act of 1962 in regard to the appointment of an arbitrator. The operative part of the order of their Lordships of the Supreme Court dated April 14, 1976 is as under: "the matter will now go to back the High Court for decision of the other questions, including the question whether the principles set out in the Act of 1952 would apply or whether those set out in the Act of 1962 would apply for the fixation and award of compensation. This order will govern the companion appeal also." 5. Rao Narayan Singh applied to the Supreme Court for clarification of the order of remand passed on April 14, 1976, as according to him, the appeal filed in this Court by the Union of India should not be heard on merits, as the Union of India did not file any appeal before the Supreme Court against the order passed by this Court on August 9, 1974. The application of Rao Narayan Singh in this respect was rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by the order dated September 19, 1979 with the following observations : "No clarification is, in fact, necessary but in order to dispel any doubt we direct that the High Court shall hear both the first appeals namely first appeal No. 54 and 56 of 1971 and dispose them of on merits." 6. In accordance with the directions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, we have heard both the appeals on merits. 7. In the appeal preferred by Rao Narayan Singh, (hereinafter referred to as "the owner") learned counsel for the owner argued that the compensation should have been paid to the owner for acquisition of land @ Rs. 10/- per Sq. yard and not @Rs. 7.50/- per Sq. yard, as was awarded by the arbitrator. He also argued that the owner was entitled to interest @6% per annum from the date of acquisition upto the date of payment instead of from the date of the award and that the arbitrator erred in not granting interest from May 5,1967,when the Union Government should be considered to have taken over possession of the property in question, by way of acquisition. It was also argued by the learned counsel that although the arbitrator had awarded solatium to the owner @ 15% on the value of the land but he erred in not allowing solatium at the same rate on the value of the building on account of compulsory nature of the transaction. Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the owner also argued that the appeal preferred by the Union of India was not maintainable under Sec. 11 of the Act of 1952. 8. In the appeal preferred by Union of India, learned counsel argued that the amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- awarded by the arbitrator to the owner as the value of the building was highly excessive. He also argued that the amount of compensation awarded by the arbitrator as the value of the land is also excessive, as the same should have been awarded at the rate of Rs. 2 62 per Sq. yard and not @ Rs. 7.50 per sq. yard. Learned counsel also argued that no amount is awardable to the owner either by way of interest or solatium, as there is no provision either for interest or solatium in the Act of 1952. 9. Before entering into the merits of the claim of the parties, we shall first deal with the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the owner, that the appeal preferred by the Union of India is not maintainable under Section 11 of the Act of 1972 which runs as under:— "11. 9. Before entering into the merits of the claim of the parties, we shall first deal with the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the owner, that the appeal preferred by the Union of India is not maintainable under Section 11 of the Act of 1972 which runs as under:— "11. Appeals from award in respect of compensation:— Any person aggrieved by an award of the arbitrator made under section 8 may, within 30 days from the date of such award, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the requisitioned or acquired property is situate: Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.** 10. The argument of Mr. Bhargava, learned counsel for the owner, is that in the first place, the Union Government is not a person* and in the second place it is not a person aggrieved and as such the Union Government is not entitled to file the appeal under section 11. Mr. Bhargava relied upon the definition of person as given in clause (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act and contended that the expression person includes any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but it does not include a Government, as the expression government has been defined separately in clause (23) of section 3 and Central Government and State Government have been defined in clause (8) and (41) respectively of section 3 of the General Clauses Act. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions in Shiv Prasad vs. Punjab State (1), Ramrichpal Agarwalla vs. The State of West Bengal (2), State vs. Shanker (3) and M/s Jaswant Suger Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India (4). 11. It may be observed that the Appeal No. 56 of 1971 has been preferred by two appellants namely, Union of India and Deputy Inspector General Central Reserve Police, Ajmer. Mr. Lukar appearing for the appellants in that appeal submitted that the Union of India is a person within the meaning of Section 11 of the Act of 1952 and that at any rate it was not disputable that the Deputy Inspector General. C.R.P. Ajmer was a person and as such the appeal was maintainable on his behalf. 12. Mr. Lukar appearing for the appellants in that appeal submitted that the Union of India is a person within the meaning of Section 11 of the Act of 1952 and that at any rate it was not disputable that the Deputy Inspector General. C.R.P. Ajmer was a person and as such the appeal was maintainable on his behalf. 12. The word person has been defined in clause (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act as under:— "42. person shall include any company or association of body of individuals, whether incorporated or not." 13. It may also be noticed that section 3 begins with the expression "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". The definition of word person, as given in clause (42) of section 3 of the General Clauses Act, is an inclusive definition and it includes artificial persons besides natural persons. A company, association of persons or body of individual, irrespective of the fact whether it is incorporated or not, can come within the definition of the word person. The aforesaid definition itself does not support the submission of the learned counsel for the owner that the word person only refers to a living human being a man, woman or child, an individual of the human race, as artificial persons like Corporation and joint stock companies and association of persons or body of individuals, even if unincorporated, can come within the said definition of person. Therefore, it cannot be held that the State Government or the Union Government should be necessarily excluded from the term person when the State enters into transactions and is capable of possessing or acquiring properties, entering into contracts and fulfilling obligations. In Shiv Prasads case, the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court held that the expression Government is synonymous with State and as under Art. 14 of the Constitution an obligation has been cast upon the State not to discriminate between persons, the State could not be included in the expression any person occurring in Art. 14 of the Constitution. In that case, it was recognised that as the State is engaged in business or commerce, such as is carried on by private individuals or Corporations, it is capable of suing and being sued, because of the provisions of Article 300 of the Constitution but not as a person. In that case, it was recognised that as the State is engaged in business or commerce, such as is carried on by private individuals or Corporations, it is capable of suing and being sued, because of the provisions of Article 300 of the Constitution but not as a person. The aforesaid decision of the Punjab High Court was followed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of State vs. Shanker (3), which again was a case relating to Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also held in that case that the natural and obvious meaning of the expression person occurring in Article 14 of the Constitution was a living human being and it also included artificial persons like corporations and joint stock companies besides natural persons, but It did not include a State or Government. Article 14 of the Constitution provides that the State would not deny to any person equality before the law and equal protection of laws within the territory of India and as such it was held that so far as Article 14 is concerned, the State and person are synonymous, as it is the State which is charged with the duty to protect the rights of any person. These cases are distinguishable as they relate to the interpretation of the expression "any person" employed in Article 14 of the Constitution, in which the State itself was bound to protect the rights of a person and it was in this context held that the expressionany person occurring in Article 14 did not include State. In Ramrichpal Agarwalias case (2). the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court followed the decision of the Punjab High Court in Shiv Prasads case (1), while interpreting the word person occurring in Sec. 3(2) (f) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 which contained the expression "to such per-son or class of persons" and it was held that the word "person" would not include the State or Government when carrying on its ordinary governmental functions. This case was followed by the Punjab High Court in M/s Jaswant Sugar Mills case (4) wherein clause (8) of the Sugar Control Order, 1963 was under consideration, under which the Central Government or the Chief Director were authorised to issue directions to any producer or recognised dealer to supply sugar to such persons or organisations as may be specified in the order. It was held in that case that the Delhi Administration could not be constituted as its nominee by the Central Government under clause (8), as it was neither a person nor an organization. The aforesaid decisions relate to widely different enactments and in our view they offer no guidance so far as the interpretation of the word person contained in section 11 of the Act of 1952 is concerned. 14. In State of Punjab vs. Mangal Singh Nagpal (5), the expression any other person occurring in Sec. 13 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 was held to include the State of Punjab. It was also held in that case that the definition of the word person as contained in clause (42) of Sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act was comprehensive enough to include a State Government. 15. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Kanhaya Lal Makundlal Sarraf (6), the expression person occurring in See. 72 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 was subject-matter of controversy and the learned Judges, referring to the definition of person contained in clause (42) of Sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act, observed as under: "I do not see any reason why the word "person" should be given a restricted meaning. The greater part of modern industry and commerce is founded on contract, and unincorporated bodies habitually enter into con-tracts. I do not think it can be doubled that a District Board or a Municipality is a body of individuals within the definition of person in the General Clauses Act and logically I see no sufficient reason for excluding from the ambit of the definition that body of individuals "the Government", responsible for the governance of a State. The definition in the General Clauses Act is not exhaustive, and we are entitled to look to the Indian Contract Act itself to find out what the legislature intended that the word "person" should mean. A contract involves an agreement between a promisor and a promisee and under S.2 of the Act every promisor and promisee is a person; it appears clear therefore that every contract is an agreement between parties who are person within the meaning of the Act. A contract involves an agreement between a promisor and a promisee and under S.2 of the Act every promisor and promisee is a person; it appears clear therefore that every contract is an agreement between parties who are person within the meaning of the Act. If the Government is not a person within the meaning of S.72 it is not in my opinion a person within the meaning of the other sections of the Act where that term is used; and the consequence of accepting the view advanced by the Advocate General would be that Government cannot enter into contracts." 16. A division bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Rikhabchand Dhariwal (7), while interpreting the word person occurring in section 44 of the Rajasthan Public Safety Ordinance, 1948, held that it is wide enough to include Government also. 17. In Baron, Debtor vs. Petitioning Creditors and Official Receiver (8), it was observed as under: "But the words "person aggrieved" do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A "person aggrieved" must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." 