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1980 DIGILAW 184 (BOM)

KHEMRAJ RATANLAL SANCHETI v. VASANT MADHAOSA VYAVHARE

1980-08-12

M.S.JAMDAR

body1980
JUDGMENT-The short question involved in this revision application is whether the Civil Judge can pass an order directing the defendant to produce documents, when further proceedings of the suit are stayed by an order of the appellate Court. 2. The non-applicants filed Reg. C. S. No. 87 of 1979 against the revision applicants for dissolution of partnership and accounts. The revision applicants inter alia pleaded an agreement to refer any dispute relating to the partnership to arbitration and prayed that the matter be referred to an arbitration for decision. The trial Judge rejected the contention and against that order the revision applicants preferred an appeal under section 39 (1) (5) of the Arbitration Act to the District Judge, Buldana and at their instance the District Judge directed that further proceedings in the suit be stayed until further orders. The appeal is still pending. 3. Some months after the stay order was passed and during the pendency of the appeal, the non-applicants filed an application captioned 'Notice to Produce documents' and prayed that the revision applicants be directed to produce in Court all the account books and other documents relating to the said partnership. The revision applicants opposed the application solely on the ground that as the proceedings in the suit are stayed, the application was not tenable. The Trial Judge overruled the objection and held that he is competent to pass the order sought, even though further proceedings of the suit are stayed. Consequently he allowed the application and directed the revision applicants to produce the concerned documents in the Court. This order is challenged by the revision applicants on the ground that the Trial Judge had no jurisdiction to pass it. 4. The order staying the proceedings in the suit was passed by the District Judge, on the application filed by the revision applicants under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, and not under Order XLI, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code. But that would not make any difference &0 far as the effect of the stay order is concerned. In either case the order staying further proceeding of a pending suit does not render the court functus officio for all purposes. But that would not make any difference &0 far as the effect of the stay order is concerned. In either case the order staying further proceeding of a pending suit does not render the court functus officio for all purposes. It only prevents the Court from proceeding further with the adjudication of the dispute It does not prevent the Court from passing interlocutory orders for the purposes of keeping the proceedings alive or for preserving the subject matter of dispute or for the purpose of protecting interest of the parties to the suit. 5. In Chidambaram v. Subramaniyam1, it was held that an order referring the dispute to arbitration, passed by the Trial Court in final decree, proceeding which were stayed by an order passed in the appeal against the preliminary decree, was not without jurisdiction. In Pratapsingh v. Preetam Singh2, the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the grant of stay of suit under section 34, Arbitration Act the jurisdiction of the Court to pass appropriate orders for protecting the subject matter of suit was not excluded and an application for appointment of receiver can be granted. 6. Relying on the decision in Chidambaram v. Subramaniyam the Madhya Pradesh High Court held in the case Madanlal Agarwal v. Smt. Kamlesh Nigam3, that during the pendency of a stay order passed by the High Court in a civil revision, the trial Court may pass an order of attachment before judgment under Order 38, Rule 5, Civil Procedure Code. According to the learned Judge basic reasons for this conclusion was that the trial Court would not lose jurisdiction to deal with collateral matters which would not be steps towards further trial of the suit on merits but which would only be collateral or incidental to the suit being kept alive. According to the learned Judge basic reasons for this conclusion was that the trial Court would not lose jurisdiction to deal with collateral matters which would not be steps towards further trial of the suit on merits but which would only be collateral or incidental to the suit being kept alive. The learned Chief Justice, who spoke for the Court observed thus: "We are of the opinion that during the pendency of a stay order passed by the appellate or the revisional Court, although the trial Court or the Court below may not have any jurisdiction to proceed with the Trial of the suit on merits it can certainly take such other steps which are collateral or which may be protective or which would be for the purposes of keeping the lis alive and all such steps, in our opinion, such as any application under Order 22 Rule 3 or Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure or an application under Order 39, Rule 1 or Rule 2 or an application under Order 40, Rule 1 or an application under Order 38, Rule 5, would be maintainable in the Trial Court inspite of such stay order" . I am in respectful agreement with this view. 7. In Motiram Roshanlal Coal Co. (P. Ltd.) v. District Committee Dhanbad and others4, the Patna, High Court took a somewhat different view. In that case the suit filed by the plaintiff company against the District Board for restraining the defendant Board from constructing a pacca road in their lands, was stayed by an order passed in a revision application, arising out of some other order passed in the suit. But in spite of the stay the Trial Judge entertained an application on behalf of other defendants to direct the plaintiff company or the District Board to repair the road and appointed a commissioner for holding local inspection and report the construction of the road. This order was struck down as violative of the stay order. This decision, however, can be distinguished on facts because looking to the relief claimed in the suit, the impugned order can be said to be a step in the direction of final adjudication of the dispute. 8. This order was struck down as violative of the stay order. This decision, however, can be distinguished on facts because looking to the relief claimed in the suit, the impugned order can be said to be a step in the direction of final adjudication of the dispute. 8. In A I R 1967, Supreme Court 1386 Wanchoo J. speaking for the Court observed at page 1389 as follows: "In the case of a stay order, as it is addressed to the Court and prohibits it from proceeding further, as soon as the Court has knowledge of the order, it is bound to obey it and it does not, it acts illegally and all proceedings taken after the knowledge of the order would be a nullity". 9. In Burahnuddin v. Savitra Bai5, relying on these observations of the Supreme Court a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held as nullity the order passed by executing Court in furtherance of the execution of the decree which was stayed. The ratio of these decisions however, is not attracted in this case because the order passed by the Trial Judge cannot be considered as further proceeding in the suit. 10. In my view the order passed by the Trial Judge is not violative of the stay order and he was competent to pass it. Moreover the circumstances enumerated in the application clearly envisaged the possibility that the revision applicants may tamper with the account books of the firm. The Trial Judge, therefore, was justified in passing the impugned order. The revision application thus fails and dismissed with costs. Revision application dismissed.