18. We may also refer to the decision in the case of United States of America vs. Cooper Corporation (9). In that case the question raised was as to whether the United States of America could maintain an action for damages under section 7 of the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The expression "any person" was used in the aforesaid provision and the precise question which was decided was whether the said expression conferred upon the United States of America, the right to maintain an action for damages. Justice Black observed in the aforesaid case as under: "Every soverign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person, and as such capable of making contracts and holding property.......... Justice Black observed in the aforesaid case as under: "Every soverign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person, and as such capable of making contracts and holding property.......... It would present a stronge anomaly, indeed, if, having the power to take contracts and hold property as other persons, natural or artificial, they were not entitled to the same remedies for their protection......The United States can exercise all of the legal remedies which other persons, bodies or associations can exercise, both at common law and under statutes, unless there is something in a statute or in its history to indicate an intent to deprive the United States of that right." 19. Thus, from a consideration of the aforesaid decisions, it appears that person as defined in clause (42) of section 3 of the General not exhaustive and it merely gives an inclusive definition, which takes into its ambit a body of persons, whether incorporated or not and as a State is also a body of individuals having a definite juristic personality and is capable of suing and being sued in a court of law therefore, the State Government or the Union Government should be recognised as a person, unless the subject or context otherwise provides. In Article 14 of the Constitution, the State was rightly held as not included in the expression "any person", occurring therein because of the context in which the aforesaid expression has been used. Under that provision, a duty has been cast upon the State not to discriminate between persons and to provide equal protection of law to persons and thus the State Government itself cannot be a person seeking the protection of the fundamental rights contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. It would thus depend on the subjecr-matter of each enactment and no universal rule can be laid down that the State Government or the Union Government cannot be included in the expression person in any enactment whatsoever, Moreover the expression Causes Act is Article 300 of the Constitution provides that the Union Government or the State Government is capable of suing and being sued in the name of Union of India and in the name of the State. The Union of India and the State Government have also the capacity to acquire, hold and possess properties and also to enter into contracts, as provided in Article 294 to 299 of the Constitution. We may observe that the purpose, the subjsct-matter, the context, the legislative history are a ds to construction which may indicate intent to bring the State or Government within the scope of the law and there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. Thus in view of the aforesaid conditions and looking to the setting in which the expression any person occurs in section 11 of the Act of 1952, we hold that the Central Government is included within the said expression and it is competent to file an appeal in the name of the Union of India as the matter relates to the acquisition and possession of the property, of which the Central Government is as capable of doing as any other person. 20. The second limb of the argument is that the Union of India is at any rate not a "person aggrieved" against the award of the arbitrator and cannot file an appeal under section 11. It is contended that the arbitrator is the nominee of the Central Government and as such while deciding the question of compensation payable to the owner of the requisitioned or acquired immovable property, he acts as an agent of the Central Government and as such there is no right of appeal vested in the Central Government against the award passed by the arbitrator. Learned counsel laid emphasis on the definition of the expression person interested contained in clause (d) of Sec. 2 of the Act of 1952, which expression includes all persons in relation to any property claiming or entitled to claim an interest in the compensation payable on account of the requisitioning or acquisition of that property under the said Act. It was also argued that the Government has no right to seek a reference under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and only a person interested can require the matter to be refferred to a court for determination of the question of compensation, if he has not accepted the award given by the collector. Under Sec 37 of the Act of 1962 "any person interested" is aggrieved by the amount of compensation determined under sub-sec. Under Sec 37 of the Act of 1962 "any person interested" is aggrieved by the amount of compensation determined under sub-sec. (1) thereof could make an application to the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be, under sub-sec. (2) of that section for referring the matter to an arbitrator appointed in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government and under Rule 112 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, only the owner of the property had a right to appeal to the Compensation Tribunal against the order of the Competent authority assessing the compensation. There is no doubt that under the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act or under Sec. 37 of the Act of 1962 or under Rule 112 of the Defence of India Rules, it was only the person interested, thereby meaning the owner of the property requisitioned or acquired who could seek a reference to an arbitrator or could file an appeal. But the provisions of Sec. 11 of the Act of 1952 do not confine the right to file an appeal only to the owner of the property or the person interested as denied in clause (d) of Sec. 2 of the said Act. but the scope of filing an appeal against the award of the arbitrator has been widened by using the expression any aggrieved person which can take within its ambit even the Central Government, if it feels aggrieved against the award. In our view, the departure from the expres-sion person interested employed in rule 112 of the Defence of India Rules or from the language employed in Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and Sec. 37 of the Act of 1962 and the use of the words any aggrieved person in Sec. 11 of the Act of 1952 is not insignificant but it makes clear that the legislature intended to widen the scope of appeal, which may be preferred under Sec. 11 of the Act of 1952. 21. The decision in State of Rajasthan vs. Ram Swaroop Das (11), The Urban Improvement Trust, Udaipur vs. Smt. Prem Devi (10) and the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Rajendranagar vs. Mahmoodunnisa Begum (12), cited by learned counsel for the owner are not relevant to our present purpose as they all relate to the interpretation of the expression person inte-rested employed in the Land Acquisition Act. because the expression person interested has been specifically defined in the Land Acquisition Act as well as in Sec. 2(d) of the Act of 1952. There can be no doubt about the meaning of that expression, and neither the Government nor the person for whom the land is acquired could fall within the expression person interested because of the specific definition of that expression contained in the aforesaid Acts. 22. In Collector, Varanasi vs. Gauri Shanker Mishra (13), it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that an appeal under section 19 (1) (f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, against an award passed by the arbitrator, in respect of compensation, has to be heard and determined by the High Court in accordance with the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and not as a person designate. It was thus held by their Lordships in that case that the High Court acting under section 19(1) (f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 functions as a court and not as a designate person. 23. The expression person aggrieved occurring in section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961, was considered by a seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra vs. M.V. Dabholkar (14). It was observed in that case that the expression person aggrieved occurred in several statutes and the meaning of that expression has to be ascertained with reference to the purpose of the provision of a particular statute. The following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case may usefully be extracted:— "The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved" may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one "a person aggrieved" Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning required denial or depri-vation of legal rights. The meaning of the words "a person aggrieved is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning required denial or depri-vation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the back-ground of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words «persons aggrieved" in sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or finanical interestes. The test is whether the words "person aggrieved" include "a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests." 24. The meaing of the expresssion person aggrieved, as used in various statutes was again considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desaid vs. Roshen Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed (15), Sarkaria J. speaking for the Court, after an exhaustive discussion of the matter, observed as under:— "The expression ordinarily" indicates that this is not a castiron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule." 25. Thus, fa person aggrieved must show that he is injured and must complain of infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest and is one who has been denied or deprived of something to which he was legally entitled, or if a legal burben has been imposed upon him. The person must be subjected or threatened to a legal wrong or injury or where his legal right has been infringed. The person must be subjected or threatened to a legal wrong or injury or where his legal right has been infringed. A person is said to be aggrieved when a decision is pronounced against him which wrongfully deprived him of a legal right or wrongfully refused to him something or wrongfully affected his title to something or wrongfully imposed a burden upon him. He must have a substantial or special grievance of his own, beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public. In the present case, the Central Government is clearly a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 11 of the Act of 1952 as a decision has been pronounced against it by the arbitrator and a burden has been placed upon it for the payment of compensation, which according to it is excessive or uncalled for. "The Central Government has, therefore, a substantial and particular interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, as a burden has been cast upon it, which according to it is illegal and excessive. We, therefore, do not rind any substance in the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the owner that the appeal filed by the Union of India is not maintainable and the contention of the learned counsel for the owner in this respect is repelled. 26. Now coming to the merits of the appeals, we may observe that the principles for determination of compensation payable for acquisition of property under section 36 of the Act of 1962 have been laid down in sub-section (1) of section 37 of the said Act as under: — "37(1) The compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under section 36 shall be:— (a) the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requistioning and been sold on the date of acquisition, or (b) twice the price which requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market if it had been sold on the date of the requisition, whichever is less." 27. In the present case, although the acquisition of Masuda House and land appurtenant thereto was made under Sec. 36 of the Act of 1962 on May 5, 1967, yet before proceedings for determination of compensation could commence, the Act of 1962 ceased to remain in force on account of the expiry of six months from the date of withdrawal of the proclamation of emergency issued on October 26, 1962. As such the proceedings for determination of compensation, were taken under Sec. 8 of the Act of 1952, wherein it has been provided that in the first instance, if the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, the same shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. But if no such agreement could be reached between the parties, the Central Government is authorised to appoint an arbitrator, who after hearing the dispute may make an award determining the compensation, which appears to him to be just and in making the award the arbitrator shall have regard to the circumstances of each case and the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 8 of the Act of 1952, which runs as under: "8(3). The compensation payable for the acquisition of any property under Sec. 7 shall be the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition." 28. It may be observed here that the clause (b) of sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 8, as it stood prior to the amendment brought about by the Amending Act No. 31 of 1968, was as follows: "(3) (b) twice the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in the open market if it had been sold on the date of requisition, whichever is less." 29. The provisions of clause (b) of sub-sec (3) of the Act of 1952 which were exactly similar to those of clause (b) of sub-sec (1) of Sec 37 of the Act of 1962 were struck down as unconstituional by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Kamlabai Harjivandas Parekh (16) and it was held that the aforesaid provisions were ultra vires of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, as it left no choice to the arbitrator as to which mode of assessing compensation should be accepted by him. In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations in respect of clause (a) of Sec. 8(3) of the Act of 1952 which was almost the same as the existing sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 8:— "Clause (a) of Sec. 8(3) lays down a principle aimed at giving the owner of the land something which approximates its just equivalent on the date of acquisition" (itelic added) 30. After the provisions of clause (b) of Sec. 8 (3) were struck down in Kamlabai Parekhsi case (16) by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Parliament amended sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 8 by deleting clause (b) thereof, by the Amending Act No. 31 of 1968, which came into force on August 9, 1968. Now, it would be seen that sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 8 of the Act of 1952 is similar to clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 37 of the Act of 1962, and, therefore, the principles on which compensation is to be determined and paid for the acquisition of any property under both the Acts would be the same namely the market value of the property in question, if it had been sold no the date of acquisition. As held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kamlabai Parekhs case (16) under that provision the basis for determination of compensation is that the owner should get something which approximates its just equivalent on the date of acquisition. 31. In Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Vithal Rao (17), it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that when the object is to compulsorily acquire land for a public purpose, different principles of compensation cannot be formulated on the basis that the land belongs to one type of owner or another type of owner, nor the application of different principles for determination of compensation for land is permissible on the ground that the land is acquired for a hospital or a school or for a government building or that the land is acquired by the Improvement Trust or by the Corporation or by the Government so long as the acquisition in each case is made for a public purpose. It was held in that case that Article 14 confers an individual right and in order to justify a classification there should be something which justifies a different treatment to his individual right and ordinarily a classification based on the nature of public purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the determination of compensation. It was further observed in the aforesaid case as under: "From whatever aspect the matter is looked at, the alleged differences have no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. It is said that the object of the Amending Act in itself may project the differences in the lands sought to be acquired under the two Acts. This argument puts the cart before the horse. It is one thing to say that the existing differences between persons and properties have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and it is totally a different thing to say that the object of the Act itself created the differences. Assuming that the said proposition is sound, we cannot discover any differences in the people owning lands or in the lands on the basis of the object. The object is to acquire lands for housing schemes at a low price. For achieving that object, any land falling in any of the said categories can be acquired under the Amending Act. So, too, for a public purpose any such land can be acquired under the principal Act. We, therefore, hold that discrimination is writ large on the Amending Act and it cannot be sustained on the principle of reasonable classification. We, therefore, hold that the Amending Act clearly infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void." 32. Thus, whether the acquisition is made of any property under the Act of 1952 or under the Act of 1962 or under the Land Acquisition Act, so long as the land is acquired for a public purpose, the same principles for determination of compensation must ordinarily be applied in each case and the owner of the property must get approximately its just equivalent of what is taken away. Thus, the payment of compensation would be just if the owner of the property acquired is paid the amount which the property in question would have been fetched in the open market, if it would have been sold on the date of acquisition. 33. Thus, the payment of compensation would be just if the owner of the property acquired is paid the amount which the property in question would have been fetched in the open market, if it would have been sold on the date of acquisition. 33. We would first consider the questions of compensation payable for the value of land. It is not in dispute between the parties that apart from the buildings, the property acquired contains 70 Bighas, 14 Biswas and 1412 Sq. yards of vacant land, which comes to 1,38,117.20 Sq. yards of land. In order to determine the just and reasonable compensation payable in respect of the aforesaid land, it would be necessary to find out the market price for which the land could have been reasonably sold in open market at the time of acquisition. We may first consider the principles which should be applied for determining the amount of compensation payable in such matters. 34. In N.B. Jeejabhoy vs. The District Collector, Thana (Civil Appeals Nos. 313 to 315 of 1963) decided on August 30, 1965, their Lordships of the Snpreme Court made the following observations : — "A Vendor willing to sell his land at the market value will take into consideration a particular potentiality or special adaptability of the land in fixing the price. It is not the fancy or the obsession of the vendor that enters the market value but the objective factor, namely, whether the said potentiality can be turned to account within a reasonably near future...... The question therefore turns upon the facts of each case. In the context of building potentiality many questions will have to be asked and answered; whether there is pressure on the land for building activity, whether the acquired land is suitable for building purposes, whether the extension of the said activity is towards the land acquired, what is the case of the progress and how far the said activity has extended and within what time, whether buildings have been put on lands purchased for building purposes, what is the distance between the built-in-land and the land acquired and similar other questions will have to be answered. It is the overall picture drawn on the said relevant circumstances that affords the solution." 35. It is the overall picture drawn on the said relevant circumstances that affords the solution." 35. In Raghubans Narain Singh vs. The Uttar Pradesh Government, through Collector of Bihar (18) their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the market value means the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for a property, having due regard to its existing condition with all its existing advantages and its potential possibilities when laid out in its most advantageous manner, excluding any advantages due to the carrying out of the scheme for the purposes for which the property is compulsorily acquired. Their Lord-ships quoted with approval the following observations made in South Eastern Rail Co. vs. London County Council (19)— "The value to be ascertained is the price to be paid for the land with all its potentialities, and with all the use made of it by the vendor." 36. In State of Gujarat vs. Shantilal Mangaldas (20), M. Hidayatullah C.J., as he then was, speaking for the Court observed as under: "In ordinary parlance the expression "compensation" means any thing given to make things equivalent; a thing given to or to make amends for loss, recompense, remuneration or pay." 37. Thus compensation is the payment of just equivalent for the land acquired. 38. In the Collector of Lakhimpur vs. Bhuban Chanera Dutta (21), it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that it cannot be lost sight of that the sale of comparatively similar areas can afford little guidance when a large chunk of land is sought to be acquired. In that case four sale-deeds were produced in respect of the sale of plots which were comparatively of smaller areas. In that context their Lordships observed as under: "It is well known that when a large area like the one which was the subject matter of acquisition has to be sold it cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots can be sold. It is significant that the respondent himself had originally claimed, before the Collector, compen-sation at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per Bigha. We see no reason for the High Court awarding compensation at a rate higher than Rs. 10,000/- which would also be consistent with the evidence furnished by the four sab deeds. Although the average price of these sales came to Rs. 10,000/- per Bigha. We see no reason for the High Court awarding compensation at a rate higher than Rs. 10,000/- which would also be consistent with the evidence furnished by the four sab deeds. Although the average price of these sales came to Rs. 15,000/- per Bigha but when it is considered, as has already been observed, that they were of comparatively much smaller area they would constitute good evidence for fixing the rate at a figure which was originally claimed by the respondent, namely, Rs. 10,000/- per Bigha. In other words if the plots covered by the sale had been sold in larger parcels the price likely 10 be fetched would not have exceeded Rs. 10,000/- per Bigha." 39. In Smt. Padma Uppal vs. State of Punjab (22), the same principle was again reiterated and it was observed as under: "A glance at the chart of the acquisitions which appears at page 85 of the Paper Book shows that the sales were of very small plots of land In seven transactions out of eight to which our attention has been invited, the land acquired was below 200 sq. yds. and in the eighth transaction, it was 250 sq yds. It is also well settled that in determining compensation the value fetched for small plots of land cannot be applied to the lands covering a very large extent and that the large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold " (italic added) 40. In Dadoo Yogendranath Singh vs. The Collector, Seoni (23), their Lordships of the Supreme Court quoted the observations from Jeejabhoys case supara which we have extracted above and observed that the same provides broad guidelines and that in ultimate analysis the question whether or not a land has a potential value as building site, is primarily one of fact. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships accepted the evidence in respect of the sale of similar land in the immediate vicinity. In that case there was also evidence on record that the owner of the land had before acquisition paid diversion charges to the Government at the rate of Rs. 500/- per acre in respect of the adjoining land for bringing it into use as building sites. In that case there was also evidence on record that the owner of the land had before acquisition paid diversion charges to the Government at the rate of Rs. 500/- per acre in respect of the adjoining land for bringing it into use as building sites. It appears that the charges so paid were for conversion of agricultural land into urban land and for laying out plots as building sites. This evidence was considered by their Lordships to be of clinching character. The question of potential value as building site was again considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Collector Raigarh vs. Dr. Harisingh Thakur (24), and it was observed as under in that case: "The question as to whether a land has potential value as a building site or not is primarily one of fact depending upon several factors such as its condition and situation, the user to which it is put or is reasonably capable of being put, its suitability for building purposes, its proximity to residential, commercial and industrial areas and educational, cultural or medical insti-tutions, existing amenities like water, electricity and drainage and the possibility of their future extension, whether the nearby town is a developing or a prospering town with prospects of development schemes and the presence or absence of pressure of building activity towards the land acquired or in the neighbourhood thereof." 41. In State of West Bengal vs. Mrs. Bella Benerjee (25), it was held that the principles which should govern the determination of the amount payable as compensation must ensure that what is determined is a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. The basis requirement is of indemnification of the expropriated owner. 42. In Chatusshakhiya Brahmvarinda Gayaran Trust vs. Union of India(26) the lands remained under requisition right upto the date of their acquisition and considerable building activity was carried out during this period on the land round about. In these circumstances, it was held that potential building capacity of the acquired land should be viewed in the light of the development and building activity round about or near the acquired land and consequent rise in the market-price of the acquired land should also be taken into consideration. In these circumstances, it was held that potential building capacity of the acquired land should be viewed in the light of the development and building activity round about or near the acquired land and consequent rise in the market-price of the acquired land should also be taken into consideration. No doubt, if building activity and consequent development goes on on the lands near or round about the acquired land then there would be a consequent rise in the market-price of the acquired land, inspite of the fact that it remained unbuilt or undeveloped because of continued requisition. 43. In Methar vs. The Collector, Durg (27), the principles which should guide the Court in determining the market value of the acquired land have been summarised as under, keeping in view the various decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to by us above: (i) "Market value on the basis of which compensation is payable under Sec 23 of the Act means the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for a property having due regard to its existing condition, with all its existing advantages, and its potential possibilities when laid out in its most advantageous manner, excluding any advantages due to the carrying out of the scheme for the purposes for which the property is compulsorily acquired." Raghubans Narain vs. U P. Government ( AIR 1967 SC 465 )— (ii) "The value of the potentialities must be ascertained on such materials as are available without indulging in beats of imagination........" The land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use 10 which it is being put at the time at which its value has to be determined, but also by reference to the uses to which it is reasonably capable of being put in the near future...The land must not be valued as though it had already been built upon......It is the possibilities that must be taken into consideration" Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju vs. Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatnam (AIR 1939 PC. 98)....... (iii) "In the context of building potentiality many questions will have to be asked and answered whether there is pressure on the land for building activity, whether the acquired land is suitable for building purposes, whether the extension of the said activity is towards the land acquired. 98)....... (iii) "In the context of building potentiality many questions will have to be asked and answered whether there is pressure on the land for building activity, whether the acquired land is suitable for building purposes, whether the extension of the said activity is towards the land acquired. What is the pace of the progress and how far the said activity has extended and within what time, whether buildings have been put up on lands purchased for building purposes, what is the distance between the built-in-land and the acquired and similar other questions will have to be answered. It is the overall picture drawn on the said relevant circumstance that affords the solution." Raghubans Narain vs. The U.P. Government ( AIR 1967 SC 465 at p. 467)— (iv) "(f) For ascertaining market value the value to the owner may also be determined by capitalising the rent as one of the methods, though not the only method. But method of valuation by the annual crop value is not always adequate; (g) Method of valuation may be (i) opinion of experts, (ii) price paid within a reasonable time in bonafide transaction of purchase of lands acquired and the lands adjacent to the lands acquired and possessing similar advantages and (iii) a number of years purchase of the actual or immediately prospective profits of the lands acquired; (h) For considering oral evidence, Court is not bound to accept the statements of witnesses only because they have not been effectively cross-examined or evidence in rebuttal has not been adduced. Judges are not computers... ...they are bound to call into aid their experience of life and test the evidence on the basis of probabilities. Chaturbhuj Pande vs. Collector Raigarh AIR 1969 S.C. 255 : (vii) It is not open to look into and rely on documents not properly Droved and brought in evidence by giving the other side opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal. ...they are bound to call into aid their experience of life and test the evidence on the basis of probabilities. Chaturbhuj Pande vs. Collector Raigarh AIR 1969 S.C. 255 : (vii) It is not open to look into and rely on documents not properly Droved and brought in evidence by giving the other side opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal. If use is made of inadmissible evidence or unproved documents, appeal Court will exclude them under Sec. 167, Evidence Act, Chaturbhuj Pande vs. Collector, Raigarh, AIR 1969 S.C. 255 : (viii) Comparable sales on the basis of which market price is determined should be of such lands as are (a) similar in character as far as may be, (b) reasonably proximus to the acquired land, (c) should have similar amenities and advantages and (d) these should be transactions of the time reasonably proximus to the date of the acquisition." 44. In Smt. Tribeni Devi vs. The Collector, Ranchi (28) the principles for determination of compensation have been laid down as under: "The compensation payable to the owner of the land is the market value which is determined by reference to the price which a seller might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, but as this may not be possible to ascertain with any amount of precision, the authority charged with the duty to award compensation is bound to make an estimate judged by an objective standard. The land acquired has, therefore to be valued not only with reference to its condition at the time of the declaration under Sec. 4 of the Act but its potential value also must be taken into account. The sale-deeds of the lands situated in the vicinity and the comparable benefits and advan-tages which they have, furnish a rough and ready method of computing the market value." 45. The principles which emerge from a consideration of the aforesaid decisions are that compensation payable to the owner for compulsory acquisition of land must be a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of and that the sale of small plots of land cannot afford adequate guidance for deter-mining the amount of compensation payable for acquisition of large chunks of land. The price paid for sale of small plots of land cannot afford any criteria when very laVge area of land is acquired. The price paid for sale of small plots of land cannot afford any criteria when very laVge area of land is acquired. The price paid within a reasonable time in a bona fide transaction of purchase of lands acquired and the lands adiacent to the land acquired and possessing similar advantages provides a rough and ready method of arriving at a reasonably correct market value of the acquired land. 46. It is apperant that there is no evidence on the record that building activity of substantial nature was carried on in the neighourhood of the acq-uired land at or about the time of acquisition. There is also no evidence of any trend of development of the town near or round about the acquired land. The only evidence led by the owner is relating to sale of lands in the locality. The evidence led by the parties go to show that a piece of land measuring 5000 sd. yds. was sold by Johari Lal to Sarswati Balika Vidhayalaya on March 14, 1958 at the rate of Rs. 3.50 per sq. yd. by means of sale-dead Ex.P.10. Another sale-deed produced on the record is Ex.P.4 which relates to the sale of 48,400 Sq. yds. of land on October 11,1960 by the Mayo College, Ajmer to the Life Insurance Corporation at the rate of Rs. 6.50 per Sq. yd. In the same year, Mayo College, Ajmer again sold 13,572 sq.yds. of land on November 17, 1960 by means of sale-deed Ex. P. 19 to Mayur Housing Society at the rate of Rs. 7/-per sq. yd. In the year 1961, Rao Narain Singh appellant himself sold 26, 733 Sq. yds. of land, adjoining the land which was acquired in the instant case, to Navjeevan Housing Society at the rate of Rs. 3/- per Sq. yd. by means of sale-deed Ex. P. 18. It is also apparent that no houses were constructed on the land purchased by the Navjeewan Housing Society upto the year 1965, as the said land was later acquired by the Union Government. Then there are three sale-deeds of the year 1964 on record but they relate to the sale of small plots of lands. Ex. P. 5 dated January 14, 1964 relates to sale of 1,000 sq. yds. of land by the Mayo College, Ajmer at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yd. to Mrs. Then there are three sale-deeds of the year 1964 on record but they relate to the sale of small plots of lands. Ex. P. 5 dated January 14, 1964 relates to sale of 1,000 sq. yds. of land by the Mayo College, Ajmer at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yd. to Mrs. V.M. Kaul, wife of Shri B.K. Kaul, who was at one time Minister in the erstwhile State of Ajmer and was subsequently Finance Minister in the State of Rajasthan. Then by another sale deed Ex. P. 6 dated September 25,1964 again a very small strip of land, measuring 6 x1168", was sold by Mayo College, Ajmer to the same Smt. Kaul, in continuation of the earlier sale-deed, at the same rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yd. Then on November 13, 1964 Mayo College sold a small plot of land of 782 sq. yds. to Navinchand Sharma at the rate of Rs. 7/- per sq. yd. by means of sale-deed Ex. P. 7 So far as the last three sale-deeds are concerned, as we have already observed above, they relate to the sale of small plots of land and they cannot afford any guidance for the determination of compensation payable for the land in question. There are two more documents on the record to which reference may be made. Ex. P. 9 is a sale-deed by which 5,000 sq yds. of land was sold by Bhartiya Shikshan Sansthan to Saraswati Balika Vidhayalya on March 29, 1961 at the rate of Rs. 43.50 per sq yd. This land is adjoining the land which was sold by Johari Lal to Saraswati Balika Vidhayalaya. A nother sale-deed Ex. P. 8 dated December 7, 1962 relates to the sale of 500 sq. yds of land by Dr. Mithan Lal to Shri Deodutt Sharma at the rate of Rs. 5/- per sq. yd. Again this is a sale of small plot of land and cannot be of much utility for the determination of compensation for acquisition of a very large area of land. 47. We have examined the situation of the lands sold by means of the aforesaid sale-deeds with reference to the site plan appearing at page 307 of the paper-book, which learned counsel for both the parties are agreed can be safely relied upon to judge the comparative position of lands in respect of which sale-deeds have been produced. 47. We have examined the situation of the lands sold by means of the aforesaid sale-deeds with reference to the site plan appearing at page 307 of the paper-book, which learned counsel for both the parties are agreed can be safely relied upon to judge the comparative position of lands in respect of which sale-deeds have been produced. So far as the lands which were sold by the Mayo College Society to Life Insurance Corporation of India and the Model Housing Co-operative Society known as Mayur Colony and concerned, we find that they are situated towards the city and are at considerable distance from the land of Masuda House. On the other hand, land sold by Rao Narain Singh himself to Navjeewan Housing Society and that sold by Johari Lal to Saraswati Balika Vidhayalaya are situated very near to the land which has been acquired. It may be recalled that Joharilal had sold the land to Saraswati Balika Vidhayalaya at the rate of Rs. 3.50 per sq. yd. in March, 1958 while the appellant Rao Narain Singh himself sold the adjoining piece of land to Navjeevan Housing Society at the rate of Rs. 3/-per sq. yd. in April, 1961. There is no evidence of sale of such big lots of land between 1961 and 1967, when the land in question was acquired. In case of both the aforesaid sales it was argued by learned counsel for the owner that the price charged was less than the market price. In the case of sale by Joharilal to Saraswati Balika Vidhayalaya the statement of P.W.2 Johari Lal has been relied upon who stated that he sold the land at lower rate to Balike Vidhyalaya as he was Vice President of the Vidhyalaya at that time. We have perused the sale-deed Ex. P. 10 and no such averment has been made by Johari Lal in that document. Besides that the sale deed shows that Johari Lal alone was not the vendor but the land belonged to five other co-sharers besides Johari Lal, including his two brothers who were also the van-dors. The land was purchased by Saraswati Balika Vidhayalaya through its Secretary Shri Ramdayal Garg. Besides that the sale deed shows that Johari Lal alone was not the vendor but the land belonged to five other co-sharers besides Johari Lal, including his two brothers who were also the van-dors. The land was purchased by Saraswati Balika Vidhayalaya through its Secretary Shri Ramdayal Garg. It is very easy for Johari Lal to make a statement now after several years that the land was sold by him at a concessional rate, moreso because it appears from the statement of P.W. 2 that he has still some land left with him. We are not prepared to place any reliance upon the oral testimony of Johari Lal. 48. In respect of the sale effected by Rao Narain Singh himself infavour of Navjeevan Housing Society, it has been stated by P.W.6 Sadhu Singh who was then President of the Navjeevan Housing Society, Ajmer that although the market rate of land at that time was Rs. 6/- per sq. yd, but because the society consisted of refugees, Rao Narain Singh sold the land at the rate of Rs. 3/-per sq. yd. It was brought to our notice from another appeal filed by the Union of India that the land belonging to the Navjeevan Co operative Housing Society, Ajmer was also acquired by the Government in the year 1965 for the purposes of C.R.P. and the matter of payment of compensation of such land was pending consideration before the Arbitrator at the time when P.W.6 was examined in the present case. The Arbitrator fixed the compensation at the rate of Rs. 4/- per sq. yd. in the case of Navjeevan Housing Society by his award dated April 30, 1973 and although the Society felt satisfied with the award, the Union of India has filed an appeal which was heard by us along-with the present appeals and is being decided by a separate judgment. In these circumstances, when the question of payment of compensation to Navjeevan Housing Society itself was in dispute, the statement of P.W. 6 to the effect that the market rate of land was twice the rate at which the land was actually sold by Rao Narain Singh to the Society, cannot be accepted. In these circumstances, when the question of payment of compensation to Navjeevan Housing Society itself was in dispute, the statement of P.W. 6 to the effect that the market rate of land was twice the rate at which the land was actually sold by Rao Narain Singh to the Society, cannot be accepted. Thus it is difficult to rely upon the oral evidence led to show the rate at which the adjoining lands were sold to Saraswati Balika Vidhayalaya and Navjeevan Housing Society, did not represent the prevalent market rate of the relevant time or were sold at concessional rates. 49. In Chaturbhuj Pande vs. Collector, Raigarh (29), their Lordships of the Supreme Court refused to rely on the oral testimony adduced by the clai-mant in respect of his claim as regards the value of the land, although the witnesses examined on behalf of the owner were not effectively cross-examined and the Collector had not adduced any evidence in rebuttal. Their Lordships observed that these facts did not lead to the conclusion that the court is bound to accept the oral evidence of witnesses produced by the owner of the land. Their Lordships further observed that the Judges are not computers and in assessing the value to be attached to oral evidence their experience of life is bound to be called into aid. Thus the evidence produced by the owner has to be tested on the basis of probabilities and for the reasons we have already adverted to above, in our opinion, it would not be safe to rely on the oral testimony of the witnesses produced by the owner of the land. But it would be proper to take into consideration the two sale-deeds which have been produced on the record at their face value from which it appears that in the year 1958 Johari Lal sold his land to Saraswati Balika Vidhyalaya at the rate of Rs. 3.50 per sq. yd. while in 1961 Rao Narain Singh appellant himself sold the adjoining land to Navjeevan Housing Society at the rate of Rs. 3/- per sq. yard. 50. As we have pointed out above, lands on which the Mayur Colony is situated and those purchased by the Life Insurance Corporation from the Mayo College are situated in a populous area of the city and at considerable distance from Masuda House land. 3/- per sq. yard. 50. As we have pointed out above, lands on which the Mayur Colony is situated and those purchased by the Life Insurance Corporation from the Mayo College are situated in a populous area of the city and at considerable distance from Masuda House land. Learned counsel for the owner also argued that the Urban Improvement Trust, Ajmer had prepared a Madar Ka Naka scheme in respest of the land lying beyond the acquired land towards the east and that plots were offered at the rate of Rs. 7/- per sq. yard for residential purposes and Rs. 15/-per sq. yard for commercial accommodation. Although, a notification in respect of the Madar Ka Naka scheme was issued on May 9, 1963, yet the sanction of the Government for sale of lease hold rights in land situated in that scheme at the reserve price of Rs. 7/- per sq yard for residential plots and Rs. 15/-for commercial plots was given on April 19, 1965 and there is nothing on the record to show as to when the aforesaid Scheme was actually brought into effect and the plots of land were sold. Moreover, the Urban Improvement Trust while preparing the Madar Ka Naka Scheme had decided to develop the land and small plots for building commercial or residential accommodation were to be sold along with development and facilities like electricity, water, underground sewage roads etc. A perusal of the scheme shows that it was proposed to sell very small plots of 120 sq. yards and 194 sq. yds. each and was meant for low income group and middle income group persons, as also for the members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes. Thus the proposed sale of small plots of land in a developed condition cannot offer any safe guidance for the determination of the market value of the acquired land. In these circumstances, the proposed sale of fully developed land by the Urban Improvement Trust in the Madar Ka Naka Scheme cannot be of any assistance in the determination of the question before us. 51. Thus, it is evident that from 1958 to 1961 there was no appreciable increase at all in the value of land in the area in which these lands and the land of Masuda House, which has been acquired, are situated. 51. Thus, it is evident that from 1958 to 1961 there was no appreciable increase at all in the value of land in the area in which these lands and the land of Masuda House, which has been acquired, are situated. As we have already mentioned above, there is no sale-deed in respect of any sale of land in the locality between 1961 and 1967 except sales of small plots of lands which cannot affored safe guidance for the determination of compensation payable to the owner of the land. The value of the land, therefore, did not exceed Rs. 3/-or 3.50 per Sq yard upto the year 1961 and there is no convincing evidence that even thereafter there was any appreciable increase in the market value of land in the area where the acquired land is situated. What appears to us to be substantial of material of elinghing character in the case is the claim submitted by the appellant himself before the Collector. Ajmer at the rate of Rs. 4/- per sq. yard. The Commandant C R.P. Ajmer made an inquiry from the owner by his letter dated February 18, 1964 and one of the questions in respect of which informa-tion was sought related to the cost of the land In the reply dated February 18, 1964, which is produced as Ex. D.3 on the record, para 3 runs as under; "Though market rate of the land is increasing day by day but I claimed Rs 4/- (four rupees) per sq. yd. at the time of compensation claim submitted to the Collector, Ajmer." Thus even in the year 1964 the owner Rao Narain Singh himself thought that Rs. 4/- per sq. yard would be just compensation for his land. In our view, the amount at which the claim was advanced by the owner of the land, Rao Narain Singh, himself even on February 18. 1964 in his letter Ex. D.3 must be considered to be a fair recompense for the acquisition of the land, particularly look-ing to the fact that lands nearby were sold at the rate of Rs. 3/- and Rs. 3.50 per sq. yd. though some year earlier. 52. The Union of India while making an offer of Rs. 5.71,232/- to the owner in respect of building and land, calculated the estimated value of the land at the rate of Rs 2/10/ per sq. 3/- and Rs. 3.50 per sq. yd. though some year earlier. 52. The Union of India while making an offer of Rs. 5.71,232/- to the owner in respect of building and land, calculated the estimated value of the land at the rate of Rs 2/10/ per sq. yard on the basis of an estimate supplied by the Executive Engineer (B & R) Ajmer Learned counsel for the Union of India was unable to show as to on what basis the estimated price at the rate of Rs. 2/10/ per sq. yard was arrived at. In Ex. DA dated October 28, 1963, the Collector, Ajmer has referred to the fact that some of the best situated land was that which was sold by Rao Narayan Singh to Navjeevan Housing Society and that is why the price of the acquired land was offered at Rs. 2,62 per sq. yard to the owner, which was the price of the land estimated in the year 1958 when the land was sought to be acquired. It is not the case of the Union of India that the aforesaid price was arrived at after a consideration of the market rate of the land in the locality. As such we are unable to place any reliance upon the estimated value of land made by the Executive Engineer. 53. It appears from the evidence on record that there was not much building activity round about the acquired land during the years 1958 to 1967. Even the market price of the land in the vicinity of the acquired land did not rise during this period, as Johari Lal sold his land in March, 1958 at the rate of Rs. 3.50 per Sq. yard, while the owner Rao Narayan Singh himself sold his adjoining land in April 1961 @Rs. 3/- per Sq. yard. Even small plots of land were sold much later in the year 1964 @Rs. 1/- per Sq. yard and Rs. 7/- per Sq. yard and no evidence about sale of land in the vicinity is available on the record between 1964 to 1967. 54. In Krishna Yachendra Bahadurvaru vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board Bangalore (3), there was evidence of sale of some lands in the same area in the year 1946 at the rate of Rs. 6/-per Sq. yard and in April 1956 at the rate of Rs 12/- per Sq. 54. In Krishna Yachendra Bahadurvaru vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board Bangalore (3), there was evidence of sale of some lands in the same area in the year 1946 at the rate of Rs. 6/-per Sq. yard and in April 1956 at the rate of Rs 12/- per Sq. yard, their Lordships while determining the market value of the acquired lands in October 1951 and January 1954 considered that the mean between the two rates would afford a reasonable criteria and held that compensation should be paid @Rs. 9/- per Sq. yard. In the aforesaid case, their Lordships observed as under: "We are conscious that this process of determination of market value adopted by us may savour of conjecture or guess, but the estimation of market value in many cases must depend largely on evaluation of many imponderable and hence it must necessarily be to some extent a matter of conjecture or guess." Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, we would not be unjustified in holding the market value of the acquired land @Rs. 4/- per Sq. yard, which as a matter of fact was claimed by the owner Rao Narayan Singh himself in the year 1964 by the letter Ex. D. 3. It may also be observed in this connection that some portion of the acquired land is rocky as disclosed in the evidence on record and while fixing a uniform price for the entire land such factors as to the nature of the land or part of the land has also to be taken into consideration. It also appears from the record that there was not much pressure on the land for building activity inasmuch as the owner Rao Narayan Singh did not divide even a portion of the land into plots for building purposes nor any plot or portions of the land was sold by him for building purposes except the sale made in favour of Navjeewan Housing Society. Even that land was not divided into plots sold for building purposes and some years later in 1965 the said land was acquired for the purposes of C.R.P. There is also no evidence led by the owner of any intention on his part to get the land or even a portion thereof developed for building purposes. Even that land was not divided into plots sold for building purposes and some years later in 1965 the said land was acquired for the purposes of C.R.P. There is also no evidence led by the owner of any intention on his part to get the land or even a portion thereof developed for building purposes. It is not the case of the owner that he had paid any amount to the Urban Improvement Trust for conversion of land into abadi or even applied to the Trust for converting the same or for division of land into building plots. Thus, we are unable to hold that the potentional value of the land as building site should be taken into consideration, while determining the estimated market value of the land. Learned counsel for the owner also relied upon two decisions of the Orissa High Court in Kashinath Mukerji vs. Collector of Puri (30) Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (31) wherein 25% of the price of the acquired land has been added as potential value as building site. With great respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to appreciate the principels on which 25% of the price has been added to the value of the acquired land on account of the potential value as building site Another decision, relied upon by the learned counsel for the owner, also of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa vs. Dunda Oram (32), relates to acquisition of land in Rourkela town which was just growing up as an important industrial town and the decision in that case cannot be applied to the acquisition of land made in the year 1967 in the town of Ajmer. 55. The arbitrator has referred to the evidence of Shri K,D. Gauri, who was a retired I.A.S. Officer and had worked in the C.R.P. Ajmer from 1960 to 1966 and who stated that at the relevant time near the Masuda House there was Saraswati School and Masonic Lodge and huts of Malies, but the remaining land round about was uninhabited. 55. The arbitrator has referred to the evidence of Shri K,D. Gauri, who was a retired I.A.S. Officer and had worked in the C.R.P. Ajmer from 1960 to 1966 and who stated that at the relevant time near the Masuda House there was Saraswati School and Masonic Lodge and huts of Malies, but the remaining land round about was uninhabited. This witness stated that the Life Insurance Corporation building is situated about 11/2 miles away from the Masuda House and that in the year, 1964 he inquired from the Kamdar of Rao Narayan Singh about the price of the land and the Kamdar told him that the price which the owner would demand for the land would be Rs. 4/- per sq. yard. He also gave a letter to the Kamdar and Ex. D. 3 is the reply received from him in this context. 56. The arbitrator has although referred to the statement of D.W.I that the price sought in the year 1964 for the land in question was Rs. 4/- per Sq. yard but he did not take the letter Ex.D.3 into consideration on the ground that the same has no binding force. It may be that the value claimed on behalf of Rao Narayan Singh in the year 1964 vide letter Ex.D 3 may have no binding force and does not operate as an estoppel against him in the proceedings for determination of compensation, but the said letter certainly indicates the price, which Rao Narayan Singh considered in the year 1964 that the land would fetch and did represent the market value of the land, as claimed by Rao Narayan Singh at that time. The arbitrator after a consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the market value of the acquired land was near about Rs. 5/- per Sq. yard and in doing so he took into consideration of small plots of land effected in favour of MrS.B.M. Kaul and others. Although the arbitrator has referred to the fact that the lands of Navjeewan Housing Society and Saraswati Balika Vidhyalaya are situated only 50 to 60 ft. away from the Masuda House land and the land of Johari Lal is adjoining to it, yet he failed to take into consideration that the said lands were sold only for Rs. 3/- and Rs. 3.50 per Sq. yard. away from the Masuda House land and the land of Johari Lal is adjoining to it, yet he failed to take into consideration that the said lands were sold only for Rs. 3/- and Rs. 3.50 per Sq. yard. The arbitrator also look into consideration, while fixing the price for the acquisition of land in question that the acquisition of private property entails by its very compulsory nature a hard circumstance to its owner, who would be able to negotiate sales of his property at more profitable rates. This may be a good consideration for awarding solatium, which in fact has been awarded by the arbitrator at the rate of 15% of the price of the acquired land, because of the compulsory nature of the sale on account of acquisition of the land in question, but such consideration could not enter into the determination of the market value of the land. On these considerations, the arbitrator held that the price of Rs. 7.50 per Sq. yard would be just and proper compensation for the land. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the arbitrator particularly when a large area of land measuring more than 2,00,000 Sq. yards is sought to be acquired. In our view no willing purchaser would have been prepared to pay more than Rs. 4/- per Sq. yard at the time of acquisition in respect of a large area of undeveloped land measuring about 1,38,117.20 Sq. yards. We, therefore, hold that on the basis of available material, Rs. 4/- per Sq. yard, as claimed by the owner in his letter Ex.D.3, would constitute reasonable recompense for the acquisition of the land in question and should be as compensation for such land. 57. Now, coming to the question of the value of buildings, the arbitrator awarded a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- as compensation for the building, as we claimed by the owner Rao Narayan Singh in his statement of claim submitted under Sec. 8 of the Acts of 1952. It may be observed here that no oral evidence worth the name is available on the record so far as the value of the buildings is concerned. 2,50,000/- as compensation for the building, as we claimed by the owner Rao Narayan Singh in his statement of claim submitted under Sec. 8 of the Acts of 1952. It may be observed here that no oral evidence worth the name is available on the record so far as the value of the buildings is concerned. It appears that in the year 1958 the State Government of Rajasthan desired to acquire the buildings for locating the Ajmer Polytechnic and a valuation report was made by the Executive Engineer of the Rajasthan Public Works Department, Ajmer Division along with his estimate submitted on May 28,1958 and the value of the buildings was estimated as Rs. 1,44,270/-. The Executive Engineer considered the age of the building as 30 years and calculated the depreciated value on that basis. However, the Superintending Engineer, Buildings and Roads, P. W. D., Kota checked the estimates prepared by the Executive Engineer and the valuation of the building according to him came to Rs. 1,41,100/-. The Survey or of Works, Central P. W. D., New Delhi considered the astimate worked out by the Executive Engineer and according to him the total life of the building should be estimated as 75 years and taking the age of the building as 30 years for the ground floor and five years for the first floor portion. On the aforesaid basis he calculated the total value of the building as Rs 97,643/-. The detailed specifications on the basis of which the value of the building was estimated by the Executive Engineer Rajasthan PW D. and by the Surveyor of Works C.P.W.D have been produced on the record The Collector, Ajmer by his letter dated October 28, 1963, Ex. D. 4, offered a sum of Rs. 1,42,749/- for the building on the basis of the estimate prepared by the Executive Engineer of the Rajasthan P. W.D., when the question of acquiring Masuda House building for the Polytechnic, Ajmer arose in the year 1958. According to the Collector, Ajmer, since 5 more years have passed, the depreciated value of the building then was Rs. 1,35,000/- only. The then Collector, Ajmer expressed the view in the letter Ex. D. 4 that the value of the Masuda House was Rs. 1,42,794/- as estimated in the year 1958 but its depreciated value at that time could be approximately Rs. 1,35,000/-. 1,35,000/- only. The then Collector, Ajmer expressed the view in the letter Ex. D. 4 that the value of the Masuda House was Rs. 1,42,794/- as estimated in the year 1958 but its depreciated value at that time could be approximately Rs. 1,35,000/-. The oral testimony has rightly been disar-ded by the arbitrator, so far as the question of the value of the building is concerned, P.W 1 Narain Singh who is the Mukhtiyar Aam of Rao Narayan Singh of Masuda, has given the value of the building at Rs. 2,50.000/- merely because people say so. P.W 5 S.N. Sharma is an employee of the State Government and the estimates prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer of the Rajasthan P.W.D were got produced by the owner through this witness, as well as the report of the Collector dated July 24, 1958 in which Rs. 2.10 per Sq. yard was proposed for the purchase of the land attached to the Masuda House on the basis of the transaction of the land in the neighbourhood. P.W.8 U.M Mehta, who was an employee of Rao Narain Singh of Masuda, has stated that the main building of *Masuda House, which is a double storeyed building is of the value of Rs. 1,50,000/-. It was also stated by him that the accounts were properly maintained in the Masuda Estate and regular account-books were kept by Rao Narayan Singh in which entries were made regarding the expenditure incurred on the construction of building. According to this witness, the account-books containing the accouts regarding the construction of Masuda House building must be with the Kamdar of Rao Narayan Singh. If the owner was in possession of regularly kept account-books and the account-books were properly maintained, as stated by this witness, P.W.8 U.M. Mehta, then an adverse inference should be drawn against the owner on account of his non-production of the account-books. 58. In the case of the Collector, Raigarh vs. Chaturbhuj Pande (33), it was observed that the failure on the part of the owner to produce accounts led to an adverse inference that they would not have justified the claim for compen-sation advanced by him, if such account books would have been produced. 59. 58. In the case of the Collector, Raigarh vs. Chaturbhuj Pande (33), it was observed that the failure on the part of the owner to produce accounts led to an adverse inference that they would not have justified the claim for compen-sation advanced by him, if such account books would have been produced. 59. The arbitrator has largely depended upon an estimate produced by one G.L. Sharma and upon his own site inspection report in arriving at the conclusion that the owner was entitled to get Rs. 2,50,000/-as the price of the building, as claimed by him. After the evidence of the claimant was over before the arbitrator and four witnesses were examined on behalf of the Union of Government, the arbitrator employed a novel procedure which appears from the order-sheet dated July 31, 1970, the relevant part of which runs as under:— "It appears that some of the construction works in the main building have not been shoon in the estimate prepared by the C.R.P. but are shown in the estimate and plan filed by the petitioner. In order to find out the truth whether they exist it is necessary that a plan may be prepared with the help of both the parties. The C R.P. may give reasons of not showing them in the estimate or say that they have been left out by mistake. The parties may therefore prepare a plan soon." Now, according to this order, both the parties were directed to prepare a plan jointly so as to show the construction works in the main building, which were left out in the estimate prepared by the C.R.P. but no order or direction was given by the Arbitrator to revalue the entire property. It appears from the letter of Shri G.L. Sharma dated August 29, 1970 which may be found at page 254 of the paper-book, that he examined the building in company with Shri V D. Gupta, Assistant Surveyor, C.P.W.D as the representative of C.R.P., Ajmer. However, the letter dated August 29, 1970 and the estimate submitted alongtherewith was signed only by Shri G.L. Sharma. As a matter of fact he revalued the entire property afresh and produced an absolutely new estimate. According to him, the value of the land was Rs. 2,31,600/-. However, the letter dated August 29, 1970 and the estimate submitted alongtherewith was signed only by Shri G.L. Sharma. As a matter of fact he revalued the entire property afresh and produced an absolutely new estimate. According to him, the value of the land was Rs. 2,31,600/-. Shri G.L. Sharma, without being solicited, sent yet another letter to the Arbitrator on October 3, 1970, which is at page 263 of the paper book, in which he sought to clarify that in the valuation statement the costs of the ceiling fans, light shades, chandeliors, garden and green trees have not been included. Thereafter, on October 3, 1970 Rao Narayan Singh submitted an application before the arbitrator stating that the Deputy Inspector General of the C.R.P., Ajmer may be directed to submit a report of his technical representative with regard to the costs of the structure of the Masuda House On this application, the arbitrator passed an order on that very day (at page 266 of the paper book) that a copy of the application be sent to the D.I.G., C.R.P. to say that the report may be produced on the next date of hearing In the application submitted by Rao Narayan Singh on October 3, 1970, it was mentioned by him that the representative of the parties along with their approved valuers, Shri V D.Gupta, Assistant surveyor, C.P.W.D. Ajmer on behalf of the D.I.G , C.R.P., Ajmer and Shri G.L. Sharma, retired Executive Engineer, Government of Rajasthan, on behalf of Rao Narayan Singh visite the site of Masuda House, Ajmer and prepared notes of the particulars and specification of the structure of the entire construction of Masuda House. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid narration that although the arbitrator by his order dated July 31. 1970 desired the parties to prepare a plan so as to show the left out construction works, as were not shown in the estimate and plan submitted earlier by the C.R.P., yet Rao Narayan Singh appointed a valuer on his own be-half and submitted a fresh valuation report of the entire construction of Masuda House. To our mind, it appears that fresh evidence could not be allowed to be created and smuggled into the record in this manner at a stage at which the clai-ment was not entitled to produce any evidence as he had already produced all his documentary as well as oral evidence. To our mind, it appears that fresh evidence could not be allowed to be created and smuggled into the record in this manner at a stage at which the clai-ment was not entitled to produce any evidence as he had already produced all his documentary as well as oral evidence. Even thereafter four witnesses for the Union of India had also been examined. At that stage, there was no question of giving any fresh opportunity to the claimant to produce a new valuation state-ment. The Union Government was justified in such circumstances in not submitting a fresh valuation report as it was not willing to become a party to the introduction of fresh evidence in this regard by the back door at that stage. The Union Government relied upon the earlier valuation reports prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer of the Rajasthan P.W.D, and the Surveyor of Works, C.P.W.D. which were got produced by the owner himself. 60. However, in his award, the arbitrator has unfolded a different story in this respect and has stated that "In view of such great divergence in respect of the structure cost of the entire constructions comprised in the Masuda House building, the parties were directed on 31.7.70. to produce sample valuation report of the structure cost of the entire construction of Masuda House. Consequently, Shri G.L. Sharma retired Executive Engineer, Government of Rajasthan and V.D. Gupta Assistant Surveyor, C.P.W.D. carried out necessary measurements and prepared valuation statements and they have stated that the present day depreciated value of the structure, leaving out land, works out to Rs. 2,31,600. In support of this valuation report they have given details and specifications about their calculations. The learned counsel for the Union has argued that the arbitrator had never directed a technical property valuer in the presence of C.R.P. for such purpose and that this valuation ought to be ignored." 61. The counsel for the Union of India also argued before the arbitrator that because Shri G.L. Sharma was not produced for cross-examination, his report should not be considered. But that argument was repelled by the arbitrator on the ground that the counsel for the Union had ample opportunity to req-uire him to appear for cross-examination if he wanted to do so. But that argument was repelled by the arbitrator on the ground that the counsel for the Union had ample opportunity to req-uire him to appear for cross-examination if he wanted to do so. The entire tenure of the award in this respect, portion of which has been reproduced above shows that the arbitrator was labouring under considerable mis-apprehension as if the valuation statement furnished by Shri G.L. Sharma was a joint valuation report produced by the valuers of both the parties and that the details given in support of the valuation of Rs. 2,31,600/- were also supplied by the valuers of both the parties. This impression was obviously entirely erroneous. We have already referred to above that the direction of the arbitrator was merely that a plan may be prepared jointly by both the parties so as to specify the constructions which were not mentioned in the plan and the estimate submitted by the Union Govern-ment. There is nothing on the record to show that Shri G.L. Sharma was appo-inted by the arbitrator to carry out the necessary measurements along with Shri V.D. Gupta or both of them had jointly submitted a valuation statement and have given details and specifications about as to how the value of the building was worked out as Rs. 2,31,600/- We are of the view that in the first instance the arbitrator should not have allowed the claimant without any cogent reason to produce a valuation statement at such a late stage and even if he was allowed to do so, then it was necessary that Shri G.L. Sharma, who gave the valuation report should have been produced by the owner for cross-examination by the other party. We do not agree with the arbitrator that it was the duty of the Union of India to call Shri G.L. Sharma for cross-examination if it desired to do so. On the other hand, in our view, if the claimant desired to rely upon the valuation statement prepared by Shri G.L. Sharma, then he should have been produced and made available for cross-examination by the other party. 62. In M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs. The Worksmen(34) it was held that even in domestic tribunals, where the Evidence Act is not strictly applicable, the application of the principles of natural justice do not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. 62. In M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs. The Worksmen(34) it was held that even in domestic tribunals, where the Evidence Act is not strictly applicable, the application of the principles of natural justice do not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that no material can be relied upon to establish a contested fact which is not spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about them and are subjetced to cross-examination by the party against whom they are sought to be used. In case a letter or other document is produced to establish some fact, which is relevant to the enquiry, the writer must be produced or his affidavit in respect thereof be filed and an opportunity should be afforded to the opposite party who challenges this fact to cross-examine him. Their Lordships also observed that this procedure is both in accordance with the principles of natural justice as also according to the procedure prescribed under the C.P.C. and the Evidence Act, both of which incorporate these general principles. 63. We may observe that Shri G.L. Sharma was never appointed as a Commissioner by the arbitrator under Order 26 Rule 11 C.P C. As he was a representative of one party only and had produced a valuation statement at such a late stage, then he should have been made available for cross-examination to the Union of India We are, therefore, of the view that the estimate prepared by Shri G.L. Sharma cannot at all be taken into consideration, as the writer thereof has not been produced and he has not been made available for cross-examination. Moreover, Shri G.L. Sharma was available no other person could prove the statement prepared by him in accordance with the known principles of evidence. 64. It was then argued by the learned counsel for the owner that the estimate prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer of the Rajasthan Public Works Department were based on Schedule rates of the year 1955 and that Shri G.L. Sharma prepared an estimate on the basis of standing order No. 160 of the Rajasthan Police Works Department. It was then argued by the learned counsel for the owner that the estimate prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer of the Rajasthan Public Works Department were based on Schedule rates of the year 1955 and that Shri G.L. Sharma prepared an estimate on the basis of standing order No. 160 of the Rajasthan Police Works Department. We have perused the standing order No. 160, which was produced for our perusal by the learned counsel for the owner, and it was discovered that the said schedule has no relevance to the determination of the value of the property for purposes of sale or purchase The owner also submitted a comparative table, probably at the stage of final arguments, to show the valuation estimates at different occasions in respect of the structure of Masuda House building and a perusal thereof shows that the only items which were not included in the estimates prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer of the Rajasthan Pub-lic Works Department were the cost of the road side retaining walls, wire fencing and main gate wall. While all other items contained in the estimate prepared by Shri G.L. Sharma were already contained in the estimates prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer of the Rajasthan Public Works Department except the three items mentioned above and the total valuation of which as estimated by Shri G.L. Sharma was only Rs. 5,720/-. This comparative statement appears at pages 305 and 306 of the paper-book. 65. The estimate prepared by the Executive Engineer of the Rajasthan Public Works Department was prepared apparently with the intention that the property in dispute would be acquired for the purpose of locating the Rajasthan Poly-technic in the Masuda House building. The Collector, Ajmer in his letter dated January 6, 1965 expressed the view that the owner, Rao Narain Singh of Masuda. appeared to be willing to accept the price as estimated by the Executive Engineer and also observed that the present depreciated value of the Masuda House building was only Rs. 1.35,000/-. The estimates prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer were got produced on the record by the owner himself through P.W.5 Ramdayal. The original estimate prepared by the Executive Engineer was for a sum of Rs. 1,44,270. But on checking, the Superintending Engineer reduced the same to Rs. 1,41,100/-. 1.35,000/-. The estimates prepared by the Executive Engineer and the Superintending Engineer were got produced on the record by the owner himself through P.W.5 Ramdayal. The original estimate prepared by the Executive Engineer was for a sum of Rs. 1,44,270. But on checking, the Superintending Engineer reduced the same to Rs. 1,41,100/-. The Chief Engineer, approved the estimates prepared by the Superintending Engineer. We find no reason for not accepting the estimates of the cost of structure of Masuda House building as finally approved by the Chief Engineer of the Rajasthan Public Works Department. It may also be pointed out that as the age of the building became more at the time of acquisition, its depreciated price at such time would naturally be less. In any case, the depreciated value of the structure at the time of acquisition cannot stand for comparison with the valuation estimated by the Chief Engineer, in the year 1958. The Central Public Works Department reduced the price of the building because of the sging thereof. But without taking further depreciation into consideration for determining the price of the building, we are of the view that the estimated price for the building as determined by the Superintending Engineer and aproved by the Chief Engineer should be accepted as the market price of the building. Thus, in our opinion, the estimated price of the building, should be considered as Rs. 1.41,100/- as contained in the letter of the Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department (B & R), Kota Unit ( Ex. P. 13(a)). 66. The arbitrator has also largely relied upon the site inspection report said to have been prepared by him after making a local inspection of the site of Masuda House. The objection of the learned counsel for the Union of India in this regard is that the site inspection report appears to have been signed by the arbitrator on June 30, 1971, much after the Award was delivered by him on April 15, 1971. The objection of the learned counsel for the Union of India in this regard is that the site inspection report appears to have been signed by the arbitrator on June 30, 1971, much after the Award was delivered by him on April 15, 1971. We have looked into the original site inspection report, which is on record and there appears no doubt that it was signed by the arbitrator on June 30, 1971 while he had already become functus officio after the delivery of award on April 15, 1971, A perusal of the site inspection note shows that each and every item from Tar road, wire fencing to the details of the main building, including ornamental works, electric fittings, arches etc. with their dimensions have been specfied in the inspection report which runs into severel pages. Apparently, the said inspection report appears to have been prepared and placed on the record subsequentv. A careful perusal of the entire record shows that when the matter was finally argued before the arbitrator and when he delivered his award on April 15, 1971, the site inspection report does not appear to have been placed thereon, as it has been signed by the arbitrator only on June 30, 1971. An application for certified copy of the site inspection report was submitted by one of the parties, after the delivery of the award and then the clerk concerned made a report that there was no such document on the record and a certified copy of any such document could not be given. It was only thereafter that the arbitrator put his signatures on the so called site inspection report on June 30, 1971. In our view, an unsigned document which might be available with the arbitrator could not be taken into consideration by him while passing his award, as it was of no legal value. Although, it cannot be said that the arbitrator was bound by technical rules of evidence yet to give authenticity to a document. It is essential that it should be signed by the maker thereof and an unsigned document can have no sanctity. Although, it cannot be said that the arbitrator was bound by technical rules of evidence yet to give authenticity to a document. It is essential that it should be signed by the maker thereof and an unsigned document can have no sanctity. The arbitrator become functus officio after the delivery of the award and he had no power or authority vested in him to call for the record thereafter and place a signed inspection report on the record, we are not prepared to place any reliance upon the so-called inspection report which has been signed by the arbitrator on June 30, 1971. 67. The next question which requires consideration in these appeals is as to whether the owner, Rao Narain Singh, is entitled to payment of interest on the amount of compensation awarded to him. It is no doubt true that the Act of 1952 does not provide for payment of interest, but it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singh vs. Umrao Singh (35) that interest can be awarded on general principles. It was argued before their Lord-ships that the East Punjab Requisition of Immovable Property (Temporary powers) Act, 1948 made no provision for payment of interest and the omission in making such a provision in the law in question should be construed as an intention on the part of the legislature not to award interest with regard to the amount of compensation determined under that Act. Their Lordships repelled this contention and approving a full bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Surjan Singh vs. East Punjab Government (36) held that absence of provision for interest in the Punjab Act of 1948 could not reasonably lead to an inference that that Act intended to exclude the application of the general rule in the matter of payment of interest. The following observations of their Lordships may be usefully extracted:— "When a claim for payment of interest is made by a person whose immovable property has been acquired compuleorily he is not making claim for damages properly or technically so-called; he is basing his claim on the general rule that if he is deprived of his land he should be put in possession of compensation immediately; if not, in lieu of possession taken by compulsory acquisition interest should be paid to him on the said amount of compensation." Their Lordships also quoted with approval the following observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co., Ltd. vs. New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (37). "Upon the expropriation of land under statutory power, whether for the purpose of private gain or of good to the public at large, the owner is entitled to interest upon the principal sum awarded from the date when possession was taken, unless the statute clearly shows a contrary intention." ................................................................................................................... "But for all that, the owner is deprived of his property in this case as much as in the other, and the rule has long been accepted in the interpretation of statutes that they are not to be held to deprive individuals of property without compensation unless the intention to do so is made quite clear. The right to receive the interest takes the place of the right to retain possession and is within the rule." (Italic is added) Thus, it is well settled that although the provisions of the Interest Act may not be applicable to such cases, still the courts power to award interest on equitable grounds is not taken away unless there is express bar contained in the statute. It is not disputable that the right to receive interest in lieu of possession of immovable property taken away either by private agreement or by compulsory acquisition is generally regarded by judicial decisions as an equitable right. 68. It is not disputable that the right to receive interest in lieu of possession of immovable property taken away either by private agreement or by compulsory acquisition is generally regarded by judicial decisions as an equitable right. 68. In Satinder Singhs case (35), their Lordships held that the owner whose immovable property has been acquired and taken possession of by the State, is deprived of the right to receive income from such property and as there is a time lag between the taking of possession by the State and the payment of compensation by it to the claimant, the owner is entitled to claim interest on the value of the property. 69. In the present case, the acquisition of the Masuda House building and lands appurtenant thereto became effective on March 5, 1967, the day on which the notice of acquisition issued under section 36 of the Act of 1962, was served upon the owner. It is also not in dispute that the property in question was formerly requisitioned by the Collector, Ajmer for the purposes of C.R.P. Ajmer under section 29 of the Act of 1962 with effect from April 24, 1963 and that the rent for such property was paid to the owner thereof only upto May 4, 1967 when the requisition of the said property came to an end. Thus, the owner, Rao Narainsingh, is entitled to payment of interest from May 5, 1967. It was stated by learned counsel for the respondents that a sum of Rs. 5,32,594/- which was offered by the Collector, Ajmer to the owner under section 8(1) of the Act of 1952, on behalf of the Central Government, was deposited by the Central Government, on November 2, 1968. But out of the aforesaid amount, Rs. 70, 040.46 p. were withdrawn subsequently on January 31, 1971 and the sum of Rs. 4,59,510.84 was withdrawn by Rao Narainsingh on June 2, 1971. The interest will cease to run from the date of deposit on such amount which Rao Narainsingh withdrew on June 2, 1971 but will continue to be payable on the remaining amount of compensation until payment thereof is made by the Central Government. 4,59,510.84 was withdrawn by Rao Narainsingh on June 2, 1971. The interest will cease to run from the date of deposit on such amount which Rao Narainsingh withdrew on June 2, 1971 but will continue to be payable on the remaining amount of compensation until payment thereof is made by the Central Government. Learned counsel for the owner, however, claimed interest on the entire amount of compensation from the date of taking over possession upto the date of payment, at the rate of 6% per annum, on the basis of the rate of interest awardable in respect of compensation payable under the Central Land Acquisition Act. 70. The arbitrator has awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the award upto the date of payment, keeping in view the provisions of section 34 C.P.C. However, under the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act interest is payable on the amount of compensation at the rate of 4% per annum and keeping in view the principles enumerated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singhs case (35) interest is payable on the amount of compensation determined in these appeals at the rate of 4% per annum from the date of possession by acquisition i.e. May 5, 1967 upto the date of deposit or payment of the remaining amount of compensation to the owner. It would be discriminatory if interest is awarded at the rate of 6% per annum, if property is acquired in Rajasthan for public purpose by Central Government under the Act of 1952, but at the rate of 4% per annum only if the property is acquired under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act for any public purpose or for purposes of a local authority or a company. As interest is being awarded in the present case on equitable principles, the rate of interest should be commensurate with the rate which can be awarded on other compulsory acquisitions made in the State of Rajasthan under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act. It is for this reason that we hold that the amount of compensation should carry interest at the rate of Rs. 4% per annum. 71. It is for this reason that we hold that the amount of compensation should carry interest at the rate of Rs. 4% per annum. 71. Lastly, coming to the question of awarding of solatium, the arbitrator has awarded solatium at the rate of 15% over and above the market price of the lands, on account of the compulsory nature of transaction in the matter of acquisition of property. While learned counsel for the owner claimed solatium on the entire amount of the market value of the land as well as, that of building at the rate of 15%, on the anology of Sec. 23(2) of the Central Land Acquisition Act, yet learned counsel for the Union of India submitted that no amount should be awarded as solatium, as the same would be an addition to compensation, determined on the basis of the market price of the land and building. In Balammal vs. State of Madras (38) the provisions of Madras City Improvement Trust Act, 1950 came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it was observed as under:— "Compensation awardable for compulsory, acquisition of property must be a just equivalent of the value of the land of which a person is deprived and then compensation may at the option of the authority be related to different dates, according as it is awardable under the Land Acquisition Act or under some special provision the compensation award-able to the owners of the lands, unless the distinction is supported by any rational classification having reasonable relation to the subject-matter or to the object sought to be achieved by the special provision and is founded on some intelligible differentia, the special provision must be held void, as infringing the guarantee under Art. 14." In the aforesaid case, their Lordships struck down sub-clause (2) of clause 6 of the Schedule read with Sec. 73 of the Madras City Improvement Trust Act of 1950 which deprived the owners of the statutory right to solatium, at the rate of 15% on the valuation of the lands and held that the owners whose land was compulsorily acquired were entitled to statutory solatium, as was allowed under sec. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. 72. In Borough Municipality of Ahmedabad vs. Jayendra Vajubhai Divatia (39), Beaumont, C.J. as he then was. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. 72. In Borough Municipality of Ahmedabad vs. Jayendra Vajubhai Divatia (39), Beaumont, C.J. as he then was. held that although in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act of 1925, no provision was made for payment of solatium on the amount of compensation paid for acquisition of land under that Act, yet in order to arrive at a just compensation to be paid to the owner of the acquired property, it is quite impossible to leave out of consideration that some amount has to be paid to the owner on account of the compulsory nature of acquisition as the person interested would be disinclined to part with the land acquired. The aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court was relied upon by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the Municipal Corporation, Indore vs. K.M. Palsikar (40), wherein it was held that although in Sec. 387 of the Madhya Bharat Municipal Corporation Act, no provision has been made for the award of any amount by way of solatium, yet on the basis of the reasoning adopted by Beaumont C.J. with which their Lordships expressed their agreement, it was held that the award of solatium at 15% was justified. 73. In Hari Krishan Khosla (decd)vs. The Union of India (41) provisions of Sec. 8(3) of the Act of 1952 were held to be violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as there is no provision for payment of solatium on the amount of compensation awarded and on interest, while such benefits were allowed to the owners whose lands are sought to be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It was held by their Lordships that the owners of land acquired under the Act of 1952 were also entitled to claim and receive from the Central Government solatium at 15% and also interest at 6% per annum on the amount of compensation. 74. It was then argued by the learned counsel for the Union of India that under Sec. 23(2) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, solatium could be awarded only at the rate of 10% on the amount of compensation and not @ 15% as was allowed under the Central Land Acquisition Act. 74. It was then argued by the learned counsel for the Union of India that under Sec. 23(2) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, solatium could be awarded only at the rate of 10% on the amount of compensation and not @ 15% as was allowed under the Central Land Acquisition Act. The aforesaid argument appears to us to be justified, as in the case of any compulsory acquisition of land in Rajasthan solatium at the rate of 10% on the market value of the property can be allowed to the owner, as part of compensation. On equitable principles, solatium at the very same rate could be allowed in the case of compulsory acquisition of immovable property made under the Act of 1952 in the State of Rajasthan. Although, no provision for payment of solatium has been made in Sec. 8(3) of the Act of 1952, as solatium is part of compensation, which comprises both of the market value as well as solatium paid on account of compulsory nature of transaction, the owner was also entitled to payment of interest on the total amount of compensation, including 10% solatium. 75. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, both the appeals are partly allowed and the award given by the arbitrator on April 15, 1971 is modified and the following amount is awarded to the owner, Rao Narainsingh, as just recompense for the compulsory acquisition of Masuda House building and adjacent land, under Sec. 8(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952: — 1. Masuda House along with out-houses, parks, trees, water tanks, electric and sanitary fittings and appurtenant structures. Rs. 1,41,100/- 2. 70 Bigha 14 Biswas land at the rate of Rs. 4/- per sq. yard. 3. Loss of access of and utility of about 3 Bighas and 2 Biswas of land in Khasra No. 3844. Rs. 2.000/- 4. Solatium at 10% of the compensation payable in respect of the land and building, keeping in view the compulsory nature of acquisition of property. 5. Interest at the rate of 4% per annum on the total amount of compensation from the date of acquisition i.e. May 5, 1967 to November 2, 1968 and from November 3, 1968 upto the date of payment or deposit on the balance amount now remaining due after deducting Rs. 5. Interest at the rate of 4% per annum on the total amount of compensation from the date of acquisition i.e. May 5, 1967 to November 2, 1968 and from November 3, 1968 upto the date of payment or deposit on the balance amount now remaining due after deducting Rs. 4,59,510.84, which have already been paid to the owner, Rao Narainsingh by way of compensation. 76. Rao Narainsingh of Masuda, who is owner of the property in ques-tion is entitled to payment of the aforesaid amount of compensation and interest thereon as specified above, from the Central Government. 77. In view of the fact that both the parties have succeeded in part, the parties are left to bear their own costs of these appeals.